DocketNumber: Appeal, 244; Appeal, 270
Judges: Kephart, Schaffer, Maxey, Drew, Linn, Stern, Barnes
Filed Date: 10/4/1937
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
This case is before us on original jurisdiction upon a special certiorari directed to the court below, removing the record to this court, and the matter is now before us for consideration after argument on the amended bill in equity and preliminary objections thereto filed by defendants. The case was argued jointly with the associated case of PhiladelphiaPiers, Inc., v. McCaughn,
Defendants are respectively a wharfage company and three railroads. The railroads are common carriers engaged in the transportation of freight and passengers in interstate commerce, and likewise in the operation and maintenance of pier and wharf facilities on the Delaware River in the City of Philadelphia. The Reading Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company own and operate their own wharves. The Baltimore and Ohio leases its wharf from the City of Philadelphia, but operates it in exactly the same manner as the two other railroads. The fourth defendant, Philadelphia Piers, Inc., leases its wharf from the United States Government, but operates it in a similar manner. Its wharf is served by certain lines of the defendant railway companies. Over all the wharves and piers of defendants pass import and export freight between ocean-going vessels on the one hand, which dock at the piers, and railroad cars and other forms of land transportation, which deliver or receive the merchandise at the wharves. The merchandise is consigned by water carrier to and from foreign countries, as well as in interstate commerce. Where freight is delivered to or transported from the piers by rail, compensation for use of the railroad defendants' wharves is included in the tariffs charged by the railroad companies. In the case of Philadelphia Piers, Inc., where a railroad serves the incoming or outgoing freight, this defendant receives compensation for the use of its pier from the railroad concerned, which is absorbed by that railroad in its carriage charges to the consignor. Where the freight is delivered to or received from other carriers or forms of land transportation, defendants, up to the inception of these proceedings, received no compensation for the use of their piers. *Page 116
A short time prior to 1937, defendants gave notice that, beginning February 1, 1937, a top wharfage charge of 50 cents per ton would be levied on freight moving across their piers to or from ocean-going vessels shipped in foreign commerce, where such freight was not delivered to or transported from the piers by rail carrier. Top wharfage is a charge levied upon the owners of merchandise for the privilege of using the pier or wharf, in transferring the freight to and from vessels docking there, or of having their goods lie upon the dock in the course of loading and unloading operations.
This notice meant that where freight moved to or from the wharves by rail, no wharfage fee was charged, this being absorbed in the rail rates. But if rail transportation was not involved, defendants announced their intention after February 1, 1937, of charging 50 cents per ton for the use of their piers. Presumably this charge is reasonable, not being in excess of the value of the service furnished.
Defendants filed with the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission tariffs proposing the charge in question. On January 26, 1937, a hearing was held before the Director of Wharves, Docks and Ferries of the City of Philadelphia, pursuant to authority alleged to have been conferred by section 14 of the Act of June 8, 1907, P. L. 488. A further hearing was held on February 1, 1937, at the conclusion of which the director rendered a decision against the railroad defendants denying the right to impose the announced wharfage charges. On March 9, 1937, the Public Service Commission, after previously suspending the tariffs, decided that it did not have jurisdiction over wharfage charges for the use of piers and wharves in Philadelphia, and discontinued the proceeding before it to sustain tariffs filed by defendants. Defendants then filed in the court below a bill for an injunction to restrain the Director of Wharves, Docks and Ferries from interfering in any manner with their levying the charges in question. The *Page 117
prayer of the bill was granted, and a preliminary injunction against the director was awarded, the ground of the lower court's decision being that neither the United States Maritime Commission nor the Director of Wharves, Docks and Ferries of the City of Philadelphia has any rate-making jurisdiction to regulate or control the charges sought to be imposed by defendants, and that such jurisdiction resides solely in the Public Utility Commission of the Commonwealth, and since the latter had not acted in the matter, such wharfage charges were not forbidden. From this decision the director has appealed to this court, in the case of Philadelphia Piers, Inc., v.McCaughn,
Immediately thereafter plaintiff in the case of original jurisdiction, McNeely and Price Co., a shipper engaged in foreign commerce, filed in the court below a bill of complaint praying for an injunction against defendants restraining them from imposing the charges in question. The ground of the complaint is that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, having succeeded to the authority and jurisdiction of the former Public Service Commission, on May 10, 1937, revoked the order of the Public Service Commission and directed that the proceeding in respect of the tariffs in question be listed for reargument on the question of its jurisdiction to regulate the rates thereof; and that pending such determination by the Public Utility Commission defendants have no right to collect the wharfage charges, not having filed tariffs with the Public Utility Commission, as required by law. This court on petition by defendants brought up the record in this matter from the lower court, and instituted it herein as an original proceeding. The plaintiff filed herein an amended bill of complaint, stating the same grounds, and to this defendants filed preliminary objections.
