DocketNumber： 02585-02587
Judges： Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
Filed Date： 11/18/1987
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/13/2024
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ronald and Frances Gajkowski, Robert Schipske and William and Jean Abate (appellants) appeal by allowance a Superior Court order 350 Pa.Super. 285, 504 A.2d 840 which reversed an order of an en banc panel of Bucks County Common Pleas. Appellants brought suit in Common Pleas against appellees, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
On November 18, 1979, the members of Local 107 employed at the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company’s (3M) Bristol plant voted to commence a lawful economic strike after rejecting 3M’s final offer for a new collective bargaining agreement. After the strike vote, Local 107 initiated around-the-clock picketing at the entrance to the Bristol facility. The picketing remained uneventful until January 25, 1980, when Robert Ballinger, a member of Local 107, shot Ronald Gajkowski, Robert Schipske and William Abate with a .22 caliber revolver.
Appellants filed a complaint in trespass in Bucks County Common Pleas against Local 107 and its parent organization, the IBT. Following a lengthy trial, the jury was instructed on common law negligence principles and the stricter proof requirements incorporated in Pennsylvania’s Labor Anti-Injunction Act. Although Common Pleas held that the act’s strict limitations on union liability for civil
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8 of Pennsylvania’s Labor Anti-Injunction Act, Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, No. 308, 43 P.S. § 206h (Anti-Injunction Act), sets out both the kind and degree of proof necessary to hold a labor organization liable for the acts of officers, members or agents:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute as herein defined, shall be held responsible or liable in any civil action at law or suit in equity or in any criminal prosecution for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases, and by the weight of evidence in other cases, and without the aid of any presumptions of law or fact, both of — (a) the doing of such acts by persons who are officers, members or agents of any such association or organization; and (b) actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof by such association or organization.
The background of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was explored in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947). There, the Court held that the unique language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes the employment of either standard agency or respondeat superior analysis to hold a union vicariously liable for the torts of its officers, members and agents:
*522 We hold, therefore, that “authorization” as used in § 6 means something different from corporate criminal responsibility for the acts of officers and agents in the course or scope of employment. We are of the opinion that the requirement of “authorization” restricts the responsibility or liability in labor disputes of employer or employee associations, organizations or their members for unlawful acts of the officers or members of those associations or organizations, although such officers or members are acting within the scope of their general authority as such officers or members, to those associations, organizations or their officers or members who actually participate in the unlawful acts, except upon clear proof that the particular act charged, or acts generally of that type and quality, had been expressly authorized, or necessarily followed from a granted authority, by the association or non-participating member sought to be charged or was subsequently ratified by such association, organization or member after actual knowledge of its occurrence.
Id. at 406-407, 67 S.Ct. at 781 (footnote omitted). Following United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Congress provided a right of action for money damages in certain labor disputes in Section 303(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1982).
In an effort to avoid the difficult proof requirements of Section 8, appellants proffer two arguments, neither of which is persuasive. First, appellants contend, and Common Pleas agreed, that the legislature, through the adoption of Section 8, did not intend to supplant common law agency principles in personal injury matters. They argue that the statute was designed to protect unions solely from suits for economic damages stemming from a labor dispute.
We do not agree. Protecting unions from damage awards which would impinge upon the collective rights of workers is the clear import of Section 8. Supra at 855. The protection is available regardless of the theory that the plaintiff pursues. The purpose of this section’s higher standard of proof in civil actions is the protection of the worker’s right to collective bargaining without exposing his union to the higher costs engendered by the agency notion of respondeat superior. Since the union generally has no pool of profits with which to withstand the impact of unanticipated and costly damage awards, it could well be destroyed by an inadequately established claim.
No court of this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case included within this act, except in strict conformity with the provisions of this act, nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this act. Exclusive jurisdiction and power to hear and determine all actions and suits coming under the provisions of this act, shall be vested in the courts of common pleas of the several counties of this Commonwealth: Provided, however, That this act shall not apply in any case—
(d) Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined, an employe, or employes acting in concert, or a labor organization, or the members, officers, agents, or representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for such organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery, or other property of the employer with the intention of compelling the employer to accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of employment, or for collective bargaining.
