Citation Numbers: 171 A. 900, 314 Pa. 247
Judges: OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE KEPHART, March 19, 1934:
Filed Date: 1/30/1934
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
Argued January 30, 1934. Plaintiff requested a new trial in the court below because of the improper conduct of the foreman of the jury in personally visiting the place where the accident occurred, the liability for which was then before the jury, and communicating knowledge learned while at the place of the accident to other members of the jury. The foreman denied some of the charges, and the jurors were not in accord as to what the foreman had related.
We cannot condemn too severely the act of a juror personally viewing the place of an accident or any matter subject to judicial investigation which is not performed under the security and protection of the court. Such acts are improper and a juror should not only be censured for such conduct but, if necessary, punished by the court, and if the act was of sufficient importance, a mistrial should be directed. The particular thing complained of here was that the foreman measured some distances at the scene of the accident; but this could not have influenced the jury for it appears the distances were all in evidence and all the facts which the juror may have reported were properly before the jury. See Com. v. Filer,
The second reason for a new trial was that one of defendant's drivers is alleged to have stated to a juror "If you don't win this case for Ralph Brothers [defendants] it means my job." The testimony on this point is so unsatisfactory that we may exclude it entirely from consideration. Moreover, it is flatly denied by the driver and by the juror to whom the witness said the driver talked.
The third reason in support of the motion was a statement that the foreman of the jury, after the verdict was sealed, refused to permit a juror to change her vote. We have held recently, following a long line of cases, that the oral verdict given in open court is the only verdict of the jury: Eastley v. Glenn,
The charge that one of the jurors spoke to one of defendant's counsel, without indicating what was said or that any attempt was made to influence the juror, is obviously most trivial.
We do not condone the conduct of the jurors here involved, but we find that the discretion of the trial court was not abused in refusing a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Eastley v. Glenn , 313 Pa. 130 ( 1933 )
Commonwealth v. Filer , 249 Pa. 171 ( 1915 )
Carter v. United States Steel Corp. , 529 Pa. 409 ( 1992 )
Commonwealth v. Kravitz , 400 Pa. 198 ( 1960 )
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Darcy v. Claudy , 367 Pa. 130 ( 1951 )
Pratt v. St. Christopher's Hospital , 581 Pa. 524 ( 2005 )
Commonwealth v. Patrick , 416 Pa. 437 ( 1965 )
Wolfe v. Riggle , 407 Pa. 172 ( 1962 )
Com., Dept. of Gen. Serv. v. Min. Prod. , 927 A.2d 717 ( 2007 )
Carter v. United States Steel Corp. , 390 Pa. Super. 265 ( 1990 )
Commonwealth v. Sero , 478 Pa. 440 ( 1978 )
Fisher v. Strader , 399 Pa. 222 ( 1960 )
Commonwealth v. Pierce , 453 Pa. 319 ( 1973 )
Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co. , 352 Pa. 51 ( 1945 )
Rice v. Bauer , 359 Pa. 544 ( 1948 )
Redmond v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co. , 329 Pa. 302 ( 1937 )
Havranek v. Pitssburgh , 344 Pa. 375 ( 1942 )
Commonwealth v. Price , 463 Pa. 200 ( 1975 )
Commonwealth v. Hoke , 381 Pa. Super. 70 ( 1989 )
Schirra v. Delaware, L. & WR Co. , 103 F. Supp. 812 ( 1952 )
Pittsburgh National Bank v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of ... , 273 Pa. Super. 592 ( 1980 )