DocketNumber: CC 080202045; CA A141214; SC S058706
Citation Numbers: 261 P.3d 1, 350 Or. 686
Judges: Balmer, Durham, De Muniz Walters
Filed Date: 9/9/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This case concerns the proper application of stare decisis and requires us to decide whether Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 312 Or 337, 822 P2d 1146 (1991), is still good law. In Collins, this court held that an exclusion in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy that purported to eliminate all coverage for a claim by one insured against another insured under the same policy was unenforceable to the extent that it failed to provide the minimum coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Law (FRL), ORS 806.060 and ORS 806.070. Id. at 347. The exclusion, however, was enforceable as to any coverage beyond that statutory minimum. Id. In this case, plaintiff, Farmers Insurance Company, issued an insurance policy to defendant, Tosha Mowry, that contained an exclusion identical to the exclusion in Collins. Defendant was injured in an accident in which her friend — a permissive user and thus an insured person under the policy — was driving. Plaintiff brought this action seeking a declaration that defendant had $25,000 available in coverage under her policy — the minimum coverage required by the FRL for bodily injury to one person in any one accident. Defendant argues that her coverage is $100,000, the insurance amount stated on the declarations page of her policy. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted plaintiffs motion and denied defendant’s. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion that cited Collins. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 236 Or App 236, 234 P3d 1098 (2010). We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff issued defendant a motor vehicle liability insurance policy that provides liability coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Exclusion 12(a) of the policy, however, states that “coverage does not apply to * * * [liability for bodily injury to an insured person.” The policy defines an “insured person,” in relevant part, as “you” or “[a]ny person using your insured car.” Thus, the policy provided insurance coverage for claims made against an insured by third parties, but purported to exclude coverage for claims against an insured made by other “insured persons” under the policy, such as family members or others using the insured vehicle.
We begin by reviewing the relevant statutes and then turn to this court’s decision in Collins. Under ORS 742.450(4) (2005), amended by Or Laws 2007, ch 782, § l,
“Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle liability insurance policy under ORS 742.450, 806.080 and 806.270 may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addition to the required coverage, and such excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of * * * [ORS] 742.450 to 742.464. With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional coverage only that part of the coverage which is required by ORS 806.080*690 and 806.270 is subject to the requirements of those sections.”
Thus, an insurance policy may limit the coverage for some types of liability, including insured-versus-insured claims, to the minimum limits required by the FRL even though the policy provides greater coverage for other types of claims.
In Collins, Farmers issued a motor vehicle liability policy that was virtually identical to the policy in this case, including a liability limit of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence and an exclusion stating that “coverage does not apply to * * * [l]iability for bodily injury to an insured person.” Collins, 312 Or at 339 (boldface type omitted). The plaintiff, a family member of the insured, was injured while a passenger in the insured’s car. As a family member of the insured, the plaintiff was an insured person under the policy. Farmers notified the plaintiff that it would only provide $25,000 in coverage, the minimum amount required by the FRL. The plaintiff asserted that the absolute exclusion violated Oregon law and was therefore completely unenforceable. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to $100,000 in coverage, the full amount stated on the declarations page of the policy. Id. at 340.
After describing the relevant components of the FRL, the court stated that Oregon law implies in every motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued in the state a provision that the policy includes the minimum coverage required by ORS 742.450, ORS 806.080, and ORS 806.270. Id. at 342. “Coverage other than that required by law may be limited by any lawful exclusion.” Id. at 343. More specifically, the court stated:
“The manifest purpose of ORS 742.464 is to permit an insurer to write any other lawful coverage that the insurer wishes to write, in addition to the required coverage. Such coverage may include higher limits than those required by ORS 742.450 and 806.080. But as to such higher limits, the mandatory requirements of ORS 742.450 and 806.080 do not apply. The insurer may limit such additional coverage by any exclusion not otherwise prohibited by law.”
Id. at 342.