43 P.S. § 206d(d). Appellants argue that the language “this act shall not apply in any case,” coupled with the prohibition against violence in Section 4(d), 43 P.S. § 206d(d), prevents the use of Section 8 of the Act in cases involving violent acts. Careful scrutiny of Section 4, 43 P.S. § 206d, reveals that subsections (a) through (d) were added to the Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, No. 308, by the Act of June 9, 1939, P.L. 302, No. 163. Prior to that amendment, Section 4 concluded with the word “Commonwealth” immediately before the proviso. Subsection (d) was
Section 4, as originally drafted, deprived our courts of jurisdiction to grant injunctions in labor disputes except as provided elsewhere in the Act. The proper and logical section for amendment to create exceptions to that limitation of jurisdiction is Section 4. The balance of the Act remains in full effect in those situations covered by the jurisdictional section.
Link Belt, supra, 415 Pa. at 128, 202 A.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
This distinction is also sound from the standpoint of policy. A union qua union can have no legitimate interest in preventing an injunction against violence on the picket line, whether or not it participated in fomenting that violence. If it did, it is properly a party. If it did not, it should support an end to the violence as all good citizens are required to do. On the other hand, a civil suit for damages against a union which did not participate or foment unlawful acts by its members can destroy or severely cripple a union which has taken no part in its members’ unlawful acts. Therefore, to permit such suits without proof of actual participation strikes at the core of the act’s
II. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL 107
For a labor organization to be liable for “participation” pursuant to Section 8 of the Anti-Injunction Act, a jury must find that (1) the acts were committed by officers, members or agents of the organization and (2) the organization actually participated in the acts. Such a finding must be predicated upon clear proof. Philadelphia Marine, supra at 453 Pa. 52, 308 A.2d at 103 (quoting Gibbs, supra). It is beyond question that the major players in this tragedy were members of Local 107. The difficult question is whether the entity itself, Local 107, “participated” in the drama and so is liable to compensate the victims. A finding of participation may be based upon circumstantial evidence. Ritchie v. United Mine Workers, 410 F.2d 827, 833 (6th Cir.1969). See also James R. Snyder Co. v. Edward Rose & Sons, 546 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir.1976) (proof of authorization or ratification can be based upon circumstantial evidence). In determining whether a labor organization has actually participated in the commission of an act, we hold that the number of persons involved, the status of these persons in the organization, and whether the organization was aware of and in a position to exercise control over the acts, are all relevant considerations. See United Aircraft Corp. v. International Association of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 89, 285 A.2d 330, 337 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972). This record shows clear proof of Local 107’s participation in the sorrowful events of January 25, 1980, a participation for which it should be condemned and held accountable to those injured. Therefore, Superior Court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. in favor of the appellee, Local 107.
At this point, an exacting review of the 1,113 page trial transcript is necessary. The following people were primary
Although pulling the trigger was the physical act of one intoxicated picketer, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly hold that Local 107 participated in the calamity of January 25. On that fateful day, Crossan, Kendig, Ballinger and two others went to the “Tulleytown Tank” for lunch. Crossan stated that the men “drank continuously” for a couple of hours. Id. at 424. Upon their return to the line, Crossan and Kendig began handing out leaflets to non-striking employees. Id. at 425. 3M security supervisor Joseph Boxmeyer asked Crossan and Kendig to stop doing this on 3M’s property. N.T. February 29, 1984 at 79-81. Kendig went on to let air out of the tires of cars on the 3M lot. N.T. February 28, 1984 at 429; February 29, 1984 at 81. Later, Crossan and Kendig left in Kendig’s truck, ostensibly to check on Kendig’s children. Before leaving, a striker overheard Kendig remark that he was going to get a gun to shoot out 3M’s lights and security camera. N.T. February 28, 1984 at 195. At Kendig’s house, both Crossan and Kendig had a shot of alcohol before coming back to the line. While they were riding back to the plant, Kendig showed Crossan a gun he was storing in the truck. Crossan made no objection to Ken-dig’s bringing the gun on the line. N.T. February 28, 1984 at 432-434.
