Short v. D. R. B. Logging Co.

HAY, J.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff, in August, 1946, was the owner and driver of a logging truck and trailer. Defendant is a Michigan corporation, and, at that time, was engaged in logging near Wolf Creek, in Lane County. Another logging concern, known as Markham Logging Company, was also logging in the same vicinity. Each maintained and operated at its respective log landing a derrick for loading logs on trucks, commonly called a loading pole, which consists of a vertical spar or mast, having a boom attached at its lower end, and carrying a hoisting tackle. The loading poles were situated between six and seven hundred feet distant from each other. The two concerns used the same logging road for hauling logs, but were entirely separate organizations.

Plaintiff had had many years of experience in various branches of the lumbering industry, and had been engaged in log hauling for more than five years immediately prior to August 14, 1946. On that date, he entered into contractual arrangements to haul logs for Markham Logging Company from its loading pole to different sawmills in or about Eugene. One Fred Hockley was at that time driving a logging truck for another Markham contract hauler. Plaintiff and Hockley had each hauled two loads of logs for Markham on that day, and were returning late in the afternoon to the Markham landing to pick up a third load. Before they arrived there, however, the loading crew had quit for the day, and they met the crew on the road on their way home. Some days previously, Mr. J. E. Markham, owner of Markham Logging Company, had told the manager of defendant company that the Markham logs had been “loaded out,” that they were going to have “extra” trucks on hand, and that he did not know what to do with them. Defendant’s manager thereupon told him: “Send them down our way; we can use them; we need the trucks.” When plaintiff and Hockley met the Markham loading crew on the road, Mr. J. E. Markham, who was with the crew, told them that if they would go on up the hill they could load out at the defendant’s loading pole. Hockley and plaintiff accordingly drove their trucks to the defendant’s landing, with Hockley’s truck in the lead. When plaintiff arrived at defendant’s loading pole, Hockley’s truck was already on the landing and in process of being loaded. Plaintiff was accompanied by his son, Donald, and both of them got out of plaintiff’s truck and walked onto the landing to observe the loading operation. The loading was in charge of defendant’s employee, George Myers, who operated the donkey engine which powered the hoisting apparatus. He was being assisted by another employee, Howard Pry, as head loader. The load which was in process of being loaded upon Hockley’s truck consisted of a single large log. The donkey engine was standing a little way behind and to one side of the loading pole. The log had been lifted from a log pile and placed upon Hockley’s truck and trailer. Fry, the head loader, just before the log was lifted from the log pile, had observed plaintiff and his son approaching the landing, and had shouted a warning to them, but plaintiff did not hear him. Hockley had left the cab of his truck, and was standing to the left of the cab upon a small pile of logs which was lying parallel to the truck and trailer. Plaintiff and his son ranged alongside of Hockley upon the same pile of logs. “One-log” loads are secured to the logging truck by means of a binding chain or chains passed around the log and the truck body. In addition thereto, metal wedges, called “cheese blocks,” which are attached to the body of the truck by adjustable chains, are used to keep the log in place. The cheese blocks were adjusted by the head loader, and the log was then lowered into place. Thereupon the loading line was slackened, and the sling, by means of which the log had been attached to the loading tongs, slipped off the tongs and fell to the ground. The log then rested upon the truck and trailer bunks and between the cheese blocks, although one of the trailer cheese blocks required further adjustment.

It was the duty of the truck driver to secure the load with the binding chain. Hockley, who had not had very much experience in log hauling and had handled few one-log loads, asked plaintiff’s advice as to the best method of binding the load. Fry, the head loader, was at that time at the opposite side of the trailer from where plaintiff was standing, and was concealed from plaintiff’s view. Without warning to plaintiff, Fry took hold of the chain which controlled the trailer cheese block which needed to be adjusted and pulled it, for the purpose of making the adjustment. While he was doing this, the rear end of the log suddenly slid over the cheese block and fell to the ground, striking the end of the little pile of logs upon the opposite end of which plaintiff, his son, and Hockley were standing. The impact violently dislodged the logs, and threw the three men into the air. Hockley and plaintiff’s son were not hurt thereby, but plaintiff received severe and permanent injuries.

When the log started to slide from the trailer, Fry shouted a warning, but the suddenness of the catastrophe made the warning of no avail.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant to recover damages for his injuries. He charged defendant with negligence as follows: (1) In failing to provide a safe and adequate place for loading the truck, in that the landing was unlevel and the ground sloping; (2) in placing a large “one-load” log on the truck and trailer without first ascertaining whether the cheese blocks had been securely fastened; (3) in attempting to center a “one-load” log upon the trailer by knocking out the cheese block on the downhill side after the loading line and loading tongs had been removed from the log; (4) in attempting to center a “one-load” log upon the truck and trailer without the use of tongs, loading lines and donkey; (5) in knocking out the cheese block on the downhill side of a “one-log” loaded trailer, after the loading tongs and line had been removed from such load, being aware that plaintiff was standing on one end of a pile of logs, the other end of which was likely to be struck by the log if it rolled or slid off the trailer, and without giving plaintiff any warning; and (6) in attempting to shift and center the “one-load” log upon the truck and trailer without first attaching a binder chain about the log.

