DocketNumber: No. 318
Judges: Clark, Gordon, Green, Paxson, Sterrett, Trunkey, Williams
Filed Date: 10/1/1888
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The only question to be decided in this case is, whether or not Ellen Wain properly exercised the power of appointment given her in the last will and testament of her father, Jacob S. Wain, deceased. The testator, Jacob S. Wain, devised and bequeathed all his property, real, personal, and mixed, to certain persons named in his will upon certain trusts, viz.: to pay the net income thereof to his wife, Sarah M. Wain, during the term'of her life; at her death to apportion the trust estate into as many shares as he had children, and to convey to his sons, Henry and Edward, their respective shares in fee; to pay to each of his daughters, whether covert or single, the income of their respective shares for their maintenance and support ; or, in case of their marriage and death, to their surviving husbands or children respectively, as the case might be; “ and to convey the share of any unmarried daughter, or of a daughter dying married and without children, as she may by writing under her hand and seal, in nature of a last will and testament, executed in the presence of two witnesses, designate and appoint, and, in default of such appointment, to their or her brothers or sisters living, or if dead leaving issue, then to the said issue share and share alike.”
Ellen Wain, one of the daughters who was unmarried and without issue, made and published her last will and testament, wherein she undertook to exercise the power of appointment reposed in her by her father’s will, referring specially to the property covered by the trust, and over which she was invested with the power. Her will is in due form, was signed by her in the presence of two witnesses, was after her death duly probated and recorded, and it is conceded to be a perfectly valid disposition of her estate.
It is contended, however, that the will is not a valid exercise of the power because it is not in compliance with the donor’s directions in this, that it is not a writing under seal. The testimonium clause of the will is in these words: “ In witness thereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal; ” and to this is appended the signature in the form following: “ Ellen Wain — ” No wafer or scroll in the usual form was affixed for a seal, nor was there any flourish of the pen in lieu thereof other than the dash “ — ” following the name, which was per
The world has outgrown the necessities of an age when men made their seals because they could not write; what then from necessity attested the very act of execution and the genuineness of it, is now but a mere arbitrary form, through which, however, special obligations still attach, in support of the well-recognized distinction between writings which are sealed and those that are not. “ Although in this and many of our sister States,” „says Chief Justice Tilghman, in Taylor v. Glaser, 2 S. & R. 502, “the law has been somewhat relaxed in favor of custom and convenience in doing business, yet this relaxation is confined to the manner of making a seal. Sealing and delivering is still the criterion of a specialty; and it is important that the distinction between specialties and writings should be preserved in the courts; because, in payment of debts due from the estates of deceased persons and in other cases the law makes the distinction. If it should be thought that in the present state of society it would be best to put all writings on the same footing, the legislature alone has power to accomplish it.”
That the writing should be “ under seal,” it may be conceded, was in this instance a mere technical requirement, which could not in any way affect the substance of the instrument, or add to or subtract from the testator’s rights; yet it was competent for him, as against a mere volunteer, not a charity, to impose any lawful restriction upon the execution of the power which his judgment would approve or his fancy suggest.
Was the will of Ellen Wain under seal? This is the ques
The mere fact that in the testimonium clause the testatrix states that she has affixed her hand and seal, is insufficient to constitute the instrument a writing under seal, if in fact there be no seal; but if there be any mark or impression which might reasonably be taken for a seal, this statement of the testatrix will certainly afford the strongest evidence that the mark was so intended. In Taylor v. Glaser, supra, there was nothing but a flourish of the pen below the signature, and it was offered to be shown that this accompanied Glaser’s ordinary signature. There was nothing on the face of the paper, which, in the opinion of the court, the obligor could have intended for a seal. To the same effect is the case of Duncan v. Duncan, 1 W. 322, where a ribbon had been inserted, manifestly as a preliminary to the act of sealing, which act was never performed.
Whether the instrument is under seal or not, is a question to be determined by the court upon inspection ; and whether or not any mark or impression shall be held to be a seal-, de
The decree of the Orphans’ Court is reversed, and the record remitted, in order that a decree may be made in accordance with this opinion.