The once peaceful picket line deteriorated into a raucous mob. One witness described the growing tension and two witnesses characterized the situation as “rowdy.” N.T. February 27, 1984 at 130; February 28, 1984 at 190. Joseph Boxmeyer, 3M’s security head, noted in his log that the picketers were attempting to create a confrontation through their actions. N.T. February 29, 1984 at 85; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 59. Some time after 7:00 P.M., one picketer and an employee of 3M reported shots. N.T. February 27, 1984 at 134; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 36. Crossan then met Kendig near the gas station across the street from the plant; Kendig handed Crossan the pistol and urged Crossan to shoot out the lights at the plant. Crossan replied, “I don’t know how.” Kendig offered to instruct him; Crossan decided to go to the men’s room. N.T. February 28, 1984 at 434-35. He admitted that he did not attempt to restrain Kendig or contact Smalley. Id. at 436. After Crossan departed, Kendig met up with Ballinger and
Jack Smalley, business agent for Local 107, testified that he was responsible for the conduct of the strike at the Bristol 3M plant. N.T. February 28, 1984 at 371. He asserted that Local 107 had a rule against drinking alcoholic beverages on the picket line. Id. at 376, 379. At least four witnesses testified there was no such rule. N.T. February 27, 1984 at 110; February 28, 1984 at 236, 241, 273. Smalley stated that he was aware of drinking on the line but admitted he took no steps to curb it. Id. at 388-390. George Cook testified that on one occasion he observed George Massimini, another business agent of Local 107, delivering alcoholic beverages to the strikers. Id. at 279-80.
This record reveals a dangerous combination of escalating tensions, alcohol and firearms. The firing of the pistol at the three victims was not the act of a lone perpetrator but the end result of a collective assault on the 3M plant. The passing of the weapon among union officials responsible for the negotiating process is sufficient to hold Local 107 liable as a participant. See, e.g., Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v. McCarthy, 708 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1983) (imposition of liability on union where union representative, vested with authority to control violence, failed to act), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 346, 78 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). See also NLRB v. Brewery and Beer Distrib. Drivers, 281 F.2d 319, 321-22 (3d Cir.1960) (court deems authority of stewards comparable to that of factory foremen); Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 Ky.L.J. 295, 314 (1961) (discusses authority of stewards as bottom link in chain of union command). The record shows that many strikers, with varying degrees of authority, were aware of the pistol on the line.
This record also includes circumstantial evidence that Joseph Cimino, president of Local 107, sanctioned the assault on the Bristol plant. Three days prior to the events of January 25, Cimino attended a meeting at the Washington, D.C. office of the IBT to discuss a number of unresolved issues. Present were Cimino, Norman Weintraub, an IBT economist, Joseph Cotter, an IBT staff employee, Nelson Schmidt, a 3M attorney, and Robert Hanson, a 3M personnel manager. At the conclusion of the meeting, Cimino and Hanson agreed to re-evaluate their positions during a follow-up phone call. Mr. Hanson’s notes, introduced into evidence by stipulation, reveal the content of his conversation with Cimino on January 25, the day of the melee:
Joe Cimino called me answering my call to Cotter. Summary of conversation: We need all 13 items I gave you yesterday. People are adamant and strong. I’ve spent a lot of time on picket line. They won’t go back to work for a few cents. I’ve got to represent them. We’re going to extend our picketing. I’ve got approval from the Inti. We’re going to do what we have to do — it’s*531 been peaceful for ten weeks — it’s getting hot now — they are uptight — we’ve got to get mgmt’s attention. I have no malice — I won’t lie to you or sandbag you. These people don’t like being 2nd class citizens — they compare rates and benefits with St. Paul, and other three plants & don’t like being behind. Everybody has sick days these days. You get injunction & then tell us where you’re shipping all boxcars — it’s written on cars “To Anchor” or “To Leño” — that’s really rubbing salt in wounds. First time they’re doing it. We’re have a demonstration Mon. in Phil. — 95% of 3M will be there and some truck drivers.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 28 (emphasis added).