Defendant made general denial, and affirmatively pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff in that: (1) He negligently entered upon premises possessed and controlled by defendant in immediate proximity to the loading operation; (2) he failed and neglected to look out for, observe and stay at a safe distance from defendant’s loading machinery and equipment; (3) although he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that the loading operation was in progress, he failed and neglected to stay and remain a safe distance therefrom.

The cause was tried by the court and a jury. After defendant had rested, it moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor on the ground that plaintiff had not sustained any of the allegations of negligence set forth in his complaint, or furnished any evidence at all in support thereof, and on the further ground that it affirmatively appeared from plaintiff’s own case that he was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. The court allowed the motion, and directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. This was done, and judgment for defendant was entered, accordingly, from which judgment plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The principal assignments of error are directed against the allowance of the motion for a directed verdict. Other assignments challenge the court’s ruling upon objections to a question propounded to an expert witness, and its rejection of an offer of proof.

In passing formally upon the motion, the court confined itself to ruling upon the second ground, viz., that it affirmatively appeared from plaintiff’s own case that he was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. However, the record shows that while the motion was being argued the trial judge made specific reference to five of the six specifications of negligence alleged in the complaint, and indicated that he was of the opinion that sufficient evidence had not been adduced to carry the case to the jury upon those specifications. Our own initial reading of the testimony tended to confirm the trial court’s view as to the particular specifications which he had discussed, and even as to the one remaining specification. We felt that, if in fact the evidence failed to establish any of the specifications of negligence, consideration of the second ground of the motion would be unnecessary. We have accordingly considered carefully the plaintiff’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and are of the opinion that it was not sufficient to sustain any of the specifications of negligence charged against defendant.

We shall now consider the specifications separately. There was no evidence whatever that the landing was unlevel and the ground sloping; in fact the evidence was to the contrary. The charge of negligence in placing the log upon the truck and trailer without first ascertaining whether the cheese blocks had been securely fastened, was contradicted by evidence which showed that, before a log is finally lowered into' place, the loader adjusts the cheese blocks as nearly as he is able to estimate or judge of where they should be to receive the log, but that readjustment frequently is necessary after the log is in place. The charge of attempting to center the log upon the trailer by knocking out the cheese block on the downhill side after the loading line and loading tongs had been removed, was not sustained by the evidence, which showed that the landing was' level, and that therefore there was no downhill side. The allegation that the defendant attempted to center the log upon the truck and trailer without the use of tongs, loading lines and donkey was not sustained, there having been no evidence whatever that the defendant attempted to “center” the log or to move it in any manner after it was lowered into place. The allegation that defendant knocked out the cheese block on the downhill side of the load after the loading tongs and line had been removed, being aware that plaintiff was standing on one end of a pile of logs, the other end of which was likely to be struck by the log if it rolled or slid off the trailer, and without giving plaintiff any warning, was contradicted, first, by the fact that, as stated, there was no evidence that there was any downhill side of the landing; second, by lack of evidence that defendant knew that plaintiff was standing on the end of the pile of small logs at the time when the log slid from the trailer; and third, by lack of evidence that defendant knocked out any cheese block. The evidence was that defendant’s employee was endeavoring to adjust a cheese block by tightening it rather than “knocking it out”. Finally, there was no evidence to sustain the charge that defendant attempted to shift and center the log upon the truck and trailer without first attaching the binder chain about the log. As we have said, the evidence did not show that defendant attempted to “center” or move the log at all. Moreover, the evidence was that the placing of a binder chain about the log was the duty of the log hauler, who, in this instance, was an employee of an independent contractor who had no connection with defendant, and that the practice is not to attach the chain until after the truck has been removed from the landing.

Our conclusion being, therefore, that plaintiff failed to prove his case, it follows that, in directing a verdict for the defendant, the trial court did not err. We need not pass upon the correctness of the court’s ruling on the second ground of the motion, viz., that it affirmatively appeared from plaintiff’s own case that he was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. We do not wish it to be inferred, however, that we believe that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion upon the second ground. The extent of our finding is simply that plaintiff’s failure of proof renders it unnecessary for us to express an opinion upon the ruling on the other ground of the motion. We do not reach the remaining errors assigned.

Husband, Fort & Johnson, of Eugene, for the petition. Evans S Thwing, of Eugene, contra.

The judgment is affirmed.