Demaray v. Dept. of Environmental Quality

LEESON, J.

Plaintiff brought tort claims against the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and several DEQ employees arising out of his discharge from employment with DEQ. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, to determine whether defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221, 223, 851 P2d 556 (1993). We reverse in part and remand.

Plaintiff worked for DEQ for nearly 15 years. During his tenure, he was a vocal critic, both publicly and by way of intra-office memoranda, of DEQ’s alleged failure to follow the state’s environmental laws.

In 1988, plaintiff became an “open burning coordinator.” One of his duties was to send a “Notice of Nóncompliance” (NON) to violators of open burning regulations. He was required to submit all NONs and enforcement referrals for review by his supervisor, defendant Davis, before sendingthem out. In early January, 1990, plaintiff gave seven draft NONs to Davis. Davis edited the drafts in a manner that eliminated references to criminal penalties for noncompliance and revised language dealing with enforcement. He returned them to plaintiff with a memorandum instructing plaintiff not to refer to criminal penalties in subsequent NONs, because DEQ is not a criminal enforcement agency, and instructing plaintiff not to state that a violation would be referred to the enforcement section of DEQ unless he truly intended to make such a referral.

Plaintiff did not send out the NONs as edited by Davis. Instead, he sent Davis a memorandum explaining that he was holding the NONs because he believed that Davis’ changes disregarded the specific language of the rules governing DEQ. On January 22, 1990, Davis met with plaintiff to discuss his failure to send out the revised NONs. At that meeting, Davis again instructed plaintiff not to recite criminal penalties in NONs. Two days later, Davis again met with plaintiff and took him to talk to the Enforcement Section manager, Wood. Wood told plaintiff that plaintiff was misinterpreting the rules, and suggested that they talk to the principal drafter of the rules if plaintiff still had questions. The principal drafter informed plaintiff that Davis’ interpretation was correct, and that plaintiffs interpretation was incorrect.

Following that meeting, plaintiff and Davis returned to Davis’ office, where plaintiff persisted in questioning Davis about whether he was required to send out the revised NONs as edited. At one point, Davis shrugged his shoulders and threw up his hands. Plaintiff returned to his own office.

Several days later, plaintiff submitted new drafts of the seven NONs to Davis. Four of them still contained the language that Davis had objected to concerning referral to the enforcement section of DEQ, and one contained language concerning criminal penalties. On February 20, 1990, plaintiff was suspended, and, on March 30, he was dismissed. The stated reason was “insubordination, misconduct, and/or other unfitness to render effective service.”

Plaintiff filed these claims for (1) violation of his federal constitutional rights, 42 USC § 1983; (2) an unlawful employment practice (whistleblowing), ORS 659.510; and (3) wrongful discharge. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all three claims, on several grounds. The trial court granted the motion “in its entirety.”

As an initial matter, plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been denied, because evidence not conforming to the requirements of ORCP 47D was attached to the motion. He properly objected below that some of the statements in Davis’ affidavit do not appear to be based on Davis’ personal knowledge, and that a document attached to the motion was not sworn or certified. We have disregarded the evidence that was improperly attached to the motion. However, the mere fact that evidence not conforming to the requirements of ORCP 47D was attached to the motion does not in itself mean that the trial court erred by granting the motion. The question remains whether defendants showed, through the properly presented evidence, that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We first address whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendants as to plaintiffs claim under 42 USC § 1983. Section 1983 provides that a “person” who violates the federal constitutional rights of another while acting under color of state law is liable for redress of that injury.¹A “person,” i.e., one who may be liable under that statute, does not include the state, its agencies or its officials who are sued in their official capacities for retrospective damages. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 US 58, 109 S Ct 2304, 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989); Anderson v. Dept. of Rev., 313 Or 1, 828 P2d 1001 (1992). A state official is, however, a “person” when sued in that capacity for prospective injunctive relief. Hafer v. Melo, 502 US _, 112 S Ct 358, 116 L Ed 2d 301, 308 (1991).

Asa matter of law, DEQ is not a person under section 1983, and the trial court did not err by granting it summary judgment on that claim. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra.

The individually named defendants contend similarly that they are not “persons” for purposes of plaintiffs section 1983 claim, because the claim is against them in their official capacities.

Plaintiff does not expressly state whether this action is against the individuals in their official or their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, supra, 502 US at __. (116 L Ed 2d at 309.)² Several courts have held that, in the absence of a specific contrary pleading, an action against an official is presumed to be an official-capacity action. See, e.g., Wells v. Brown, 891 F2d 591, 592 (6th Cir 1989). We need not decide whether to adopt that rule, however, because it is apparent from the relief sought thai plaintiffs section 1983 claim is against the individual defendants in their official capacities.