The grounds of these objections raise, not a question of the statutory law of the State, but a Federal question. *Page 118 This question is whether, in view of the fact that defendants seek to impose the wharfage charges only upon goods moving in foreign commerce over their piers, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or any municipality or administrative agency thereof has any jurisdiction to regulate the same or to interfere in any manner in the levying of such charges by defendants. Defendants' contention is that, foreign commerce alone being involved, regulation of wharfage charges is solely within the power and jurisdiction of the Federal government and its administrative agencies duly established to that end. It is said, first, that the subject of the regulation of wharfage charges, being national in scope and effect, comprises a sphere in which state law has no power to operate, irrespective of whether regulatory legislation has been enacted by Congress; and, secondly, it is maintained that even if the subject matter is one in which state regulatory law may legitimately operate in the absence of controlling federal legislation, Congress has entered the field and undertaken to regulate the matters in question, and that this has been done either by the Federal Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and its amendments, or by the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended.
Defendants advance the contention that, although formerly, in the absence of federal regulation, states or their municipal subdivisions were empowered to regulate charges in the nature of dockage or wharfage fees on vessels discharging or receiving cargo in their harbors or for the use of wharves operated therein, this was the case only at earlier periods when such matters were assumed to be of merely local concern. The contention is made that in more recent times the subject has become one of national importance, because of the complex network of transportation facilities now covering the entire country, each part having a necessary interrelation with every other part. It is argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission is now and for many *Page 119 years has been engaged in the process of determining and fixing rates for interstate carriage of freight between inland points and ports of delivery, and that, since wharfage rates have an effect on the flow of interstate commerce, the fixing of them has ceased to be a matter merely of such local interest and significance as to justify state regulation.
There is no evidence before us of the extent to which the imposition of wharfage charges has become a matter of preëminently national concern, or of the nature and degree of its effect upon interstate and foreign commerce. In its absence it cannot be taken for granted that wharfage charges have entered the category of exclusively federal questions regardless of whether or not Congress has taken action in respect to them. All the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States indicate that the regulation of wharfage and dockage rates and the determination of what are and what are not reasonable charges is a subject of local concern subject to state regulatory power in the absence of applicable Federal legislation.
In the case of Cannon v. New Orleans,
In Packet Co. v. Keokuk,
In Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg,
Again in Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg,
In The Minnesota Rate Cases,
In the recent case of Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama,
We know of no case which holds that the subject of wharfage charges is of such national moment that any attempt at state regulation of them would per se be an intrusion into a forbidden field. It is clear that the sphere of wharfage rate regulation is one which is subject to state regulatory power in the absence of controlling Federal legislation on the subject.
This conclusion brings us face to face with this question: Has Congress by appropriate enactment so manifested its intent to supervise and control matters in connection with wharfage rates as to call for the retirement of state regulation?
It is contended that the Act of Congress of September 7, 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A., sec. 801 et seq., *Page 125 known as the Shipping Act, has so extended the authority of the Federal Government over wharfage regulation to leave no room for state interference. By this act certain powers and duties were vested in an administrative commission designated as the United States Shipping Board. Authority to regulate wharfage in certain specified respects was incontrovertibly conferred upon the Shipping Board by this act. By the Act of June 29, 1936, 46 U.S.C.A., sec. 1114, these powers and duties were subsequently transferred from the Shipping Board to the United States Maritime Commission, so that whatever authority in the premises the Shipping Board formerly had is now vested in the Maritime Commission.
