DocketNumber: 186 MAP 2002
Judges: Cappy, Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Lamb, Nigro, Newman
Filed Date: 12/18/2003
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
OPINION
We granted allowance of appeal to consider the validity of the agricultural zoning of a tract located in the heart of one of the most highly developed areas in the region, entirely surrounded by an urban landscape, and immediately adjacent to what is currently the world’s largest shopping complex at one discrete location: the Court and the Plaza at King of Prussia. We hold that this agricultural zoning, designed to prevent development of the subject property and to “freeze” its substantially undeveloped state for over four decades in order to serve the public interest as “green space”, constitutes unlawful “reverse spot zoning” beyond the municipality’s proper pow
The subject property, located in Upper Merion Township (Township
There are six (6) major limited access highways that service the King of Prussia area, four (4) of them actually begin at the [Golf Club] site (Schuylkill Expressway, PA Turnpike, Route 202, County Line Expressway)____The fact that the site is uniquely accessible and is essentially at the hub of*121 such a major road network, places an extremely heavy pressure on the site. Added to this is the reality that there is very little vacant land as a single large parcel in the adjacent Valley Forge Industrial Park, especially with the visibility of the Golf Course site.
R.R. 845a.
The Golf Club opened in the 1920’s, several decades before the Township enacted its first zoning regulations. In 1953 the Township created an AG-Agricultural Zoning District (AG District) and so designated a substantial portion of the Township including the Valley Forge Park
Between 1955 and 1990 the vast majority of the properties within the AG District were rezoned to permit intense commercial development. As the trial court here wrote:
[Sjince the date of its creation, portions of the AG district have been rezoned, many to commercial uses, reducing the district to its current parameters containing the golf course and two other properties [a 7.3 acre parcel improved with Pennsylvania Turnpike Interchange No. 24 and its associated highway ramps and toll plaza and a one-half acre parcel improved with a nonconforming residential structure] previously identified. The last such change or reduction in the district’s size occurred in 1985 ... with the most significant revisions taking place between 1955 and 1960, when areas including the present Valley Forge Industrial Park, King of*122 Prussia Mall, General Electric, Acme and Valley Forge Convention Center Areas were rezonéd.
Trial Ct. slip op. at 6.
The trial court described the properties surrounding the Golf Club, noting that those in the Township were all within the AG District in the early 1950’s, and the current state of their zoning and development, in these terms:
Across North Gulph Road lies an area zoned SM-Suburban Metropolitan, within which district there is located a combination of restaurant, hotel, and office uses. Beyond North Warner Road is found an area zoned C-2 Commercial, containing a Home Depot store, a bank, a gas station and a convenience store, and, below DeKalb Pike, within an AR-Administrative Research district, are located a number of office buildings. To the west, as one crosses the boundary line of Upper Merion Township, Delaware (sic) County into Tredyffrin Township, Chester County, there are to be found three different zoning districts, consisting of an HO-Hotel Office district, a P-Professional Office district and the Glenhardie Condominium situate within the OA-Office Apartment district.
Trial Ct. slip op. at 3-4.
On July 13, 1964 the Township governing body enacted Ordinance No. 64-141 which provided that:
The Township has a general plan (here in after [sic] called General Plan) of its parks, playgrounds, recreation areas and facilities which plan has been on file at the office of the Township; and
There is hereby located and superimposed ... a recreation area, being all of the land and appurtenances thereon of the Valley Forge Golf Club, said located generally in the area of the Township ... the same consisting of approximately 138 acres.
R.R. 255a-256a. The purpose of Ordinance No. 64-141 can be understood only with reference to Sections 1907-1 and 1907-2 of the Act of May 1,1933, P.L. 103, added by the Act of July 2,
No person shall hereafter be entitled to recover any damages for the taking for public use of any buildings or improvements of any kind which may be placed or constructed upon or within the lines of any located park or recreation area after the same shall have been located or ordained by the township supervisors.
Section 1907.2 of the Second Class Township Code, 53 P.S. § 66907.2 (repealed).
