Citation Numbers: 40 A.2d 691, 351 Pa. 263
Judges: OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE ALLEN M. STEARNE, January 18, 1945:
Filed Date: 1/10/1945
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
The question presented by this appeal is whether the court below abused its discretion in refusing to open a judgment. Upon the termination of a written lease, appellee entered judgment by confession against appellant for possession of real estate in Philadelphia. Appellant filed a petition for a rule to open judgment, alleging that the parties had entered into a subsequent oral lease. Appellee's answer denied the allegation; thereafter depositions were taken. On consideration of the depositions the court in banc discharged the rule, stating that it ". . . did not believe the evidence submitted by the defendant but believed the evidence submitted by the plaintiff . . .". Appellant contends that his evidence would support a finding in his favor if believed by a jury, and that the court had no basis for its disbelief.
Appellant has confused the controlling principles of law. Courts are not required to open judgments merely because the defendant produces evidence which, if true, would constitute a defense: Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Sobolewski,
No abuse of discretion appears here. Appellant's testimony was vague and inconsistent. It was merely evidence of oral negotiations and an intention to enter into a binding written agreement in the future. He admits that a written lease was drawn as a result of the negotiations, but never executed. In such a case, the preliminary negotiations do not constitute a contract: Upsal St. Realty Co. v. Rubin,
The court stated that it did not believe the testimony of defendant's witnesses. Such disbelief did not have to be based on hearing them personally testify. They were cross-examined when the depositions were taken. Improbabilities and contradictions in their testimony might have justifiably caused disbelief. Indeed an independent reading of the depositions brings us to the same conclusion as that reached by the court below.
In view of the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the court below, it is unnecessary to consider the point now raised by appellee that the terms of the written lease barred this appeal.
The order discharging the rule is affirmed at appellant's cost. *Page 266
Earley's Appeal , 90 Pa. 321 ( 1879 )
MacHalicka v. Lukasevic , 346 Pa. 487 ( 1943 )
St. Clair S. T. Co., for Use v. Hahne Et Ux. , 345 Pa. 420 ( 1942 )
Kweller v. Becker , 338 Pa. 169 ( 1940 )
Keystone Bank of Spangler v. Booth , 334 Pa. 545 ( 1939 )
Schuy'l T. Co. v. Sobolewski Et Ux. , 325 Pa. 422 ( 1937 )
Quaker City C. C. Co. v. Warnock, Etc. , 347 Pa. 186 ( 1943 )
Upsal St. Realty Co. v. Rubin , 326 Pa. 327 ( 1936 )
Horn v. Witherspoon , 327 Pa. 295 ( 1937 )
Perri v. Perri , 335 Pa. 394 ( 1939 )
Hilliard Estate , 383 Pa. 63 ( 1955 )
American Express Co. v. Burgis , 328 Pa. Super. 167 ( 1984 )
Pappas v. Local Joint Executive Board , 374 Pa. 34 ( 1953 )
Deviney v. Lynch , 372 Pa. 570 ( 1953 )
McCune v. Gross , 377 Pa. 360 ( 1954 )
Steigleman v. Sciotto , 388 Pa. 113 ( 1957 )
Baron v. Bernstein , 175 Pa. Super. 608 ( 1954 )
American Vending Co., Inc. v. Brewington , 289 Pa. Super. 25 ( 1981 )
Sutton v. Alexander , 198 Pa. Super. 53 ( 1962 )
Kogen v. Horowitz , 169 Pa. Super. 349 ( 1951 )
Gregory v. FASSETT , 178 Pa. Super. 599 ( 1955 )
Foster v. Nixon , 194 Pa. Super. 572 ( 1961 )
Regional Agri. Credit v. Barabas , 159 Pa. Super. 402 ( 1946 )
Harper Et Ux. v. Quinlan , 159 Pa. Super. 367 ( 1946 )
Kazanjian v. Cohen , 175 Pa. Super. 195 ( 1954 )
Harrison v. Stoeckert , 369 Pa. 143 ( 1952 )
Poelcher v. Poelcher , 366 Pa. 3 ( 1950 )
Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co. , 385 Pa. 388 ( 1956 )
Sugarman Et Ux. v. Baldini , 161 Pa. Super. 136 ( 1947 )