DocketNumber： 320 CAP
Judges： Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Lamb
Filed Date： 12/18/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
OPINION
This is a capital, direct appeal.
On the evening of June 18, 1996, in connection with a territorial dispute between groups involved in the sale of illicit drugs, Louis Combs (“Combs” or the “victim”), was fatally shot in a breezeway next to 437 Schuylkill Avenue in the City of Reading. Following investigation, Appellant, Raymond Johnson (“Appellant” or “Johnson”), was charged with criminal homicide and related offenses, and a warrant was issued for his arrest, followed by a fugitive warrant. Johnson was finally taken into custody in New York in February of 1998.
In his initial statement of questions involved, Johnson identified the following eight issues: a claim of trial court error in the admission of testimony from Nicole Ramsey (“Ramsey”), who was associated with Johnson in drug trafficking, concerning other-crimes evidence; a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to request a cautionary, limiting instruction regarding other-crimes evidence; a claim of trial court error in the admission of Ramsey’s testimony concerning inculpatory statements made to her by a third participant in Johnson’s illicit-drug-trade group (known only as Izod or Ike); a claim of trial court error in permitting Ramsey’s testimony to be read to jurors by the court reporter during their deliberations; claims of trial court error in overruling an objection to the district attorney’s closing-speech reference to the absence of an identified alibi witness, and of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a mistrial following such reference; a claim of trial court error in permitting testimony concerning remarks made by Johnson and a fourth participant in his drug trade, defense witness Adrian Starks (“Starks”), to Commonwealth witness Jackie Cook (“Cook”) before trial while the men were incarcerated; a claim of trial
I. Evidentiary Sufficiency
This Court’s automatic review of the sufficiency of the evidence in capital cases is accomplished on consideration of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (as the verdict winner), as well as reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, and entails consideration of whether such evidence and inferences would permit a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211, 223, 662 A.2d 621, 627 (1995). The Commonwealth must establish the fact of a person’s unlawful killing, as well as the defendant’s involvement in the killing, action with specific intent to kill, and deliberateness. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 552 Pa. 499, 506-07, 716 A.2d 580, 583 (1998).
Here, the gunshot wound to a vital part of the victim’s body permitted the jury to infer that the shooter acted with the requisite specific intent. See id. The Commonwealth presented testimony from four witnesses to establish that Johnson was the killer: Cook, Spenser Branford (“Branford”), Ramsey, and former detective Bruce Dietrich (“Detective Dietrich”).
Branford’s testimony also concerned the encounter between Johnson and the victim, and was, in many material respects, corroborative of Cook’s, although Branford was not physically in a position to see the actual killing.
Ramsey testified to her sale of illegal drugs for Johnson in the relevant time period. Ramsey indicated that Johnson experienced problems with Combs for some time prior to the murder, which, she believed, resulted from the fact that Johnson and Izod, whom she described as Johnson’s “right-hand man,” were selling drugs in proximity to Combs’ operations. She recalled overhearing conversations between Johnson and Izod on the subject, during which Johnson would “get mad, and [say] he was going to handle that. And they didn’t know who they were playing with.” She was also present during a confrontation between Combs and Izod that occurred approximately two weeks before the murder, which, she ex
Ramsey also testified that, on the day of the killing, Johnson had been at her apartment, was carrying a weapon, and had repeatedly expressed his anger with Combs. Ramsey recalled Johnson placing several calls from a nearby telephone booth throughout the day and receiving separate visits from Starks (whom Ramsey also identified as selling drugs for Johnson) and Izod; during the latter’s visit she overheard the two discussing “something about handling that.” Ramsey later learned that something had occurred on Schuylkill Avenue and, upon investigation, received a message to page Izod and Johnson. She recounted that, upon responding to the page, Izod informed her that “we did them n_s. You didn’t think we would, but we did. There is not going to be a problem.”