A dissenting opinion in Collins argued at length that the plaintiff should have had $100,000 of coverage under the policy. The dissent took issue with the majority’s interpretation of ORS 742.464. In its view, that statute required an insurance policy to first grant the minimum coverage required by the FRL before the policy could exclude excess coverage. Collins, 312 Or at 351 (Unis, J., dissenting). Because the exclusion in Collins denied all coverage for insured-versus-insured claims instead of granting the minimum required by the FRL, ORS 742.464 did not allow Farmers to exclude any excess coverage. Id. at 352. The dissent concluded:
“If the insurer wishes to exclude from excess coverage persons required * * * to be covered for the statutory minimum, it must first affirmatively grant the statutorily-required minimum coverage for those persons, ORS 742.464, and must state the limits of liability, ORS 742.450(1).”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
In this case, defendant argues that we should overrule Collins because it was wrongly decided and because Hamilton calls the reasoning of Collins into question. Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts that the principle of stare decisis prohibits this court from overruling precedent without sufficient justification, which defendant, in plaintiffs view, has not provided. Plaintiff argues that the issues raised by defendant were fully considered by the Collins court and that Hamilton does not conflict with Collins.
Because the parties disagree about how stare decisis should be applied in this case, we turn to a review of that doctrine. “[T]he principle of stare decisis dictates that this court should assume that its fully considered prior cases are correctly decided. Put another way, the principle of stare decisis means that the party seeking to change a precedent must assume responsibility for affirmatively persuading us that we should abandon that precedent.” State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282, 290, 121 P3d 613 (2005). As this court has often stated, the motivating force behind the doctrine of stare decisis is “moral and intellectual, rather than arbitrary and inflexible.” Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 54, 11 P3d 228 (2000) (quoting Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran, 203 Or 489, 528, 280 P2d 301 (1955)).
Our cases discussing stare decisis identify various considerations that this court has weighed in deciding
Before returning to the parties’ differing views on the application of stare decisis in this case, we pause to sketch briefly our approach to stare decisis in several common types of cases. In the area of constitutional interpretation, our cases emphasize that decisions “should be stable and reliable,” because the Oregon Constitution is “the fundamental
“[W]e remain willing to reconsider a previous ruling under the Oregon Constitution whenever a party presents to us a principled argument suggesting that, in an earlier decision, this court wrongly considered or wrongly decided the issue in question. We will give particular attention to arguments that either present new information as to the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue or that demonstrate some failure on the part of this court at the time of the earlier decisions to follow its usual paradigm for considering and construing the meaning of the provision in question.”
Id. at 54. See also Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 289-91, 321-22 (applying Stranahan-, rejecting effort to overturn 20-year-old precedent).
In applying the principle of stare decisis to common-law precedents, we have relied upon similar considerations, although we have articulated them somewhat differently. In G.L., for example, we listed three alternative bases, which, if affirmatively asserted by a party, would “ordinarily” cause us to reconsider a nonstatutory rule or doctrine:
“(1) that an earlier case was inadequately considered or wrong when it was decided; (2) that surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed in the earlier case; or (3) that the earlier rule was grounded in and tailored to specific factual conditions, and that some essential factual assumptions of the rule have changed.”
306 Or at 59 (citations omitted).
G.L., however, does not purport to cover all circumstances in which we will revisit common-law precedent. Rather, G.L. identifies the typical grounds for reconsidering a decision, namely where a decision was demonstrably wrong or where the statutory or factual underpinnings of a decision
This court has addressed stare decisis as it applies to statutory interpretation on a number of occasions, and not always consistently. At times we have articulated a strict version of what is often referred to as the “rule of prior interpretation.” Under that rule, “[w]hen this court interprets a statute, the interpretation becomes a part of the statute, subject only to a revision by the legislature.” State v. King, 316 Or 437, 445-46, 852 P2d 190 (1993); see also Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or 344, 350 n 6, 838 P2d 600 (1992) (same). That statement in King to the contrary notwithstanding, this court has in fact declined to follow earlier decisions interpreting a statute when it has concluded that changes to other statutes, which provide the context for the statute at issue, require reconsideration of the prior decisions, see Holcomb, 321 Or at 105, and when it has been persuaded that its earlier interpretation was seriously in error. See Severy / Wilson v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 461, 474, 245 P3d 119 (2010).