Thus, the purpose and effect of Township Ordinance 64-141 was to preclude any further development or improvement of the Golf Club or its facilities for three years. The Golf Club challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 64-141 and the enabling provisions of the Second Class Township Code by complaint in equity and the trial court, in a decision dated January 14, 1966 on the Golf Club’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, reported as Valley Forge Golf Club v. Upper Merion Township, 39 D. & C.2d 181, 187 (Montg.Cty.1965), held Ordinance No. 64-141 unconstitutional as depriving the Golf Club -without compensation of the full enjoyment of its property.
On the failure of its initial legislative action, the Township sought to create public support for a bond issue, the proceeds of which were to be used to acquire the Golf Club property. By ballot question, the Township referred to the electorate in November 1965, the issue of whether to incur $2 Million in debt “for the purpose of providing funds for and toward the acquisition of lands and buildings known as the Valley Forge Golf Club....” R.R. 266a. In a brochure distributed to
The Board unanimously believes it is of utmost importance that the Valley Forge Golf Course remain as a green, open area in Upper Merion Township....
The acquisition of the Golf Course will, by no means, benefit only those who play golf, but is a vital necessity as far as maintaining green areas before the last of our good, green areas is gobbled up. In addition, it is for the welfare of the human being to enjoy natural green areas in view of the ever-increasing jungle of cement and steel all about us.
A privately-owned golf club, the course consists of 135 acres of rolling, green property including several buildings. ... It is the last major open space, green area — not designated for any type of residential or commercial development — remaining in the 17-square mile township. The township supervisors and local planning commission never have considered the tract for development. The township comprehensive plan, a complete program for orderly community development lists the area as open, green space. Development of the land for other purposes would create a serious imbalance in the township....
The importance of preserving the golf course as open space has been considered officially by the Township since 1959. The first legal action was initiated in July 1964, when the supervisors placed an “overlay” on the course. This legal move was to “freeze” the value of the property so additional improvements after that date could not be charged to township taxpayers in acquiring the tract. It also served as “fair warning” to the owners — present and future — that the supervisors intended to act to acquire the property for public ownership____
The supervisors want to preserve the area as open, green space to prevent unwarranted development which would adversely affect the township....
R.R. 263a-265a.
The governing body’s campaign was successful and the bond issue was approved by the electorate. The Township created a municipal authority, denominated the Upper Merion — Valley Forge Municipal Authority, pursuant to the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, the Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382, as amended, 53 P.S. § 301 et seq., for the purpose of acquiring the Golf Club’s lands and operating a public golf course thereon. By resolution of November 4, 1968, the authority resolved to initiate the condemnation. A declaration of taking was filed by the authority two days later on November 6,1968. The Golf Club responded with the interposition of preliminary objections to the declaration of taking challenging, inter alia, the power of the condemnor and the sufficiency of the posted security. By opinion and order entered August 3, 1970, the trial court sustained the Golf Club’s objections
The Township, by its municipal authority, perfected an appeal to this Court but then, by Township Resolution No. 70-63 taken November 16, 1970, authorized the solicitor to withdraw the appeal and to “terminate all actions and activities relating to the purchase of the Golf Course by either the
In view of the cost of pursuing the acquisition to the higher courts, the recent court decision and the cost of acquisition, it would not be in the best interest of the Township. The recent decision of the Courts enables the Board to control the use of the land for open space by zoning.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
During this period, the Golf Club and prospective purchasers thereof initiated the first of a series of requests for a rezoning of the subject lands addressed to the Township governing body. By a “citizen’s petition” filed on April 11, 1967, the Golf Club attempted to avail itself of the authority now codified at Zoning Ordinance § 165-260 under which the owners of more than fifty (50%) percent of the lands in a described area may by petition request a modification of the zoning regulations applicable to their lands. The Golf Club requested a rezoning of about sixty acres of the tract to SM-Suburban Metropolitan zoning designation in order to permit construction of a clubhouse, hotel, accessory recreational facilities, and additional parking. R.R. 267a. The request was denied by unanimous decision of the governing body made on October 9,1967. R.R. 268a.
Subsequent requests for legislative zoning relief fared no better. The governing body denied the petitions of a prospective purchaser of the Golf Club: (a) dated November 16, 1981 seeking a rezoning of 68 acres of the tract for the purpose of constructing office buildings while committing to maintain the remainder of the tract as a golf course, R.R. 285a-289a; (b) dated March 16, 1982 seeking a rezoning of a portion of the tract to SM-Suburban Metropolitan designation to permit development for office purposes while committing to maintain the balance of the tract (40 acres) as open space; and (c) dated December 9, 1982 seeking a rezoning of the tract to Administrative research designation for the purpose of constructing offices and a hotel. R.R. 291a-293a, 347a.
