Commonwealth v. Johnson, C., Aplt.

[J-3-2014]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 680 CAP
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence
: entered on 10/04/2012* (post-sentence
: motions denied 02/13/2013) in the Court of
v. : Common Pleas Criminal Division of Adams
: County at No. CP-01-CR-0001180-2010.
:
CHRISTOPHER LYNN JOHNSON, : *The Trial Court entered an order granting
: motion to reinstate appeal rights nunc pro
Appellant : tunc on 04/16/2013.
:
: ARGUED: March 11, 2014
:
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS DECIDED: December 30, 2014
This is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence of death following the
conviction of Appellant Christopher Lynn Johnson (“Appellant”) on one count of
first-degree murder 1 and related charges 2 entered in the Adams County Court of
Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501.
2 Related charges were Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or
transfer firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, Firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.
C.S. § 6106; and Possessing instruments of crime, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
The record reveals that on the night of November 11, 2010, Officer David Grove, a
Deputy Wildlife Conservation Officer of the Pennsylvania Game Commission, was
patrolling the area near Gettysburg National Military Park in Freedom Township, Adams
County when he informed Adams County 911 center at 10:32 p.m. that he had
encountered a vehicle “spotlighting”3 just across from the Battlefield. N.T. 9/24/12 at 56.
According to the 911 operator who testified at trial, Officer Grove reported seconds before
10:34 p.m. that he was prepared to stop the vehicle. At just after 10:35 p.m., he
transmitted the license plate number of the stopped pick-up truck, which was registered to
Appellant. At just before 10:37 p.m., Officer Grove stated that the driver and passenger
were out of the pickup truck and he was awaiting assistance before proceeding further.
The next transmission the 911 center would receive came from responding Officer
Daniel Barbagello, who, at seconds before 10:39 p.m., called “officer down, officer down.”
N.T. at 59. Officer Barbagello detected no pulse when he examined Officer Grove, who
had been shot three times, including a fatal shot to the back of the neck.
For the six hours leading up to that tragic shooting, 27 year-old Appellant and his
19 year-old friend Ryan Laumann had been drinking beer and driving Appellant’s pick-up
truck in the area looking for deer to shoot. N.T. 479-515. Earlier that afternoon,
Laumann had returned home from work at about 4:00 p.m. to find Appellant waiting there
with the odor of an alcohol called “99 Bananas” on his breath. N.T. at 476. Laumann
perceived Appellant to be “walking fine, talking fine,” though he “seemed to be maybe a
3 “Spotlighting” is a term denoting the sighting of deer or other wildlife at night with the aid
of a high powered spotlight.
[J-3-2014] - 2
little tipsy like buzzed a little bit. He was kind of giggly, more or less just kind of giggled at
the smallest little things a little bit.” N.T. at 477, 478. Laumann, a licensed hunter,
brought his compound bow with him and rode passenger as Appellant drove capably, in
Laumann’s opinion, for the approximately five minute drive to the Johnson’s hunting cabin
off Orrtanna Road. N.T. at 479-480.
After drinking a beer or two, the two men shot Laumann’s compound bow, and
Appellant’s crossbow and .22 long rifle with a scope to make sure they were still “sighted
in.” N.T. at 480. They walked along the tree line and climbed up into their tree stand, a
three to four foot wide landing accessible by an 18-step, leaning metal ladder, N.T. at
488. Lauman carried his compound bow up the ladder while Appellant made his way up
the ladder carrying his crossbow without any problem. N.T. at 489. The two sat on the
tree stand until dark without any safety restraints, drank beer, and watched for deer. N.T.
at 480. Over the course of their time there, Lauman saw Appellant drink six or seven
cans from a 12-pack of Bud Light while he had two or three. N.T. at 484, 490. Another
source of beer available that night was a small stock of cans kept in the creek, though
Laumann did not state definitively whether Appellant drank any from that stock. N.T. at
492-93. Laumann was “pretty sure,” but not certain, that all empties were thrown into the
bed of the pick-up truck. N.T. at 493. At dark, the men climbed down from the tree stand
and walked back to the cabin, and again, Laumann saw nothing about Appellant to
indicate he was having difficulty with his balance. N.T. at 491. Other than the moment
Appellant quickly went back into the cabin before boarding the pick-up and leaving, the
two men were together the entire time. N.T. at 484.
[J-3-2014] - 3
Appellant drove the two to Ross Orchard, where they began spotlighting for deer.
N.T. at 494-95. Appellant had no problem negotiating the orchard’s roads, which
Laumann described as “just little dirt lanes wide enough for a vehicle” and “a little bumpy
from time to time[,]” with one hand on the wheel while simultaneously holding a spotlight
out the driver’s side window with the other, Laumann testified. N.T. at 498. The two
spotted a number of deer without any attempt to hunt, and then left the orchard. They
drove along local roads, turning frequently, went across a bridge, down a stone lane, and
across a creek until they arrived at Red Rock Road. N.T. at 500. Laumann witnessed
Appellant drink “a few” more beers from the Bud Light 12-pack during this time, but noted
that Appellant negotiated a stretch of road where the two had gotten stuck only ten days
earlier. N.T. at 503.
Appellant stopped the pick-up when his spotlight shone upon a doe. He leaned
out the window and over the roof and continued to aim the light directly on a doe
positioned 20 to 25 yards away in a field along the passenger side as Laumann registered
a strike just behind the deer’s left shoulder with his compound bow. N.T. at 503, 505.
The two did not retrieve the deer, opting instead to give it time to die. N.T. at 507.
Appellant drove further along Red Rock Road about a few hundred yards when he
spotted a deer in a field on the driver’s side. N.T. at 507. Saying he wanted the deer, he
backed up into a driveway to change directions on Red Rock Road. He regained sight of
the deer and shone a light on it while Laumann pointed the .22 long rifle outside the
passenger side window and fired, but he missed. Appellant grabbed the rifle from his
position in the driver’s seat and leaned across the console to poke his body out the
passenger window while still holding the spotlight with his left hand. He then braced the
[J-3-2014] - 4
rifle between his right arm and torso and fired twice at the deer, causing it to stumble and
fall. N.T. at 507-512. On cross examination, Laumann confirmed that Appellant, whom
he described as an “average shot,” would have used his right hand to pull the trigger,
swing the oval lever beneath the trigger down to discharge the shell and back up to load
the next shell into place, and then pull the trigger to take the second shot. N.T. at 566-67.
Appellant drove off, leaving the deer for later retrieval, and turned down nearby
Schriver Road when he and Laumann noticed headlights appear from behind. N.T. at
516. Laumann said he believed it was “DNR”4 and Appellant replied “Do you think?” as
they saw blue and red overhead lights activated. N.T. at 516. Appellant continued to
drive around a bend and pulled over alongside the road near pine trees and roadside
brush. N.T. at 517. On cross-examination, Laumann insisted Appellant pulled over
immediately, at the first safe opportunity, upon seeing the overhead lights. N.T. at 576.
Before their encounter with Officer Grove would begin, Laumann worried aloud
that they were in "a lot of trouble" for shooting the deer, to which Appellant replied "[d]on't
worry, I got you, but I'm not going back to jail." N.T. at 518. Appellant said this in a
"normal tone like he was being serious, but [Laumann] did not take it as threatening...like
he was going to harm anybody."N.T. at 518.
They remained seated as Officer Grove addressed them by loudspeaker from his
patrol SUV. N.T. at 517. He ordered Appellant to turn off the engine and drop the keys
out of the driver’s side window, and Appellant complied. N.T. at 517-18. Officer Grove
then directed Appellant to lean his arm outside the driver’s side window, open the driver’s
4 Presumably, Laumann used the DNR acronym for “Department of Natural Resources,”
though when asked to specify he said “Game Officer.” N.T. at 517.
[J-3-2014] - 5
side door using the exterior handle, step outside the vehicle, close the door, and stand
with his hands atop the vehicle. Again, Appellant complied. N.T. at 518.
When Officer Grove asked if there were any passengers in the vehicle, Appellant
nodded, and Officer Grove gave Laumann the same instructions for exiting and placing
his hands on the vehicle alongside Appellant. N.T. at 519-520. After ordering the men to
remain still at that time, Officer Grove remained in his vehicle for about one minute. He
asked if there were weapons in the car and, if so, where, and Appellant answered there
were weapons in the back seat of the cab. N.T. at 522.
It was at this time Appellant whispered to Laumann that he had a .45 on his side.
N.T. at 521. Laumann warned there was nothing he could do about it and that it would be
discovered and taken away. N.T. at 521. Officer Grove then ordered Appellant to place
his hands on his head and walk backwards towards the patrol car. Appellant was able to
comply. N.T. at 522, 579. Officer Grove approached Appellant and placed a handcuff on
him, prompting Appellant to yell "What did I do? Why am I being arrested? N.T. at 523-24.
Officer Grove gave no answer and Appellant began to resist. Officer Grove’s voice rose,
Laumann testified, as he issued four or five commands during the struggle for Appellant
to get down on the ground. The next thing Laumann heard was the sound of gunshots,
and Laumann dropped to the ground behind the truck and lost sight of the encounter. N.T.
at 525-26. When he peeked for a second, Laumann saw Appellant standing in a
backward leaning posture and firing at least three more shots in rapid succession with the
gun in his right hand and right arm fully extended. N.T. at 527, 530, 531, 581. Laumann
screamed Appellant's name and then everything went silent.
When Laumann looked up, he saw Appellant rise from a lying position, run for his
truck, and stumble and fall while yelling "I'm hit, I'm hit." N.T. at 533. Appellant reached
around on the ground near the driver's side of his vehicle and found his keys where he
[J-3-2014] - 6
discarded them minutes before as instructed. N.T. at 535. Laumann stood up and was
ordered by Appellant to get in the pick-up. N.T. at 535. Laumann then looked over at the
patrol vehicle and could see Officer Grove lying with his head facing the rear tires and his
legs pointed to the middle of the road. Laumann boarded the pick-up and Appellant
started the engine, put it in drive, and sped off. N.T. at 535.
Leaving the scene at between 60 to 80 miles per hour, Appellant made numerous
turns and navigated the "real narrow...bumpy and real windy" pathways he had earlier
used to get to Red Rock Road. N.T. at 536, 539. As Appellant drove in this manner,
Laumann observed him open the center console and reach around to grab what
Laumann believed to be a clip for his .45, which already lay on his lap as he drove. N.T. at
538. Laumann believed it to be a clip because Appellant thereafter leaned forward over
his lap and Laumann heard the "click like a snap noise" as when a clip gets pushed into a
handgun. N.T. at 539. Laumann kept telling Appellant that he wanted to get out of the
pick-up, and about four to five minutes into his flight, Appellant stopped at a rural stop sign
and allowed Laumann to grab his belongings and get out of the vehicle. N.T. at 537.
Hours later, Laumann denied knowledge of the incident when investigators visited
his house, saying that Appellant had dropped him off at his girlfriend's house at 6:30 p.m.
N.T. at 590. He recanted his false statement the following morning, however, and
provided investigators with a full eyewitness report of the crime, although he withheld an
admission to his having killed a deer with his bow and fired at another deer with a .22 rifle
until just two weeks before trial. N.T. at 548-550, 552, 591, 602.
When asked at Appellant's capital trial whether he believed Appellant was drunk at
any time during the events of November 11, 2010, Laumann answered "no." N.T. at 553.
Appellant seemed "normal" and caused Laumann no concerns while he drove throughout
the evening, he said. "There were times he kind of giggled a little bit. That's when I took
[J-3-2014] - 7
it that maybe he was tipsy. Like I wouldn't consider him drunk, but he was feeling the
alcohol." N.T. at 554.
Later in his testimony, he elaborated that, to him, tipsy and buzzed meant halfway
between sober and drunk. N.T. at 571. He also stated he was not strictly counting the
number of beers Appellant drank and that six or seven was a "rough estimate." N.T. at
573. Laumann reiterated that while he saw Appellant pull the clear bag of full beer cans
out of the creek to check on them, he never saw Appellant pull a beer out of the bag. N.T.
at 573-74.
The following morning, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Edmund Miller was driving
along Bingham Road in Franklin Township in his work capacity on what he described as a
cool but sunny and pleasant day when he spotted Appellant limping along the side of the
road. N.T. 9/25/12 at 280-81. Not knowing Appellant, Miller nevertheless stopped and
asked if he needed a ride, but Appellant acted “aloof” and did not seem to want one. N.T.
at 281. Miller said “you look like you’re hurt,” and Appellant then accepted his invitation
for a ride. N.T. at 281-82. Appellant gave his destination and directed Miller as they
drove. When Miller asked why Appellant was limping, Appellant explained he had
slipped on a rock up in the hills. N.T. at 283. Miller drove the approximately two miles
toward Appellant’s Orrtanna Road hunting cabin, and as he turned onto Orrtanna Road,
he could see police cars ahead. About ten police officers converged on his truck when
he stopped in the dirt lane leading to the cabin, Miller said, and Appellant did “nothing.”
“He just wanted [me to turn] in the lane” and drop him off, and said he would walk the rest
of the way, Miller testified. Appellant then got out of the truck of his own accord. N.T. at
284, 286, 288, 289.
Officers immediately secured Appellant on the ground with his hands cuffed
behind his back N.T. at 298-300. Armed officers backed away from Appellant as
[J-3-2014] - 8
Pennsylvania State Trooper Neal Navitsky of the Fugitive Apprehension Unit approached
to read Miranda warnings to Appellant. N.T. at 300, 315. After rolling Appellant on his
side to confirm his identity and rule out a possible gunshot wound to the abdomen,5
Trooper Navitsky crouched down to eye level with Appellant and explained to him the
extreme importance of what was about to be read to him, that if he had questions he
needed to interrupt and ask, and that he must maintain eye contact so the trooper would
know he was being attentive. N.T. at 316, 325. Appellant acknowledged that he
understood Trooper Navitsky’s instructions and maintained eye contact throughout
Miranda warnings. N.T. at 317. When Trooper Navitsky asked him if he understood the
rights that were just explained, Appellant acknowledged that he did. N.T. at 317. Asked
“[w]ith these rights in mind do you wish to talk with us?” Appellant again answered in the
affirmative. N.T. at 318.
