DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 188
Judges: Brien, Consideration, Eagen, Jones, Manderino, Pomeroy, Roberts, Toot
Filed Date: 4/23/1974
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Opinion by
Appellant, Emma Fortune, on June 16, 1971, in a nonjury trial, was convicted of the illegal possession of narcotic drugs. Act of September 26, 1961, P. L. 1664, §4(q), 35 P.S. §780-4(q). Post-verdict motions were denied and the appellant was sentenced to a term of not more than five years imprisonment. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, of sentence per curiam with a dissenting opinion by Judge Spaulding, in which Judge Montgomery and Judge Hoffman joined. Commonwealth v. Fortune, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 264, 289 A. 2d 729 (1972). This appeal followed.
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient in law to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged, we must, after a verdict of guilty, accept as true all of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, upon which the trier of facts could properly have based the verdict. Commonwealth v. Malone, 444 Pa. 397, 381 A. 2d 866 (1971); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 275 A. 2d 46 (1971). Considered in that light, the evidence, and the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, do not establish that the appellant was guilty of the illegal possession of narcotic drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.
The only evidence against the appellant was the testimony of the arresting officer, the only witness at the trial. His testimony established the following facts. On the afternoon of June 15, 1970, the arresting officer and several other officers, pursuant to a search warrant, went to 2350 North Carlisle Street, a two-story private home. The first floor of the home consisted of three rooms, a living room, a kitchen and a rear shed, each next to the other in a straight line going away from and perpendicular to the street. The living room had a large window on the street side of the room. The front door of the home was near the front window and opened into the living room. The stairs to the second floor were to the right of the front door as one enters the residence. The rear portion of the living room was used as a dining area.
When the police arrived, they saw a woman (not the appellant) seated at the large living room window. The window was open and the police, from outside the resi
When the illegal possession of contraband is charged, the evidence must establish that the appellant had a conscious dominion over the contraband. Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A. 2d 119 (1971). The illegal possession of narcotic drugs is a crime which “by its very nature is unique to the individual. By definition, the possessor is the only person who could commit this crime. Guilt by association ... is unacceptable.” Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 427, 263 A. 2d 463, 466 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A. 2d 476 (1971). The presence of one person in a group of people at the scene “is not of critical import in drug possession cases.” Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 427, 263 A. 2d 463, 466
In this case, no narcotic drugs were found on the person of the appellant. None were found anywhere else on the premises. Those that were found were not in a place normally accessible only to a resident of a home. The drugs were found in plain view, strewn on the kitchen floor. Four persons were on the first floor and had more immediate access to the kitchen than did the appellant who was upstairs when the police broke in “within seconds” after their arrival. There is no evidence that the appellant had any knowledge of the presence of the drugs in her home prior to the arrival of the police. The appellant’s residency in the home does not establish any such knowledge. We cannot assume that a resident of a home, where guests are present, knows of the full contents of the premises. The appellant’s remark, “Don’t lock me up,” is at best, equivocal as to whether the appellant had any prior knowledge that drugs were on the premises. The record is silent concerning the verbal context, if any, in which the remark was made. The record does not indicate what prompted the remark. The appellant’s remark, made after the police officers broke down her front door and entered her home, was as consistent with innocence as with guilt.
Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom, did not
The order of the Superior Court and the judgment of sentence are reversed and the appellant is ordered discharged.
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