Commonwealth v. Bridges

OPINION

O’BRIEN, Justice.

Appellant, Alphonso Bridges, was tried by a judge sitting without a jury and was found guilty of murder of the third degree for the beating-stabbing death of Gerald Flowers. Post-verdict motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than two nor more than ten years in a state correctional institution. This appeal followed.

The facts surrounding this appeal are as follows. On January 20, 1975, James Gaddy and Daniel Lee, members of the “Clang Gang,” solicited the decedent to buy a bottle of wine for them. This group proceeded to a state liquor store at Stenton and Ogontz Avenues in Philadelphia. Flowers entered the store while Gaddy and Lee remained outside. Before Flowers could buy the bottle of wine, members of “Sommerville,” a rival gang, approached Gaddy and Lee. Both Gaddy and Lee urged Flowers to hurry, but these urgings went unheeded. The Sommerville Gang attacked Gaddy and Lee, during which attack Lee was stabbed.

After escaping from the Sommerville attack, Gaddy and Lee returned to a store located at 67th and Ogontz Avenue and telephoned for medical assistance for Lee. Gaddy and Lee decided that Flowers had delayed his departure from the state store in order to set them up for the Sommerville attack. Gaddy promised Lee that he would get Flowers. Upon leaving the store, Gaddy met four other members of the Clang Gang, appellant, Mark Savage, Miguel Garcia and Bernis Shelton. Gaddy informed the other gang members about the incident and then stated: “We’re going to get him, now, going to go up and get him.” The five then proceeded to search for Gerald Flowers. The Clang members encountered Flowers at 66th and Ogontz. Gaddy interrogated Flowers as to why he had delayed his departure from the state store and thus caused Lee’s stabbing by the Sommerville gang. Flowers denied prolonging his stay in the store for the purpose of aiding the Sommerville gang to attack. This explanation was unsatisfactory to the Clang members. Flowers was then knocked down and all five individuals proceeded to punch and kick Flowers about the head and stomach. During the altercation Garcia pulled a knife and stabbed Flowers. The Clang gang was then frightened away from the scene by the arrival of a mail truck. Flowers died shortly thereafter.

Appellant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he should be vicariously liable under § 306 of the Crimes Code for the death of Gerald Flowers. We do not agree.

Section 306 of the Crimes Code provides in pertinent part:

“(a) General rule. — A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.

“(b) Conduct of another. — A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

“(1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;

“(2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the offense; or

“(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.

“(c) Accomplice defined. — A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:

“(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he :

“(i) solicit such other person to commit it; or

“(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

“(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.

“(d) Culpability of accomplice. — When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 306(c) imputes criminal responsibility to a person who aids, agrees or attempts to aid a person or a group in the planning and/or commission of the offense if such aid, agreement or attempt is done with the “intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.” See Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515, 351 A.2d 214 (1976); Commonwealth v. Waters, 463 Pa. 465, 345 A.2d 613 (1975); Commonwealth v. Leach, 455 Pa. 448, 317 A.2d 293 (1974).

Subsection (d) of § 306 of the Crimes Code, supra, limits the culpability of accomplices in crimes having a “particular result” as an element of that offense. In order to impose criminal liability on a person as an accomplice for a crime that has as an element a particular result, such person must act with the same culpability that would render a person acting as principal criminally responsible for the act.

In the instant case, appellant was convicted of murder of the third degree.

In Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 23-24, 334 A.2d 610, 613 (1975), this court, in discussing the type and quantity of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction for murder of the second degree under the old Crimes Code, now murder of the third degree, stated:

“ ‘To sustain a conviction of murder of either degree, the evidence must establish that the killing was committed with malice, Commonwealth v. McFadden, 448 Pa. 277, 292 A.2d 324 (1972).’ Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 510, 318 A.2d 716, 717 (1974). ‘[Malice] consists either of an express intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or of a “ ‘wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty’ ” indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A.2d 911 (1963).’ Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 175, 242 A.2d 237, 240-41 (1968). See Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra. ‘Legal malice may be inferred and found from the attending circumstances of the act resulting in death, [citations omitted.]

“ ‘Malice may be inferred from the use of a gun upon a vital part of the body, and the finder of fact is not required to ignore this inference merely because the defendant testifies that he did not intend to take a person’s life. Commonwealth v. Gidaro, 363 Pa. 472, 70 A.2d 359 (1950).’ Commonwealth v. Robinson, 452 Pa. 316, 323, 305 A.2d 354, 358 (1973). ...”

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,¹ and applying both the definition of murder of the third degree and the provisions of § 306 of the Crimes Code, supra, we are of the opinion that the Commonwealth has sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was an accomplice in the homicide of Gerald Flowers. Appellant agreed with four other gang members to get Flowers, they approached decedent and punched and kicked Flowers about the head and stomach. The requisite malice can be inferred from such “reckless” conduct. A factfinder could infer malice from the circumstances of the beating, and he is free to disregard appellant’s denial that he knew that Garcia had a knife.

Appellant next argues that there was no causal connection between Flowers’ death by stabbing and appellant’s conduct. Appellant misperceives the imposition of liability by § 306 of the Crimes Code. Section 306 clearly places criminal responsibility on a person who aids another person in the commission of a crime. The other person may be the actual perpetrator or murderer, but if a person with intent of promoting or facilitating that person’s act aids that person, he is criminally responsible.

An accomplice’s conduct does not have to result in and of itself in the criminal offense, but rather an accomplice’s conduct must, with the intent to promote or facilitate, aid one whose conduct does causally result in the criminal offense. In the instant case the evidence is clearly sufficient to show that appellant’s conduct was with the intent to promote the malicious, reckless and wanton attack on Gerald Flowers.

Appellant next argues that the court below erred in failing to suppress his confession because of noncompliance with this court’s juvenile confession doctrine. See Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975). We do not reach the merits of appellant’s argument because we are of opinion that if it was error to admit appellant’s confession, it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant took the stand and reiterated his prior statement given to the police.

In Commonwealth v. Hart, 471 Pa. 271, 274, 370 A.2d 298, 300 (1977), this court, in citing Commonwealth v. Cummings, 466 Pa. 332, 353 A.2d 381 (1976), stated:

“ ‘. . . This court has consistently held that when a defendant takes the stand and reiterates the factual narrative contained in a confession claimed to be invalid— whether for constitutional infirmities or because of violation of Rule 130, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S. (1975 Pamphlet)— the admission into evidence of the alleged illegal formal confession, if error at all, is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 331 A.2d 193 (1975); Commonwealth v. Brittain, 455 Pa. 562, 317 A.2d 219 (1974).’ ”²

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

JONES, former C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. NIX, J., files a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which MANDERINO, J., joins. MANDERINO, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . Commonwealth v. Young, 446 Pa. 122, 123, 285 A.2d 499, 500 (1971).

2 . The instant case is factually distinguishable from Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). In Harrison, the United States Supreme Court found that the use of a constitutionally defective confession “impelled” the Defendant in that case to take the witness stand after his defense counsel stated that his client would invoke his Fifth Amendment right. In the instant case, appellant’s defense was one that he did not have the requisite intent necessary for imposition of criminal responsibility in connection with Flowers’ death. This record is devoid of any fact showing any impulsion on the appellant to testify by the use of his confession.