The strict application of the rule of prior construction has long been criticized as wrong in principle and unduly restrictive in practice, see State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 638-44, 932 P2d 1145 (1997) (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (critiquing rule of prior interpretation), and we take this opportunity to review and, for the reasons that follow, disavow it. The modern application of the rule first surfaced in State v. Elliott, 204 Or 460, 465, 277 P2d 754, cert den, 349 US 929 (1955) (adopting rule). When the rule was announced in Elliot, the court did not explain why (or how) an interpretation of a statute becomes part of the statute itself. Elliot simply asserted that
The rule of prior interpretation, as articulated in Missouri Athletic Club, is based on the theory of legislative acquiescence. 261 Mo at 605, 170 SW at 911. That theory posits that a judicial decision interpreting a statute becomes ratified by legislative silence and thus can only be changed by the legislature. Jack L. Landau, Some Observations about Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 Willamette L Rev 1, 18-19 (1996). Legislative acquiescence, however, is a legal fiction that assumes, usually without foundation in any particular case, that legislative silence is meant to carry a particular meaning — as relevant here, affirmation of the judicial decision at issue. Id. at 19-20. In reality, the legislature may decline to address a judicial decision for any number of reasons, none of which necessarily constitutes an endorsement of the decision’s reasoning or result; this court does not surrender its authority to reexamine a prior interpretation of a statute merely because the legislature has been silent on the issue.
In Severy / Wilson, this court articulated a less rigid approach to precedent interpreting a statute:
“Although this court makes every attempt to adhere to precedent, in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis, it has, from time to time, found an earlier interpretation of a statute to be so deficient that it has concluded that some reexamination of the prior statutory construction was appropriate.”
349 Or at 474. In Severy / Wilson, this court overruled a precedent that was “internally inconsistent” and “ignore[d] the words of the statute.” Id. Similarly, in Holcomb, this court
Thus, our more recent cases discussing stare decisis have, appropriately, abjured the strict rule of prior interpretation articulated in King and have instead relied upon considerations similar to those that we have used in examining constitutional and common-law precedents. That does not mean that we perceive no difference between our task in interpreting a statute and our task in interpreting a constitutional provision or a rule of common law. On the contrary, as discussed above, Stranahan makes the point that, because this court is the ultimate interpreter of state constitutional provisions — subject only to constitutional amendment by the people — if we have erred in interpreting a constitutional provision, there is no one else to correct the error. That is not true in the interpretation of statutes. Our responsibility in statutory interpretation is to “pursue the intention of the legislature, if possible.” ORS 174.020(1)(a). After we have interpreted a statute, the legislature’s constitutional role allows it to make any change or adjustment in the statutory scheme that it deems appropriate, given this court’s construction of the statute (and, of course, subject to constitutional limitations). The legislature can — and often does — amend a statute that this court has interpreted to clarify or change the statute or otherwise to advance the policy objectives that the legislature favors.
For those reasons, we disavow the inflexible rule of prior interpretation as set out in cases such as Elliott and King. In applying stare decisis to decisions construing statutes, we will rely upon the same considerations we do in constitutional and common-law cases, although, as noted, the weight given to particular considerations will not necessarily be the same.
As the discussion above indicates, the application of stare decisis is not mechanistic. Rather, stare decisis is a prudential doctrine that is defined by the competing needs for
At the same time, this court’s obligation when interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions and when formulating the common law is to reach what we determine to be the correct result in each case. If a party can demonstrate that we failed in that obligation and erred in deciding a case, because we were not presented with an important argument or failed to apply our usual framework for decision or adequately analyze the controlling issue, we are willing to reconsider the earlier case. See Stranahan, 331 Or at 54 (so stating). Similarly, this court is willing to reconsider cases when the legal or factual context has changed in such a way as to seriously undermine the reasoning or result of earlier cases. See Holcomb, 321 Or at 105.
Collins, in fact, relied on both common-law contract principles and statutory interpretation. See Collins, 312 Or at 341 (“The only question before us concerns the effect of exclusion 11(a). * * * ORS 742.464 answers the question.”). In Collins, as here, there was no question as to the amount of coverage required by statute; the parties agreed that Farmers had to provide at least $25,000 in coverage for the insured’s injuries, the FRL minimum. The issue was whether the exclusion was valid as to the additional coverage that the policy provided for some claims. Stated differently, the parties and the court agreed that ORS 742.464 allows an insurance policy to limit coverage to the minimum required by the FRL for insured-versus-insured claims. The question was whether the contractual exclusion had achieved that result.