Detective Dietrich was the lead investigator for Combs’ killing. He explained that he obtained a warrant for Appellant’s arrest in June, 1996, but was unable to locate him until February, 1998, when he learned that Johnson had been taken into custody in New York. The detective also detailed his efforts to locate Johnson in both Reading and New York, testifying that he: contacted Johnson’s friends and relatives in Reading; checked addresses that Johnson was known to frequent; and traveled to New York, where he spoke with more of Johnson’s friends and relatives. He further explained that he advised individuals with whom he spoke that he held a warrant for Johnson’s arrest.
In light of the above, the jury’s determination that Appellant deliberately perpetrated Combs’ killing rests on a sufficient evidentiary foundation.
As noted, Appellant lodged a specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance found by the jury. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(14). In this regard, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to
Under Section 9711(d)(14), a capital defendant is eligible for the death penalty if the jury unanimously finds the following circumstance:
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), arid the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant’s activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(14).
Presently, the involvement of Combs in drug trafficking was established primarily via testimony from Cook; Johnson’s involvement in such activities was demonstrated primarily through Ramsey.
We recognize that the prosecution against Johnson relied heavily on evidence procured from admitted participants in the illegal drug trafficking endeavors. Nevertheless, in this regard, the jury bears the responsibility to resolve questions of credibility, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. See Commonwealth v. Rice, 568 Pa. 182, 193-94, 795 A.2d 340, 346 (2002). Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and employing reasonable inferences, the evidence was sufficient to establish the Section 9711(d)(14) aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Claims of Trial Court Error
A. Claims relating to Ramsey’s testimony
i. other-crimes evidence
In his first of several claims related to Ramsey’s testimony, Johnson contends that the trial court erred by permitting her to testify concerning other-crimes evidence, namely, Johnson’s involvement in drug trafficking, including Ramsey’s, Starks’, and Izod’s sale of illegal drugs on his
On consideration of the above, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s reliance on evidence of Johnson’s involvement in drug trafficking to establish his motive was permissible under governing evidentiary precepts. Again, Appellant offers no support for his position, interwoven into several of his arguments, that the Commonwealth was bound to establish specific geographic boundaries for the activities of each of Johnson’s and Combs’ groups to demonstrate the fact of their competition. It is enough, in our view, that prosecution testimony showed a diversion of drug sales from Combs’ group to Johnson’s, knowledge on the part of both men that there was competition (albeit that Combs may not have been aware of Johnson’s identity as his competitor), and Johnson’s awareness that Combs was his rival.
With respect to the timing of the trial court’s limiting instruction, although this Court has expressed a preference that such direction should be given to jurors at the time limited-purpose evidence is adduced, see Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 383-84, 378 A.2d 841, 845 (1977), it has held nonetheless that a required limiting instruction may properly be given during the general charge. See id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 563 Pa. 269, 280, 759 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2000). In light of such precedent, and particularly as Appellant did not request an instruction at the time the limited-purpose
Johnson also contends that Ramsey’s testimony to the effect that Starks also sold drugs for Johnson was inadmissible hearsay. The record suggests, however, that Ramsey testified from her personal knowledge and not, as Johnson asserts, from repetition of hearsay declarations. See generally N.T., at 316-19. We recognize that trial counsel lodged various objections in an attempt to force the Commonwealth to develop a more specific foundation for Ramsey’s knowledge in this regard, and that it would have been preferable for the trial court to require the additional record development of foundation. Nevertheless, in light of Ramsey’s testimony as to her own involvement in Johnson’s drug trade and personal knowledge of Starks, we believe that the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretionary decision making authority as concerns matters connected with the admission of evidence. See generally Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168, 177-78, 555 A.2d 835, 840 (1989).
ii. . statements concerning Izod
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Ramsey to testify that Izod was his “right-hand man” in drug trafficking. The Commonwealth contends, correctly, however, that this testimony is not hearsay, since it does not involve an extrajudicial statement, but rather an observation based on Ramsey’s personal knowledge of Johnson’s drug-trade activities. Accord Commonwealth v. Hashem, 363 Pa.Super. 111, 153, 525 A.2d 744, 764 (1987) (quoting a trial court’s observation that “[i]t is hornbook law that what a person knows firsthand from his own knowledge is not hearsay” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 526 Pa. 199, 584 A.2d 1378 (1991).
Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony from Ramsey indicating that, approximately two weeks before Combs’ murder, she overheard Izod and Combs having an argument about “turf,” in which Combs told Izod that he was not going to let Izod “take food out of our mouths.” According to Johnson, the testimony was objectionable as hearsay which was not relevant to establish motive, since it was not probative of the Commonwealth’s theory that Johnson killed Combs over a drug rivalry at 437 Schuylkill Avenue. Moreover, Johnson emphasizes that the statement did not involve him, but rather, reflects a conversation between Combs and Izod. Therefore, he claims, this statement cannot be attributed to or otherwise connected with him, absent some other relational evidence. In this regard, Appellant views Ramsey’s testimony, and other indications in the record of Izod’s affiliation with his group, as insufficient.
The trial court’s reasons for admitting this statement are unclear, since it did not address the matter either at trial or in its opinion. While we agree with the Commonwealth’s position that the statement bears a relationship to its motive evidence, as it tends to show competition in drug sales, this merely establishes relevance, and its character as hearsay must be evaluated to determine its admissibility. The Commonwealth contends that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; however, the statement may be read to embody the fact of competition in the drug trade, which the Commonwealth sought to prove to suggest Johnson’s guilt. We conclude, however, that any error by the trial
iii. Izod’s coconspirator declaration
Johnson contends that the trial court erred in admitting Ramsey’s recounting of Izod’s inculpatory comments to her, as follows: “[W]e did them n_s. You didn’t think we would, but we did. There is not going to be a problem.” In this regard, he takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that such statements qualified for treatment under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, see Pa.R.E. 803(25)(E). Citing to Commonwealth v. Zdrale, 530 Pa. 313, 608 A.2d 1037 (1992), Johnson correctly recites the requirements of the coconspirator exception: the existence of a conspiracy between the declarant and the defendant must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; the statements must be shown to have been made during the course of the conspiracy; and they must have been made in furtherance of the common design. See id. at 317, 608 A.2d at 1039. According to Johnson, however, the above remarks meet none of these requirements. Primarily, Johnson argues that the trial court’s finding of a conspiracy between Izod and Appellant to murder Combs is unsupported in the evidence proffered by the Commonwealth, particularly as Johnson was not charged
Application of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is predicated on agency principles — when the elements of the exception are established, each conspirator is considered an agent of the other, and therefore, a statement by one represents an admission by all.
Here, the trial court held that Ramsey’s and Cook’s testimony provided the Commonwealth with ample direct and circumstantial evidence that proved that Appellant, Izod, and Starks conspired to murder Combs so that they could take over his drug territory. In our view, however, the evidence of such a conspiracy is more modest than ample, although it was at least arguably sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden concerning the first requirement of the coconspirator exception.
Nevertheless, we believe that any error on the part of the trial court in articulating a basis for the admission of Izod’s inculpatory remarks is harmless, since the coconspirator exception contains no requirement that the conspiracy identified as the basis for admissibility be related to the crime charged. See United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir.1999) (“Subject to relevancy and similar considerations, out-of-court statements of a declarant coconspirator, if made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, regardless of whether the conspiracy furthered is charged or uncharged, and regardless of whether it is identical to or different from the crime that the statements are offered to prove[.]” (citations omitted)); cf. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. at 113, 425 A.2d at 392 (“This Court has extended the co-conspirator exception to admit declarations by ‘co-participants’ in a crime even where conspiracy has not been charged or proven.” (citations omitted)).
iv. the reading of Ramsey’s testimony
Johnson claims that the trial court erred in granting the jurors’ request for Ramsey’s testimony to be read to them during their deliberations, particularly since the trial court did not issue contemporaneous, cautionary instructions.