During the course of these proceedings before the board and in response to the citizens group’s letter of inquiry, the supervisors’ chairman prepared a memorandum to the governing body dated May 80, 1984, in which he first describes “the Board’s goal of retaining the Golf Course as a Golf Course”, and then discusses the Township’s position with respect to the zoning ordinance validity challenge. After agreeing with the citizens group that “[t]he Golf Course issue is the single most important issue to confront the Board during 1984,” the chairman represents: “[f]or myself, my goals are simple: (1) I would like to maintain the Golf Course as it is. I want to do this not only at this time but also in the future.” R.R. 510a-511a.
In a report prepared during this initial validity challenge by the Township’s land planner, John Rahenkamp & Associates, in June 1984, entitled “Evaluation Of Existing Agricultural Zoning District”, the authors concluded that the only negative effect of the then proposed office/hotel development proposals on neighboring properties “would be the loss of the Golf Course.” The planners continued:
The impact of the present ... proposal is obvious in terms of the elimination of the open space, but not as obvious regarding infrastructure impacts. Given sufficient developer contributions and wide reaching traffic studies and plans ... the road improvements contemplated might more than outweigh the impact of increased cars.... Both the storm water and sewage impacts can be handled. The tax ratables will have a positive fiscal impact on the township. On balance the issue clearly becomes loss of the open space which is an issue of significant public impact or visual loss because so few of the area residents use the Golf Course.
*128 The bottom line is that this critical piece of remaining open space is in a concentrated area nearing if not surpassing urban intensities. The site may well be the link-pin [sic linchpin?] in a series of public decisions which must be made. The reality of the evolving urban character of the area must be dealt with thru [sic] a rational planning process. For instance a much higher level of transportation may be justified and this site may be critical to its success. Indeed, we feel that suburban-office may be underutilizing the site.... It is in the public interest to optimize the intensity of the site, in principle trading quantity for quality....
John Rahenkamp and Associates cannot excuse the township from responsibility for not moving forward on the critical planning to begin dealing with the realities of this intense core area. There are clearly no easy decisions .... However, delays in effective public action can no longer be considered prudent nor in the public interest.
R.R. 347a.
By decision and order dated September 5, 1985, the board denied the challenge. The purchaser then sought review of the zoning board’s decision before the trial court, but the expiration of the purchaser’s contractual rights required dismissal of the appeal. Despite the inability of the Township’s planners in 1984 to justify municipal inaction to that point, no public action was taken with respect to the Golf Club for more than a dozen additional years until, by letter dated October 29, 1997, less than two weeks prior to the filing of the instant validity challenge, and presumably in anticipation thereof, the Township tendered a formal purchase offer.
On November 13, 1997, Realen, under contract to purchase the property, presented its zoning ordinance validity challenge to the Township zoning board. Realen’s challenge included claims that the Golf Club’s AG District zoning constitutes spot zoning, special legislation, and is both arbitrary and irrational. Two conceptual site plans were presented with the challenge to illustrate the desired definitive relief. Plan A depicted development of the property for multi-family residential use
Fourteen sessions of a public hearing were conducted by the zoning board between February 1998 and June 1999 in the matter of Realen’s challenge. By decision dated August 13, 1999, the zoning board denied the challenge in every respect. In rejecting Realen’s spot zoning challenge, the zoning board concluded
The subject property is unique. The subject property has many distinguishing features that make it different from other surrounding properties. Such characteristics include its shape, road frontage, adjoining and existing uses as well as natural features, not to mention the shear large size of the property.
Zoning board decision at 24. Of these factors, the major arterial highways serving as the tract’s perimeter were, in the board’s view, the strongest zoning justification.
