DocketNumber: Appeals, Nos. 25 and 26
Judges: Frazer, Kephart, Moschzisker, Sadler, Schaefer, Simpson, Sloan, Walling
Filed Date: 1/3/1922
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Opinion by
Judgments had been recovered against plaintiffs, Lena Hartzell and John H. Hartzell, mother and son. These judgments were assigned to defendants, who caused executions to issue on them. Two farms, one belonging to the mother and the other to the son, with the personal property thereon, were sold at the resulting sheriff’s sales and purchased by defendants. Subse
The facts shown on the trial fully warranted the conclusions of the chancellor and the remedial decrees resulting therefrom. It was established that, following the execution, another of Mrs. Hartzell’s sons arranged with a bank to lend him the money necessary to liquidate the judgments against his mother and brother; when this was made known to defendant Whitmore, he advised that the arrangement should not be consummated, that he and defendant Kahle would buy in the property and hold it for the benefit of plaintiffs until they could raise the money to pay the indebtedness,— they, defendants, in the meantime, applying the proceeds of any property sold by them to the reduction of their claims.
On the day of, and preceding the first of, the sheriff’s sales, both defendants were at Mrs. Hartzell’s farm, and Whitmore told her that he would purchase all the property, real and personal, at the sheriff’s sales for her and her son John, that the personal property would remain on the farms and, when he and Kahle were paid with interest, the farms and other property would be returned to her and her son. Whitmore made similar statements to John prior to the sale and the arrangement was repeated in the presence of the other defendant, Kahle. It was proven that at the sheriff’s sales Whitmore dissuaded other persons from bidding, stating he was buying for the benefit of the defendants in the executions, and, as a consequence, he purchased everything sold at prices greatly below real values, except some of John’s
Under the facts here appearing it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable to permit defendants, by deception, through which they procured appellee’s property at a sum far below its real value, to covinously profit. They must now make good their undertaking to return it upon being paid their debt and interest. So long ago as 1829, in a case tried before Chief Justice Gibson at nisi prius (Brown v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle *408), we laid down the rule that parol declarations, made by a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, that he was bidding for another, are admissible to establish a trust for the person for whom the purchaser declared he was bidding. It was there said, “To......allow him to hold the land under such circumstances would be supporting a breach of trust and a fraud in law.” ■ In Cook v. Cook, 69 Pa. 443, we said, “Now it is perfectly clear that Phillip purchased [at sheriff’s sale] for John and his conduct at the
Tbe learned chancellor who beard these cases correctly determined them and bis decree in each is affirmed at tbe cost of appellants.