Generally, the determination whether to grant a request from jurors for a reading of a portion of the trial testimony during deliberations for the purpose of refreshing its recollection rests within the discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Peterman, 430 Pa. 627, 631, 244 A.2d 723, 726 (1968). The reading of the testimony does not implicate reversible error, provided that it does not place undue emphasis on one witness’s testimony. See id. at 631-32, 244 A.2d at 726.
In the present case, the trial court allowed the testimony to be read only after the jury’s second request and undertook considerable precautions to ensure the accuracy of the reading, such as directing that it occur on the record and instruct
B. Claim of prosecutorial misconduct
Appellant next raises an issue concerning commentary by the district attorney regarding his failure to produce an alibi witness.
By way of background, Johnson’s defense case included presentation of two alibi witnesses: his wife at the time of trial, Crystal Johnson, and her friend, Shadena Johnson (who was of no relation to Johnson or his wife). Both testified that Johnson resided in Brooklyn, New York, in June of 1996, and specifically that, at the time the victim was killed, he was with them in Brooklyn at the residence of Alice Jackson, where he proposed to Ms. Johnson. Johnson, however, did not produce testimony from Ms. Jackson, and, during closing argument, the prosecutor challenged the viability of Johnson’s alibi defense with reference to her absence.
[Djuring the Commonwealth’s closing argument there was mention made that the defendant did not call a certain witness perhaps from New York on his behalf. And you’re not to take any negative inference against the defendant for any witnesses that were not produced by him ... [T]he defendant has no obligation to take the stand, [and] the defendant has no obligation to call any witnesses or present any evidence. So there would be no negative inference taken by you against the defendant because of anybody he didn’t call ... You are not to make any negative findings or inferences against the defendant for not calling additional witnesses.
N.T., at 515-16.
Generally, a prosecutor’s comments will not establish a ground for relief from a conviction unless their unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jurors, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 373, 701 A.2d 492, 503 (1997). Moreover, the prejudicial effect of improper comments may be cured by a cautionary instruction.
C. Claims related to Cook’s testimony
Appellant contends that, for several reasons, the trial court erred in permitting Cook’s testimony regarding his encounter with Johnson and Starks at Berks County Prison before trial. He challenges the following exchange which took place between the district attorney and Cook at trial:
Q Did the defendant say anything to you?
A He said, don’t let these crackers kill me.
* * *
Q Did he say anything else?
A [Starks] said, it’s kind of f_ed up when people’s
families die, you know what I’m saying.
Q What happened next?
A I was just looking, like, bugged out. I was like, all right, all right. I understand. I got you. The defendant said the same thing.
*51 Q What did he say?
A Its’ [sic] kind of f_ed up when people’s families die.
Q. Did the defendant say anything in addition about you testifying in the trial?
A He said I shouldn’t testify....
* * *
Q Did you know what he meant when he said crackers?
A You know, like the jury, you know the D.A., and all of you----
Q Okay. How did you interpret what they said to you, when they said, it’s kind of f__ed up when people’s families die?
A I kill my people or something, you know what I mean.
N.T., at 277-78.
Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth may introduce evidence of threats made to a witness to demonstrate the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 308-09, 543 A.2d 491, 500 (1988). He contends, however, that in the present case it is not clear that the comments were intended as a threat to Cook. Also, Johnson finds the comments objectionable as they informed the jury that he was incarcerated, thereby prejudicing him in the eyes of the jurors. Finally, because the statement contains hearsay statements made by Starks, Johnson contends that it should have been deemed inadmissible against him.