The Shipping Act relates to three distinct classes of business, to wit: (A) Water carriers in foreign commerce, (B) Water carriers in interstate commerce, and (C) "Other persons subject to the act" who furnish terminal facilities, inter alia, wharfage facilities. It prohibits discriminatory acts byany of these classes of business (46 U.S.C.A., sec. 815). It prohibits in section 816, paragraph 1, discriminatory rates by water carriers engaged in foreign commerce (that is, Class A, supra) and it provides (sec. 817) for regulation of rates as to water carriers engaged in interstate commerce (that is, Class B, supra). In the second paragraph of section 816 it provides that "Every such carrier [i. e., common carriers by water in foreign commerce] and every other person subject to this chapter [in which is included any person carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water] shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever the board finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a *Page 126 just and reasonable regulation or practice. (Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, sec. 17, 39 Stat. 734.)"
While the words "rates" or "rate-making power" are not used in the Shipping Act in respect to the Shipping Board's power over Class C, supra, we hold that the phrase "just and reasonable regulations and practices" as used in paragraph 2 of section 816 above quoted, is comprehensive enough to give the Shipping Board power over Class C.
We have also reached the conclusion that in theInterstate Commerce Act, as at present amended, Congress intended to confer and did confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission power to regulate the wharfage charges of these defendants, to the exclusion of any state regulation. A consideration of the act itself and of its interpretation and application by the Federal courts sustain this conclusion.
The first section of the act (February 4, 1887, as amended: 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 1) is phrased in broad and general terms. The transportation subject to regulation is "of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment" in interstate or foreign commerce: 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 1 (1) (a). The regulatory power is conferred only so far as the transportation is within the United States. The term "railroad" is defined as including, together with bridges and ferries operated in connection with any railroad, all "terminals, and terminal facilities of every kind used or necessary in the transportation of the persons or property designated" in the act. "Transportation" is defined to include "all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage . . . and all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, . . . transfer in transit . . ., storage and handling of property transported." The term "common carrier" includes "all persons, natural or artificial, engaged in such *Page 127 transportation . . . as common carriers for hire": 49 U.S.C.A., sec. 1 (3).
A wharf or dock is clearly an "instrumentality" or "facility of shipment or carriage," and the operator of it for public use furnishes a service of value and necessity "in connection with the receipt, delivery and transfer in transit . . . of property transported." Unquestionably the railroad defendants herein are common carriers engaged in interstate commerce by rail, and they operate most of the piers in question. The fourth defendant, Philadelphia Piers, Inc., operates its wharf, as averred in the bill of complaint, in the business, inter alia, of "transferring import and export freight between ocean-going vessels and railroad cars . . . for transportation to and from foreign countries," and likewise freight not served by rail to and from the pier. As such, it cannot be considered as in a different situation from that of the railroad carriers. An inference is warranted that there is between itself and the defendant railroads which serve its pier at least an "arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment" in the type of commerce which here concerns us, its close connection with the rail carriers being apparent.
Undoubtedly, as the Court said in Penna. R. R. Co. v. PublicUtilities Commission of Ohio,
Nevertheless, the defendant companies are engaged in transportation, within the definition of the act and, likewise by definition, defendants are common carriers engaged in such transportation in foreign commerce, the only type of commerce sought to be affected by the charges in question. It is immaterial that the rates to be imposed are for a service or facility furnished solely in Pennsylvania, and hence of a wholly intrastate nature. Such service or facility is but part, and an indispensable part, of a shipment in foreign commerce. In United States v. Erie R. R. Co.,
In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, supra, the court referred to the foregoing case with renewed approval, pointing out (p. 176) that the transportation by rail was a part of foreign commerce, in which case the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A., sec. 1 (1) (c), (2) (a)) applies to that part of the act of transportation which takes place within a single state. It is no doubt true, as said in WilmingtonTransportation Co. v. Calif. R. R. Commission,
We think the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the two following cases are decisive of the pending controversy: (1) Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. InterstateCommerce Commission Young,