When asked what brought everyone here to this point, Appellant replied that he
had made some bad decisions. Adams County Detective Frank Donnelly then asked
Appellant if he realized he shot a police officer last night. According to Trooper Navitsky,
Appellant replied he “didn’t shoot a police officer. He was just a game warden.” N.T. at
318. Appellant then attempted to clarify his remark by saying he was simply noting the
distinction between a police officer and a game warden. N.T. at 319.
Trooper Navitsky redirected the conversation back to the previous night, and
Appellant described the entire sequence of events leading up to the shooting, specifically:
he and Laumann had poached a deer at night; they drove off but saw red and blue lights
appear from behind and pulled over for a vehicle stop; they were ordered to exit their
5 Initial information given to Trooper Navitsky was that Appellant sustained a possible
gunshot wound to the abdomen. N.T. at 324. His examination of Appellant revealed no
abdominal injury, however, but disclosed, instead, a small amount of blood just below
Appellant’s belt on his right hip, “as if a pen were to burst in your pocket and leak ink, it
was probably that amount of blood that was just below his belt line.” N.T. at 324.
[J-3-2014] - 9
vehicle and place their hands on his truck; he “got to thinking” of the .45 caliber handgun
on his waistband because he was prohibited as an ex-felon from possessing it, and
contemplated removing it and kicking it under his truck to hide it from Officer Grove’s
detection; he complied with orders to walk backwards towards Officer Grove; he
“panicked” when Officer Grove placed a handcuff on his right hand, pulled it away and
drew his .45 with the left hand. N.T. at 319-322. When asked how he managed to grab
the gun, he explained that, while using his body to block Officer Grove’s sightline to the
gun, he used his left hand to manipulate the release on the holster, draw the gun, and
transfer it to his right hand to begin firing. N.T. at 322. He and Officer Grove exchanged
gunfire, Appellant reported, and afterward he retreated to his vehicle and drove away
without checking on Officer Grove’s condition. N.T. at 322-323.
Appellant said he drove up to a road off of Teaberry and Mountain Cold Springs
Road, parked his truck, and began traveling by foot. N.T. at 324. He ascended a steep
slope in the woods until he reached a high peak, and threw his .45 handgun down one
side of the peak and threw his holster down the other side. N.T. at 324. He attempted to
treat the gunshot wound to his hip by cinching his leather belt to act as a tourniquet, he
said, to provide compression to the wound. N.T. at 324.
During this initial ten minute interview, Trooper Navitsky found Appellant’s
answers “very much” responsive to the questions being put to him. N.T. at 327-28.
Appellant did not simply answer “yes” or “no,” but, instead provided detailed answers
demonstrating an understanding of the questions asked, the trooper stated. N.T. at 328.
Notably, Trooper Navitsky testified, Appellant gave no indication of experiencing pain or
discomfort during the interview. N.T. at 328. He maintained eye contact throughout and,
it appeared to Trooper Navitsky in his experience, spoke in an unguarded manner
consistent with the giving of truthful answers. N.T. at 328.
[J-3-2014] - 10
Trooper Navitsky paused the interview when EMS arrived to treat and transport
Appellant to a hospital. N.T. at 326-327. He gained access to a voice recorder in the
meantime, and he and another fully uniformed trooper waited about ten minutes while
EMTs prepared Appellant. They eventually boarded the ambulance with three EMTs
and Appellant to resume the interview. N.T. at 329. Once inside, Trooper Navitsky
began recording and held the recorder in front of Appellant where he could see it. N.T. at
330-331.
Portions of the recording were played at trial. N.T. at 337. At the outset, Appellant
can be heard saying “ouch, ouch, ouch[,]” which Trooper Navitsky attributed to
Appellant’s being placed on his back on the litter causing him to lie directly on his cuffed
wrists. N.T. at 338. The troopers removed the cuffs, repositioned Appellant’s arms to the
front of his body, and cuffed each hand to the nearest siderail of the stretcher for comfort,
giving Appellant about six or eight inches of mobility with each arm. N.T. at 338.
At that point, Trooper Navitsky noticed the EMT preparing to administer morphine
to Appellant. He can be heard on the tape asking if he could have five minutes to record
Appellant’s statement before the morphine was administered, and the EMT answered
“that’s fine.” N.T. at 339.
Trooper Navitsky witnessed no change in Appellant’s mental status during the
course of his interrogation. N.T. at 340. “He was very coherent. He was calm. He was
attentive. He was being respectful and polite and he was answering my questions
accordingly and expounding on his answers[,]” Trooper Navitsky testified. N.T. at 340.
The recorded statement began with the question: “Before we spoke, did I read you
something?” and the answer was “Yeah, Miranda rights.” Appellant confirmed he knew
what Miranda rights were and denied having any illegal drugs in his system. N.T. at 341.
[J-3-2014] - 11
When asked how many beers he had drunk, Appellant answered “two to three.” N.T. at
342.
Appellant acknowledged having possessed the .45 handgun for three years,
starting shortly after his release from prison. He answered questions about the
silhouette targets observed at his cabin and took credit for the closest grouping of three
bullet holes, attributing his accuracy from 35 yards out to having taken a “normal” stance
instead of turning the gun sideways, which he had apparently done on his other practice
shots. N.T. at 344-45. Appellant also took credit for shooting the deer on Red Rock
Road, saying he was pretty sure his shot hit its mark, and thought the deer was a
mechanical decoy at first like the kind he said he had seen on Iron Springs Road because
it had not moved after the first shot. N.T. at 345. When asked about the holstered .45 on
his left hip, Appellant explained that the holster was a Blackhawk brand, angled on the left
hip to allow the gun to go straight into the right hand reaching across and designed to
require the push of a release button before one draws so the gun won’t fall. N.T. at 346.
The next portion of the recorded interview involved Trooper Navitsky noting
Appellant’s request to turn the tape recorder off so he could address a topic off the record.
Trooper Navitsky later explained at trial that Appellant wished to advise the trooper of
Ryan Laumann’s participation in the poaching of a deer the night before. N.T. at 348.
Trooper Navitsky confirmed on cross-examination that Appellant’s initial statement
and his recorded statement were essentially identical. Nowhere in either statement, the
trooper testified, did Appellant explicitly admit that he attempted to shoot directly at or kill
Officer Grove. N.T. at 358.
Doctor Kern Michael Hughes, York Hospital staff trauma surgeon testified that at
about 11:00 a.m. on the morning of November 12, 2010, Appellant was brought to his
trauma unit for the possibility of a serious gun-related injury. N.T. at 369. His vital signs
[J-3-2014] - 12
were normal and, after taking a personal history, conducting a physical exam and
reviewing both a chest x-ray, and CT scan of Appellant’s abdomen and pelvis, Doctor
Hughes determined the bullet wound in Appellant’s hip was confined to the superficial
regions of the hip. N.T. at 371. This “flesh wound” as Dr. Hughes called it in layman’s
terms required no surgical intervention, and was treated with antibiotics and a dressing.
N.T. at 373. Dr. Hughes’ notes, furthermore, described Appellant as alert and oriented
during his examination. N.T. at 372.
As he does with all trauma patients due to concern of blood loss, Dr. Hughes
continued, he sought to rule out hypothermia during his physical examination and
laboratory testing of Appellant. Appellant did not present with hypothermia, even with his
exposure to the cool night, and so he excluded it as a concern. N.T. at 374. On
cross-examination, Dr. Hughes acknowledged that the hour-long ride in a heated
ambulance while receiving a 100 milliliter warm bolus IV would have affected Appellant’s
hydration and body temperature to some degree, bearing on the issue of hypothermia
and dehydration. N.T. at 382-83. Appellant did complain of pain to Dr. Hughes. N.T. at
374. Pain is a very subjective thing, Dr. Hughes explained, and so Appellant was
medicated in accordance to his complaint.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of first degree murder and
related offenses and gave him notice of the aggravating circumstances it intended to
pursue in the event he was convicted on the main charge. The trial court thereafter
denied Appellant's omnibus pretrial motion to quash all but one aggravating
circumstances and to suppress his statements to police, the latter motion being denied
following a hearing. The court did grant Appellant's motion for a change of venire, and a
jury was selected in Lancaster County.
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Trial commenced in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County on September
24, 2012, with the Honorable Michael A. George presiding. On October 3, 2012, the jury
returned a guilty verdict on the charge of murder in the first degree and related charges.
The case proceeded to penalty phase where the Commonwealth sought the death
penalty on four aggravating factors: that the victim was a law enforcement official, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(1); that the victim was a prosecution witness killed for the purpose of
presenting his testimony, § 9711(d)(5); that the killing happened while in the perpetration
of a felony, § 9711(d)(6); and that the defendant had a significant history of felony
convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, § 9711(d)(9).
Appellant's proffer focused on his loving relationship with friends and family, in particular
his nine year old daughter, Jasmine, and the substantial impairment he experienced from
alcohol consumption. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury found two
aggravating circumstances--that the victim was a law enforcement officer and that the
killing occurred while in the perpetration of a felony--whereas only one mitigating
circumstance was found, the catch-all at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). Concluding
unanimously that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, the jury sentenced Appellant to death for the murder of Officer Grove.
The trial court subsequently denied Appellant's motion for reconsideration on
October 15, 2012. This direct appeal followed, in which Appellant raises
three guilt-phase issues and six penalty phase issues for our review.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence of First Degree Murder Conviction.
Before addressing Appellant's enumerated issues, we consider, as we must in all
capital cases, whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions of first degree
murder. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n.3 (Pa. 1982). Because
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evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and
our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d. 24, 37 (Pa. 2011).
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the
evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient
to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d
52, 58–59 (Pa. 2003). The Commonwealth may sustain this burden by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (Pa. 2008).
To obtain a conviction of first degree murder, the Commonwealth must
prove that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the defendant
perpetrated the killing, and that the defendant acted with malice and a
specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, [ ] 959 A.2d 916, 920
([Pa.] 2008). Section 2502 of the Crimes Code defines murder of the first
degree as an “intentional killing,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), which, in turn, is
defined as a “[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” Id. at § 2502(d). It is
well-settled that specific intent to kill can be established through
circumstantial evidence such as the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part
of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Rega, [ ] 933 A.2d 997, 1009 ([Pa.]
2007).
Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013).
The evidence as set forth above and admitted in Appellant's jury trial sufficed to
support his conviction of first degree murder. Both Appellant's and Ryan Laumann's
statements identified Appellant as the man who shot Officer Grove after making the
considered decision that he would not go back to prison. In that respect, Laumann
provided eyewitness testimony thoroughly detailing the circumstances in which Appellant
shot Officer Grove multiple times, including a fatal shot to the neck.
Appellant also demonstrated no physical or mental impairment from alcohol up to
and including the time of the shooting, in Laumann's opinion, as Appellant acted and
[J-3-2014] - 15
communicated in a normal manner. He was able to navigate narrow, windy roads while
aiming a spotlight and to shoot accurately at deer while holding a light from inside his
truck. He pulled over at the first available safe spot when Officer Grove had activated his
overhead lights. He stated clearly that he understood Laumann’s concern about their
impending arrest for poaching, but calmly said he was not going back to prison. He was
able to understand and execute Officer Grove's physically demanding orders to exit the
vehicle in a counterintuitive way and walk backwards toward the officer with his hands
atop his head. He exhibited coordination and dexterity in freeing his cuffed right hand
from the officer while simultaneously pressing the release button to his holster with his left
hand, drawing his gun, and switching it to his right hand to commence firing at Officer
Grove. He avoided crashing the pick-up during his high-speed flight from the scene, and
he honored Laumann's request to be let out of the pick-up truck by coming to a stop at a
rural stop sign and allowing Laumann to gather his belongings and exit the pick-up.
Appellant gave a statement the following morning that not only contained
incriminating content but also displayed keen recollection of sequence and detail about
the prior evening, permitting the reasonable inference that drink did not affect his faculties
in any way pertinent to the element of forming specific intent. His admittedly bad
decisions led to Officer Grove's death, Appellant confessed to Trooper Navitsky, and he
provided an account reflecting a mindset during the encounter that was able to both
appreciate the implications of his poaching and gun possession and deliberate over his
options and understand their respective consequences. One example of the latter is
when he considered trying to hide his .45 from Officer Grove by tossing it under the pickup
truck as he stood alongside it, he said in his statement presumably to show he had
thought of non-confrontational possibilities. He clearly rejected this option as futile,
however, choosing instead to engage Officer Grove in violence to avoid arrest.
[J-3-2014] - 16
On the issue of Appellant’s alcohol use on the night in question and to what extent,
if any, it affected his state of mind at the time of the shooting, the Commonwealth's
toxicology expert, J. Ward Donovan, M.D., opined to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that Appellant “was fully capable of forming intent and had capability of rational
judgment.” N.T. 9/28/12 at 1067. Specifically, even when factoring Appellant’s “buzzed”
state at the time he first met with Laumann and adopting for the sake of argument the
defense position that Appellant consumed about twelve beers over the next six and
one-half hours to bring him within an expected BAC range of .15 to .22 percent, Dr. Ward
interpreted Appellant’s physical deeds and statements at the critical time period, along
with his clear memory of the entire evening as demonstrating higher cognitive functioning
consistent with an intact mental state capable of forming specific intent. N.T. 9/28/12 at
1069-1086. Finally, the autopsy report and ballistics evidence provided further evidence
establishing that among the seven shots Appellant fired at Officer Grove from close
range, three struck the officer, including a fatal one to a vital part of the body--the officer’s
neck. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence establishing that
Appellant shot Officer Grove to death with malice and the specific intent to kill.