This Court has long recognized that any attempt by a defendant to interfere with a witness’s testimony is admissible to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 384, 398-99, 668 A.2d 97, 104 (1995) (concluding that a witness’s testimony that a defendant offered him a bribe not to testify at trial was admissible to show the defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 472, 447 A.2d 234, 243 (1982) (citing cases for the proposition that the Commonwealth may demonstrate consciousness of guilt through at
With regard to the revelation by the remarks that Johnson' was incarcerated, although generally no reference may be made at trial in a criminal case to a defendant’s arrest or incarceration for a previous crime, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 541 Pa. 85, 94, 660 A.2d 1316, 1321 (1995), there is no rule in Pennsylvania which prohibits reference to a defendant’s incarceration awaiting trial or arrest for the crimes charged. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 538 Pa. 485, 506-07, 649 A.2d 435, 445-46 (1994). Moreover, although the Court has disapproved forcing a defendant, who was incarcerated prior to trial, to attend trial in identifiable prison clothing, this prohibition is based primarily upon the impact that the “constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire” might have upon the jury. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693,
D. Issuance of a flight/concealment charge
Appellant avers that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to flight and/or concealment as circumstantial evidence of his guilt. As he acknowledges, however, where evidence exists that a defendant committed a crime, knew he was wanted, and fled or concealed himself, such evidence is admissible to establish consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Tinsley, 465 Pa. 329, 333, 350 A.2d 791, 792-93 (1976). Johnson contends, nevertheless, that the trial court’s instruction was improper, because there was no direct testimony showing that he knew that he was sought after by the police, and the evidence revealed that he resided in New York near the time of the shooting.
A defendant’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances attendant his flight. See Commonwealth v. Lester, 554 Pa. 644, 658, 722 A.2d 997, 1003 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271, 291, 684 A.2d 1025, 1035 (1996)); see also Tinsley, 465 Pa. at 333, 350 A.2d at 793 (concluding that such an inference was justified where the evidence revealed that the defendant abandoned his normal pattern of living without explanation and could not be located at his residence or place of employment or through contacts to his relatives). Here, there was evidence that Johnson disrupted his normal pattern of living following Combs’ killing. Further, the police conducted an extensive search spanning Pennsylvania and New York, but were unable to locate Johnson for
E. Claim of tainted jury selection
Appellant, who is an African-American, claims that the trial court erred in denying his challenge to the array of prospective jurors on the ground that only two out of 161 were of African-American descent. Thus, he contends that it did not reflect a fair cross section of the community, as required under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Further, he argues that Berks County’s use of a driver’s license list systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool. In support of his argument, Johnson invokes statistics that reveal that 9.7% of the population of the City of Reading is comprised of persons of African-American descent.
In response to Johnson’s objection at trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony from the jury supervisor for Berks County, who indicated that a computer had randomly selected the panel from a list of residents having driver’s licenses provided by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, which contained approximately 250,000 names. The Commonwealth notes that Appellant does not have the right to demand that specific numbers of minorities sit on the jury panel which judges him. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 299, 304 A.2d 684 (1973); Commonwealth v. Craver, 547 Pa. 17, 27-28, 688 A.2d 691, 696 (1997) (“ ‘Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular
To establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a jury array fairly represent the community, Johnson must show that:
(1) the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such people in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. “Systematic” means caused by or inherent in the system by which juries were selected.
Craver, 547 Pa. at 28, 688 A.2d at 696 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 366-67, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-70, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). Proof is required of an actual discriminatory practice in the jury selection process, not merely under-representation of one particular group. See id. at 27-28, 688 A.2d at 696. The defendant bears the initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence of discrimination in the jury selection process. See Jones, 452 Pa. at 312, 304 A.2d at 692.
This Court has rejected various criminal defendant’s attacks, on the basis that African-Americans were underrepresented, to the racial composition of a jury panel drawn from voter registration lists. See Commonwealth v. Bridges, 563 Pa. 1, 18, 757 A.2d 859, 868 (2000); Commonwealth v. Henry, 524 Pa. 135, 144, 569 A.2d 929, 933 (1990). More recently, the reasoning and holdings of those cases have been extended to approve the usage of driver’s license lists for purposes of jury selection. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 305, 815 A.2d 563, 575 (2002) (plurality) (“Absent some showing that driver’s license selection procedures are inherently biased, [the defendant] has failed to distinguish jury pool lists
Here, while Johnson presented evidence to suggest that African-Americans were underrepresented, he has not offered evidence or argument revealing systematic exclusion. Therefore, he has failed to establish a constitutional violation.
III. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As noted, in his briefing, Appellant raised a number of claims attacking trial counsel’s stewardship, including claims of ineffectiveness for failing to: request an instruction during Ramsey’s testimony concerning other-crimes evidence; request a jury instruction that a sentence of life imprisonment precluded the possibility of parole; request a mistrial following assertedly improper arguments by the district attorney; present evidence and adequately cross-examine the jury supervisor in support of Johnson’s challenge to. the jury panel; adequately cross-examine this witness to reveal the prejudice within the selection process; object to the questioning of Starks regarding his brother’s arrest for murder; and investigate, develop and present mental health and personal history mitigation evidence. Pursuant to Grant, 572 Pa. at 67, 813 A.2d at 738, these claims are now appropriately matters to be resolved in collateral, post-conviction proceedings and, accordingly, will be dismissed without prejudice to Johnson’s rights and/or interests under the Post Conviction Relief Act. Accord Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414, 422, 825 A.2d 1252, 1257 (2003); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 573 Pa. 605, 611, 827 A.2d 1195, 1199 (2003).
IV. Statutory review
Our review of the record does not support a conclusion that the jury’s verdict was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (h)(3)(i).
. The Commonwealth did not present additional evidence during the penalty phase, but merely incorporated the record of the guilt phase in support of the Section 9711(d)(14) aggravator.
. The court stated:
You have heard evidence tending to prove that the defendant was involved in other improper conduct for which he is not on trial. I am speaking of the testimony to the effect that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking.
This evidence is before you for a limited purpose, that is, for the purpose of tending to show motive. This evidence must not be considered by you in any way other than for the purpose I just stated.
*39 You must not regard this evidence as showing that the defendant is a person of bad character or criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt. If you find the defendant guilty, it must be because you are convinced by the evidence that he committed the crime charged and not because you believe he is wicked or has been involved in improper conduct.
N.T., at 528.
. Appellant also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request such a contemporaneous instruction. As discussed below, however, this Court has recently held that such claims challenging the stewardship of counsel are more appropriately reserved for collateral review. See infra (citing Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002)).
. In Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974), the United States Supreme Court explained:
The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy exception and its limitations is the notion that conspirators are partners in crime. As such, the law deems them agents of one another. And just as the declarations of an agent bind the principal only when the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so the declaration of a conspirator must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be admissible against his partner.
Id. at 218 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 2259 n. 6 (citations omitted); accord Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 159-60, 371 A.2d 468, 482-83 (1977) (plurality); Commonwealth v. Timer, 415 Pa.Super. 376, 384, 609 A.2d 572, 575 (1992). See generally Pa.R.E. 803(25) (including statements of coconspirators under admissions of party-opponents).
. Testimony of Ramsey and Cook indicated that: Johnson and Izod were associates in drug trafficking; the victim was their rival; Johnson and Izod had been overheard, on various occasions, discussing the competition for drug sales; members of Johnson's group had been involved in confrontations with the victim prior to his murder; Johnson and Izod were together on the day of the murder and were overheard discussing "something about handling that”; and Izod was observed near the site of the shooting immediately after its occurrence.
. Although Johnson discusses the Commonwealth’s asserted failure to meet the in-furtherance-of requirement as a claim of trial court error, his objection at trial, and his statement of matters complained of on appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.1925, implicated only the issue of whether the Commonwealth had met the existence-of-a-conspiracy requirement. As a general rule, therefore, these claims would be considered waived. See Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 60, 337 A.2d 873, 881 (1975) ("if the ground upon which an objection is based is specifically stated, all other reasons for its exclusion are waived, and may not be raised post trial”); Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 420, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998) ("Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”). However, we will consider the question pursuant to the relaxed waiver doctrine, since the submission of briefs in this appeal predates this Court's modification of the relaxed waiver doctrine in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 561-563, 827 A.2d 385, 403 (2003).