Whether we consider Collins to be a common-law case or one of statutory interpretation makes little difference here. The sole issue in this case is whether the rule announced in Collins — that a contractual exclusion for insured-versus-insured liability is effective beyond the minimum limit set by the FRL — should be overruled. Defendant’s basic argument is that Collins should be overruled because the case was wrong when decided. Defendant does not argue that other considerations, such as a change in the legal context or a change in the factual underpinnings of Collins, support reconsidering and overturning that decision. In fact, the Insurance Code and the FRL did not change in any relevant
In arguing that Collins was wrongly decided, defendant contends that the Collins majority impermissibly rewrote the insurance policy in that case to grant the coverage required by the FRL when the policy expressly excluded such coverage. Defendant asserts that, under ORS 742.464, an insurer may exclude additional coverage for insured-versus-insured claims only if the policy first grants at least the required minimum coverage for those claims. However, Collins explicitly considered and rejected that argument. See 312 Or at 343, 343 n 3. Moreover, as noted, defendant does not argue that the statutory or factual context of this issue has changed, so that Collins, even if not erroneous when decided, should no longer be followed. Rather, by raising only issues that were considered and rejected in Collins, defendant actually demonstrates that the Collins majority did in fact consider the arguments that she raises and that those arguments were unpersuasive to a majority of this court.
We assume that fully considered prior cases were correctly decided, Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 290, and defendant raises no argument that was not rejected by the majority in Collins. As such, there is no principled reason for this court to overrule Collins on the ground that the majority was wrong. See G.L., 306 Or at 59 (“judicial fashion or personal policy preference” are not “sufficient grounds” to reverse well established precedent). Were we writing on a blank slate, we might agree with defendant that the Collins dissent had the better argument, but unless we ignore the doctrine of stare decisis, that prospect is an insufficient basis for overruling Collins.
In the area of commercial transactions, we have noted that stability and predictability strongly support adherence to precedent. Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Or 213, 239, 88 P2d 808 (1939). That is so because parties rely on the rules of law announced by this court to structure their
We turn to defendant’s contention that, despite Collins having decided the precise issue presented in this case, we should rule in defendant’s favor because of this court’s more recent decision in Hamilton, 332 Or 20. In that case, following an accident, the insured filed a claim against the driver, a family member, seeking the full coverage stated on the declarations page of the policy. North Pacific responded that only $25,000, the FRL minimum, was available in liability coverage under the policy. The policy contained a provision that North Pacific claimed was intended to exclude excess coverage for insured-versus-insured claims beyond the minimum amount required by the FRL. Id. at 22-23. The exclusion provided, “We do not provide Liability Coverage for any person * * * [f]or bodily injury or property damage to you or any family member to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits of liability required by the Oregon financial responsibility law.” Id. at 23 (boldface type omitted). That phrasing was an attempt by North Pacific to embody the holding in Collins. Id. at 26.
This court, however, distinguished the exclusion in Hamilton from the one in Collins, “which was worded as a simple, absolute exclusion from coverage.” Id. at 27. The Hamilton exclusion operated only “to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits required” by the FRL. Id. at 23. Hamilton thus required the insured to look to the FRL to divine the circumstances in which the exclusion applied and the attendant coverage. Even assuming that an insured was sufficiently sophisticated to locate the FRL in the Oregon Revised Statutes, the words used by
Following the methodology for interpreting insurance contracts set out in Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469, 836 P2d 703 (1992), the court construed the ambiguous exclusion against North Pacific and held, as a matter of insurance contract law, that the exclusion was not enforceable to any degree. Accordingly, that provision was eliminated from the policy, and North Pacific was liable for the full coverage listed on the declarations page. Hamilton, 332 Or at 29.