II. Penalty-Phase Admission of Rebuttal Evidence
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in admitting a seven year-old
conviction for Endangering the Welfare of a Child--his then fourteen month-old daughter,
Jasmine--as rebuttal to his Section 9711(e)(8) “catch all” mitigation proffer that he
currently shares a close and loving relationship with now eight year-old Jasmine,
especially where such evidence was admitted without further limiting instruction. The
rebuttal evidence not only inflamed the passions of the jury by informing it that he had
driven over 100 miles per hour with his toddler daughter in the car, Appellant contends,
but also failed the test of relevancy, as it involved an act far too remote in time from the
[J-3-2014] - 17
specific defense proffer that Appellant currently offers significant emotional support to his
daughter and would continue to do so while incarcerated. N.T. at 1845. As such, the
court’s denial of Appellant’s motion in limine seeking exclusion of the prior offense
constituted reversible error under Rules of Evidence 404 and 403, as well as under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Appellant asserts.
The Commonwealth responds that the trial court properly admitted the rebuttal
evidence because Appellant’s Section 9711(e)(8) presentation went far beyond the
current parent-child relationship when it included testimony describing, and a slide show
depicting, their relationship from years ago, close in time to the 2005 offense. As such,
the mitigation proffer was subject to challenge with respect to its suggestion that
Appellant was a responsible, loving father throughout the course of his parenthood,
argues the Commonwealth.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion in limine is an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Rosen, 42 A.3d 988, 993 (Pa. 2012). “An abuse of discretion is more
than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have
abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996).
During the penalty phase, Appellant called several witnesses to provide mitigating
evidence as to his character. Former next-door neighbor Barbara Garde watched
Appellant grow from a child to an adult and a father. She described him as a “very, very
good loving, loving, responsible father in my opinion.” N.T. 1546. On cross-examination,
she was asked whether she knew of his 2005 conviction for an incident in which he was
engaged in a high speed chase with the police while his daughter was in the back seat, to
which Garde responded “no, I wasn’t aware of that. It doesn’t change my opinion,
[J-3-2014] - 18
though.” N.T. 1548. To the question of whether she would still consider Appellant a very
good, loving, responsible father, Garde replied “Well, maybe except for that one incident.
There’s a lot more to being a father than just one single incident. N.T. at 1548.
Appellant’s younger sister, Brandy Johnson, described the loving relationship
between Appellant and Jasmine, saying “[s]he’s always been daddy’s girl since the day
she was born. Christopher would do anything for her.” N.T. at 1555. During her
testimony, a video was played depicting Jasmine’s third birthday party while Brandy
Johnson narrated scenes explaining how Appellant got the cake, prepared the whole day
beforehand, and doted on Jasmine at the party in a variety of ways. N.T. at 1558-59.
Brandy also described how Appellant helped raise her son and “taught him how to be a
boy” during this same timeframe. “He would do anything for them two little babies[,]”
Brandy testified. N.T. at 1560-61. She also testified as to how Appellant took better care
of her than their father did when they were children growing up together. N.T. 1572.
Appellant’s mother, Kimberly Topper, gave extensive testimony about Appellant’s
history as a father starting from the day Jasmine was born: “I could see the lights in his
eyes was [sic] like the lights. I could see the beauty that he saw in her like the day he
was born that I saw in him.” N.T. at 1480-81. Topper described how Appellant assumed
primary responsibility for Jasmine’s emotional and financial support when Jasmine was
around one year old because of the mother’s drug using lifestyle:
[TOPPER]: “He would say, mom, I can’t keep my eyes open anymore.
He says, I’m afraid Jasmine is going to get hurt. Can you come here and
just let me get an hours’s [sic] sleep, two hours, something like that and I’d
go get her and bring her back to work with me. . . . Sometimes I’d have to
wait until I got off work at three or four so he could get a couple hours sleep
before he had to go back to work and sometimes she’d show up just before
he had to go to work. She would be out, you know, she was running
around with friends and --”
[J-3-2014] - 19
N.T. at 1482 (emphasis added). Topper also narrated a slide show which included
photos depicting, among other things, Appellant and Jasmine together in her first years.
N.T. at 1499-1500.
The trial court’s ruling was correct, as the record confirms Appellant’s proffer was
not confined to his current relationship with his daughter but extended well back to a time
proximate to his 2005 offense. Testimony referred to his parenting through the years,
while other witnesses described his daughter as having been “daddy’s girl since the day
she was born.” N.T. 1555. Additional character evidence portraying Appellant as a man
known to be loving and religious, kind and helpful to neighbors, and whose behavior up to
the time of the murder had been non-assaultive, also made relevant rebuttal evidence
revealing a moment in this time period where Appellant posed a serious threat to his child
with conduct marked by a disregard for her safety and welfare.
Contrary to Appellant’s contention, therefore, admission of Appellant’s 2005
Endangering the Welfare of a Child conviction was relevant response to his subsection
(e)(8) proffer, as it bore upon mitigation evidence offered to show Appellant as a loving
and caring father throughout Jasmine’s life.6 To Appellant’s Pa.R.E. 403 argument that
the danger of unfair prejudice arising from evidence of his prior conviction outweighed its
probative value with respect to the issue of Appellant’s history as a loving, caring, and
selfless parent, well-taken is the trial court’s response that any prejudice in the admission
was not an unfair result of a jury’s potential emotional response but was, instead, a fair
result from the nature of Appellant’s act itself. N.T. at 1368.7 We thus find no merit to this
claim.
6 As such, we deem meritless Appellant’s argument that admission of his prior conviction
amounted to the introduction of a non-statutory, additional aggravating circumstance that
unduly “obliterated” his mitigation proffer. Properly admitted rebuttal evidence does not
fall under such category. See Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 390 (Pa. 2011).
(continuedQ)
[J-3-2014] - 20
III. Penalty Phase Instruction on the Applicable Standard of Review for
Voluntary Intoxication as a Mitigating Factor
Appellant next asserts the sentencing court erroneously charged the jury that the
same standard applicable in the guilt phase determination of whether intoxication
diminished Appellant’s capacity to form the specific intent to kill also applied in the penalty
phase determination of whether his voluntary intoxication served as a mitigating
circumstance under either 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(3)8 and the “catch-all” mitigator of 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8)9. In so equating the penalty standard with a guilt standard the jury
had already applied to reject his voluntary intoxication defense, Appellant contends, the
lower court “categorically barred the penalty-phase jury from considering” his heavy
consumption of alcohol on the day of the murder as a mitigating factor and thus denied
him his rights under the Pennsylvania death penalty statute and the Eighth and
(Qcontinued)
7 Appellant raises an adjunct argument that a limiting instruction was required to cure the
inflammatory effect that admission of his prior conviction allegedly had on the jury.
Appellant waived this claim through his silence during both the admission of the evidence
and at the conclusion of jury instructions, particularly in light of the court’s pre-hearing
assurance that it would give a limiting instruction “at Appellant’s request” should the
Commonwealth offer into evidence his prior conviction. See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
668 A.2d 97, 104 (Pa. 1995) (deeming waived appellant’s claim of erroneous omission of
a curative instruction when appellant failed to pursue the instruction). Moreover,
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 waiver applies, as Appellant failed to include this claim in his concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415,
719 A.2d 306 (1998) (holding issues not raised in Rule 1925 concise statement are
waived).
8 § 9711(e)(3) provides for a mitigating circumstance when “[t]he capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired.”
9 § 9711(e)(8) provides for a mitigating circumstance upon the existence “[a]ny other
evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the
circumstances of his offense.
[J-3-2014] - 21
Fourteenth Amendments. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) (recognizing a
defendant’s right to jury deliberation on mitigating evidence that a juror could reasonably
find warrants a sentence less than death).
Appellant acknowledges that success on this claim with respect to the (e)(3)
mitigator depends on our taking up his call to overrule a line of precedent holding that the
guilt and penalty phase standards in this context are functionally equivalent. He
attempts to distinguish the cases factually from his own, however, and further assails the
precedent as having inexplicably and erroneously grafted a guilt phase standard for
determining specific intent on penalty phase considerations of impaired capacity that are
specifically delineated by statutory language setting forth a different standard.
Indeed, our jurisprudence has confirmed that it is “binding precedent” that a
defendant convicted of first degree murder in rejection of a voluntary intoxication defense
would seem “logically precluded” from proving § 9711(e)(3) substantial impairment by a
preponderance of the evidence in the penalty phase. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d
512, 529 n. 18 (Pa. 2011).10 See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 117 (Pa. 2012)
10 In Gibson, this Court recognized that substantial impairment of either capacity as
stated disjunctively in subsection (e)(3), i.e., capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s
conduct or to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of the law, could stand alone as
a means by which to secure the mitigator: “There is no dispute that Appellee
appreciated the criminality of his conduct, for reasons already explained. The only
question is the degree to which the PCRA evidence would have demonstrated to the jury
that Appellee was substantially impaired in his capacity to conform to the law.” Id. at
528-29. Though recognizing a conceptual difference between the two subsection (e)(3)
expressions, we still acknowledged application of the same evidentiary standard to both.
As such, in specifically assessing the appellee/defendant’s capacity to conform to the
law, we applied, over the appellee’s opposing argument, the guilt-phase voluntary
intoxication defense standard in accordance with binding precedent that logical
preclusion applied given the facts of the case. Id. at 529 (citing Commonwealth v. Flor,
998 A.2d 606, 627 n. 7 (Pa. 2010) (recognizing that, to demonstrate the (e)(3) mitigator
based on voluntary intoxication, the defendant must have been “overwhelmed or
(continuedQ)
[J-3-2014] - 22
(recognizing first degree murder conviction logically precludes application of the (e)(3)
mitigator); Marinelli, 810 A.2d at 1277 (applying guilt phase standard for voluntary
11
intoxication in penalty phase). In so doing, our Court effectively applied
interchangeably between guilt phase and penalty phase the standard that a defendant
must show he was so overwhelmed by intoxication as to be incapable of forming the
specific intent to kill at the time of the murder.
The Commonwealth first responds that Appellant waived this claim by making a
vague and undeveloped objection to the jury charge. By both objecting ambiguously at
side-bar that the charge implicated “one of our mitigators” and refusing the court’s
invitation to explicate, answering instead, “that’s it, thank you, Judge[,]” Appellant fatally
(Qcontinued)
overpowered by alcohol to the point of losing his faculties so as to be incapable of forming
a specific intent to kill”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 810 A.2d 1257, 1277 (Pa.
2002)). To the extent that the subsection (e)(3) mitigating factor is thus logically
precluded by the jury’s verdict that a defendant formed the specific intent to kill, we
concluded, “the jury may consider voluntary intoxication of a lesser degree under
subsection (e)(8).” Id. at 531, n.18.
It is in light of this precedent that we consider, infra, Appellant’s underlying question of
whether the second part of the (e)(3) mitigator--regarding a substantially impaired
capacity to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of the law--imposes a less
stringent standard than the guilt phase standard on specific intent articulated above.
11 Our jurisprudence would seem to allow that exceptions to our observation on logical
preclusion may attend instances where the penalty phase defendant introduces a greater
quantum or quality of voluntary intoxication evidence than he did in the guilt-innocence
phase. For example, a penalty-phase defendant may elect to abandon a failed
guilt-phase “mistaken identity/alibi” defense, to which intoxication evidence would have
been irrelevant, and press an (e)(3) mitigation case through evidence of his intoxicated
state at the time of the murder. So, too, may a general guilt-phase strategy of foregoing
a voluntary intoxication defense because of its potential to spawn adverse character
judgments, see Gibson at 527 (collecting cases recognizing aggravating effect of
voluntary intoxication defense), be abandoned in a penalty-phase decision that a new
course of action is necessary. In the case sub judice, Appellant made no enhancement
of his guilt-phase intoxication proffer in the penalty-phase.
[J-3-2014] - 23
omitted to specify whether it was the mitigator at subsection (e)(3) or subsection (e)(8)
that was, in his opinion, unduly affected by the charge. The Commonwealth also argues
that Appellant effectively acceded to the charge when he replied “there may be” to the
court’s comment that “there’s a case right on point” in support of the charge, thereby
providing alternate grounds for waiver.
In any event, the Commonwealth contends, Appellant’s claim is meritless as to the
(e)(3) mitigator given binding precedent of this Court that the standards are the same.
As for Appellant’s argument assailing the charge with respect to the subsection (e)(8)
mitigator, the Commonwealth points to the dearth of voluntary intoxication evidence he
offered for this mitigator: “Defendant’s drinking on the day and night of the murder was a
small and hardly persuasive aspect of the defense mitigation case. Its primary, if not
exclusive, relevance was to the ‘extreme mental or emotional disturbance’ and
‘substantial impairment’ mitigators.” Brief for Appellee at 24.
At the penalty phase hearing, the trial court issued the following pertinent
instruction:
THE COURT: Now, ladies and gentlemen, in this case the Defendant has
set forth and the Sentencing Code identifies what are known as mitigating
factors. As I described earlier for you, mitigating factors must be only
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
The mitigating factors identified by the defense include the following:
The mitigating factor alleged that Christopher Johnson was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. A second and
separate mitigating factor that the capacity of Christopher Johnson to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired, and the third mitigating
factor which is identified is--consists of evidence of mitigation concerning
the character and record of Christopher Johnson and the circumstances of
his offense.
[J-3-2014] - 24
In that regard, ladies and gentlemen, the . . . Defendant has identified
factors that they would like you to consider in determining whether that
mitigating circumstance exists.
Those factors consist of the following: That Mr. Johnson was under the
influence of alcohol when the accident occurred. In regard to that
particular factor, ladies and gentlemen, the same standard of determining
its applicability , which I described during the guilt phase of this trial, is
applicable. In other words defining whether or not that is a consideration.
N.T. 10/4/12 at 1844-45 (emphasis added).
During subsequent side-bar discussions about the charge, Appellant raised the
following objection to the above instruction on voluntary intoxication:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We were--again, we were just objecting to the
instructions on the victim impact evidence that we had talked about before.
I don’t thik that was on the record. And I had a question for you because
you said it quickly and I wasn’t sure I understood it. We had alleged as one
of our mitigators he was under the influence of alcohol and did you say the
same standard applied as the legal intoxication for first to third degree?
THE COURT: I did.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, we would object to that.
THE COURT: I believe there’s a case right on point on that.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: There may be.
