Commonwealth v. Ricker, D., Aplt.

[J-126-2016]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 41 MAP 2016
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court dated July 17, 2015 at No. 1693
: MDA 2014 Affirming the Order of the
v. : Dauphin County Court of Common
: Pleas dated October 1, 2014 at No. CP-
: 22-CR-0003601-2014.
DAVID EDWARD RICKER, :
: ARGUED: December 6, 2016
Appellant :
DISSENTING STATEMENT
JUSTICE WECHT FILED: September 28, 2017
The Court dismisses this appeal as improvidently granted, because a majority of
Justices now have concluded that the case presents a poor vehicle by which to review
the use of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings. The Court has determined that,
because the Commonwealth introduced some non-hearsay evidence at David Ricker’s
preliminary hearing, we should await a case in which the issue is more suitably
presented. I respectfully disagree.
The Commonwealth’s prima facie case was premised upon, and, for all practical
purposes constructed entirely by, Trooper Michael Trotta’s taped interview. At the
preliminary hearing, the crux of the prosecution’s case was inadmissible hearsay. It is
true that the Commonwealth presented live, non-hearsay testimony from Trooper
Douglas Kelley. But this testimony was tangential; it merely corroborated elements of
what the Commonwealth sought to prove through introduction of Trooper Trotta’s taped
interview. It also is true that Trooper Kelley’s testimony could have established one or
more elements in one or more of the three crimes for which David Ricker was charged.
But that is not what happened.
At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Trotta’s taped statement was the
Commonwealth’s proverbial star witness. Trooper Trotta’s statement left no gaps to be
filled in with other evidence. The non-hearsay testimony was surplusage.1 Of course, it
was well within the Commonwealth’s discretion to introduce Trooper Kelley’s testimony.
However, while that testimony could have established some elements of the offenses, it
is plain that it did not do so. From my review of the record, I fail to discern how we
reasonably can conclude otherwise. The prima facie case was established exclusively
by Trooper Trotta’s taped interview. The fact that the Commonwealth introduced other
material does not change this reality.
Perhaps the Court is correct that this case does not offer the optimal vehicle for
analyzing the issue. Nonetheless, I believe that it is imprudent for us to decline review
here. The question presented is “one of such substantial public importance as to
require prompt and definitive resolution by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” See
1
Chief Justice Saylor criticizes my characterization of Trooper Kelley’s testimony,
and highlights the lack of authority to support what he perceives as my effort to
“downplay” or “subordinate” that non-hearsay evidence. See Concurring Statement at
15-16 n.8. This criticism misconstrues my point. I neither make, nor intend, any
argument to “downplay” (or “up-play”) any evidence. What I am doing is simply viewing
the preliminary hearing, and the Commonwealth’s clear objective at that hearing, in a
realistic manner in light of what is plain from the record. My review of that record makes
patently clear that the Commonwealth sought to establish its prima facie case through
Trooper Trotta’s taped statement. The remainder of the evidence (i.e. Trooper Kelley’s
testimony) was used merely to bolster that hearsay evidence, and to corroborate it, but
quite obviously not to establish any elements on its own. To view the matter otherwise,
as the learned Chief Justice does, elevates the non-hearsay to a level unintended by
the Commonwealth and presses it into service now in a manner belied by the record of
how the hearing actually occurred. The result allows the Commonwealth to insulate its
case from meaningful challenge by a defendant and prevents this Court from
considering the constitutionality of a hearing conducted in the fashion that occurred
here.
[J-126-2016] - 2
Pa.R.A.P.1114(b)(4). While this provision of our rules guides our decisions on whether
to grant review in a case, its principle is equally compelling when we consider whether
to dismiss an appeal as improvidently granted. Thousands of preliminary hearings
occur across this Commonwealth each year. Query: How will those proceedings be
conducted and governed, and for how long, until the very best vehicle arrives at this
Court for review? To the extent that the Superior Court erred in this case, and I believe
that it did, its error will be replicated and imposed upon every defendant in this
Commonwealth until the best case arrives on our doorstep. The issue is adequately
preserved and presented, and should not be left on a back burner to await resolution at
some unknown point in the future.
