Stewart v. State

FOLEY, J.

Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing Ms application for a writ of habeas corpus. lie sought the writ in order to prevent his extradition to the State of Mississippi where he had escaped from prison.

Mississippi initiated the extradition proceedings, asMng that petitioner be returned to that state to serve the remainder of a 20-year sentence resulting from Ms conviction for manslaughter, plus a sentence of 18 months for one escape from prison and in addition a sentence of one year for a subsequent escape from prison.

On September 18, 1969, after demand had been made by the Governor of Mississippi, the Governor of Oregon signed a Warrant of Arrest and Extradition authorizing petitioner’s return to Mississippi. Three days prior to this, petitioner had filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, seeMng release from the custody of the sheriff of Marion County, Oregon, who now detains Mm pursuant to the governor’s warrant. Petitioner’s application alleges cruel and inhuman treatment in the Mississippi prison, and claims that if petitioner is returned there he will be murdered by trusty-inmates of the prison. The circuit court held a hearing on the application for the writ, but ruled that the only proper question for its determination was whether the petitioner was the same person named in the extradition warrant. Petitioner concedes he is the same person designated in the warrant.

As pointed out by petitioner in his brief, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Storms v. Lambert, 224 Or 189, 355 P2d 766 (1960), held that the only issue to be decided in an extradition proceeding is the validity of the prisoner’s arrest. The court reiterated that it would not look behind the warrant or inquire into the guilt or innocence of the fugitive. In Fisco v. Clark, 243 Or 466, 414 P2d 331 (1966), the petitioner, accused of murder in Louisiana, was in custody pursuant to a governor’s warrant of extradition He sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he would be denied the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if he were extradited to Louisiana The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that it would not entertain an imputation that the courts of the demanding state would disregard the rights of the accused but would instead assume that the demanding state would accord to the accused all the rights and privileges to which he was entitled. More recently, in Mays v. Shields, 251 Or 168, 444 P2d 949 (1968), the court held, in a hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that it is not the function of the Oregon court to examine the motives or possible unlawful purpose of those seeking extradition.

This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Oregon. Its holdings preclude any inquiry by this court such as that proposed by petitioner here. Oregon, the asylum state, will not attempt to sit in judgment in this case on the criminal processes and penal administration of its sister state. However, it may well be that other avenues of relief are open to petitioner.

The right to extradition is provided by the United States Constitution, Art IV, § 2, which reads in part:

“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”

A Comment in 74 Yale L J 78, entitled Extradition Habeas Corpus, discusses the conflict between two constitutional principles, “ ‘one promoting efficiency and comity between states [IT.S. Const. Art. IV, § 2], [and] the other protecting fundamental rights of the individual [XJ.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1].’ ” The following portion of that discussion throws light on the role of state courts in extradition proceedings.

* * Considerations of interstate comity suggest that this duty is more appropriately filled by the federal courts. These considerations, embodied in the extradition clause and the spirit of full faith and credit, should preclude a state court from sitting in judgment upon the criminal processes of sister states. The federal system is the source of the comity obligation of the states, however, and federal courts are not within the matrix of interstate comity. This is not to say that the federal courts may ignore considerations of interstate comity when rendering decisions which affect relations between states. But as national courts they are in a position to accommodate the demands of comity between the states to other national considerations —in this case, to the protection of individual constitutional rights. Furthermore, in extradition cases it is a federally established procedure — for which the federal courts should have a special responsibility — which is the source of the potential danger to individual rights. * * 74 Yale L J at 124.

Affirmed.