THE COURT: Any comment?
PROSECUTOR: Nope.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s it. Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: All right.
N.T. at 1860-61.
This objection left the trial court to speculate as to which mitigating factor defense
counsel referred in his objection. Presuming the competency of counsel, as we must
under Sixth Amendment decisional law, we may presume counsel knew that for nearly a
decade our jurisprudence had held and reaffirmed in the subsection (e)(3) context that
[J-3-2014] - 25
the guilt and penalty phase standards for voluntary intoxication were functionally
equivalent, whereas the subsection (e)(8) inquiry allows a lower standard permitting all
mitigation evidence to be considered, See Gibson, supra. It could therefore reasonably
be inferred that counsel objected to the application of the guilt phase voluntary
intoxication standard to the jury’s deliberations on the (e)(8) mitigation offer. It is just as
reasonable under the same presumption of Sixth Amendment competence, however, that
counsel directed his objection to the subsection (e)(3) proffer as a constitutional
challenge to the current state of our relevant jurisprudence. As can be seen, one cannot
be sure as to which mitigator counsel actually referred.
Indeed, the trial court invited defense counsel to explicate his position, and
perhaps if counsel did so the court could have discerned the specific objection laid before
it and considered on the record whether a modification to the instruction was necessary.
As the record stands, however, Appellant declined the court’s invitation to clarify his
ambiguous objection, leaving the precise basis for counsel’s objection indeterminable.
As we may not base our review on presumptions and speculation about what counsel
meant when he offered an ambiguous objection to the court, invocation of the waiver
doctrine is appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. 2005).
(requiring a specific objection to the charge to preserve an issue involving a jury
instruction).
Even if we were to address Appellant’s bare assertions that 1) a decade’s worth of
jurisprudence identifying the appropriate standard for voluntary intoxication in the penalty
phase is based upon a flawed interpretation of an inapposite seminal case; 2) the
language of the (e)(3) mitigator as a whole presents a less stringent standard than that
applicable in a guilt-phase voluntary intoxication defense; 3) at least one of the (e)(3)
mitigator component parts, i.e., the incapacity to conform one’s conduct to the
[J-3-2014] - 26
requirements of the law contemplates an aspect of the mental state distinct from intent
that cannot, as a matter of linguistics, be contemplated by the guilt phase standard; and
4) the above instruction completely precluded the jury from considering the effects of
Appellant’s alleged heavy drinking in its (e)(8) deliberations, we would find each assertion
as briefed presents as a broad pronouncement which, though eloquent to the extent it is
made, is nonetheless devoid of specific references of support in the record and lacking in
developed analysis. One example is the paucity of argumentation on alcohol’s effect on
Appellant’s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, the second
expression of the § 9711(e)(3) mitigating circumstance. Indeed, the only reference
Appellant makes to his subsection (e)(3) proffer is “Appellant offered evidence of his
heavy consumption of alcohol the day of the incident as mitigating factors under . . . 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(3) (ability to appreciate criminal conduct was substantially impaired).”
Brief for Appellant at 20-21. In referring only to the first of two parts of the subsection
(e)(3) mitigator, Appellant implies that he made no proffer relevant to a challenge that he
possessed a substantially impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the law. Later in
his brief, however, Appellant does make the statutory construction statement in the
abstract that our jurisprudence equating voluntary intoxication standards applicable in
each trial phase works the absurd result of precluding a jury from ever finding mitigation
through proof of a substantially impaired capacity to conform one’s conduct to the law.
Again, however, nowhere does Appellant indicate where in the record he advanced
argument on this part of the subsection (e)(3) mitigator to the jury.
Another example is Appellant’s claim that the voluntary intoxication standard
applying to the subsection (e)(3) mitigation case must be less stringent than the standard
applying to a guilt-phase voluntary intoxication defense. Other than stating this
proposition as if it were self-proving on its face, Appellant provides no further discussion
[J-3-2014] - 27
as to why it is less difficult to bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that heavy drinking substantially impairs a defendant’s ability to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law than it is to
present enough evidence that drink overwhelmed a defendant’s faculties so as to inject
reasonable doubt as to defendant’s ability to form specific intent. Our jurisprudence has
interpreted subsection (e)(3) to come under the guilt phase voluntary intoxication
standard for nearly a decade, and, under the doctrine of stare decisis, it was thus
incumbent upon Appellant in seeking the overhaul of such precedent to assume the
burden of developing a comprehensive discussion demonstrating that substantive
differences between the statutory (e)(3) mitigator and the guilt phase diminished capacity
by intoxication inquiry exist warranting different treatment of each.12 No such advocacy
appears before us.
Elsewhere in his brief, Appellant argues that our equation of the two standards
works the indefensible result of rendering the statutory (e)(3) mitigator “absurd” and a
nullity, but this assertion fails to consider that our decisions have dealt only with cases in
which the defendant’s penalty phase proffer and guilt phase proffer were essentially the
same. As addressed in footnote 11, supra, it would seem that in cases where a
penalty-phase defendant either presents an intoxication case for the first time--having
12 “‘Any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.’
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, (1984). We have said also that the burden borne
by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where
the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare
decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 172-73 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
553 U.S. 442 (2008).
[J-3-2014] - 28
elected to forego an intoxication defense at trial--or enhances his guilt phase intoxication
defense appreciably, the jury’s first-degree murder verdict would not logically preclude it
from finding the subsection (e)(3) mitigator satisfied on the basis of newly presented
penalty-phase evidence. Therefore, simply because a jury’s rejection of a guilt-phase
intoxication defense would logically foreclose (e)(3) mitigation on the same body of
evidence does not render the (e)(3) mitigator a nullity. § 9711(e)(3) mitigation is still
available, as a matter of logic, to the penalty phase defendant who adds to the quantum
or quality of intoxication evidence previously offered at trial.
One final omission from Appellant’s argument is a fully developed discussion of
whether he even laid an evidentiary foundation entitling him to the subsection (e)(3)
mitigator instruction at all. In Gibson, supra, we reviewed a capital Post Conviction
Relief Act appeal relating to the appellee’s conviction for killing a Philadelphia police
officer and a bystander during a failed robbery attempt of a bar. In a unanimous decision
reversing the PCRA court’s order vacating sentence and remanding for a new penalty
hearing on, inter alia, PCRA testimony regarding the appellee’s (e)(3) proffer, this Court
observed that the evidentiary record called into question whether, as a matter of law, the
appellee was even entitled to an instruction on the (e)(3) mitigator. Noting initially that
there was no question that Appellee appreciated the criminality of his conduct--given the
guilt-phase presentation of evidence offered on specific intent to kill--we inquired into the
degree to which the evidence would have demonstrated a substantial impairment in his
capacity to conform to the law. On this point, however, the evidence was lacking, we
reasoned, as defendant’s own experts found insufficient evidence that defendant was
intoxicated on the critical moment. Gibson at 529.
As to the sufficiency of Appellant’s proffer in this respect, we find only one passage
in his brief relevant, where he offers in his “Statement of the Case” that “Appellant put on
[J-3-2014] - 29
expert toxicological evidence regarding his impairment, N.T. p. 937[,]” which, it should be
noted, directs the reader to an irrelevant portion of testimony some 50 pages removed
from the beginning of the toxicologist’s testimony. With no account of, or developed
discussion about, the toxicologist’s findings and the significance thereof in the argument
section of his brief, we find a second basis upon which Appellant failed to preserve this
issue for our review.
In any event, our own review of testimony offered by Appellant’s toxicologist shows
it to have been equivocal at best on the effects alcohol had on Appellant’s powers of
judgment and intent formation as the expert was confronted with examples of Appellant’s
specific actions and statements with respect to the time leading up to, including, and after
he shot Officer Grove. There was some indication that at a .22 BAC, which represented
the absolute highest number in the hypothetical BAC range of .15 to .22 percent at the
time of the shooting rendered from the evidence, one could suffer impairment of judgment
and undergo a disinhibitory effect, but no further elaboration was made on that point.
The toxicologist also opined that Appellant’s ability to perform the distracted tasks
involved in aiming a spotlight to look for deer while driving, accurately shooting a deer with
two shots, and driving away to evade detection of his illegal conduct with the intention of
returning later to retrieve the deer reflected higher levels of cognitive function, which
militated toward inferring lower degrees of impairment to his cognitive abilities. This
equivocation manifested itself at the conclusion of the toxicologist’s testimony, where the
most he could state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty was that, even at the
hypothetical’s top end .22 BAC, “it could happen” that “an individual could lose his
faculties needed to form the specific intent to kill,” N.T. at 1009, and that such opinion
applies to this case. N.T. at 1047. To the follow-up question immediately posed by the
Commonwealth as to whether one can infer from the challenging circumstances
[J-3-2014] - 30
overcome by Appellant in poaching a deer--just minutes before the police encounter--a
specific intent to kill the deer, the toxicologist answers “yes.” N.T. at 1047-48. Such a
qualified and equivocal opinion failed to lay an evidentiary foundation for an (e)(3)
mitigation instruction.
IV. Comparative Worth Remark in Penalty Phase Opening Statement
Appellant next charges reversible error with the court’s refusal to grant mistrial in
response to the prosecutor’s penalty phase opening remarks inviting the jury to consider
whether the mitigation evidence it was about to hear concerning the life of Appellant
outweighs the life of the victim. Specifically, the controversial remark went as follows:
You will be asked at the conclusion of this sentencing hearing to look at the
facts presented in mitigation and the facts presented in aggravation. When
listening to the testimony concerning the life of the Defendant, the one
question I would like you to think about when hearing all the testimony in the
sentencing hearing is does any of that evidence outweigh the life of Officer
Grove?
N.T. at 1407. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. Side-bar discussion
ensued during which the trial court found it necessary to have the jury removed to the
deliberation room. After denying defense counsel’s motion, the court called for the jury’s
return and then issued the following curative instruction:
THE COURT: Your oath in this matter, ladies and gentlemen,
commits you to a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence to
determine the facts. Once your oath allows you to determine those facts,
you are then required to apply to those facts the law which I give you and
then reach an appropriate sentences based upon the facts as you and you
alone determine and the law given to you by the court.
Ladies and gentlemen, I will remind you once again that the aggravating
circumstances which have been identified are the aggravating
circumstances which the Commonwealth is alleging. They must be proven
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense has identified mitigating
circumstances. Once again, those are mitigating circumstances which
must be proven by preponderance of the evidence.
[J-3-2014] - 31
Your obligation as jurors when this matter proceeds to sentencing, and I will
give you more detailed instructions at the conclusion, is to weigh those
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances.
You may only take into account in that balancing process the aggravating
circumstances which were proven to you by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and the mitigating evidence, if any, which was proven to you by a
preponderance of the evidence. It is not a proper consideration to weigh
the value of one life against another life and you may not do so. That
would be a violation of your oath.
N.T. 10/2/12 at 1410-11.
Appellant acknowledges the presumption under the law that juries follow
court-issued instructions, but argues that “words once spoke can never be recalled[,]”
particularly where a jury is asked to engage in the “legally improper but all-too-human
tendency to compare one life against another.” Brief for Appellant at 29. No one
question may encompass the entire death penalty process, Appellant contends, citing
extra-jurisdictional caselaw,13 and an invitation to distill the many considerations a jury
must make into the single question of “whose life has more value” runs the risk of injecting
bias and caprice into the sentencing decision.
The statement deprived him of a fair trial despite the issuance of a curative
instruction, Appellant continues, because the statement represented neither fair
comment on the evidence nor appropriate oratorical flair, but was, instead, “a
non-impassioned attempt to focus the jury, before mitigation had even begun, on an
improper and highly prejudicial consideration: ‘Does any evidence outweigh the life of
Officer Grove?’” Brief for Appellant at 30. That it was the “captain of the prosecution
team” who made the statement only adds to misconduct and creates the reasonable
possibility that the verdict was the product of the jury’s inflamed passions instead of
reason, Appellant concludes.
13 Storey v. State, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (1995).
[J-3-2014] - 32
The Commonwealth places its statement within the bounds of permissible oratory
directed at convincing the jury to disfavor the defense’s mitigation evidence in favor of
imposing a sentence of death. To that end, the Commonwealth asserts the remark was
primarily intended to place in sharp relief a decision the jury would have to make as to
whether the mitigation proffer outweighed the undisputed aggravating circumstance at
Section 9711(d)(1) for the killing of an officer during the performance of his duties. Even
if these words as uttered were improper, they were too innocuous and briefly stated to
prevent the jury from objectively weighing the evidence, the Commonwealth continues.
Finally, any possible taint from the statement was cured by the trial court when it
sustained the defense objection and delivered a curative instruction.
Our standard of review in assessing the denial of a mistrial is as follows:
The trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of an allegedly
prejudicial statement on the jury, and as such, the grant or denial of a
mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. A mistrial
may be granted only where the incident upon which the motion is based is
of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.
Likewise, a mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are
adequate to overcome any possible prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 692, 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (2007) (citation omitted).
“It is well-settled that, during the penalty phase, where the presumption of
innocence no longer applies, a prosecutor is afforded reasonable latitude and may
properly comment on the evidence with oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827
A.2d 385, 408 (Pa. 2003) (collecting cases). “[C]omments by a prosecutor do not
constitute reversible error unless their unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jury,
forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could
not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true penalty determination.”
[J-3-2014] - 33
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 107 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 827, 117
S. Ct. 90, 136 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1996).
The excerpt above shows that the prosecutor asked the jury to ask itself whether
any of Appellant’s mitigation evidence outweighed the life of Officer Grove. The trial
court’s interpretation of this request was that it asked jurors to assign a weight to the
respective lives of Appellant and Officer Grove and then decide whose life was worth
more. This, the trial court found, was impermissible and required an immediate curative
instruction. The Commonwealth’s insistence, on the other hand, is that the prosecutor
was attempting to focus jurors on their eventual obligation to weigh the mitigation
evidence against the Section 9711(d)(1) aggravating circumstance of having killed an
officer during the performance of his duties. The transcript shows that the prosecutor did
immediately offer this position in response to the objection, wherein he stated “[h]e is a
law enforcement officer is the aggravator, the killing of a law enforcement officer in the
line of duty. That’s what it means. That’s what was said.” N.T. at 1408.