On further appeal, the trial court, by decision dated December 1, 2000, affirmed the zoning board’s rejection of Realen’s challenge as did a panel of the Commonwealth Court by decision dated June 4, 2002. We granted Realen’s petition for allowance of appeal by order dated December 18, 2002. In re Appeal of Realen Valley Forge Green Associates, 572 Pa. 716, 813 A.2d 847 (2002). In reviewing the decision of a zoning hearing board where the trial court has not taken any additional evidence, as in the instant case, appellate review is limited to determining whether the board abused its discretion or committed a legal error. Crown Communications v. Zoning Hearing Board of Glenfield, 550 Pa. 266, 705 A.2d 427, 430
In reviewing the Board’s decision, we note that our analysis is limited to “determining whether the Board abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence.” Upper Salford Township v. Collins, 542 Pa. 608, 669 A.2d 335, 337 (1995). Furthermore, when an appeal presents a question of law, such as the present case, our scope of review is plenary. Kmart Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Fitzsimmons), 561 Pa.111, 748 A.2d 660, 662 (2000).
Realen here renews the contentions rejected by the zoning board and the courts below
These challenges, although presented as independent grounds for relief, are closely related by their principal premises and the methods of their analysis. Indeed, each of Realen’s challenges has at its conceptual core the following well-established legal precepts.
The right of landowners in this Commonwealth to use their property as they wish, unfettered by governmental interference except as necessary to protect the interests of the public and of neighboring property owners, is of ancient origin, recognized in the Magna Carta, and now memorialized in Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (protecting as an “inherent right of mankind ... acquiring, possessing and protecting property”).
C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Township Zoning Hearing Board, 573 Pa. 2, 820 A.2d 143, 150 (2002). The limit beyond which the power to zone in the public interest may not transcend is the protected property rights of individual landowners. Our cautionary words in Cleaver, 200 A.2d at 413 n. 4, are no less appropriate today:
The natural or zealous desire of many zoning boards to protect, improve and develop their community, to plan a city or a township or a community that is both practical and beautiful, and to conserve the property values as well as the ‘tone’ of that community is commendable. But they must remember that property owners have certain rights which are ordained, protected and preserved in our Constitution and which neither zeal nor worthwhile objectives can impinge upon or abolish.
Recognizing that “[u]nder the traditional standard applied when determining the validity of zoning ordinances, a zoning ordinance must be presumed constitutionally valid un
[a]mong other reasons, an ordinance will be found to be unreasonable and not substantially related to a police power purpose if it is shown to be unduly restrictive or exclusionary. ... Similarly, an ordinance will be deemed to be arbitrary where it is shown that it results in disparate treatment of similar landowners without a reasonable basis for such disparate treatment.... Moreover, in reviewing an ordinance to determine its validity, courts must generally employ a substantive due process inquiry, involving a balancing of landowners’ rights against the public interest sought to be protected by.an exercise of the police power.
Id. Moreover,
The substantive due process inquiry, involving a balancing of landowners’ rights against the public interest sought to be protected by an exercise of the police power, must accord substantial deference to the preservation of rights of property owners, within constraints of the ancient maxim of our common law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. 9 Coke 59 — So use your own property as not to injure your neighbors. A property owner is obliged to utilize his property in a manner that will not harm others in the use of their property, and zoning ordinances may validly protect the interests of neighboring property owners from harm.
Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Golla, 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d 1337, 1341-42 (1982).
Hence, the function of judicial review, when the validity of a zoning ordinance is challenged, is to engage in a meaningful inquiry into the reasonableness of the restriction on land use in light of the deprivation of landowner’s freedom thereby incurred.
Id., 452 A.2d at 1342.
The Township, as a municipal entity possessing only those powers expressly delegated by the Commonwealth,
Spot zoning challenges have at their conceptual core the principle that lawful zoning must be directed toward the community as a whole, concerned with the public interest generally, and justified by a balancing of community costs and benefits. These considerations have been summarized as requiring that zoning be in conformance with a comprehensive plan for the growth and development of the community. Spot zoning is the antithesis of lawful zoning in this sense. In spot zoning, the legislative focus narrows to a single property and the costs and benefits to be balanced are those of particular property owners.
In Appeal of Mulac, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A.2d 275, 277 (1965), we confirmed the definition of “spot zoning” described in such authorities as Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, Upper Darby Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 583, 198 A.2d 538 (1964); Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964); and Putney v. Abington Township, 176 Pa.Super. 463, 108 A.2d 134 (1954), “as a singling out of one lot or a small area for different treatment from that accorded to similar surrounding land
The zoning board rejected Realen’s spot zoning challenge on the ground that the difference in zoning treatment between the agriculturally designated Golf Club property and the adjoining properties, all of which are designated for intense, commercial development, is justified by the “shape, road frontage, adjoining and existing uses as well as natural features, not to mention the shear large size of the property.” Zoning board decision at 24.