The Superior Court’s decision here permits prima facie cases to be built
exclusively upon hearsay. Consider the consequences of that decision, which will
continue, and which may be exacerbated, as we await the best case. Magisterial
district judges will be unable to fulfill their essential role of determining whether the
Commonwealth has presented enough evidence to detain the accused. Defendants will
be subjected to extensive periods of pretrial incarceration that later may prove to have
been unnecessary. Neither the Commonwealth nor the defendant will gain a fair
assessment of the strength of the case going forward. The defendant will be stripped of
a fair opportunity to test the Commonwealth’s case via his or her rule-based right to
cross-examination, to direct his or her pretrial investigation, to exercise his or her
constitutional right to an attorney in a meaningful fashion, and to consider intelligently
his or her options to plead guilty or to proceed with a jury trial or a non-jury trial.
And there is a still larger problem that follows from the Court’s dismissal. Not
only will the Superior Court’s decision fundamentally alter the preliminary hearing; as
well, today’s result effectively hands the Commonwealth a blueprint for ensuring that
[J-126-2016] - 3
cases are constructed in such a way as to perpetually avoid review of the question
presented in this case. Henceforth, the Commonwealth can present inadmissible
hearsay to establish every element of every crime charged. The Commonwealth then
can call one live witness to testify as to any tangential, corroborative fact, no matter how
obvious or duplicative. For instance, in a murder case, the Commonwealth can call one
police officer to say that he or she saw the victim’s corpse in the morgue, even though
this fact was already established through hearsay. So long as that one additional fact
could touch upon or establish any element of the crimes charged, the prima facie
question will forever be able to avoid our review, and the Superior Court’s decision will
remain the law of this Commonwealth, escaping our consideration in perpetuity.
Its facial appeal notwithstanding, the Court’s decision necessarily induces these
unfortunate results. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would review the merits of the
case, and I would reverse the Superior Court. My analysis follows.
I.
In a criminal prosecution, the preliminary hearing is the first event at which the
right to counsel attaches. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (plurality). It is
the proceeding at which the Commonwealth must carry its first burden. The preliminary
hearing is no mere formality. It is important to both the Commonwealth and the
defendant. The preliminary hearing is essential to the functioning of a justice system
that seeks to balance the Commonwealth’s authority and obligation to prosecute crime
against the accused’s individual rights under our Constitutions.
At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth must appear before a neutral and
detached magistrate and justify restraints of a person’s liberty—restraints imposed by
pretrial incarceration, by requiring a person to defend against criminal charges, or both.
The Commonwealth must justify such restraints by establishing a prima facie case to
[J-126-2016] - 4
the judicial officer’s satisfaction. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D). Although the burden is
relatively low, it is nonetheless vital to our system of justice.
The question in this case is whether the Commonwealth can satisfy that burden
on the basis of inadmissible hearsay evidence alone. The Superior Court decided that it
may do so, concluding that Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E) countenances a prima facie case
established under such circumstances. This interpretation runs afoul of our
constitutional requirements of due process and fundamental fairness. It is
unsustainable, as a matter of law.
II.
The vast majority of criminal cases begin with the filing of a criminal complaint
against an individual suspected of committing one or more criminal offenses. In most
instances, the district attorney plays no part in the initial charging decision, which is
made by a law enforcement officer. Nor does the prosecutor typically appear at the
initial arraignment. Normally, the attorney for the Commonwealth involves himself or
herself in a case for the first time at the preliminary hearing.
Rule 542 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure governs those
hearings. The rule, inter alia, authorizes the Commonwealth to “assume charge of the
prosecution,” and to “recommend to the issuing authority that the defendant be
discharged or bound over to court.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(A)(1)-(2). The rule also
safeguards certain rights held by the defendant, including the right to “be represented
by counsel” and to “cross-examine witnesses and inspect physical evidence offered
against” him or her. Id. 542(C)(1)-(2). The defendant may call witnesses and offer
physical evidence on his or her own behalf. Id. 542(C)(3)-(4).
