DocketNumber: TC 22993, CA 5493, SC 25230; TC 29437, CA 6129, SC 25230
Judges: Unde, Tongue, Bryson, Howell
Filed Date: 10/25/1978
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
In these cases the court sustained state laws mandating certain retirement and insurance benefits for police and firefighting personnel against claims that the laws unconstitutionally infringed on the cities’ powers of self-government. 281 Or 137, 576 P2d 1204 (1978). The Cities of La Grande and Astoria filed an extensive petition for rehearing, and we set the case down for reargument. We reaffirm the constitutionality of the challenged statutes.
First. The dispute involves the meaning of the "home rule” amendments added to the Oregon Constitution in 1906, which we repeat here to avoid the inconvenience of referring back to the original opinion. Article XI, section 2, was amended to include the words emphasized here:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by the Legislative Assembly by special laws. The Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town. The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon1 . . . .
At the same time, article IV, which had earlier been amended to reserve to the people the statewide powers of initiative and referendum, was further amended to add what is now section 1(5):
The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by subsections (2) and (3) of this section are further reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and district as to all local, special and muncipal legislation of every character in or for their municipality or district. . . .
It deserves to be reemphasized that the terms of the granted powers and of the accompanying limitation need not be and are not symmetrical. Much of the argument against these statutes has proceeded as though a constitutional grant of power to one level of government necessarily carries with it a corresponding withdrawal of power from the other. That this is not so has long been a truism with respect to the relationship between the powers of Congress and the states, and it is equally true of "home rule” within a state. It is entirely possible to grant certain powers to local governments to act on their own initiative without at the same time limiting the powers of the state legislature. Indeed, as a practical matter this is essential if local government is to have any authority to legislate on its own in matters in which the state could also act, for otherwise local powers would have to be narrowly confined in order to save room for potential state legislation.
The withdrawal of power from the legislature is found in the other clause of the 1906 amendments quoted above, that "[t]he Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend, or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town.” Or Const art XI, § 2. Since the attack in the present cases is on state statutes, we deal with an issue whether the constitution denies the state the power to act, not an issue whether it authorizes local action. There is, of course, no question that La Grande and Astoria could adopt retirement or insurance programs for their employees. The only question is whether article XI, section 2, cut off the legislature’s authority to enact statewide standards for such programs.
As we noted in the original opinion, the literal text of article XI, section 2, provides no basis for the cities’ position, because their own relevant policies were not in fact stated in their city charters. 281 Or at 150. Petitioners do not purport to point to precise words in article XI, section 2, as denying the legislature’s authority to enact these laws. However, the opinion also agreed with petitioners that the limitation expressed in article XI, section 2, should not be read to hinge on whether a city chooses to place a particular policy into its charter or into some other form of
While declining to "exalt form over substance,” however, we found sense in the draftsmen’s choice of words that denied the legislature power to enact or supersede municipal charters rather than to supersede local enactments of any kind. If the latter were intended, "charter or act of incorporation” would hardly be the way to write it. But the special function of a charter or act of incorporation is that it is needed to organize the local political entity, to establish its governing organs, their selection, their powers and their limits. The charter is the local constitution. The fact that cities, like states, sometimes place merely legislative policies into their charters does not contradict this special constitutive function. "The charter is a grant of power, and the municipality possesses only those properties [sic\ which the charter confers upon it,” the court wrote in 1907, citing earlier cases for this restrictive reading of charter powers. MacDonald v. Lane, 49 Or 530, 532, 90 P 181 (1907) (City of Portland could not create an office not provided in its charter). It was against the background of this view of charter powers, granted or denied each city by legislative enactment, that the 1906 amendment withdrew this legislative control over charters and left the decisions how to structure and empower their municipal organs to the voters of each city or town.
Second. Lacking precise terms in article XI, section 2, that expressly withdraw the power of the legislature to enact these statutes, petitioners invoke the history of the provisions. Specifically, they argue that Justice Harris’s opinion in Rose v. Port of Portland, 82 Or 541, 162 P 498 (1917), which we quoted in 281 Or at 144-145, confused the explanation given for "home rule” resolutions in 1901 and 1903 with what petitioners describe as the "altogether different” version
The version originally proposed by the Legislative Assembly in 1901 and 1903, but not submitted to the voters, was almost three times the length of the one ultimately adopted, mainly because the older versión contained detailed procedures for the preparation and adoption of charters.