. Accord United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir.2002) (observing that whether a statement was made in the context of a separate conspiracy or as part of a larger conspiracy makes no difference in terms of admissibility under the coconspirator exception); United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir.2000) (noting that “the conspiracy that forms the basis for admitting a co-conspirator’s out of court
We recognize that the phrasing of the in-furtherance-of requirement in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson, 417 U.S. at 211, 94 S.Ct. at 2253, suggests that the declaration of a conspirator must be made in furtherance "of the conspiracy charged.” Id. at 218 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 2259 n. 6; see also supra note 4. However, as other courts have observed, Anderson did not address an argument that an uncharged conspiracy could not support admission of a coconspirator's statement, but rather,
was simply reiterating the established principle that the conspiracy, or common enterprise, must have been in progress at the time the statement sought to be admitted was made. Indeed, ... ‘[n]o circuit court has ever held that Anderson requires that the predicate for admissibility under the exception be the precise conspiracy charged in the indictment.’
United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1400 (9th Cir.1988), implied overtoiling on other grounds recognized in People of the Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1993); see also Ellis, 156 F.3d at 497 n. 4 (explaining that Anderson applied the common law as it existed prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which, in contrast to the federal rules (and Pennsylvania's development of the coconspirator exception as ultimately embodied in our evidential rules), did contain a requirement that the coconspirator’s statement be made in furtherance of a charged conspiracy).
. While Appellant does not raise a specific challenge to Ramsey’s account of Izod’s statement pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we note that the federal analogue to Pennsylvania’s coconspirator exception has been described as firmly-rooted for purposes of the federal Confrontation Clause. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). See generally Commonwealth v. Robins, 571 Pa. 248, 261, 812 A.2d 514, 522 (2002) (opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, joined by Saylor, J., on this point) (explaining that extrajudicial declarations within firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions are deemed sufficiently reliable to satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements, without the need for further inquiry into their reliability).
. The district attorney stated:
The alibi. June 18, 1996, is not a holiday so it conveniently became the day the defendant proposed to his wife. That made it memorable and also another thing that made it memorable was that the person who’s not even related to the defendant Alice Jackson who you didn’t see in the courtroom, she wanted to give the defendant a Father’s Day present. Where is Alice Jackson? She didn’t come here and tell you about the celebration at her house in 1996.
Ask yourself, why not. Not only does this person who is unrelated to the defendant but yet buys a Father’s Day present and the defendant shows up at her house and proposes to his wife to get engaged on a*49 Wednesday night. [Detective] Dietrich said it wasn't a Wednesday night. [June 18th] was a Tuesday night. [Detective Dietrich] didn't happen to remember that. He knew that because it's documented in the homicide report. Maybe the defendant did propose to his wife on Wednesday because we know he was nowhere to be found in Reading after June 18, 1996. Maybe she was right, it was Wednesday.
N.T., at 511-12.
. Apparently, Ms. Jackson, who resides in New York, was suffering from cancer.
. The Commonwealth argues that the statements were proper under Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 597, 549 A.2d 513, 526 (1988) (holding that the prosecutor’s comments, pertaining to the defendant's failure to present a certain alibi witness, was not improper, "for it merely challenged [the defendant’s] failure to produce a witness who would have corroborated [the defendant's] testimony”). As Johnson did not testify and did produce two corroborating witnesses in support of the alibi defense, the present factual circumstances vary from those addressed in Yarris.
. Although Johnson is a plurality opinion, a majority of the Court was in agreement with respect to the jury selection issue.
. The Prothonotary is directed to transmit the complete record of this case to the Governor of Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 971 l(i).