The rule also sets forth the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, mandating that an
issuing authority may hold a defendant for trial only when the Commonwealth
[J-126-2016] - 5
establishes a prima facie case demonstrating that “(1) an offense has been committed
and (2) the defendant has committed it.” Id. 542(D). Finally, the rule authorizes the
Commonwealth to satisfy this burden, at least in part, through the use of hearsay. Rule
542(E) provides as follows:
Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in
determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay
evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense,
including, but not limited to, those requiring proof of the ownership of, non-
permitted use of, damage to, or value of property.
Id. 542(E) (boldface added for emphasis).
In this case, the Superior Court interpreted “any” to mean, effectively, one
element, some elements, or all of the elements of a crime. The court opined that, “[i]f
hearsay evidence is sufficient to establish one or more elements of the crime, it follows
that under the rule, it is sufficient to meet all of the elements.” Commonwealth v. Ricker,
120 A.3d 349, 357 (Pa. Super. 2015). Thus, concluded the Superior Court, Rule 542(E)
permits the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case premised exclusively upon
hearsay evidence, even though that same body of evidence would not be admissible at
a later trial.
III.
Like the Superior Court, we must interpret the term “any” as it appears in Rule
542(E). In all matters involving statutory interpretation, we apply the Statutory
Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501 et seq. The Act directs us to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the drafter of the relevant provision. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).2 To
accomplish that goal, we interpret the operative language not in isolation, but with
2
Generally, our rules of procedure are subject to the rules of statutory
interpretation. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C) (“To the extent practicable, these rules shall be
construed in consonance with the rules of statutory construction.”).
[J-126-2016] - 6
reference to the context in which it appears. See Consulting Eng’rs Council of Pa. v.
State Architects Licensure Bd., 560 A.2d 1375, 1377 (Pa. 1989). A provision’s plain
language generally provides the best indication of the drafters’ intent. See, e.g.,
McGrory v. Dep’t of Transp., 915 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v.
Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. 2003); Pa. Fin. Responsibility Assigned
Claims Plan v. English, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1995) (“Where the words of a statute are
clear and free from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very
words.”). Only where the words are ambiguous will we resort to other means for
discerning legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); see In re Canvass of Absentee
Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. 2004) (citing O’Rourke
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. 2001) (“Only when the language of the
statute is ambiguous does statutory construction become necessary.”)).
The plain meaning of the term “any” sheds faint light on whether the rule was
intended to allow a prosecutor to demonstrate a prima facie case based solely upon
otherwise inadmissible hearsay. In the Superior Court’s view, “any” reasonably could
mean “every” or “all.” This is a reasonable interpretation, one that comports generally
with dictionary definitions. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “any” in a number of
ways, including “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind” and “one, some, or all
indiscriminately of whatever quantity.”3
On the other hand, it would be reasonable as well to interpret “any” in a more
restrictive, singular sense. A simple hypothetical will illustrate the point. The setting is a
law firm. In an effort to ingratiate himself with his older colleagues, one young associate
shows up for work on a Friday with a dozen doughnuts, and sends out an email reading
“I brought doughnuts today. Please help yourself to any that you like.” Inside the box
3
See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited Aug. 7, 2017).
[J-126-2016] - 7
are three different kinds of doughnuts: glazed, chocolate-sprinkled, and cream-filled.
Lawyer A walks up and selects one glazed doughnut, reasonably believing that “any”
meant “any one” particular doughnut. However, imagine that Lawyer B was the first to
the box, and he decided to take two glazed doughnuts and two chocolate-sprinkled
doughnuts. Lawyer B, also reasonably, interpreted “any” to mean “some” or “as many
as,” because each doughnut fairly can be considered “any” doughnut. The first glazed
is “any”, as is the second glazed, and as is each of the two chocolate-sprinkled
doughnuts. Now, suppose instead that Lawyer C is the first to the box, and that he
takes all of the doughnuts. Every one of them is a doughnut that he likes, and there
was no limit suggested on the amount of doughnuts that he could take. In fact, he was
told that he could take “any” of them. In his view, “any” meant “all,” which he happens
to know is also the precise meaning ascribed to the term by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
Both the Superior Court’s interpretation and the above hypothetical demonstrate
the interpretive complexities attending the term “any,” with its several common usages.