The issue as presented, therefore, is whether the prosecutorial comment was both
improper and so prejudicial that it rendered trial fundamentally unfair. Initially, while we
do not reject out-of-hand the possibility that a juror may have understood the prosecutor’s
remark as a reference to the (d)(1) aggravator, see infra, a plain reading of the statement
requires that we subordinate this possibility to the court’s interpretation, i.e., that the
prosecutor improperly invited the jury to weigh “the life” of Officer Grove against
Appellant’s mitigation presentation of his life.
Prosecutorial calls to consider victim impact evidence alongside a defendant’s
mitigation evidence have increasingly come into practice following the United States
Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), which recognized
[J-3-2014] - 34
the constitutionality of victim impact statements.14 In Payne, the Court reconsidered
prior holdings prohibiting the admission of victim impact evidence in criminal trials. Id. at
817-27. Overruling both Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (discerning Eighth
Amendment violation in admission of victim impact statements, which prove irrelevant to
defendant’s culpability and risk arbitrary and capricious imposition of death penalty) and
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding evidence of murder victim’s
personal characteristics irrelevant to circumstances of the crime and thus violative of
Eighth Amendment), Payne observed that “a State may properly conclude that for the jury
to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should
have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the
defendant.” Id. at 825. The Booth paradigm, the Court opined, “unfairly weighted the
scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating
evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances, the State
is barred from either offering ‘a glimpse of the life’ which a defendant ‘chose to
extinguish,’” id. at 822, (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting)), or “demonstrating the loss to the victim’s family and to society which
has resulted from the defendant’s homicide.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that “if the
State chooses to permit the admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial
argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.” Id. at 827.
The only constitution-sourced limit Payne recognized regarding the otherwise
constitutionally valid use of victim-impact evidence was in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause: “[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly
14 With our decision in Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001), this
Commonwealth joined the majority of states permitting victim-impact statements allowing
evidence of the victim’s personal characteristics and the harm sustained by the victim’s
family and community.
[J-3-2014] - 35
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Id. at 825. While Payne
provided no explicit delineation between fair and unduly prejudicial commentary in this
regard, it did observe that there was “no reason” to treat victim-impact evidence
“differently than other relevant evidence[,]” and cited Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168
(1986) as authority on the application of due process limits.
Darden addressed whether a prosecutor’s extreme and unquestionably improper
comments made during the guilt phase of a capital murder trial were so unfair as to render
the defendant’s conviction a denial of due process. “It is not enough that the
prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant
question is whether the prosecutors' comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden at 181 (quoting Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). As such, the court in making its due process
inquiry considered the challenged conduct in relation to the proceeding as a whole.
Applying the “narrow [standard of review] of due process,” Id., the Court first
considered the nature and extent of the improper argument and determined the argument
“did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of
the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.” Id. at 181-82.
Other factors influencing the Court’s due process analysis included: much of the
argument was responsive to the opening summation by the defense (a point not meant to
excuse the impropriety of the argument but to help better ascertain the effect of the
comment by placing it in context); the issuance of curative instructions that the jury’s
decision must be based on evidence alone and that arguments of counsel were not
evidence; the weight of the evidence against the defendant was heavy; and defense
counsel’s “very effective[]” rebuttal argument “turning much of the prosecutors’ closing
[J-3-2014] - 36
argument against them by placing [it] in a light that was more likely to engender strong
disapproval than result in inflamed passions against petitioner.” Id. For these reasons,
the Court concluded the defendant’s trial “was not perfect--few are--but neither was it
fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 183 (citation to federal district court decision omitted).
As referenced in Payne, therefore, it is evident that the Darden and DeChristoforo
approach applies to a due process challenge to prosecutorial comment relating to
victim-impact and characteristics evidence. As a logical extension, the prosecutorial
practice of asking a jury to consider the defendant’s mitigation evidence in light of impact
and personal characteristic evidence of the victim’s life is likewise appropriate under the
aegis of Payne and its declaration that “there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to
bear in mind that harm [i.e., that harm caused by the loss of the victim’s life] at the same
time as it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.” Payne at 826
(emphasis added). As for the practical result of engaging in this deliberative exercise,
the very act of weighing mitigation evidence in light of victim impact/characteristics
evidence is endorsed by the Court’s opinion that a jury may fairly consider both “at the
same time” when deciding ultimately the weight given to aggravating and mitigating
factors, respectively.
In the case sub judice, however, the question arises whether the prosecutor’s
explicit call for the jury to consider whether Appellant’s mitigation evidence outweighed
“the life” of Officer Grove comes under the above analysis, as the statement as made
goes beyond asking the jury merely to consider victim impact/characteristics evidence
and mitigation evidence together. The concern emerges that the prosecutor’s argument
as articulated would instead cause the jury to believe it was tasked with weighing one life
against another in an arbitrary procedure--one neither reflecting the facts of the case nor
expressed in the law they swore to apply in deliberations--whereby it should impose
[J-3-2014] - 37
death simply if it finds Appellant’s life is worth less than Officer Grove’s. In this respect,
therefore, the prosecutorial comment fell outside the realm of Payne paradigm and was
plainly inappropriate.
In our view, however, the totality of circumstances surrounding the comment
prevented it from prejudicing the jury. Looking at the extent and nature of the opening
comment, we see it was a brief, indeed truncated remark not couched in an otherwise
emotionally inflammatory plea recalling graphic details of the crime or describing
Appellant in derogatory terms, and the court’s sustaining of the defense objection
stopped the comment short of including an overt discussion on the relative worth of each
life. 15 Also going to the nature of the remark and its potential for prejudice is the
reasonable, albeit decidedly lesser possibility under the facts that a juror could have
understood it as a request to focus particular attention on how the mitigating proffer
weighed against the enumerated aggravating factor at 9711(d)(1) that Appellant took the
15 Compare Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.2005), in which the circuit court
reviewed the totality of circumstances and rejected a charge of fundamental unfairness in
the prosecutor’s closing at the sentencing phase. The statements in question included
(1) “Qwhen you look at the character of this Defendant, and when you look at [the victim],
how profane when you look at all the circumstances of this crime and of this Defendant,
how profane to give this man a gift of life under these circumstances.”; (2) “What
punishment do you recommend when you’ve got a character like that? What
punishment do you recommend when somebody like [the victim] is taken from us?”; and
(3) “if not in a case as aggravating as this, if not in a case with absolutely no mitigation like
this, if not in a case with a character like this, if not in a case when somebody like [the
victim] is taken, then when are you going to do it?”. The court based its decision on
several factors, including that the comparison between the defendant’s and victim’s life
was not the centerpiece of the prosecutor’s argument, and that the the solicitor did not
overtly say that the defendant’s life was worth less than the victim’s. In that latter regard,
it distinguished its facts from those in a recent state case in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court found fundamental unfairness in a prosecutor’s challenge to the jury that
it compare the life of the defendant to the lives of the two juvenile victims and ask itself
whether their lives were worth the life of the defendant, “the psychopath, this killer who
stabs and stabs and kills, and rapes and kidnaps.” Hall v. Catoe, 360 S.C. 353, 601
S.E.2d 335 (2004).
[J-3-2014] - 38
life of a uniformed officer in the line of duty. Though, as noted above, we subordinate
this possibility to the far greater likelihood that the jury would have perceived the remark
as a comparative worth argument, and we are cautious not to otherwise overstate this
secondary aspect of the remark, we nevertheless find this possibility served as an
additional tempering feature under the facts.
Most instrumental, however, in arresting any potential prejudice attendant to the
comment was the trial court’s swift and unequivocal response in issuing a detailed, and
comprehensive curative instruction reminding the jury that it was prohibited from basing
its sentence on the comparative worth of the victim’s and defendant’s respective lives,
and that it must, instead, make its sentencing decision on the evidence alone and in
accordance with instructions on applicable law.16 Finally, a two and one-half day penalty
trial replete with evidence wholly unrelated to the controversial remark followed, and the
jury returned with a verdict that denied several requested aggravating circumstances and
granted the subsection (e)(8) mitigating circumstances, further dispelling the notion of an
inflamed jury rendering a verdict on passions rather than reason. Given these
circumstances of record, therefore, we find unavailing Appellant’s claim that the
prosecutor’s opening remark rendered his penalty trial fundamentally unfair.
V. Precluding Witness Testimony Relating Appellant’s Purported Statements
of Remorse
Appellant next asserts that the lower court erred when it ruled his proffer of
testimony from friends and family relating his recent statements of remorse did not qualify
for admission as Pa.R.E. 803(1) (present sense impression) or 803(3) (then existing
16In most instances, the law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the
court. Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (Pa. 2007).
[J-3-2014] - 39
mental, emotional, or physical condition) exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay.
Specifically, the trial court permitted the witnesses to testify as to their observations of
Appellant during their meetings with him but not to the particular statements he made.
N.T. at 1490. Barring the statements, Appellant contends, violated his rights not only
under the rules of evidence themselves, but also under the 8th and 14th Amendments’
mandate that reliable mitigation evidence, regardless of state evidentiary rules, be
admitted as articulated in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1973).
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant has waived his constitutional
challenge for failure to raise it first before the trial court, as he limited his argument to their
admissibility under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, which, the Commonwealth
continues, provided no pathway to admission in any event because the statements
involved neither presently observed conditions or events as contemplated by Rule 801(1)
nor observations of his contemporaneous emotions made in the absence of a motive to
deceive, as required by Rule 803(3).
The following side-bar exchange comprises the entire discussion on the matter:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, in chambers we just had a
discussion regarding evidence that we wanted to present. We have
represented to the Court that we have multiple witnesses including the
current witness, Kim Topper; her husband, Roger Topper; the Defendant’s
cousin, Linda Yates: and sister, Brandy Johnson; among others who would
testify that he has proclaimed to them on multiple occasions his remorse
and his regret for what happened.
We’re asking the Court to admit that under Rule 803(1), which would be
present sense impression or under 803(3), which would be then existing
emotional condition. We think are admissible -- those statements would be
admissible under those exceptions to the hearsay rule.
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, we’re objecting to that because for a
number of reasons, but it’s hearsay and we don’t think it goes to state of
mind in this under these circumstances.
[J-3-2014] - 40
THE COURT: All right. The objection will be sustained. The
defense is permitted to have witnesses describe objective observations of
the Defendant. However, they may not testify as to statements made by
him to them, that is hearsay, and it is not admissible and does not meet the
exceptions outlined by the defense.
N.T. 6/18/12 at 1489-90.
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including evidence proffered at the
penalty phase of a capital trial, are within the discretion of the trial judge, and such rulings
will form no basis for appellate relief absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.
Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002). See also Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811,
818 (Pa. 1994) (noting the determination of whether hearsay, state of mind statements
are admissible is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only
upon an abuse of that discretion).
A capital defendant at the penalty hearing may present relevant evidence in
mitigation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2); Commonealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 765 (Pa. 2005).
Evidence is relevant to mitigation if it is probative of any of the enumerated mitigating
circumstances set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e). Id. “Given the broad standard
governing what qualifies as mitigation evidence, we have no doubt that a defendant's
testimonial expression of remorse at the penalty phase could be deemed relevant to his
character.” May at 766.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Pa.R.E.
801(c); Commonwealth v. McCrae, 832 A.2d 1026, 1034 (Pa. 2003). Rule 802 provides
that, “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules [the Rules of
Evidence], other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Id.
at 1034. Although we are not informed what statements, exactly, the proffered
witnesses would have attributed to Appellant, we think it reasonable to infer from the
counsel’s motion to the court and Appellant’s own testimonial expression of remorse at
[J-3-2014] - 41
penalty trial that the statements represented direct expressions of remorse, in the nature
of “I’m sorry for what happened.” As such, Appellant's alleged statements were relevant
to mitigation, but were also offered for their truth--indeed they were relevant only if used
for that purpose--and thus clearly would have constituted hearsay.
On whether the statements were nonetheless admissible, the above excerpt from
the penalty hearing shows defense counsel offered summarily that admission was
required under state of mind exceptions to the rule against hearsay as articulated in
Pa.R.E. 803(1) and (3).17 The court, however, rejected the proffer as failing to meet the
exceptions, and defense counsel discussed the matter no further. Counsel now
contends that the court erred in precluding Appellant’s statements of remorse through
17Rule 803, Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay--Regardless of Whether the
Declarant Is Available as a Witness, provides in pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of
whether the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
Comment: This rule is identical to F.R.E. 803(1).
For this exception to apply, declarant need not be excited or otherwise
emotionally affected by the event or condition perceived. The trustworthiness
of the statement arises from its timing. The requirement of
contemporaneousness, or near contemporaneousness, reduces the chance
of premeditated prevarication or loss of memory.
***
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement
of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or
emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the
declarant's will.
Pa.R.E. 803(1) and (3).
[J-3-2014] - 42
friends and family because the statements were both relevant to the critical issue of
mitigation in the penalty phase of trial and trustworthy, given they were (1) statements
against interest, (2) spontaneously made to family, (3) corroborated by his own
penalty-phase testimony, and (4) subject to cross-examination. We disagree, as
counsel failed to edify the court sufficiently as to the trustworthiness component of the
proffered testimony.