The trial court agreed with the zoning board’s analysis and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, writing:
the Board found that the Property is unique and distinguishable in several respects from the surrounding properties. (Board’s Op., Findings of Fact Nos. 40-42, at 7, 8). Two notable differences found by the Board were that the Property is considerably larger than the surrounding properties and the Property is completely surrounded by roadways. (Findings of Fact Nos. 61-62).
In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Associates 799 A.2d 938, 944-45 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (footnote omitted).
The analysis of the tribunals below on this issue is seriously flawed. First, the large size of the tract is not determinative. Zoning unjustifiably discriminatory is beyond the municipality’s police power and “[i]t makes no difference whether it is a 1/4 acre lot or a 50 acre industrial complex area....” Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514, 519 (1965) (invalidating as “spot zoning” the
Of the land characteristics offered by the zoning board in support of its rejection of the spot zoning challenge, only the size of the tract and its location entirely bounded by arterial highways, are the subject of any discussion. There can be no question, as the zoning board found, that arterial roadways are, in many instances, an appropriate feature to be designated as the boundary between incompatible zoning districts. But the issue here is not whether any zoning district designation could be appropriately applied to the Golf Club’s lands but whether the AG District designation can be so justified. It turns reason and land planning precepts on their head to assert, as the zoning board’s decision implies, that this tract’s restricted, agricultural zoning is justified by its ready access to the region’s primary arterial roads on every hand. Apart from a bare assertion that it is so, neither the zoning board nor the courts below have offered either reason or authority to support the proposition, essential to the propriety of the decision here reviewed, that the location of these highways makes agricultural zoning appropriate for this tract while the properties on the opposite side of the same roadways are appropriately zoned and developed for intense, commercial use. Any relationship between agricultural zoning and the other tract characteristics identified in the decisions below, including the property’s topography and shape, is similarly unexplored in the evidence of record, the findings of the Board, or the arguments of appellees.
On this record, no characteristic of the Golf Club’s property justifies the degree of its developmental restriction by zoning as compared to the district designation and use of all of the
We recognize that the circumstances here presented differ factually from the spot zoning cases we have previously decided in the chronology of the municipal action creating the unjustified “island” of disparate zoning. In previous cases, the island was created by a single municipal act directed toward the property which became the disputed island; either to that property owner’s benefit or detriment. Here, in contrast, the Golf Club’s status as an island of agricultural zoning was the product of a series of rezonings of surrounding properties beginning in the 1950’s and ending in about 1985.
Realen contends that the origin of a tract’s unjustified zoning treatment as compared to adjoining properties is not decisive and we agree. It is the difference in treatment that must be justified, not its origin or chronology. Some courts have used the term “reverse spot zoning” to describe the circumstances where the unjustified difference in treatment arises from the rezoning of lands surrounding the tract at issue and this term appropriately underscores the distinction between cases like that here presented where an island is created by the rezoning of other land from the more common situation where the challenged legislation is that creating the island tract.
Realen contends that it is not possible for a challenger to meet its evidentiary burden where the factfinder possesses such unbridled discretion in its credibility determinations and the body with the statutory power to appoint members of the fact-finding tribunal — the municipal governing body — actively participates in opposition to the challenge. Our decision with respect to Realen’s reverse spot zoning challenge makes it unnecessary to decide this novel issue. We will note, however, that the zoning board’s fact finding in this case includes particularly troubling examples of the difficulty Realen describes. For example, the zoning board here found as a pivotal fact that “[t]he subject property can be used and developed with single family detached dwellings, which are permitted by right on the subject property.” Factual Finding No. 68, zoning board’s decision at 10. The Township’s expert land planner testified during the course of the board’s hearing just to the contrary including the direct conclusion that none of the uses permitted by right on the tract are “practical.” R.R. 460a. Realen’s expert witnesses testified unambiguously that single-family detached homes are not a feasible use for this intensely developed, commercial area of the Township.