Preeminent lexicographer and legal writing maven Bryan Garner, undoubtedly
recognizing these complexities and usages, has described the numerous “uses and
meanings” of “any” as follows:
As an adjective, any has essentially six uses. (1) The most common
occurrence is in conditional, hypothetical, and interrogative sentences,
where any means “a (no matter which)” or “some” . (2) In the negative
assertions, it creates an emphatic negative, meaning “not at all” or “not
even one” . (3) In affirmative sentences, it means
“every” or “all” . (4) In a
sentence implying that a selection or discretionary act will follow, it may
mean “one or more (unspecified things or people); whichever; whatever”
. (5) In a declarative sentence or imperative involving a
qualitative judgment, it means “of whatever kind” . In this sense, there is sometimes the
implication that the quality may be poor . (6) In a declarative sentence involving a quantitative
judgment, it means “unlimited in amount or extent; to whatever extent
necessary” . In a related colloquial sense, it may mean “of great size
or considerable extent” when following a negative .
BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 51 (4th ed. 2016).
“Any,” at first blush a simple word, has variable meanings depending upon the
context in which the term is used. The problem we face here is that, not only is the term
itself amenable to multiple definitions and usages, but the context in which it appears
also is unhelpful. The remainder of Rule 542 offers us no guidance as to whether the
term “any” was intended to mean “any” in its singular or less than total sense, or
whether it was intended to mean one, some, or all. Each construction would be
reasonable in this case. Because “[a] statute is ambiguous when there are at least two
reasonable interpretations of the text,” A.S. v. Pa. State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 905-06
(Pa. 2016), Rule 542(E) is ambiguous.
When language is ambiguous, this Court generally may resolve the ambiguity by
considering: “the occasion and necessity for the statute or regulation; the circumstances
under which it was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the
former law, if any, including other statutes or regulations upon the same or similar
subjects; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and administrative
interpretations of such statute.” Freedom Med. Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 131 A.3d 977, 984 (Pa. 2016) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)). However, there are
additional canons of statutory interpretation that we must consider as well. Relevant
[J-126-2016] - 9
here is our “canon of constitutional avoidance.”4 We invoked this canon of restraint
recently in Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2016):
[W]e are bound to interpret a statute, where possible, in a way that
comports with the constitution’s terms. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922 (directing us to
presume “[t]hat the General Assembly does not intend to violate the
Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth”). We reach a
constitutional challenge only when we find no tenable interpretation of the
statute in question that obviates the necessity of doing so. “When the
validity of [a statute] is drawn in question, and if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the [constitutional] question may be avoided.” Commonwealth v.
Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 827 (Pa. 1974) (quoting Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). In MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. Pa. Pub.
Utility Comm'n, 844 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2004), we explained the governing
principle as follows:
The “canon of constitutional avoidance” provides that when a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,
555 (2002). . . . Pennsylvania explicitly recognizes this
canon by statute in instances where construction of a
Pennsylvania statute is at issue. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922; see
also Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 832 A.2d 1042, 1050-51
(Pa. 2003).
MCI WorldCom, 844 A.2d at 1249-50.
Veon, 150 A.3d at 443 (citations modified).
Although “any” is susceptible to myriad interpretations, for purposes of the
narrow question at issue in this case, only two are relevant. The one formulated by the
4
As detailed below, the lower courts’ interpretations of “any” raise considerable
due process concerns that necessitate avoidance of an expansive interpretation.
Moreover, because the term is ambiguous, the rule of lenity also would apply and would
require a more restrictive interpretation of “any.” See Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961
A.2d 66, 74 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that, if an ambiguity exists in a penal statute, the
ambiguity should be resolved in the light most favorable to the accused).
[J-126-2016] - 10
Superior Court reads “any” to include “every” element of the crimes charged. The other
interpretation encompasses something less than every element, whether one element
or some, but not all, elements. As we shall see, the former interpretation raises grave
due process concerns that render it unsustainable, requiring it to give way to a
construction that does not raise the same concerns.
IV.
A.