Apposite jurisprudence has denied categorical acceptance of hearsay testimony
as to an out-of-court defendant’s statement of remorse, requiring instead an additional
measure of trustworthiness beyond that which springs from the temporal coordination of
the statement and the remorseful emotion on which it remarks. In May, supra, the capital
defendant sought to admit as mitigation the testimony of his victim’s two adult daughters,
who would have testified that defendant apologized and expressed remorse during their
face-to-face meeting with them and in a three-page letter. The daughters, who were
opposed to the death penalty, were willing and available to testify regarding Appellant’s
expressions of remorse, but the trial court ruled the hearsay proffer inadmissible without
the additional assurances that cross-examination of the defendant would bring. We
upheld the ruling, reasoning:
The case sub judice is very similar to [Commonwealth v.]Young, [637 A.2d
1313 ([Pa.]1993)] in which the defendant also declined to testify on his own
behalf during the penalty phase. In an attempt to present evidence of his
remorse, the defendant there sought to introduce letters he had written to a
member of a religious order concerning his case, but the trial court ruled
that the letters were inadmissible hearsay. On appeal, this Court held that
the trial court properly excluded the letters because the Commonwealth
could not cross-examine the defendant regarding their content. This Court
specifically noted that “to allow the letters into evidence would have been
tantamount to granting [the defendant] the right of allocution ... [which right]
has been abrogated and replaced by the statutory law which specifies
procedures for sentencing for first-degree murder.” Id. at 1322. The fact
that the evidence here would have been admitted through testimony,
whereas the evidence in Young would have been admitted through letters,
makes no relevant difference. Both constitute hearsay. In both
[J-3-2014] - 43
circumstances, the defendants attempted to present favorable evidence
while denying the Commonwealth an opportunity to challenge the
statements through cross-examination. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion and properly excluded the testimony of the victim's daughters.
May. at 887 A.2d 750, 765-66.
Unlike the defendants in May and Young, Appellant eventually testified regarding
his remorse and would thus have been available for cross-examination as to his earlier
statements allegedly made to the proffered witnesses. This fact, however, fails to take
the case sub judice outside the ambit of May and Young, for, at the time defense counsel
offered the hearsay testimony in question, counsel made no indication to the court that
Appellant would later testify, let alone that he would testify as to his remorse. In death
penalty cases, our standard of review is to review the court’s evidentiary ruling at the time
it was made for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Reid, supra. With the record
revealing neither an indication by counsel that Appellant might testify, a request for a
conditional ruling in the event he did, nor a resubmission of the motion when it became
certain that he would, in fact, testify, we detect no abuse of discretion or error of law in an
evidentiary ruling made consistently with the controlling precedent of May that such
statements of remorse, unaccompanied by additional measures of trustworthiness, fail to
gain admission under our evidentiary rules pertaining to state of mind exceptions to the
rule against hearsay.
An alternate basis on which to support the court’s refusal to admit the hearsay as a
state-of-mind exception derives from a capital defendant’s motive to affect remorse in
out-of-court conversations with potential character witnesses who may then relay his
ostensibly sympathetic statements to the penalty jury. “When the declarant's
out-of-court statements demonstrate his state of mind, are made in a natural manner, and
are material and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the exception.” Commonwealth
v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 623-24 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Riggins, 478 Pa.
[J-3-2014] - 44
222, 234, 386 A.2d 520, 525 (1978)) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v.
Lonwenberg, 392 A.2d 1274, 1279 (Pa. 1978) (“In addition to the necessity for [the state
of mind] exception, the admission of this type of evidence is justified because the
circumstances in which these utterances were made indicate that they accurately
reflected the declarant's state of mind at that time and there was an absence of a motive
to deceive.”)
A capital defendant has motive to deceive when declaring his remorse, as the
statement, if deemed credible, may advance his self-interest in mitigating punishment.
This danger of surreptitious self-serving that may accompany the capital defendant’s
statement thus removes it from that class of statements whose reliability flows from a
context showing the statement was naturally made. This is not to preclude the possibility
that capital defendants may sincerely express remorse to others in extra-judicial
conversations; it, instead, simply acknowledges that great pressures bearing upon the
capital defendant to make potentially mitigating statements warrant both the conclusion
that such statements are not “naturally made” for purposes of Pa.R.E. 803(1) and (3) and
the corresponding requirement that the defendant testify on the issue of his remorse
before a jury--who may then assess his sincerity in person and with the benefit of
cross-examination--as a prerequisite to possible admission of hearsay statements of his
remorse.
Even if the trial court had ascertained that Appellant would, in fact, testify as to his
remorse--a circumstance neither alleged by Appellant nor appearing of record--such that
exclusion of witnesses’ hearsay testimony to that same effect constituted error, we would
nevertheless deem the error harmless. Harmless error may be established in one of
three ways: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was only de
minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted
[J-3-2014] - 45
evidence; or (3) the prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by comparison to the
other evidence that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have
contributed to the jury's decision regarding the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Smith,
861 A.2d 892, 897 (2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Appellant personally expressed his remorse when he apologized to the
Grove family from the witness stand. This was the clearest, most direct expression of
remorse available as it gave the jury the opportunity to assess the sincerity of Appellant’s
statement. Moreover, the jury heard testimony from two faith ministers that Appellant
presented as witnesses to his character. Specifically, Prison pastor Ronald Cordell
testified that Appellant was a consistently devout and exemplary student at his prison
bible lessons who desired instruction and conversation on forming a relationship with God
and repentance. N.T. at 1527-28. Pastor Robert Herr also testified that Appellant
displayed a level and complexity of religious searching consistent with genuine reflection
and a legitimate attempt to gain an understanding of biblical teaching that made sense to
him. N.T. at 1534-35. Herr testified as to his personal experience with so-called “prison
conversions,” wherein inmates feign newfound spiritual insight about their prior criminal
lives for the sole purpose of obtaining favorable results in pending legal proceedings, but
Herr differentiated Appellant’s approach to and participation in the faith exercises he
administered from the that typically practiced by charlatans. N.T. at 1535.
How these three accounts of Appellant’s allegedly remorseful, reflective, and
repentant state of mind provided materially different or inferior evidence on the subject as
compared to the excluded proffer, Appellant does not explain and we do not perceive.
We therefore deem harmless any error attending the exclusion of cumulative testimony
as to Appellant’s alleged remorse.
VI. Denial of Appellant’s Motion to Quash the Aggravating Factor that
Appellant Killed While in the Perpetration of a Felony
[J-3-2014] - 46
Appellant next contends that the lower court erred in denying his motion to quash
the aggravating factor that he killed while “in perpetration of a felony” under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9711(d)(6) when his underlying felony conviction was for Persons not to Possess a
Firearm. “The only felonies that the legislature intended as aggravating circumstances,”
Appellant argues, “are the six serious felonies of robbery, rape, deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, and kidnapping[]” enumerated in
18
the Crime Code’s definition of “perpetration of a felony” at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). Brief
for Appellant at 31. This Court has rejected the identical claim in both Commonwealth v.
Walker, 656 A.2d 90 (Pa. 1995) (holding jury may consider underlying felony conviction of
criminal trespass as felony for purposes of Sentencing Code’s § 9711(d)(6) aggravator)
and Commonwealth v. Robinson, 877 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2005) (holding “felony” for purposes
of (d)(6) are not those enumerated in Section 2502(d), but, instead, those contemplated
in Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq.). Appellant declares, however, “the time is
ripe for Robinson to be overruled[]” and, to that end, provides an argument that, he says,
“reiterates the convincing textual and legislative history arguments advanced by the
Robinson defendantQ.” Brief for Appellant at 31.
Indeed, as Appellant acknowledges, our decision in Robinson reaffirmed
jurisprudence set forth in Walker that a jury may find an “in perpetration of a felony”
aggravating circumstance, and that “felonies” for such a purpose are expressly defined in
the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq. We went on to reject the defendant’s
attempt to distinguish his argument from Walker’s through incorporation of legislative
history, which, he maintained, revealed how our Legislature’s severance of the former
18 Section 2502(d) defines “perpetration of a felony” as “[t]he act of the defendant in
engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.”
[J-3-2014] - 47
death penalty statute to accommodate constitutional requirements espoused in the
United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct.
2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), and reformation into present-day Crime Code’s Section
2502 (murder statute) and Sentencing Code’s Section 9711 (death penalty statute)
inadvertently omitted importing into Section 9711 the definitional section of Section 2502
as a necessary component. Robinson, 877 at 446. Our General Assembly amended 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711 “on no less than five occasions” since our decision in Walker, we noted,
and in no amendment did it alter the pertinent law as interpreted by this Court. Id. So, we
held, was applicable the well-settled presumption of statutory construction that our
interpretation was in accordance with legislative intent. Id. (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4);
Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. 1999)).
A vigorous dissent, authored by Justice Saylor, noted that the appellant had
provided an extensive legislative history of Sections 9711 and 2502, together with a
well-developed argument in support of limiting the Section 9711(d)(6) aggravator to the
six enumerated felonies of Section 2502. A probing and comprehensive analysis of the
original severance, subsequent amendments to the capital sentencing scheme, and the
resultant incarnations and iterations of each Section followed, with the dissent ultimately
opining that Section 2502(d) avoids ambiguity and “gains full meaning only when read in
conjunction with the death penalty statute.” Robinson, at 457. Conjoining the statutes in
such a way as to limit felonies qualifying as an aggravator in sentencing, Justice Saylor
opined, aligns perfectly with the United States Supreme Court’s mandate that carefully
defined, narrowing criteria apply as a threshold to death eligibility. Id. Two justices joined
Justice Saylor in dissent.
In Robinson, therefore, this Court rejected zealous advocacy and robust dissent
on the very same issue and argument that is now raised herein. Appellant concedes as
[J-3-2014] - 48
much when he states “[i]n Robinson, the defendant’s arguments were substantially the
same as the ones in this briefQ.” Brief for Appellant at 42.19 We agree, and therefore
deem Robinson binding precedent, particularly given Appellant’s reiterations of the
defendant’s unavailing arguments made in that case. Furthermore, just as we inferred in
Robinson an accordance between legislative intent and our prior interpretations of the law
from the General Assembly’s failure to alter the law subsequently, so we continue to infer
accordance in our review of the case sub judice, where the General Assembly has left the
law unaltered for nine years following the fully-developed treatment the issue received in
Robinson. Accordingly, we dismiss this claim as meritless.
VII. Admission of Victim Impact Evidence
Appellant next contends the court committed reversible error when it instructed the
jury on the use of victim impact evidence, as the court's language allowed the jury to use
victim impact as a super non-statutory aggravator. Appellant filed a pre-hearing motion
seeking to preclude the Commonwealth from offering victim impact evidence. The lower
court denied the motion, and the jury considered victim impact evidence in violation of
Appellant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Appellant argues.
19 Indeed, though Appellant points to an additional aspect of Section 2502 in support of
his legislative history argument, this point is in no way transformative, as the nature of his
challenge still mirrors the legislative history-based challenge that the Majority in Robinson
dispatched. Appellant does argue elsewhere, however, that his case is factually
distinguishable from Robinson because it involved a non-violent felony, whereas
Robinson involved two violent felonies and a non-violent one. Appellant thus speculates
that the violent nature of the two felonies in Robinson “may have been sufficient to
convince the [C]ourt that Robinson’s overall crime warranted a punishment of death, and
therefore that the perpetration of a felony aggravating circumstance was in his case
serving the narrowing function required by [United States Supreme Court jurisprudence].
Brief for Appellant at 43. Nothing in Robinson substantiates this theory, as we confined
our opinion to the question regarding the statutory source of a “felony” as that term is used
in the “perpetration of a felony” aggravating circumstance and determined the applicable
definition comes from the Crimes Code at section 101: “What constitutes a felony in this
Commonwealth is defined in the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq.”
[J-3-2014] - 49
Central to Appellant's claim is the proposition that the United States Supreme
Court decision in Payne, supra, erroneously overturned prior decisions of the Court that
held capital punishment must be based solely on evidence that tends to inform the jury
about the nature of the offense and character of the defendant. See Booth, supra, and
Gathers, supra. Quoting liberally from the dissent in Payne, Appellant argues that victim
impact statements serve no purpose other than to appeal to the sympathies or emotions
of the jurors. Payne, 501 U.S. at 856-57 (dissenting opinion of Stevens and Blackmun,
JJ.). The testimony of Officer Grove's family offered no insight to either the nature of the
offense or the character of Appellant and was therefore irrelevant, he maintains. Even if
relevant, he offers in the alternative, the victim impact statements were "overwhelmingly
more prejudicial than probative and should not have been admitted." Brief for Appellant at
45.
Appellant candidly acknowledges, however, that our Court has held the statutory
authority at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(c)(2) to instruct a jury that it may consider victim impact
evidence violates neither state or federal due process nor prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment. See Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001). He
maintains, however, that the standard jury instruction emanating from this provision and
substantially followed by the lower court in charging the jury in the case sub judice,
however, simply fails to provide adequate guidance on how to consider the victim impact
statement vis a vis the Eighth Amendment, which requires more accuracy in and factual
support for an instruction than would be required in a non-capital case. "On the one
hand, the Court says the jury can give the evidence whatever weight they think it
deserves, but on the other hand limits the jury to a 'rational inquiry into the culpability of
defendant.’ Is Appellant more culpable because the victim was loved by his parents?
Less culpable because the victim was not yet married? Was Appellant more culpable
[J-3-2014] - 50
because of a community-wide outpouring of grief for the victim? Less culpable because
the victim had not yet had children?" Appellant asks, referencing argument from the
hearing at N.T. 1437-1464. Brief of Appellant at 46.
The Commonwealth dismisses this claim as meritless because this Court has
approved not only the use of victim impact statements but also the substantially same
instruction that the court used in the case sub judice. See Means, supra.
Our standard of review for penalty phase jury instructions is the same as that which
guides us in reviewing a guilt phase jury charge. In reviewing a challenge to a jury
instruction, the entire charge is considered, not merely discrete portions thereof.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1138 (Pa. 2007). The trial court is free to
use its own expressions as long as the concepts at issue are clearly and accurately
presented to the jury. Id. It is the policy of this Court to give our trial courts latitude and
discretion in phrasing instructions. Id.
The trial court gave the following instructions regarding victim-impact testimony:
However, if you find at least one aggravating circumstance and at least one
mitigating circumstance, you may then consider the victim and family
impact evidence when deciding whether or not the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstance or
circumstances.
Each of you may give the family and victim impact statements whatever
weight you think it deserves. Your consideration of this evidence,
however, must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the
Defendant and may not be an emotional response to the evidence which
was presented.
N.T. 10/4/12 at 1848-49.