The argument fails to note to what this change referred. What was it that the earlier version proposed to make subject to general laws? It was the authority of a city "to frame a charter for its own government.” And, further bearing out the understanding of the function of a charter discussed above, the amendment before its shortening stated that when adopted by the voters, the charter of a city "shall become the organic law thereof.” It was precisely this "organic” or constitutive role that article XI, section 2, attributed to the charter. It was this power of each city "to frame a charter for its own government” that would have been subject to and controlled by state legislation under the first but not under the final version of the amendment. And it is these organic and constitutive powers of self-government that are safeguarded by our interpretation of the amendment.
On reargument the state maintains that article XI, section 2, was meant to prevent only special or individual laws dealing with municipal government,
In an effort to extend this principle from laws concerning city charters to a local option to escape state substantive laws, the cities argue that early
Moreover, petitioners continue this line of argument by pointing to the analogy of county "home rule” under article VI, section 10, and positing that "matters of county concern,” like "municipal legislation” under article IV, section 1(5), extends to "substantive” as well as "structural and procedural” matters. This points up the apparent misunderstanding we wish once more to lay to rest. Petitioners crash through an open door. Of course, local charters are enacted to pursue substantive objectives, not just for their own sake. As the opinion points out, it is precisely because municipalities and the legislature often enact laws "in pursuit of substantive objectives, each well within its respective authority,” that the problem of conflict can arise. 281 Or at 148.
We tried again in note 30 to "forestall possible misunderstanding” by stressing that these cases are concerned with the constitutional limitation on state legislation stated in article XI, section 2, not with the authority of local communities and voters to act on their own initiative. The limitation stated in article XI, section 2, is only that "[t]he Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town.” The opinion holds that this limitation refers to legislative interference with the political arrangements made in local charters and "charter-like” provisions but does not invalidate general social, economic, or other regulatory statutes merely because they contradict local policies. This holding concerns only the constitutional limits on the state legislature; it does not concern what may be done under local authority granted by charter, statute, or "municipal legislation” under article IV, section 1(5), as petitioners appear to fear.
Third. The petitioners and the dissent argue that the distinction between legislation invading a municipality’s "charter of government” or "organic law” and legislation for general social goals will not free the state and the cities, and ultimately this court, from making difficult legal decisions.
Petitioners propose that this weighing of "local” against "statewide” interests could be made on a record of evidence taken in trial courts, including statistics, expert testimony, and the like. The suggestion demonstrates the flaw of "balancing” rather than resolving it. This approach would make the constitutionality of a statute depend, not on what kind of laws article XI, section 2, means to withdraw from the legislature, but on the capacity of litigants in a particular case to "prove” the value of the statute to the state as compared with the value of the competing policy to the city. But such a trial record might look different in a case from La Grande from the record in a case from Astoria, and settle nothing for Eugene, or Portland, though the statute is enacted for the whole state. A law that was sustained on one record in 1978 could be attacked again on different "proof” of the competing interests offered by different parties in 1979. And the ultimate dispute is over policy, even when the facts are undisputed. Nothing in article XI, section 2, supports such an approach to a trial of competing interests before the court.
Alternatively, petitioners propose that the legislature be required to state "findings” and "reasons” for imposing a statewide policy which could be contested in a trial on judicial review. The proposal misconceives
Finally, the petition for rehearing debates only the general tenor of the opinion in this case. It does not address the question actually at issue, the validity of the retirement and insurance requirements enacted in the 1971 statute. We reaffirm the constitutional validity of the statute.
The section was further amended in 1910 to add:
[A]nd the exclusive power to license, regulate, control, or to suppress or prohibit, the sale of intoxicating liquors therein is vested in such municipality; but such municipality shall within its limits be subject to the provisions of the local option law of the State of Oregon.
The difference between these clauses with respect to the "repeal” of a charter was noted in Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, 49 Or 520, 524, 90 P 153 (1907). See McKeon v. City of Portland, 61 Or 385, 122 P 291 (1912); cf. ORS 221.610-221.660 (1915 act authorizes cities to surrender their charters and disincorporate).
See, e.g., State ex rel Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Or 203, 576 P2d 1238 (1978) (local building code). The notion of mutually exclusive state and federal powers in the economy proved disastrous to congressional power under the commerce clause in the twentieth century because state legislation had been sustained in the nineteenth century by denying that its subject was within the federal commerce power. Thus Kidd v. Pearson,
The petition also points out that, according to Rose the statement on which Rose relied for an explanation of the 1906 amendments was dated September 6, 1906, three months after the election at which the amendments were adopted. See 82 Or at 560. The cities suggest, therefore, that the statement could not be a reliable source for the purpose behind the amendments. But the 1906 date in Rose is a typographical error. The letter actually was dated September 6, 1905.
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3.