Before addressing these due process concerns, a brief jurisprudential note is in
order. The issue upon which this Court granted review is the validity of a prima facie
case established only by hearsay in light of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him or her, a right which traditionally has
been confined to the trial setting. See Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53
(1987). Indeed, the confrontation right has been the focus of this case from its
inception. Nonetheless, in their briefing to this Court, both the Commonwealth and
Ricker have determined that due process considerations are integral to a full resolution
of the claim, and both parties have asserted expressly to us here that the due process
issue is unavoidable.5 It is rare that opposing parties agree on a fundamental point in a
case. Undoubtedly, the parties are more familiar than we are with this case, having
been involved with it from its outset. They have determined that consideration of due
process issues is necessary for compete disposition of this matter. The Commonwealth
has gone so far as to waive expressly any challenge to issue preservation. I would
grant the parties’ joint request for review.
5
See Brief for Ricker at 14, 33-34; Brief for the Commonwealth at 17 n.3 (“The
Superior Court found the due process claim unpreserved. As noted by [Ricker], both
parties seek review of this claim as well. The [Commonwealth] waives any right to
assert that this claim has not been preserved. Resolution of both the Confrontation
Clause and due process claim is in the public interest.”).
[J-126-2016] - 11
Occasionally, in order to resolve a complicated legal question upon which
allocatur was granted, we must consider issues beyond those that have been the focus
of the lower courts.6 This is particularly true for a discretionary court such as ours.
Sometimes, the parties recognize that our review and resolution of a discrete legal claim
would be hampered without consideration of a separate issue. And so it is with today’s
case. Hence, though uncommon, at times our function necessitates incorporating and
addressing additional claims or arguments, such as the due process issue agreed upon
by the parties here.
Furthermore, both statutory interpretation and constitutional determinations are
questions of law, which allow for de novo review. See Commonwealth v. Lutz-Morrison,
143 A.3d 891, 894 (Pa. 2016) (statutory interpretation); Commonwealth v. Smith, 131
A.3d 467, 472 (Pa. 2015) (constitutional due process). Both parties have agreed that
the due process issue is indispensable to the ultimate disposition of this case, and both
have availed themselves of the opportunity to brief that issue in full. Accordingly, there
are no jurisprudential reasons to abstain from the due process considerations that are
implicated in this case.
B.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prevents states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property,
6
At times, this Court identifies such issues, and directs the parties to include them
in their presentations to this Court. By way of example, consider our recent grant of
allocatur in Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 135 A.3d 1016 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam),
where, in order to consider a police seizure of a vehicle for purposes of rendering aid,
we directed the parties to brief and to argue the potential application of the community
caretaker doctrine, even though the issue had not been part of the lower courts’
analysis and even though neither party requested consideration of that issue.
[J-126-2016] - 12
7
without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. In addition to
incorporating specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states and providing certain
substantive rights, the clause generally serves to protect individuals from processes and
procedures so unfair that they offend “fundamental conceptions of justice,” Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 790 (1977)), and to uphold traditional notions of fundamental fairness and ordered
liberty. Id.8
In his oft-quoted concurrence in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951), Justice Felix Frankfurter remarked upon the role that due process
plays in safeguarding fairness for those involved in the judicial system, noting that
“[f]airness of procedure is due process in the primary sense. It is ingrained in our
national traditions and is designed to maintain them.” Id. at 161 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Justice Frankfurter then
offered the following historical quote from Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., No. 108, 111 U.S.
701, 708 (1884): “(B)y ‘due process’ is meant one which, following the forms of law, is
7
The Due Process Clause generally encompasses two species of protection. The
first category, known as substantive due process, applies to those rights “created only
by the Constitution,” see Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229
(1985), and “specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The second category is procedural due process, which embodies the notion
that “[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1863)). In today’s case, only
procedural due process is at issue.
8
As noted infra, though broad on its face, procedural due process is not a device
for imposing substantive or normative notions of just results. See e.g. Dowling 493 U.S.
at 352 (“Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due
Process Clause has limited operation.”).
[J-126-2016] - 13
appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the
ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and
wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an
opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought.” Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 162 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Finally, Justice
Frankfurter offered the following insight upon the place of due process in a system of
ordered justice:
The requirement of ‘due process' is not a fair-weather or timid assurance.
