DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 256
Citation Numbers: 249 Pa. 187, 94 A. 744, 1915 Pa. LEXIS 697
Judges: Elkin, Fbazeb, Frazer, Mestrezat, Moschzisker, Potter
Filed Date: 4/19/1915
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
Opinion by
All assignments of error are fatally defective.. The first, which is to the entry of judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, fails to quote the motion for the rule, or the request for binding instructions for defendant. “The assignment of error is therefore not complete or self-sustaining. To make it so it should set out the point refused, the motion or rule for judgment and the order of the court below overruling the motion.” Merritt v. Poli, 236 Pa. 170.
The second assignment embraces two sentences from the opinion of the court directing judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. The opinion of the court is not assignable for error: Condron v. Penna. R. R. Co., 233 Pa. 197.
The third assignment states: “The court erred- in entering judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto.” As this assignment fails to quote the record it is not self-sustaining: Ridgway v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 244 Pa. 282.
The case might very well be disposed of on the ground that no alleged error is properly assigned and that the record is therefore not before the court on appeal. We however waive these errors.
Plaintiff was a “rougher” in defendant’s rolling mill,
The assignments of error attempt to raise two questions, first, whether or not there was sufficient evidence of negligence on part of defendant to require a submission of the case-to the jury; and, second, whether the court was justified in saying as matter of law that plaintiff was negligent. In determining these questions, it is necessary to view the evidence in the most favorable
Plaintiff testified that he had finished his day’s work just prior to the accident and started or was about to start towards the wash-room, when the superintendent called to him: “Hurry up, George, I want to get this mill started; get them riggings on and throw the feed roller shield on.” He told the foreman he could not put on the guard because the rollers were not tightened up and on the witness stand said the man who was then engaged in adjusting the machine would have to take it off again in order to complete the work. As a further reason for not putting on the shield he testified at some length, that it was dangerous to do it while the machinery was in motion, as the guard might catch a coupling or the sprocket and chain, and result in the witness being injured; that it was not so dangerous to hang up the rigging; but these reasons were not given at the time. He also testified it was usual to put the guard on before the machinery started up, but they often had to put it on when the machinery was in motion. The superintendent and other witnesses for defendant contradicted plaintiff’s testimony—the former, however, admitted that the chain which ran around the sprocket under the guard would break as often as two or three times a week. After the evidence was all •in the jury were permitted to visit the place of the accident to inspect the mill with the machinery both motionless and in operation.
It is apparent from the evidence quoted that the operation of this mill was accompanied with more or less ■ danger. Defendant performed its duty by providing a guard for a dangerous exposed part of the mill. Nor was defendant negligent in removing the guard while changing the machinery. The change could not have been made without its removal. The Act of May 2,1905, P. L 352, by Sec. 11, requiring guards to be provided,
The first question raised by this record is whether defendant was negligent in not properly replacing the guard. It is contended by plaintiff that it was the duty of the superintendent, who was directly in charge of the work, to see that this guard was put in place before the machinery was started and failure to do so was negligence, especially as plaintiff had called his attention to it. It is further contended that the order of the superintendent to hurry, and his failure to countermand the order after the absence of the guard was brought to his attention, was sufficient to relieve plaintiff from the exercise of the same judgment and caution which he would have been obliged to use under ordinary conditions (Lee v. Woolsey, 109 Pa. 124), and that plaintiff was within the rule that where a servant, in obediénce to the requirements of the master, incurs the risk of dangers which are not such as to threaten immediate injury, he is permitted to rely on the judgment of his superior and is not to be held liable for contributory negligence if an injury results: Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. 505; Reese v. Clark, 198 Pa. 312.
The difficulty with this contention is that plaintiff has not brought himself within the application of the rule stated. He was told to do two things; he called the superintendent’s attention to the fact that one of the things specified was not ready to be done; he did not give as an excuse for not performing it that it was dangerous. Had he put the shield on before attempting to hang the riggings the accident could not have happened. The excuse given for not putting on the shield was that certain other work needed to be done and if the shield were put on it would have to be taken off again. This was not a sufficient reason to justify plaintiff in ignoring the instructions given him by the superintendent. The accident was therefore the result of his dis
The assignments of error are overruled and judgment affirmed.