Because Common Pleas properly instructed the jury on the applicability of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act through the use of special interrogatories, our review is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence on which to base the jury’s verdict. Burbage v. Boiler Eng’g. & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 323, 249 A.2d 563, 566 (1969). Our system vests the responsibility of determining the facts with the jury and we will not upset their findings absent a showing that the verdict is capricious, against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Simon v. H.K. Porter Co., 407 Pa. 359, 363, 180 A.2d 227, 229 (1962). We are particularly reluctant to disturb a verdict which is supported by both the trial court and a panel of that court sitting en banc. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 338, 191 A.2d 822, 830
Our detailed factual recital shows that there is evidence on this record sufficient for a jury to determine that enough of the membership of Local 107 and of its officers took part in the tragic events of January 25 to hold the Local liable as a participant for the appellants’ damages. The principal players include stewards serving as agents on the negotiating committee, officers and a host of members of the Local. The record bespeaks rising tensions, fueled by alcoholic beverages, that reached a violent crescendo on the evening of January 25, without any responsible effort to avert it. Considering the evidence which the jury had when it held Local 107 liable, we see no reason to disturb that verdict.
III. PARTICIPATION OF THE IBT
While the record is full of evidence from which the jury properly inferred the participation of Local 107 in the January 25 violence, there is no clear proof of either actual participation or actual authorization by the IBT. At trial, appellants sought to demonstrate, through the introduction of copies of the constitutions of the two organizations, that the local is the agent of the parent and therefore jointly liable for the harm. This effort to demonstrate an agency relationship was buttressed by evidence of strike benefits paid from the IBT to local members. Also, appellants proffered evidence of a parade held in Philadelphia three days after the shooting; however, there was absolutely no showing that the officers of the IBT sanctioned this event as a demonstration of support of the violence of January 25. This showing falls well short of the clear proof of actual authorization or actual participation called for in Section 8. Cf. Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir.1969) (parent union’s agents actually involved in violence), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969). Indeed, this is precisely the situation in which the legislature intended to protect a union from the imposition of liability through its enactment of Section 8.
The day-to-day functions of a labor organization will not evidence liability for tortious conduct. For example, a number of courts have held that the payment of routine strike benefits alone does not give rise to liability under Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Gibbs, supra 383 U.S. at 738, 86 S.Ct. at 1145; Federal Prescription Serv. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 527 F.2d 269, 276-77 (8th Cir.1975). Absent a showing that the IBT took affirmative steps to either sanction or take part in the events of January 25, Superior Court properly exonerated the organization from any liability.
Based on the foregoing, the order of Superior Court is reversed with regard to Local 107. It is otherwise affirmed.
. At trial, Ballinger denied any responsibility for the shooting although he admitted to police at the scene that he in fact was the perpetrator and later pled nolo contendré to the criminal charges.
. The jury apportioned the damage award as follows: Ronald Gajkowski, $589,960; Frances Gajkowski, $62,500 (loss of consortium); Robert Schipske, $12,000; William Abate, $540,000; and Jean Abate, $100,000 (loss of consortium).
. That section reads:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 106.
. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the state courts have jurisdiction over labor matters involving violence and threats to public order. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025 (1954) (state court not precluded from determining common law tort based on threats of violence and intimidation).
. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) states:
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or any violation of subsection (a) [relating to unfair labor practices by a labor organization] of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
. See generally Note, Labor Unions — Vicarious Liability for Torts Committed by Members, 57 Wash.L.Rev. 193 (1981); Comment, The Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 21 UCLA L.Rev. 600 (1973); Note, Tort Liability of Labor Unions for Picket Line Assaults, 10 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 517 (1977); Annotation, Liability of Labor Union or its Membership for Torts Committed by Officers, Members, Pickets, or Others, in Connection with Lawful Primary Labor Activities, 36 A.L. R.3d 405 (1971).
. Appellees' argument, that the stewards enjoyed no real authority with the expiration of the collective agreement, is specious. Even assuming arguendo that the stewards’ authority ended with the expiration of the contract, these stewards, Crossan and Kendig, assumed
. Mr. Cimino’s statement is probative on the issue of whether he “participated” in the violence at the Bristol plant. The statement could also be considered as indicative of Local 107’s “authorization” of the shooting. However, as circumstantial evidence, we do not believe that this statement alone is clear proof of Local 107’s “authorization” of the tragic events of January 25.