It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects
aliens as well as citizens. But ‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect
enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved
through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,
‘due process' cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and
man, and more particularly between the individual and government, ‘due
process' is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions,
and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we
profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick.
It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving
the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with
the unfolding of the process.
* * *
Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole
constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past
in assuring fundamental justice, it is also a living principle not confined to
past instances.
Id. at 162-63, 174.9
9
See also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of
procedure.”); and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards.”).
[J-126-2016] - 14
Notwithstanding the constitutional dimensions of “fundamental fairness,” its
scope has not been unbounded, and the principle is not simply a catch-all repository
allowing resort to sundry invocations of fairness when no lawful remedy exists. In
Lovasco, the Supreme Court emphasized the limitation as follows:
Judges are not free, in defining “due process,” to impose on law
enforcement officials [their] “personal and private notions” of fairness and
to “disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.” Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). . . . [They] are to determine only
whether the action complained of . . . violates those “fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions,” Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), and which
define “the community's sense of fair play and decency,” Rochin, 342 U.S.
at 173.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (citations modified).
Still, while bounded by principles of restraint, procedural due process
nonetheless provides important protections to criminal defendants, largely to ensure the
fairness of proceedings. In the pretrial stage, procedural due process provides a litany
of protections, as summarized by Professor Wayne LaFave and his colleagues in their
treatise on criminal procedure:
At the investigatory stage, due process restricts the state's utilization of
lineups, showups, and other identification procedures insofar as they
present a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” prohibits
police practices that are so “outrageous” as to “shock the conscience,”
and mandates against the intentional destruction or failure to preserve
evidence recognized to be exculpatory and actions directed at making it
more difficult for the defendant to locate potentially favorable witnesses.
At the charging stage, due process prohibits unjustified extensive delay in
charging that results in prejudice to the defense in preparing its case and
charges that are the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness. At the pretrial
stage, due process governs procedural elements of the motion to
suppress, ensures that the defense receives reciprocal discovery when it
is required to provide discovery to the prosecution, provides the indigent
defendant with access to experts as needed to evaluate and present a
contention resting on scientific expertise (e.g., insanity), recognizes a
defense right to obtain during pretrial discovery governmental records
determined by the trial court to contain material exculpatory information,
[J-126-2016] - 15
imposes on the prosecution a duty to disclose to the defense or court
material exculpatory evidence that is within its possession or control, and
prohibits state timing requirements for motions that are so stringent as to
deny the defendant a reasonable opportunity to raise a constitutional
objection.
1 W AYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., Criminal Procedure § 2.7(a) (4th ed. 2015) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
It is indisputable that neither the United States Constitution nor the Pennsylvania
Constitution requires a preliminary hearing. This does not mean that, once afforded, the
hearing lies outside the scope of due process protections. To date, neither the United
States Supreme Court nor this Court has defined the protections demanded by due
process when the Commonwealth proceeds with a preliminary hearing, at least not with
regard to the quantity of admissible evidence that the Commonwealth must advance in
order to support a magisterial district judge’s decision to bind a defendant over for trial.
We approached the question in Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d
172 (Pa. 1990) (plurality). In that case, five Justices held that the due process
implications attendant to any adjudicative proceeding attach as well to preliminary
hearings.
On its face, Verbonitz is a plurality decision. Closer inspection reveals that a
majority of the Court would have held that constitutional principles of due process apply,
at least to some degree, at preliminary hearings. Justice Larsen authored the lead
opinion, which was joined by Justices Zappala and Papadakos. Justice Larsen noted
that, to satisfy its prima facie burden, “the Commonwealth must produce legally
competent evidence . . . .” Id. at 174. He then continued:
In this case it is clear that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden. As
Justice Flaherty stated in his concurring opinion in Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631, 647 (Pa. 1981)
(Flaherty, J., concurring), “fundamental due process requires that no
adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence”. If more than “rank
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hearsay,” id., is required in an administrative context, the standard must
be higher in a criminal proceeding where a person may be deprived of his
liberty.
Id. (citation modified; emphasis added).
