Lee v. Crater Lake National Park Co.

COSHOW, J.

We have carefully examined the evidence bearing upon the issue presented by this appeal. There is no controversy involving questions of law between the parties here. Our opinion is that the evidence preponderates in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on the precise question presented. Defendant admitted, through its own witnesses, that it had taken over the actual management of the transportation at the beginning of the season in 1924. The season at Crater Lake begins July 1st and ends September 30th. Under the contract plaintiff was, to a large degree, at the mercy of defendant. The contract was prepared by defendant and, after some conversation between defendant and plaintiff, was signed as prepared. Plaintiff does not claim that he did not understand the contract, but under such circum stances defendant should be held strictly to performance in good faith of its covenants and undertakings in the contract. When defendant took over the management of transportation it made plaintiff starter at Crater Lake. It was plaintiff’s duty to get the passengers to the stage and start the automobiles on their journey. Defendant claims that this was no part of the duties of plaintiff under his contract to conduct the transportation but was an extra job given him when defendant took over the actual control of the transportation. Defendant’s managing director, however, testified that of the salary paid plaintiff for serving as starter, $100 was paid by the transportation company, which was plaintiff, and $50 by defendant. We think that if there was any need at all for a starter that that work was a part of the transportation. It may be that the starting of the automobiles from the Lodge at the Lake was also a great convenience to defendant. It was an accommodation to the guests at the Lodge. Plaintiff was discharged by defendant about the first of August, 1924, after one month’s service as starter.

The contract between plaintiff and defendant required defendant to pay plaintiff the amount it had earned by transporting passengers on the tenth day of the month following the month the services were rendered. Defendant received the money for the transportation and kept the accounts. Defendant failed and refused to pay plaintiff the amount due him on the tenth day of August for the services rendered July, 1924. Plaintiff was unable to pay his installment due August 15, 1924, to the intervener and that resulted in the foreclosure and sale of the automobiles for a fraction of their value. Defendant knew that plaintiff had purchased the automobiles for this busi ness from intervener and that plaintiff was depending upon the proceeds of the services rendered by him to defendant to pay for said automobiles. Defendant itself had, during the season of 1923, paid to intervener for plaintiff a part of the amount earned by plaintiff during that season. The failure and refusal of defendant to pay the amount due plaintiff was a breach of the contract. By taking over the transportation and its refusal to permit plaintiff to participate in the management of the transportation de-' fendant exercised its option under the contract and was thereby bound to pay to plaintiff the reasonable value of said automobiles.

Plaintiff demanded judgment for $22,290.47. He stated three different causes of action in his complaint. He was awarded judgment for $4,500 which the Circuit Court found to be the value of his interest in the automobiles at the time they were sold under the foreclosure decrees. He was also awarded the amount due him for transportation during the month of July, 1924, but this amount was directed to be paid to the intervener, Portland Motor Car Company. He was not allowed anything for loss of profits under his contract.

We think the judgment a just one and the decree is affirmed.

Aeeirmed.

Band, C. J., and Bean and Belt, JJ., concur.