In the first case the Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to regulate charges of a terminal company which is part of a railroad and steamship system and operates terminals *Page 130 such as those of the Southern Pacific Terminal at Galveston, Texas. That case was begun by a bill in equity to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring appellants to cease and desist, on or before a certain date and for a period of not less than two years thereafter, from granting and giving undue preferences and advantages to a shipper of cotton seed products at the port of Galveston, Texas, through failure to exact from him payment of wharfage charges for handling cotton seed cake and meal over the wharves, docks and piers of appellants, while at the same time exacting such charges from other shippers of cotton seed cake and meal. The relief prayed for was denied by the court below, and the decree was affirmed. Among the errors assigned in the action of the Circuit Court in dismissing the bill of complaint were the following: "(1) The Interstate Commerce Commission had no jurisdiction over the Terminal Company, (2) . . . (3) . . . (4) The Commission by its order assumed to control intrastate and foreign commerce, not subject to the act to regulate commerce." The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice McKENNA, held: "The property of the Terminal Company is 'necessary in the transportation or delivery' of the interstate and foreign freight transported by the lines of the Southern Pacific system. . . . It is with the system that the law must deal, not with its elements. . . . The terminal facilities which the Terminal Company was authorized to maintain were for the system, not for the corporate elements considered separately. . . . The wharves were intended for shipping facilities, a means of transition from land carriage to water carriage. . . . The manufacture or concentration on the wharves of the Terminal Company are but incidents . . . in the transshipment of the products in export trade and their regulation is within the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission. To hold otherwise would be to disregard, as the Commission said, the substance of things and make evasions of the act of Congress quite easy. It makes no difference, *Page 131 therefore, that the shipments of the products were not made on through bills of lading or whether their initial point was Galveston or some other place in Texas."
In the "(2)" case cited, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that no portion of the business of a ferry which is part of an interstate railway is under the control of the State and that the state authorities have no power to regulate the fare of passengers, whether railroad passengers or not, on the ferry between Weehawken, New Jersey, and New York City. In 1905 the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, New Jersey, adopted two ordinances, one fixing the rate for foot passengers ferried from New Jersey to New York and the other for a round trip commencing on the New Jersey shore, which rates were applicable to the ferries in question. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, engaged as a lessee in operating the lines of the West Shore Railroad and its railroad ferries, commenced this proceeding to prevent the enforcement of the rates fixed by the ordinances. The contention was that the ordinances were an unwarranted interference with the interstate business of the company and that the enforcement of the ordinances would constitute a direct burden on interstate commerce, which could not be done consistently with the Constitution. The Supreme Court of New Jersey maintained the contentions of the railroad company. The Court of Errors and Appeals reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court. The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States. Chief Justice WHITE, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: "The plaintiff in error insists, not following the exact order of its argument,a, that the assailed ordinances are repugnant to the commerce clause because Congress has legislated concerning railroad ferries and thereby manifested its purpose that there should be no longer room for the exertion of state power on the subject; and, b, that if this is not so it is now necessary to pass on the question reserved in the St. Clair Case *Page 132
[
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the last case cited from the instant case, by saying: "Due to the fact that there is an express grant to the Interstate Commerce *Page 134 Commission of jurisdiction over ferries in the Interstate Commerce Act (sec. 3) and the ferry in question was used to transport both railroad passengers and nonrailroad passengers between New Jersey and New York, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in fixing rates for both types of passengers, since to do otherwise would have resulted in discrimination or preference against the railroads involved." We do not regard this distinction as a substantial one. The sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, already cited in this opinion, mention "instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage" as expressly as they do the word "ferries," and, as we have already pointed out, a wharf or dock is palpably an "instrumentality and facility of shipment or carriage." The power of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the act quoted to regulate wharfage fees is as undeniable as its power to regulate ferriage. The evil to be avoided, according to the opinion expressed by Chief Justice WHITE in the case just quoted from, was the rendering of "the national authority inefficacious by the confusion and conflict which would result" from leaving both the Federal and State governments in "possession of the field." Therefore the Supreme Court declared in effect that in the field defined either in specific or general terms in the Interstate Commerce Act, only one sovereign could exercise its will, that sovereign being the United States.