[Uf the Twenty-rirst Biennial session.»
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OK THE .VIATE OK OREGON.
Resolved h>j the senate, the house concurring:
That the following amendment to the Constitution of the State of Oregon be and the same is hereby proposed, that is to say, that section 2 of article XI of the Constitution be amended so as to read as follows:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special laws. All laws passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended, or repealed, but not so as to impair^or destrov^any vested corporate rights.
The legislative assembly, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and classification, in proportion to population of cities and towns, which laws may be altered, amended, or repealed. Cities and towns heretofore organized or incorporated mav become organized under such general laws whenever a majority of the electors voting at-a general election shall so determine, and shall organize in conformity therewith: and cities or towns heretofore^- hereafter} organized, and all charters thereof, framed or adopted by authority of this constitution, shall be subject to and controlled bv general laws. Anv citv shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to
Adopted bv the senate Februarv 14. 1001. '
C. W. FULTON,
President oi the Senate.
Concurred in bv the house Februarv 15. 1001.
L. B. REEDER,
Speaker of the House.
Adopted bv the senate January 31. 1903.
GEO. C. BROWNELL.
President of the Senate.
Concurred in bv the house Februarv 4, 1O03.
L. T. HARRIS.
[Enphasis supplied.] nearer of J Ilou-e.
SJR 3, 22nd Or Legis Ass’y, OL 1903 at 346-347. The bracketed words do not appear in the 1901 version of the resolution.
It is of no moment that the words "governmental structure,” "procedures,” or "social and other substantive policies” were not used in 1906, as the dissent argues. These are merely the words we chose to distinguish the function of a "charter of government” or "organic law” (terms which were used at that time to describe the object of article XI, section 2) from general legislation to promote social goals. The need to find a way to describe this distinction did not arise in 1901 or 1906, it arises from efforts to invoke article XI, section 2, to declare such general social legislation unconstitutional when it contradicts a local policy.
The dissent also quotes statements about "home rule” made by proponents and opponents of the further amendment that was adopted in 1910 in order to let city voters decide on prohibition or regulation of the liquor traffic under the state’s local option law rather than being bound by the vote in the county. These statements were made by private groups locked in bitter combat over prohibition and were made to win votes for or against the 1910 amendment on that issue.
Thus the Portland Oregonian editorialized shortly before the election:
The purpose of this proposed amendment is to take from the Legislature power to enact city charters, and place that power in the hands of the people of the territory to he affected by the act of incorporation. . . .
This is an effort to bring about "home rule” for cities. It is a movement based upon correct principles and aimed at needed reforms. It has the double object of relieving the Legislature of a vast amount of work that it should not be called upon to perform, and of placing in the hands of the people themselves the power to determine the fundamental law of their city government. . . .
The editorial went on to describe the abuses that were common under the system of charter enactment and amendment by legislators, including political trickery, "franchise grabbing,” and "plutocratic influences.” The Oregonian, May 28, 1906, at 6, col 2.
Apart from political abuse, relief from the voluminous work of special legislation mentioned in the editorial required a means of letting local communities take actions on their own initiative. The 1903 Regular Session of the Legislative Assembly produced 838 pages of special laws compared to 338 pages of general laws. The 23rd Legislative Assembly in 1905 enacted 1135 pages of special laws and 424 pages of general laws in a session which ran only from January 9 to February 17, 1905, the year before the "home rule” amendments were adopted.
This understanding is also shown by a pamphlet circulated by the People’s Power League in 1906 supporting adoption of the "home rule” amendments. The pamphlet stated that adoption of the amendments would give "COMPLETE HOME RULE to the voters of every county, city and town, through the local application of the initiative and referendum to all purely local business, including CITY CHARTERS to be enacted and amended by each city for itself, LOCAL LAWS AND FRANCHISES passed by the legislature, and ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND FRANCHISES passed by city councils and county courts; . . .”
In other words, the proponents of the amendments had no notion that the amendments were to withdraw the constitutional authority of the legislature to make local laws other than the authority to enact, amend, or repeal charters. They relied on the political process of the referendum to maintain local popular control over such laws.
The distinction between issues of substantive and procedural law in such legal areas as conflicts of law or retroactivity, referred to in the dissent, is not analogous. Here we distinguish between legislation setting social goals for the state and its communities, laws prescribing what is to be accomplished, from laws prescribing the organization and processes of city government which alone are "amendments” of city charters as we have
See, e.g., the discussion of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws quoted in F. Newman and S. Surrey, Legislation 590-595 (1955). See also R. Dickerson, Legislative Drafting § 9.1 (1954).