Similarly, Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy, acknowledged that there is
no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. However, he noted that, when, by law, a
state creates a hearing, certain rights, such as the right to counsel and possibly the right
to confront witnesses, necessarily attach. Justice Flaherty then addressed directly the
question of whether hearsay “standing alone” may constitute sufficient evidence for a
prima facie case; unequivocally, he would have held that such evidence was
insufficient. Id. at 175 (Flaherty, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Justice Flaherty
deemed “this to be a requirement of due process,” id., and reiterated his
pronouncement in Ceja that “[f]undamental due process requires that no adjudication be
based solely on hearsay evidence.” Id. at 176 (quoting Ceja, 427 A.23 at 547 (Flaherty,
J., concurring)).
In the case sub judice, the Superior Court effectively buried Verbonitz as a
valueless plurality. This was a parched interpretation. In Verbonitz, five Justices of this
Court agreed that, to some degree, constitutional due process attaches at a preliminary
hearing and prohibits cases from being bound over for trial based solely upon hearsay.
Far from lacking persuasive value, the Verbonitz opinions should together be
recognized as a holding that due process prohibits the Commonwealth from depriving a
person of liberty upon nothing more than inadmissible hearsay. A hearing premised
only on hearsay cannot comport with any reasonable understanding of “fundamental
conceptions of justice” or ‘the community's sense of fair play and decency.” Lovasco,
431 U.S. at 790.
C.
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For a prima facie case to rest upon nothing more than inadmissible hearsay is to
offend traditional notions of procedural due process. At such an illusory proceeding, the
interests, purposes, rights, and benefits of a preliminary hearing are denuded of
substance or meaning.
Although not constitutionally mandated, a preliminary hearing, once established,
plays a vital role in our criminal justice system. For all parties involved, it serves a core
function, and it protects against unwarranted governmental intrusions upon a citizen’s
liberty. “The primary reason for the preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right
against unlawful arrest and detention.” Commonwealth ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle,
198 A.2d 565, 567 (Pa. 1964). Additionally, the hearing “seeks to prevent a person
from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime which was never committed,
or for a crime with which there is no evidence of his connection.” Id.
In Coleman v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court described the role of
counsel at the preliminary hearing. In determining that such a proceeding, when
afforded by state law, is a critical stage of the criminal justice system at which the right
to counsel attaches, the Court explained that the preliminary hearing may serve to
prevent “erroneous or improper prosecution.” Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9. The Court
described defense counsel’s functions at the hearing as follows:
First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses
may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case that may lead the
magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the
skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a
vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State’s
witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a
witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more
effectively discover the case the state has against his client and make
possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial.
Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making
effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for
an early psychiatric examination or bail.
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Id.
Although the panoply of constitutionally provided trial rights does not apply in its
entirety at a preliminary hearing, the hearing clearly is intended to be more than a mere
formality. The very rule that we are called upon to interpret provides a right to counsel
and to cross-examine witnesses. The rule further provides the accused with the right to
inspect the evidence offered by the Commonwealth.
The preliminary hearing was not created for the purpose of serving as a trial
preparation tool for the defense. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984
(Pa. 2013). This does not mean that no benefits necessarily and naturally accrue to the
defendant in conducting the hearing according to its true purpose and within the
confines of our Constitutions. A true preliminary hearing involves introduction by the
Commonwealth of the minimum competent evidence to establish a prima facie case. In
doing so, the Commonwealth opens its case to preliminary inspection and subjects its
witnesses to basic cross-examination. Each is necessary to convince the presiding
judicial officer that the Commonwealth’s restraint upon the accused’s liberty is
warranted. As noted in Coleman, this allows the accused and his counsel to probe the
testimony, to make arguments against the charges or in favor of bail, and to preserve
favorable testimony. It also serves as a limited discovery tool, which can inform
decisions on whether to challenge the seizure of the accused or the acquisition of
evidence in a suppression motion, and on what defense to pursue, if any. Moreover,
the ability to participate fully in a preliminary hearing can aid in focusing subsequent
expenditures of limited investigative resources, something that is particularly beneficial
to chronically (and unlawfully) underfunded public defender’s offices. See Kuren v.
Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 717 (Pa. 2016).
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Inevitably, the protocol that would ensue if due process tolerated prima facie
cases premised upon hearsay alone would typically allow a prosecutor merely to call a
police officer to the witness stand to read reports and summaries of interviews to the
magisterial district judge. The officer would not even be required to have any
involvement in the case. In busy cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the
Commonwealth could install one police officer in each criminal courtroom and simply
have that officer read the reports as the cases are called, with no requirement of prior
familiarity with any case. Under such a protocol, the right to counsel and the rule-based
right to cross-examine witnesses would amount to nothing more than hollow formalities,
promises broken. Counsel’s functions, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Coleman,
would cease to exist. There would be no ability to test the Commonwealth’s prima facie
case, no witnesses to cross-examine, no testimony to preserve. Counsel would not be
able to identify weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s case or to identify possible
defenses, as counsel would have no reason to be confident that the statements read by
police officers accurately or fully reflect what the witness would say on the witness stand
at trial. The right to counsel, and counsel’s concomitant rule-based right to cross-
examine witnesses, would shrink to a right merely to have a warm body stand next to
the accused, incapable of serving any real function on the accused’s behalf.
Additionally, the accused would be deprived of the other benefits that flow from
participating in a preliminary hearing, such as obtaining a fair idea of the case against
him or her and being able to allocate resources accordingly. At the same time, the
Commonwealth would benefit from shielding its case and its witnesses from testing and
examination, and would be permitted to proceed on little more than its assurance that it
will produce competent evidence at some later date.
[J-126-2016] - 20
Perhaps as importantly, the presiding magistrate would be unable to perform his
or her function. That judicial officer must evaluate the Commonwealth’s case and be
convinced that the Commonwealth’s charges are justified and that the Commonwealth’s
evidence warrants subjecting the accused to a full trial. If a magisterial district judge
renders a decision based exclusively upon evidence that cannot be used against the
accused at a later trial, no confidence can be ascribed to that decision. In principle, the
justification for the Commonwealth’s charges would be no different than if the
prosecutor had looked up to the judicial officer and said “trust me, we can prove this
case later.” No restraint upon a person’s liberty can rest upon such a premise.
As a flexible concept, due process is necessarily incapable of precise definition.
However, by any definition, principles of fundamental fairness and ordered liberty
demand minimally that, when the law affords an individual a hearing, particularly one
where restraint of a person’s liberty interest is at issue, that hearing cannot be a
functionless formality, nor entirely one-sided. Our Constitutions and our laws identify
rights and interests that play an important role in the preliminary hearing. When the
Commonwealth is permitted to circumvent each of those rights and interests by
introducing only evidence that cannot be introduced at trial, and nothing more, that
hearing falls well below the line that due process draws. Nothing about such a hearing
satisfies ‘the community's sense of fair play and decency.” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790.
When the law affords a hearing to a person involved in our judicial system,
particularly a hearing in which that person’s liberty is at stake, the hearing must be more
than a mere formality. In the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, “[t]he hearing,
moreover, must be a real one, not a sham or a pretense.” Palko v. State of
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (citations omitted) (overruled by Benton v.
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Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the Due Process Clause required
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause to the states)).
V.
Because a prima facie case that rests exclusively upon hearsay would violate
constitutional due process requirements, any interpretation of Rule 542(E) that permits
such a result also is unconstitutional. As such, the Superior Court’s interpretation must
be avoided. See Veon, 150 A.3d at 443. The ambiguity that surrounds Rule 542(E)’s
use of the term “any” must be resolved in favor of Ricker. The term cannot mean “all.”
The issue in this case only requires consideration of whether “any” can mean
“all.” Beyond that, the question of what portion of a prima facie case can rest upon
hearsay is not before the Court. The Criminal Procedural Rules Committee, comprised
of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers, should consider that question in the first
instance and in light of today’s result. Those additional considerations are not before
the Court, and should be reviewed in short order by the Committee.
For purposes of the present case, Ricker did not receive a preliminary hearing in
accordance with the manner required by due process. The Superior Court’s decision to
the contrary must be reversed, and Ricker must be afforded a new preliminary hearing.
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