Although in his state law tort claims plaintiff specifically seeks damages, in his section 1983 claim he does not. That claim seeks reinstatement and other employment-related prospective injunctive relief that defendants could provide only in their official capacities.

Although the individually named defendants are correct that this is an official-capacity action, they are nonetheless “persons” within the meaning of section 1983, because the claim is for prospective injunctive relief. Hafer v. Melo, supra. Moreover, because plaintiffs claim is against the individually named defendants in their official capacities, the personal immunities that they assert are inapplicable. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 US 159, 166-67, 105 S Ct 3099, 87 L Ed 2d 114 (1985).

We turn to whether summary judgment was appropriate on the merits of plaintiffs section 1983 claim. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that, during the course of his employment with DEQ, he

“has made a practice of refusing to violate state statute[s] and administrative regulation[s] as [they] relate to his job performance, * * * has disclosed those violations at public meetings of the Environmental Quality Commission, which is the policy-establishingbody for the DEQ, and has made his views known in public and to the press. Defendant DEQ’s disciplinary actions up to, and including, the present dismissal have been motivated primarily by defendants’ desire to punish plaintiff for these disclosures and for his efforts to strictly enforce the state’s environmental statutes and regulations.”

Plaintiff contends that he was discharged for speaking on matters of public concern, and that his discharge violated his First Amendment rights. Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138, 103 S Ct 1684, 75 L Ed 2d 708 (1983). Defendants argue that plaintiff was discharged for insubordination, not for his speech. However, in the light of our standard of review, we must resolve that factual issue in plaintiffs favor, and must accept as true that plaintiff was discharged for his speech.

Determination of whether plaintiffs discharge violated his First Amendment rights requires a two-part inquiry:

“First, we must determine whether [his speech] involved a matter of public concern. Second, if the speech was in that category, we must apply the Pickering [v. Board of Education, 391 US 563, 88 S Ct 1731, 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968)] balancing test[.]” Robson v. Klamath County Board of Health, 105 Or App 213, 217, 804 P2d 1187, mod 109 Or App 242, 818 P2d 990 (1991), rev den 314 Or 176 (1992). (Citations omitted.)

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment, because the speech that plaintiff claims brought about his discharge did not relate to a matter of public concern. “A matter of public concern” is

“a matter that fairly relates to political, social or other aspects of the community. It does not include speech relating to purely personal or internal administrative matters.” Robson v. Klamath County Board of Health, supra, 105 Or App at 218.

Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged as punishment for his public criticism of DEQ’s supposed failure to follow the law, and for “debating” with his supervisors in an attempt to force DEQ to follow the law, as plaintiff understood it.

In City of Portland v. Shockey, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den _ US _, 113 S Ct 1813 (1993), the court concluded that the plaintiffs speech was not on a matter of public concern. In arriving at that conclusion, it placed great emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff “was not challenging any act of his supervisors as illegal.” 313 Or at 430. In this case, that is precisely what plaintiff contends he was doing. We agree with plaintiff that even intra-office debate over whether DEQ is properly enforcing the state’s environmental statutes is speech on a matter of public concern.

Defendants also argue that, even if plaintiffs speech did address matters of public concern, the speech at issue does not survive the Pickering balancing test. The factors to be considered under Pickering are: (1) the need for maintaining discipline and harmony in the agency; (2) the need for confidentiality of agency affairs; (3) the need to ensure that the employee’s ability to perform duties has not been diminished as a result of the employee having made unfounded statements; and (4) the need to maintain close personal working relationships requiring personal loyalty and confidence. Robson v. Klamath County Board of Health, supra, 105 Or App at 217 n 6. Under that test, “[t]he State bears [the] burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds,” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 US 378, 388, 107 S Ct 2891, 97 L Ed 2d 315 (1987). Whether defendants have carried that burden is a question for the court.

There is evidence that plaintiffs insubordinate refusal to follow instructions did disrupt harmony at the agency and erode his supervisors’ confidence in him. However, plaintiff contends that he was fired for engaging in speech critical of his supervisors, not for his insubordinate refusal to follow instructions. Because we are reviewing a summary judgment for defendants, we must assume that plaintiff was discharged, as he contends, for his speech, rather than for his insubordination. While plaintiffs insubordination may have disrupted the agency, the evidence does not suggest that plaintiffs speech on matters of public concern, by itself, whether public or intra-office, caused disruption.