We agree with the trial court that Appellant’s challenge against the above
instruction, which aptly covered accepted law on a jury’s consideration of victim impact
statements, has no merit. Appellant relies exclusively on positions that have been
considered extensively by both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts and
[J-3-2014] - 51
relegated to dissenting opinion status. Nor does Appellant identify a growing trend of
decisional law departing from such jurisprudence to warrant reconsideration of
precedent. We therefore reject this claim.
VIII Denied Request for a Residual Doubt Instruction
Appellant next charges reversible error with the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury during the penalty phase that residual doubt could be considered as a mitigating
factor. Appellant acknowledges that no such request for the instruction appears of
record, but was made and denied, instead, in chambers, as confirmed by the trial court in
its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. Appellant also acknowledges decisions of both the
Supreme Court of the United States and this Court denying a constitutional right in a
capital defendant "to an instruction telling a jury to revisit the question of his guilt as a
basis for mitigation." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 (1988). Accord
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 750 A.2d 261, 277 (Pa. 2000).
A shift towards the introduction of residual doubt and a subsequent jury instruction,
however, has occurred, Appellant says. Citing a 2001 federal district court decision from
Louisiana 20 holding such evidence and an instruction are entitlements under the
statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. § 3592 because it allows for a non-exclusive list,
Appellant draws the analogy that the similarly open-ended Section 9711(e)(8) "catch-all"
mitigator likewise entitles a defendant to argument and instruction on residual doubt.
Moreover, Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 A.2d 312 (Pa. 2001) as an
instance in which this Court recognized the residual doubt argument as a reasonable trial
strategy in arguing against the death penalty. See id at 321 (holding counsel's emphasis
on lingering or residual doubt jurors may have had about defendant's guilt was
reasonable penalty hearing strategy in case where grounds existed for counsel's belief
20 U.S. v. Davis, 132 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D.La. 2001).
[J-3-2014] - 52
that defendant was poor witness and other witnesses were lacking). One year later, this
Court in a PCRA appeal held defendant's counsel could not be deemed ineffective for
presenting a residual doubt argument. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 813 A.2d 761 (Pa.
2002). This trend establishes, Appellant argues, that "the trial judge erred in not
instructing the jury during the penalty phase that residual doubt is an appropriate
mitigating factor." Brief for Appellant at p. 48.
The Commonwealth retorts, initially, that this claim is waived for Appellant's failure
to place his request for the instruction on the record. See Commonwealth v. Spell, 28
A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. 2011) (imposing waiver where defendant failed to ensure that
discussions of issue in lower court were preserved in the record). In any event, the
Commonwealth argues alternatively that controlling jurisprudence has held, contrary to
Appellant's assertion, "there is no constitutional requirement that a convicted murderer be
permitted to argue residual doubt concerning guilt as a mitigating factor." Means, supra at
158-59 (discussing Lynaugh, supra). A more recent pronouncement of this Court
marked not a trend toward recognizing residual doubt entitlements but, instead, a
reaffirmation against a right to such evidence presentation, argumentation, and
instruction. See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 895 (Pa. 2004) ("Residual
doubt is not a statutory mitigating circumstance and, as noted, given its statutory
irrelevance, it is not clear that appellant should have been permitted to present this sort of
evidence/argument at all."). Finally, the Commonwealth notes that the court did not limit
the presentation of residual doubt evidence, it was Appellant's election not to present it.
A trial court's denial of a request for a jury instruction is disturbed on appeal only if
there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 985 A.2d
783, 798-799 (Pa. 2009). We discern no such infirmity with the court's denial here, as it
was consistent with prevailing law on the topic recognizing no right to a jury instruction on
[J-3-2014] - 53
residual doubt, a non-statutory mitigator. Appellant's argument purportedly heralds a
trend in decisional law toward the recognition of such rights, but several decisions
rejecting ineffective claims that assailed counsel for advancing a residual doubt-based
mitigation theory does not a revolution make. The decisions were, instead, merely a
product of our review under the ineffectiveness rubric and its three-prong test wherein we
discerned no unreasonable trial strategy given the particular facts of the case. The
decisions did not concomitantly recognize a defendant’s right to a jury instruction
identifying residual doubt as a mitigating factor. Accordingly, this claim is meritless.
IX. Denial of Motion to Suppress Inculpatory Statements
Appellant next argues that the lower court erred in denying his motion to suppress
his statements recorded in an ambulance while hypothermic, dehydrated, under the
influence of morphine,21 in pain, and having heard the police ask medical staff to withhold
pain medication until Appellant was interviewed. This confluence of adverse effects
overbore his ability to give a voluntary statement and critically impaired his capacity for
self-determination, Appellant asserts, thus making the admission of his statement a
violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.
For the 11 1/2 hours between the time of the shooting until his arrest the following
morning, Appellant says, he experienced severe pain from the bullet lodged in his hip,
cold, thirst, little sleep, and the "stark absence of friends, relatives or legal counsel before
the police arrived to interrogate him." Brief of Appellant at 51. These dire circumstances,
he continues, composed the prelude to a mentally coercive interrogation punctuated by
an officer's request of the paramedic to withhold administering morphine to Appellant until
21 Though Appellant initially refers to a morphine-induced statement, the crux of his
argument with respect to the administration of morphine is that it was the withholding of
the medication until he completed his statement--and the mental and physical anguish
such prolonging of his pain caused--that rendered his statement an invalid product of
coercion.
[J-3-2014] - 54
a recording of Appellant's incriminating statement could be obtained. Compounding this
effect was the fact Appellant heard he was to be denied morphine until the statement was
obtained, Appellant continues. "To the patient experiencing severe pain, this denial of
medication constituted psychological
coercion, at the very least, and is precisely the type of situation that mandates the court to
consider statements taken in medical settings as 'extremely suspect.'" Brief of Appellant
at 50-51.
Appellant analogizes his deprivation of pain medication during interrogation to that
of the defendant in Commonwealth v. Perry, 379 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1977). Hospitalized with
a gunshot wound, fed intravenously, and coping with the discomfort of a catheter, Perry
asked for, but was denied, pain medication during his interrogation. He had not seen
friends or family for over 12 hours and was under visible police guard. Id. at 547. These
facts led this Court to throw out the confession, which was not, we held, "the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice." Id. Cited additionally for the same
proposition is Commonwealth ex rel Gaito v. Maroney, 220 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1966), wherein
the Court deemed an admission involuntary where obtained four hours post-surgery and
after administration of demerol, despite the district attorney's testimony that defendant did
not seem impaired. A unanimous court, Appellant states, based its decision "not only on
the lack of rational choice on the part of appellant but also on 'a strong conviction that our
system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this
fashion.'" Id. at 632 (quoting Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
Even though it was "quite possible that the challenged confession may have been
obtained while appellant was completely lucid and mentally competent[,]" Maroney
reasoned, "our judgment as to the effect of the circumstances under which the confession
was obtained upon appellant's mental capacity to confess must by its nature be one
[J-3-2014] - 55
based upon probabilities." Maroney at 631. In much the same way, even if it were
possible that he was completely lucid and mentally competent, Appellant submits, the
confluence of circumstances makes that possibility too small to serve as a basis for the
admission of his statement.
His case compares favorably to the hospitalization cases above, Appellant says,
because, unlike those defendants, who were at least receiving medical treatment at the
time, he had not yet come under the care of a physician when his statement was taken.
Instead, he lay handcuffed to a stretcher and surrounded by two police officers, one of
whom asked paramedics to delay pain relief until a statement was recorded. Moreover,
Appellant contends, his case is distinguishable from jurisprudence that a suspect's
wounded condition necessitating hospital care does not automatically render a
confession involuntary. Though we held in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089
(Pa. 1999), that displaying the 'presence of mind in fabricating a story about his shooting'
designed to mislead police revealed a will uncoerced in the hospitatlized defendant and,
thus, a statement voluntarily rendered, Appellant notes no such deliberate falsification
exists in the case sub judice. His attempt to hide his vehicle occurred immediately after
the shooting and was far too remote in time from his statement given eleven hours later to
lend insight into his state of mind at that time. In sum, given the totality of circumstances
surrounding his statement obtained in the ambulance, admission of the statement
violated his constitutional rights and should have been suppressed by the lower court,
Appellant posits.
The Commonwealth responds that the testimonial evidence adduced at the
suppression hearing dispelled any concern Appellant’s recorded confession was the
product of coercion. Pennsylvania state troopers arriving at the scene immediately
called for emergency assistance upon seeing a wounded Appellant and interviewed a
[J-3-2014] - 56
lucid and responsive Appellant in accordance with the dictates of Miranda during the
14-minute wait for an ambulance, the Commonwealth argues. Appellant freely
confessed during this time, the argument continues, and the interview stopped shortly
thereafter when the ambulance arrived to allow paramedics to prepare Appellant for
transport to York Hospital.
Knowing a tape recorder was then recording all comments, Appellant answered
the paramedic’s questions clearly, indicating he had been shot in the right hip during the
night, the Commonwealth notes. Interrogation resumed only after the EMT’s ten minute
medical assessment of Appellant, during which time he obtained Appellant’s medical
history, determined the status of the gunshot wound appeared to be stable, as it was no
longer bleeding, applied a bandage to the hip, and placed heat packs on the IV tube in
response to Appellant’s report that he was cold.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the Commonwealth maintains, pain relief in the
form of IV morphine was not delayed pending Appellant’s provision of a confession. The
record establishes, instead, that Trooper Navitsky asked the paramedic if he could have
five minutes to interview Appellant before morphine was given, and the EMT agreed, as
that represented the time it would take the EMT to prepare for, and receive a physician’s
approval for, administration of morphine anyway. N.T. at 33-47, 198. Trooper Navitsky
indicated he only wanted to put on the recorder the substance of the conversation he and
Appellant had before the ambulance arrived. N.T. at 198. Recordation of Appellant’s
statement ensued and morphine was thereafter administered intravenously within the
five-minute time frame.
As for the recorded statement itself, the Commonwealth argues, Appellant
answered all questions pertaining to his knowledge of Miranda rights and his culpability in
the shooting freely, clearly, and candidly. He knew the day of the week, denied having
[J-3-2014] - 57
taken illicit drugs, and then offered a detailed account of spotlight hunting, the deadly
confrontation with Officer Grove and subsequent flight from the scene, and his night alone
in the woods, which, he said, gave him time to think and feel remorse for the killing.
Then asking Trooper Navitsky to pause the recorder and informing him of Ryan
Laumann’s alleged involvement in another crime, the Commonwealth offers, further
revealed Appellant was neither physically nor psychologically overwhelmed but was,
instead, capable of rationale, independent, goal-oriented thought calculated to improve
his lot in a difficult circumstance. Also noted by the Commonwealth is that treating
paramedics testified Appellant was “stable, conscious, alert, oriented, and acting and
conversing appropriately.” Brief of Appellee at 45. They observed no change in
Appellant’s demeanor or mental status after he received five milligrams of morphine,22
nor did they observe any evidence of hypothermia, dehydration, or severe blood loss on
the part of Appellant, the Commonwealth recounts. N.T. at 50, 57, 58-62, 114-116, 120,
146-48.
These impressions were consistent, it is argued, with those of trauma surgeon Dr.
Kern Michael Hughes, who determined Appellant was stable and his vital signs and
mental status were normal. No surgery was necessary for what he discerned as a fairly
superficial, minor gunshot wound to the right hip area, nor did he detect any sign of
hypothermia or dehydration, the Commonwealth notes. Additionally noteworthy in this
regard, the Commonwealth says, is that Dr. Hughes discharged Appellant only several
hours after arrival.
22As to the effects of this dose of morphine, the Commonwealth also alludes to the
suppression hearing testimony of Dr. Ward Donovan, Chief of Toxicology at the Pinnacle
Health System, who, based on clinical findings of the case coupled with his own
pharmacological findings, “determined that the administration of five milligrams of
morphine in this case to Appellant between 10:10 a.m. and 10:25 a.m. would have
minimal or no impact whatsoever on his cognitive functioning.” Brief of Appellee at 46.
[J-3-2014] - 58
Finally bearing on the voluntariness of his statement, the Commonwealth adds, is
evidence that Appellant continued to cooperate with law enforcement after his hospital
discharge, showing them, in person, “the path he had taken the previous night and the
general area in which he had disposed of his weapons.” Brief of Appellant, p. 46, citing
N.T. 224-229.
The trial court explained its order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his
statement as follows:
The cornerstone of Defendant’s challenge is his claim he was suffering from
various medical infirmities at the time of his statement; however, his various
claims of illness are not supported by the record. Medical professionals
consistently indicated that during the examination at the scene, and
subsequently at the hospital, there were no physical symptoms evidencing
that Defendant suffered from dehydration, hypothermia, or significant blood
loss. In addition, Commonwealth presented credible expert testimony
corroborating the paucity of any evidence that the medical infirmities
complained of ever existed. Defendant’s expert’s opinion to the contrary is
unconvincing. While it is true Defendant complained of pain to emergency
first responders, his primary initial complaint related to the tightness of the
handcuffs rather than the bullet wound to his hip. Once the handcuffs were
released, Defendant subsequently expressed pain only in response to
questioning by medical professionals. Indeed, the totality of the
circumstances establishes that the pain suffered by Defendant, if any, did
not interfere in any way with his ability to understand, process, and
intelligently respond to police questioning. Defendant’s condition was not
so impaired as to render him incapable of voluntarily waiving his rights or
describing the incident that resulted in his custody.
***
Defendant argues that despite manifestations of a cooperative, voluntary
statement, his physical and psychological condition was impaired to the
extent he was incapable of understanding and intelligently waiving his
rights. Unfortunately for Defendant, the evidence at the suppression
hearing does not support his claim. All medical and law enforcement
personnel coming into contact with Defendant during the time period related
to the interview testified Defendant was cognizant of time and place.
Moreover, his statement evidenced the ability to recall and relate recent and
distant past events. Defendant accurately related information and
provided rational answers to the proposed questions. At one point during
the discussion, Defendant requested to have the recorded portion of the
[J-3-2014] - 59
interview suspended while he discussed a matter implicating another in
criminal conduct. His ability to process such a consideration demonstrated
the complexity of his thinking. These facts confirm Defendant had
sufficient cognitive awareness to understand his Miranda warnings and
intelligently waive his rights.
