DocketNumber: 85-3451-C-2 85-3452-C-2 CA A41480 (Control) CA A41596
Citation Numbers: 770 P.2d 58, 95 Or. App. 240
Judges: Buttler, Deits, Richardson, Riggs, Rossman
Filed Date: 2/22/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 8/7/2023
In these consolidated cases, defendants, husband and wife, appeal their convictions for manufacture and possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. They contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence seized from their property pursuant to a search warrant based on information obtained without a warrant by police officers who were riding in a helicopter looking for marijuana that they had heard was growing on defendants’ property. The question is whether that information was obtained in violation of defendants’ privacy rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Because the discovery of the marijuana by the police was the result of “a purposive intrusion into defendant’s privacy,” State v. Slowikowski, 307 Or 19, 27, 761 P2d 1315 (1988), for the express purpose of seeking out the contraband on defendants’ property, and was not merely an incidental observation made during a routine flight from one place to another, it was a search within the meaning of Article I, section 9. Further, because the search was conducted without a warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence so obtained must be suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse.
Defendants live on approximately 14 acres of rural property. The front portion of the rectangularly shaped property is pasture land. The house is situated behind the pasture land on a flat bluff of approximately two acres. The remaining acreage is on an incline to the rear of the house and abuts BLM land. The property is enclosed from behind the house to the BLM line by a four-foot high animal fence topped with two strands of barbed wire. A barn and a poultry pen are in the enclosed area behind the house. There are “no trespassing” signs surrounding the property. The marijuana at issue here, 17 plants approximately five feet high, was growing in plastic buckets about 300 feet from the house. Most of the plants were under two large trees, 45 to 50 feet high, in a generally wooded area. The other plants were nearby among smaller trees. Defendant husband testified that he had placed the plants among the trees so that they would not be seen from the sides of his property or from the air.
Acting on a tip that marijuana was growing in the area of defendants’ property, two sheriffs deputies chartered a helicopter with a pilot to scout the area. When the helicopter
Defendants challenge the accuracy of the affidavit on which the search warrant was based as to the altitude of the helicopter at the time of the deputies’ observations and also argue generally that there was no probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The challenge to the accuracy of the affidavit is in the nature of a motion to controvert and, pursuant to ORS 133.693(2), defendants have the burden to establish its inaccuracy. ORS 133.693(3). The affidavit stated that the helicopter was at 500 feet.
Defendants’ general challenge is that the aerial observations constituted a warrantless search that violated their privacy rights and that, therefore, under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment,
The point is that the coming of aircraft and their use in commerce has not done away with the privacy right of property owners in and about their property, although it has reduced the extent to which they may exert property rights in the airspace above their land. Generally, people must put up with aircraft flying over their property above the minimum altitudes fixed by the FAA;
It is one thing for an aircraft to fly over property at a safe altitude en route to a destination at a normal operating speed or at a speed that is necessary to maintain flight, during which some observations might be made of what is on the ground.
In 1859, when Article I, section 9, was adopted, there can be no doubt that occupying the airspace over a person’s property was a trespass, an unprivileged entry, although the framers could not then have foreseen that persons would be able to put themselves in that position. In Campbell, the court pointed out that, since 1859,
“the government’s ability to scrutinize the affairs of ‘the people’ has been enhanced by technological and organizational developments that could not have been foreseen then. * * * In*246 deciding whether government practices that make use of these developments are searches, we must decide whether the practice, if engaged in wholly at the discretion of the government, will significantly impair ‘the people’s’ freedom from scrutiny, for the protection of that freedom is the principle that underlies the prohibition on ‘unreasonable searches’ set forth in Article I, section 9.” 306 Or at 171.
There can be no serious doubt that aircraft are technological enhancements that permit man to travel in the airspace and, in the case of helicopters, to hover above the ground. Although Deits, J., dissenting, agrees that aircraft, including helicopters, are technological enhancements, she concludes that the use of a helicopter in this case did not violate defendants’ privacy rights, apparently because the police were in the airspace where they had the right to be and their observations “took only a short time.” Therefore, she concludes, there was no search, in spite of the facts that the police were “surveilling” defendants’ property for marijuana and that the aircraft continued to circle and to hover at lower altitudes to “confirm” the officer’s observation. She fails to explain why, if the police may hover over the property for a “short time” to search for marijuana, they may not do it for a longer time and for any reason. To rely on the legality of the officers’ observation post in the air is no more valid than it was for the state to rely on the legality of the officers’ observation post in State v. Campbell, supra, from which the officers received signals from the electronic transmitter they had installed on the defendant’s automobile.
As Professor Amsterdam points out in “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,” 58 Minn L Rev, 349, 403 (1974), the ultimate question is “whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.” In our view, the hovering or circling of aircraft at low elevations, when engaged in for the purpose of finding out what is on, or what is happening on, a person’s property, would diminish the privacy and freedom of citizens to a point that is inconsistent with the free and open society envisioned by the framers of Oregon’s Constitution. It would be a “significant impairment of the people’s freedom from scrutiny.” State v. Campbell, supra, 306 Or at 170.
The gist of Judge Rossman’s dissenting opinion is that, because searches from the air are effective as an “investigatory tool in the fight against illegal drugs,” 95 Or App at 251, we should overlook constitutional technicalities. If that were the test, we should hesitate to invalidate warrantless or general searches and wiretapping, as well as numerous other effective investigatory tools that our constitution prohibits. Judicial intervention, however, is “the instrument by which a free society imposes on itself the seldom welcome, sometimes dangerous, always indispensable restraints that keep it free.” Amsterdam, supra, 58 Minn L Rev at 353.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
There is evidence that there was an initial observation, after which the helicopter circled and descended. However, the information in the affidavit purports not to rely on any observations made after the initial one.
The officers’ conduct was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Riley, 488 US _, 109 S Ct 693, 102 L Ed 2d 835 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 US 210, 106 S Ct 1809, 90 L Ed 2d 210 (1986). Both of those cases were decided under the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis that originated with Katz v. United States, 389 US 576, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), which has been rejected in analyzing privacy rights under the Oregon Constitution. State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 759 P2d 1040 (1988); compare Oliver v. United States, 466 US 214, 104 S Ct 1735, 80 L Ed 2d 214 (1984).
Defendants argue that their case can be factually distinguished from three aerial observation cases relied on by the state, in which we held that the evidence need not be suppressed: State v. Farkes, 71 Or App 155, 691 P2d 489 (1984), rev den 298 Or 704 (1985); State v. Bruno, 68 Or App 827, 683 P2d 1383, rev den 297 Or 824 (1984); State
The complete phrase is: “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coeleum” — which, “taken literally, means that he who has the soil owns upward unto heaven, and by analogy, downward to perdition.” Prosser and Keeton, Law of Torts 79 § 13 (5th ed 1984). See Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., 186 NY 486, 79 NE 716 (1906).
FAA regulations, designed for safety, do not appear to impose a specific altitude restriction on helicopters. See 14 CFR § 91.79(d) (1986). It would be strange, indeed, to define one’s privacy rights under Article I, section 9, by administrative regulations. That is particularly true when, as with helicopters, there is no minimum altitude imposed.
Under some circumstances, the occupier of land must manifest his desire for privacy. State v. Dixson/Digby, supra. Here, defendants had done all that can be expected of them by posting “no trespassing” signs around their property. It would seem silly to require that they display large signs facing the heavens to notify persons in the airspace not to snoop.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Rossman treats this case as if the officers were merely flying over defendants’ property and happened to see marijuana plants. That is not so. They had received information that defendants were growing marijuana and were engaged in a purposeful, determined effort, without a warrant, to find it on defendants’ property.