The parties agree that Hamilton did not expressly overrule Collins. Indeed, Hamilton cited Collins as establishing “that an insurance company may write an insurance policy that limits coverage” for insured-versus-insured claims to the FRL minimum, id., and it contrasted the exclusion in Collins, which did just that, with the ineffective exclusion in Hamilton. Id. at 27. Thus, at the time this court decided Hamilton, it did not view the two cases as in conflict. Despite that fact, defendant argues that Collins cannot be reconciled with the court’s approach in Hamilton. In defendant’s view, in both cases, “the basic problem is that the insured is confused and misled.”
Defendant’s argument hangs on the notion that it is inconsistent for this court to enforce an exclusion that did not accurately reflect Oregon law but to refuse to enforce an
Even if we were to agree that Hamilton provides the proper approach to examining the exclusion in this case, such an inquiry simply leads back to the question posed by Collins, namely, the effect of an absolute exclusion for insured-versus-insured claims. As a matter of contract law, exclusion 12(a)
The proponent of overturning precedent bears the burden of demonstrating why prior case law should be abandoned. Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 290. As noted, Collins and Hamilton are not directly in conflict, and defendant advanced no argument that this court has not previously considered for reaching a different result from that in Collins. Defendant failed to carry the burden for overturning a fully considered precedent of this court.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
In 2007, the legislature amended ORS 742.450 by adding subsection (8): “Every motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued for delivery in this state shall contain a provision that provides liability coverage for each family member of the insured residing in the same household as the insured in an amount equal to the amount of liability coverage purchased by the insured.” Aside from that amendment, which was not in effect at the time of the accident in this case, the legislature has not altered the provisions of any statute relevant to this case since Collins. Subsequent references to ORS 742.450 are to the 2005 version of the statute.
Unlike the policy in this case, the policy in Collins included a provision that “[plolicy terms which conflict with laws of Oregon are hereby amended to conform to such laws.” 312 Or at 343. The court, however, noted that that provision is merely an embodiment of ORS 742.038(2), which provides:
“Any insurance policy issued and otherwise valid which contains any condition, omission or provision not in compliance with the Insurance Code, shall not be thereby rendered invalid hut shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had such policy been in full compliance with the Insurance Code.”
Thus, the court in Collins would have construed the policy to comply with Oregon law even had the policy not included the provision mentioned above. 312 Or at 343. See also Fleming v. United Services Automobile Assn., 329 Or 449, 459, 988 P2d 378 (1999) (ORS 742.038(2) “requires courts to construe an otherwise valid insurance policy to bring the policy into full compliance with the Insurance Code.”).
We do not undertake in this opinion to identify an exhaustive list of “considerations” that may be appropriate in determining whether a particular precedent should be followed or abandoned. The circumstances in which stare decisis applies are simply too varied. We note, however, that in addition to the considerations discussed in this opinion, this court has inquired into the age of the precedent at issue and the extent to which it had been relied upon in other cases. See Ciancanelli, 339 Or at 290-91 (distinguishing Stranahan, where precedent being reconsidered was less than 10 years old and had been little relied upon, with precedent challenged there, which was more than 20 years old and had been followed in many cases). We also acknowledge that the “degree” of the error in the earlier case and the extent of any resulting injustice or harm have both played roles, although impossible to quantify, in our cases. See Severy / Wilson v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 461, 474, 245 P3d 119 (2010) (an earlier interpretation of statute may “be so deficient” that reexamination is appropriate) (emphasis added); Safeway Stores v. State Bd. Agriculture, 198 Or 43, 80, 255 P2d 564 (1953) (court may depart from erroneous precedents which result in “grievous wrong” or are “injurious or unjust in their operation”) (quoting 21 CJS, Courts, § 193, 322).
As Justice Brandéis put it, “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law he settled than that it be settled right.” Brunet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US 393, 406, 52 S Ct 443, 76 L Ed 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting.)
Although parties seeking to overturn an adverse precedent often argue that the case they challenge was erroneous at the time it was decided, that is not always necessary. Particularly in cases involving common-law rules, an earlier precedent may not have been “wrong” when it was decided, but changes in other statutes and the evolution of the common law may lead this court to conclude that the earlier
Again, exclusion 12(a) states, “coverage does not apply to * * * [l]iability for bodily injury to an insured person.”