Trial Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed 11/16/11 at 11-12.
In reviewing a suppression court's denial of a suppression motion,
we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of
the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual
findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and
may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar,
826 A.2d 831, 842 (Pa. 2003)). Nonetheless, we exercise plenary review over the
suppression court's conclusions of law. Id. (citations omitted).
“There is of course no single litmus-paper test for determining a constitutionally
impermissible interrogation. Rather, the ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the
confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.
‘If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.’” Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 282 A.2d 327, 329 (Pa.
1971) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6
L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961)). Thus we must consider the totality of the circumstances,
including the accused's mental and physical condition. Id.
In Perry, supra, this Court addressed the voluntariness of a confession made by a
defendant who, like Appellant, was at the time of his interrogation undergoing medical
[J-3-2014] - 60
treatment and observation for a gunshot wound. In concluding Perry’s statement was
involuntarily made, we found dispositive the following facts:
Thirteen hours after his arrest, the detective informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and appellant indicated that he would give a statement.
The interrogation continued for about one hour and twenty minutes, until
11:15 a. m. During this time appellant gave and signed an incriminating
statement.
During the interview appellant was lying in bed and was alone in the room
with the interrogating detective. During the interview he complained to the
detective of pain and was experiencing discomfort from a catheter inserted
through the penis into the bladder in order to monitor for any abnormal
bleeding indicating injury to the bladder, urinary tract or kidney. At one
point during the interview, when the appellant complained of pain, he asked
the detective to call the nurse. When the nurse arrived, the appellant
informed her that he was in pain and wanted some type of medication.
Medication, however, was refused. Throughout the interview, appellant
was being fed through an intravenous tube. The catheter remained in the
appellant for over two days and the intravenous feeding continued
constantly for about four days. At one point during the interrogation,
appellant was asked by the detective if he wanted to continue the
interrogation and the appellant answered that he “didn't care.”
Id at 546-47.
Appellant offers Perry as controlling authority given the facts of his case, but it is
readily apparent that key differences exist between the factual scenarios of each case so
as to distinguish them. Whereas Perry was admitted to the intensive care unit for a
gunshot wound to the chest, gave his statement to an interrogator who kept him isolated
for one hour and twenty minutes in a small cubicle, complained of pain during the
interrogation to the point of calling for a nurse to administer pain medication, and was, in
fact, intentionally denied pain medication until he completed his statement, Appellant was
subject to a recorded statement lasting five minutes and taken in the company of
paramedics who agreed Trooper Navitsky had only that amount of time before morphine
would be administered. As such, Appellant had no reason to believe his pain medication
[J-3-2014] - 61
had been denied; in fact, the tape recorder captured his response of “that’s fine” when the
necessary wait time before morphine would be given. See Trial Court’s Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, supra at 15. Moreover, Appellant would have also noticed
Trooper Navitsky had yielded silently to paramedics for approximately ten minutes as
they initially cared for Appellant and prepared him for transport, had asked permission to
record Appellant’s statement, and had explained he needed only a short time to record a
statement that Appellant had already given before the ambulance had arrived. These
circumstances do not connote a psychologically coercive environment.
Relevant, as well, to our inquiry is Appellant’s demonstrated presence of mind to
ask Trooper Navitsky to turn off the recorder at one point to allow him to relate information
incriminating Ryan Laumann in another crime. Made presumably in an attempt to
cooperate with authorities in exchange for lenient treatment, Appellant’s offer further
evidenced not a coerced mind overborne with pain and intimidation but, instead, a freely
calculating mind exploring ways to secure a more favorable result for himself. We liken
the import of Appellant’s interrogation response in this regard to the falsified story offered
by the defendant in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 1999) to mislead a
police investigation into his shooting. As we inferred from the presence of mind to lie in
such circumstances a retained capacity to respond voluntarily to an interrogator, so, too,
do we infer from Appellant’s display of initiative in spontaneously departing from Trooper
Navitsky’s script to offer information and cooperation in the investigation of an unrelated
crime an unconstrained mind engaged in independent thinking and voluntary discourse.
With respect to the question of whether the compromising effect of physical pain
on one’s ability to offer a voluntary statement may have played a role here, Appellant’s
[J-3-2014] - 62
case is further distinguishable from Perry, given testimonial evidence from treating health
care providers as to the limited extent of injury and physical difficulty experienced by
Appellant at the time of the statement. Treating paramedics and Dr. Hughes all denied
observing symptoms of hypothermia, dehydration, or compromised mental status in
Appellant at the time during or immediately after his statement. Unlike in Perry,
therefore, the invalidating suspicion that substantial physical pain and its diminishing
effect on one’s will to resist the influence of others simply fails to arise under the medical
testimony adduced at Appellant’s suppression hearing.
Finally, Appellant’s provision of a voluntary statement was further substantiated by
evidence pertaining to the hours following his discharge, where in an apparent
continuation of his willingness to cooperate with authorities he accompanied them back to
the scene of the crime and retraced his steps taken before, during, and after he
committed his fateful act. For all the foregoing reasons, therefore, we discern neither an
abuse of discretion nor an error of law in the suppression court’s determination that
Appellant’s recorded confession was the voluntarily made product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice to tell Trooper Navitsky about his role in the killing of Officer
Grove.
X: Admissibility of Guilt-Phase Proffer of Alcohol Consumption History
In Appellant's final enumerated issue, he argues that the court erred in refusing to
permit testimony from witnesses regarding his alcohol consumption habit, or more
precisely, evidence of his ostensible alcoholism, as it existed prior to the criminal incident
as corroborative evidence to his guilt phase voluntary intoxication affirmative defense.
Specifically, Appellant sought to introduce testimony from his mother, Kimberly Topper,
[J-3-2014] - 63
that: she had found a case of empty beer cans and four to six bottles of alcohol in his
bedroom one week before the murder; Appellant had come down from his bedroom one
morning, also about a week before the murder, smelling of alcohol and saying he had only
drunk one or two beers; and his girlfriend, Leslie Filer, had expressed concern about
Appellant's alcohol use, to which Topper explained he had a family history of alcoholism.
Also proposed was testimony from Ms. Filer herself as to Appellant’s recent bank
statements reflecting purchases from a local restaurant in the two week period leading up
to the murder. Though the statements did not indicate what was purchased, Ms. Filer
would testify the transactions were for alcohol. N.T. at 899-904, 943.
The trial court excluded Mrs. Topper's proposed testimony on relevancy and
hearsay grounds. Neither her testimony about discovering bottles in his bedroom nor
her observation of Appellant’s condition one week or so before the murder was
sufficiently connected to the date of the incident, the court found, rendering each
irrelevant. N.T. at 900. Not only were Ms. Filer’s prospective interpretations of bank
statements in the weeks before the murder also irrelevant to the issue of Appellant’s state
of mind at the time of the murder, the court ruled, they were also speculative because
there was no way to ascertain what percentage of the purchases went for food as
opposed to alcohol. N.T. at 945. As for Topper’s account of Ms. Filer's concerns,
moreover, the court excluded it on grounds it consisted of an out of court declarant’s
statement offered for the proof of the matter asserted and thus constituted inadmissible
hearsay. N.T. at 902.
According to Appellant, the ruling of the trial court that evidence of general
consumption of alcohol was irrelevant because it was insufficient by itself to support a
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defense of voluntary intoxication and other evidence existed that Appellant drank on the
day of the murder was erroneous. In fact, Appellant contends, in so ruling, the trial court
substituted its judgment for that of the jury as to the weight of the evidence, rather than
actually making a relevancy determination, and thereby usurped the jury of its exclusive
role of determining credibility of witnesses and assessing weight to their testimonies.
Under Pa.R.E. 402, Appellant argues, the proper relevancy analysis required a
determination as to whether the evidence about Appellant’s apparent alcoholism made
more or less probable the already admitted testimony of Appellant’s drinking and the
effects thereof. This excluded corroborative evidence, Appellant reasons, would have
lent credibility to his out-of-court statement, admitted through the testimony of
admitting/treating physician Fazila Lalani, M.D. of York Hospital that his alcohol
consumption on the day of the murder consisted of twelve beers. N.T. at 896. Because
the amount of alcohol he consumed on the day of the murder was a matter in factual
dispute, Appellant asserts,23 evidence of his purported alcoholism would have made it
more likely that the higher number he reported to Dr. Lalani was the accurate one, thus
making the proffer highly relevant and probative. In this vein, Appellant concludes, the
evidence could have resonated with the common understanding regarding the nature of
alcoholism and “could easily [have led]” the jury to conclude that Appellant’s brain was
23 For example, Appellant notes, Trooper Navitsky told the jury that Appellant reported
having drunk two or three beers prior to the shooting and Trooper Michael Weaver
testified that one empty Bud Light can was found at the deer poaching scene and another
at the scene of the shooting. Dr. Lalani testified that Appellant self-reported drinking
twelve beers on the day in question, while Ryan Laumann testified Appellant was “tipsy
and buzzed’ from alcohol at 4:00 p.m. and then drank six or seven more beers in his
company before the shooting.
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likely “overwhelmed or overpowered” for purposes of the voluntary intoxication defense.
Brief for Appellant at 56.
The Commonwealth responds that this Court has previously rejected this very type
of appeal that alcohol consumption at times removed from the moment of murder is
relevant to an assessment of the state of mind element to First Degree Murder. In Spotz,
supra, we reviewed a PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
witnesses who collectively would have testified as to the defendant’s chronic drug use,
his intoxication from cocaine use some twelve hours after the early morning murder, and
his apparently high state about two to three hours after the murder. We dismissed the
testimony as irrelevant to a voluntary intoxication defense: “[n]one of this testimony
remotely suggests that Appellant was at all intoxicated by drugs or alcohol at the time of
Ms. Gunnet's murder, much less that he was so intoxicated as to be overwhelmed to the
point of losing his faculties and sensibilities and unable to formulate a specific intent to
kill[,]” we reasoned. Id. at 91-92. Here, quite similar to Spotz, the Commonwealth
contends, none of the proffered witnesses saw Appellant consume alcohol, or otherwise
had information concerning his alcohol consumption at or near the time of the murder.
The overriding principle in determining if any evidence [ ] should be
admitted involves a weighing of the probative value versus prejudicial
effect. We have held that the trial court must decide first if the evidence is
relevant and, if so, whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect. Commonwealth v. Hawk, [ ] 709 A.2d 373, 376 ([Pa.] 1998). This
Commonwealth defines relevant evidence as “having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Pa.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be
excluded “if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
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Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006).
To have prevailed in his voluntary intoxication defense, Appellant was required
under our law to inject reasonable doubt in the Commonwealth’s proof that he had
murdered Officer Grove with the specific intent to kill. This could be accomplished by
establishing he possessed a diminished capacity at the time of the crime:
A diminished capacity defense does not exculpate the defendant from
criminal liability entirely, but instead negates the element of specific intent.
For a defendant who proves a diminished capacity defense, first-degree
murder is mitigated to third-degree murder. To establish a diminished
capacity defense, a defendant must prove that his cognitive abilities of
deliberation and premeditation were so compromised, by mental defect or
voluntary intoxication, that he was unable to formulate the specific intent to
kill. The mere fact of intoxication does not give rise to a diminished
capacity defense. [Rather, a defendant must] show that he was
overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and sensibilities to prove a
voluntary intoxication defense.
Spotz at 90-91.
We agree with the Commonwealth’s position that the case sub judice comes
squarely under our holding in Spotz, which declared that evidence of chronic drug use or
intoxication at times other than the time of the murder is irrelevant to a voluntary
intoxication defense:
Appellant cites the PCRA testimony of numerous witnesses who presented
evidence concerning his chronic and acute drug use, as we summarize in
the paragraph below. It is important to emphasize that none of the
witnesses who testified at the PCRA hearing actually saw Appellant or had
information as to his drug use at the time of Ms. Gunnet's murder, which is
the only time that is relevant.
Id. at 91. As we held in Spotz with respect to the relevancy of evidence pertaining to the
defendant’s chronic and acute drug use at times other than the time of the murder, so,
too, do we hold here that evidence of Appellant’s allegedly chronic alcohol use and
possibly heavy use within a week of the murder bore no relevance to the question of
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whether he was intoxicated at the time he killed Officer Grove, much less to whether he
was so intoxicated as to be overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and
sensibilities and unable to formulate a specific intent to kill. See Spotz at 92. To that
latter point, the eyewitness testimony of Ryan Laumann, as recounted supra, provided
numerous detailed examples of how Appellant demonstrated control of his faculties and
sensibilities during “the only time that is relevant,” i.e., the hours leading up to and
including time of the murder. This testimony refuted the notion of a diminished capacity,
and Appellant could not have reasonably overcome it with irrelevant evidence pertaining
to a different period of time. Accordingly, we discern no manifest unreasonableness or
abuse of discretion in the court’s evidentiary ruling excluding alcohol consumption history
evidence.
XI. Passion, Prejudice, and Arbitrariness Review
Though Appellant raises no specific argument under this final topic, we are
required to conduct an independent penalty review pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3),
which provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it
determines that : (i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor; or (ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d).” Our careful review of the record
leads us to conclude that Appellant’s sentence of death was not the product of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, but was, instead, based on the overwhelming
evidence establishing that he fatally shot Officer Grove with the specific intent to kill. The
parties did not dispute, moreover, that evidence supported application of the Section
9711(d)(1) aggravating circumstance of taking the life of a law enforcement officer while
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acting in the line of duty. Accordingly, we hereby affirm Appellant’s convictions and
sentence of death.24
Former Justice McCaffery did not participate in the decision of this case.
Mr. Chief Justice Castille and Mr. Justice Eakin join the opinion.
Mr. Justice Saylor files a concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Baer files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Madame
Justice Todd joins.
24 The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court is directed to transmit the complete record of
this case to the Governor of Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(i).
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