Moreover, a critical question bearing on the third factor under the Pickering balance is the degree to which plaintiffs disagreement with his supervisors about the law was unfounded. Under that factor, if his view of the law was well founded, we would give less weight to defendants’ competing interest in ensuring that plaintiffs ability to perform his duties is not diminished by having made unfounded statements. If plaintiffs view of the law was not well founded, then defendants’ competing interest would have greater significance.

It is impossible to determine, on the summary judgment record before us, whether plaintiffs view of the requirements of the law was well founded. For example, there is no indication of what statute or regulation plaintiff believes his supervisors required him to violate. Defendants merely point out that plaintiff has not provided that information. Under Pickering, defendants bear the burden of justifying the discharge, Rankin v. McPherson, supra, and therefore were obligated to provide it themselves. They do not contend that they lack sufficient knowledge to do so.

It bears repeating that we are constrained to assume that plaintiff was not discharged for his insubordination, but for engaging in protected speech. The true reason for plaintiff s discharge remains a material factual issue that must be left for trial. Because defendants have failed to carry their burden of justifying the discharge, assuming that plaintiff was fired for his speech, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983 against the individually named defendants in their official capacities.

We turn now to plaintiffs state law claims, which are asserted against all defendants. We first address whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the individually named defendants on grounds of immunity.

ORS 30.265(1) provides, in part:

“The sole cause of action for any tort of officers, employees or agents of a public body acting within the scope of their employment or duties and eligible for representation and indemnification under ORS 30.285 or 30.287 shall be an action against the public body only.”

Representation or indemnification is available if the claim alleges a tort arising out of an alleged act or omission in the performance of duty. ORS 30.285(1), (3).

It appears from plaintiffs complaint that the individually named defendants were acting at all relevant times within the scope of their employment. Therefore, those claims must be “against the public body only.” ORS 30.265(7). The trial court did not err by granting the individually named defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs state law claims.

DEQ claims immunity under another provision of ORS 30.265:

“(3) Every public body and its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties * * * are immune from liability for:

CC% ‡ ‡

“(c) Any claim based upon the performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused.”

Discretionary immunity applies to

“decisions involving the making of policy, but not to routine decisions made by employees in the course of their day-to-day activities, even though the decision involves a choice among two or more courses of action.” Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Or 291, 296, 797 P2d 1027 (1990).

A decision to discharge a mid-level employee is not a “decision involving the making of policy.” DEQ is not entitled to discretionary immunity for that action.

We therefore address the merits of plaintiffs state law claims against DEQ, beginning with the claim for wrongful discharge. DEQ did not argue below, and it does not argue on appeal, that it is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of that claim. It was, therefore, error to grant summary judgment on that claim.

Finally, we address the merits of plaintiffs claim for whistleblowing. ORS 659.510 provides:

“(1) * * * no public employer shall:

a* * * * *

“(b) * * * take or threaten to take disciplinary action against any employee for disclosure of any information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of:

“(A) A violation of any federal or state law, rule or regulation by the state, agency or political subdivision[.]”

Plaintiff presented evidence that he was discharged for disclosing information he reasonably believed was evidence of a violation of a statute or regulation by a state agency. Defendants presented evidence to the contrary, thus creating a factual issue for trial. Given the factual dispute, the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the whistleblowing claim.

In summary, as to plaintiffs section 1983 claim, DEQ is not a “person” subject to liability under that statute, and the trial court did not err by granting it summary judgment. The individually named defendants are “persons” for purposes of plaintiffs section 1983 claim, and they have not shown that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court erred by granting them summary judgment on that claim.

As to plaintiffs state law claims, the complaint establishes the state law tort immunity of the individually named defendants. The trial court did not err by granting them summary judgment on plaintiffs state law claims. However, DEQ is not immune from liability for plaintiffs state law tort claims, and it has not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court erred by granting it summary judgment on those claims.

Reversed and remanded as to plaintiffs section 1983 claim against the individually named defendants, and as to plaintiffs state law tort claims against DEQ; otherwise affirmed.

1 42 USC § 1983 provides, in relevant part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

2 In Hafer, the court noted that

“[i]t is obviously preferable for the plaintiff to be specific in the first instance [about the capacity in which an official is being sued] to avoid ambiguity.” 502 US at _ n _, 116 L Ed 2d at 308 n* (quoting the Third Circuit’s opinion in the same case, 912 F2d 628, 636 n 7).