We may be presented at some point in the future with an appeal that requires us to decide whether a zoning hearing board’s performance of its fact-finding function deprived the applicant of a fundamentally fair proceeding and whether particular necessary findings of the board, although minimally supported by record evidence, capriciously and without reasonable explanation disregard overwhelming evidence having a contrary import. We are not required to resolve these issues in the present context and we decline to do so.
For these reasons, the order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby reversed and the record is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, our decision reported as Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board of Warwick Township, 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464, 469 (1974), and MPC § 1006-A (c) through (e), 53 P.S. §§ 11006-A(c) through (e), which require that Realen be afforded “definitive relief’ as the successful challenger of the Township’s zoning ordinance.
. Upper Merion Township, located in southwestern Montgomery County, is widely known by its postal designation: King of Prussia. The connection in 1957 of Philadelphia’s Schuylkill Expressway to the Pennsylvania Turnpike and U.S. Route 202 at a point in the center of the township provided the impetus for explosive growth. R.R. 30a. One of the first major employers to take advantage of the transportation infrastructure was General Electric Co., which constructed its aerospace research center for more than 3,000 employees on a rezoned AG District tract immediately adjacent to the Golf Club and the Turnpike Interchange. The following is the Township's official "Community Profile”:
Upper Merion Township is located in southeastern Pennsylvania, approximately 15 miles from center city Philadelphia. Over the last five decades, Upper Merion has developed into one of the most important 'activity centers’ of the region. The township has approximately 27,000 residents, hosts over 60,000 jobs, and offers over 9.5 million square feet of office space. Also located in Upper Merion are Valley Forge National Historic Park and the King of Prussia Mall, the nation's largest shopping mall (ranked by square footage of retail space).
. The gross tract area of the Golf Club is 135 acres with about 125 acres net of road rights-of-way. The tract perimeter is North Gulph Road, Guthrie Road, West DeKalb Pike, and North Warner Road. No public roads lie within the tract.
. When created by Act 130 enacted on May 30, 1893, the Valley Forge Park was this Commonwealth’s first park. On July 4, 1976 as part of the national bicentennial celebration, President Gerald R. Ford visited the Valley Forge Park and there signed into law the legislation authorizing federal acquisition of the parklands as the Valley Forge National Historical Park; a portion of which is located in the northwestern quadrant of the Township.
. Repealed by the Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, No. 247.
. Specifically, the court held that the authority/condemnor's bond without surety was an inadequate "naked bond” under the decision of this Court reported as In re: 203.76 Acres of Land in Franklin Tp., Beaver County, 431 Pa. 306, 245 A.2d 451 (1968); that the purpose of the condemnation, to acquire an existing private golf facility in order to initiate and operate a public golf facility, was not one for which municipal authorities have been delegated the power of eminent domain; and that the condemnation violated the Municipal Authorities Act prohibition against the exercise of the powers therein described in order to operate a project "which in whole or in part shall duplicate or compete with existing enterprises serving substantially the same purposes .... ” Section 306A of the Act, 53 P.S. § 306A.
. Realen here raises an additional issue in the nature of a challenge to • the traditional formulation of the scope of judicial review of a zoning hearing board's factual determinations.
. Appellant relies primarily on authorities of the appellate courts of Florida which have applied the term "reverse spot zoning” in invalidating refusals to rezone under circumstances having striking similarities to those here presented. See, for example, Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla.1957), and City of Miami Commissioners v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So.2d 1227 (Fla.App.1989). While not controlling here, these decisions present the persuasive view that reverse spot zoning is invalid in precisely the same sense and on the same grounds as spot zoning has been traditionally condemned; namely, that the rezoning and development of surrounding lands narrows the legislative focus to a single property or small area the differing zoning treatment of which can not be justified with reference to any of the community-wide concerns that serve as the legitimate basis for zoning in conformance with a comprehensive plan.
In this Commonwealth, the decisions reported as LHT Associates, LLC v. Township of Hampton, 809 A.2d 1072 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), and Guentter v. Borough of Lansdale, Montgomery County, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 287, 345 A.2d 306, 309 (1975), have defined the term as follows:
*137 ‘‘[r]everse spot zoning occurs where an “island” develops as a result of a municipality's failure to rezone a portion of land to bring it into conformance with similar surrounding parcels that are indistinguishable.” LHT Associates, 809 A.2d at 1075. We here use the term in this sense.