It is, of course, well settled that any Act of Congress on any phase of interstate commerce, supersedes any state statute which is in conflict therewith. It appears to be equally well settled that when the national legislature enters any field of regulation into which it is constitutionally admissible, the state legislature already occupying the same field must get out even though no statutory expression of the national legislature has as yet come into conflict with a state regulation. *Page 135
In Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. State of Washington,
In New York Central Railroad Co. v. Winfield,
In Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Van Zant,
In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter,
In the case of Chicago, Rock Island Pacific Ry. Co. v.Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co.,
A review of the foregoing cases leads us to the conclusion that the field of "regulation of wharfage charges," where agencies of respectively the State of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia attempt to operate governmentally, has been occupied exclusively by the federal government since that government gave expression to its will in the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments. To borrow phrases from the Supreme Court Justices in the opinions quoted: The Interstate Commerce Act "as we construe it, was intended to occupy that field" (Justice BRANDEIS); "Congress having fully covered the subject, no room exists for state regulation even in respect [to things] as to which the federal act [as yet] provides no remedy" (Justice VAN DEVANTER); "Its [Congress's] power to regulate such commerce and all its instrumentalities is supreme; and as that power has been exerted state laws have no application" (Justice BUTLER); "The conception of the operation at one and the same time of both the *Page 141 power of Congress and the power of the States over a matter of interstate commerce is inconceivable, since the exertion of the greater power necessarily takes possession of the field, and leaves nothing upon which the lesser power may operate" (Chief Justice WHITE); "In the original act to regulate commerce the term 'transportation' was declared to embrace all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage . . . and power of the State over the subject matter ceased" when "Congress exerted its paramount authority over the subject" (Chief Justice WHITE).
In an article on "The Effect of Congressional Legislation on State Power to Regulate Railroads," in Volume 31 of Columbia Law Review, page 450 (March, 1931), "the various aspects of railroading which are subject to regulation" are divided into "(1) rates, (2) extensions and abandonments of line, (3) spurs, (4) connections, (5) depot facilities, (6) service, (7) finance, (8) liability to shippers and passengers, (9) safety, and (10) labor." In regard to "(6) service," it is stated at page 455: "In dealing with interstate freight service requirements, the courts have been particularly free in finding exclusive Congressional occupancy of the field." In the case before us, we find "exclusive congressional occupancy of thefield."
In the historic case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 1, Justice JOHNSON, in his concurring opinion said (page 229): "Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation [italics supplied]." Chief Justice MARSHALL, in writing the opinion for the United States Supreme Court in the same case, said (page 209): " 'To regulate' implies . . . full power over the thing to be regulated; it excludes, necessarily, the action of all *Page 142 others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated."* As Chief Justice WHITE said in Northern Pacific Ry.Co. v. State of Washington (supra): "The right of a state . . . in a case like this . . . ceases when Congress . . . manifests its purpose to call into play its exclusive power [to regulate]."
In the next to the last paragraph of plaintiff's brief in rebuttal, appears the following statement: "The Court in deciding this case is faced with the question of whether it should regard the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the M. L. C. No. 10 Case
[
In the "M. L. C." Case, the issue raised in the case at bar was not raised and therefore not decided. The real issue inthat case was as to the meaning of the phrase "private wharf." Circuit Judge HOUGH, writing the opinion for the court, said: "What is meant by 'private wharf' is primarily to be ascertained by the law of the State of New York. . . . We hold . . . on this record these libellants are private wharf owners" and the authority to charge for wharfage "is implicit." He then states that "the right of regulating rates is recognized generally as a sovereign power, either by the nature of the estate as a franchise, or the nature of the occupation as being affected by a public interest. . . . See Murphy v. Montgomery,
In another part of the opinion in the "M. L. C." Case (supra), Judge HOUGH said: "The questions arising in the case as stated are primarily of New York law; for, subject to the paramount right of navigation, the national Constitution and laws have left the laws and usages relating to lands bordering on tidewater and to land below high-water mark to the supervision and regulation of the several states." In support of that statement Judge HOUGH cites Shively v. Bowlby,
In the instant case, unlike the "M. L. C." Case, it is earnestly contended by the defendants that the regulation of wharfage on land "bordering on tidewater" (to quote Judge HOUGH'S phrase) is a matter in which the State of Pennsylvania must yield its "dominion and sovereignty" to the paramount right of the United States "so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce." It is clear that the "M. L. C." Case lends no support to the position taken by plaintiff in the case now before us.
On the other hand, in the Luckenbach Case (decided in 1929), referred to above, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held, as we hold in this opinion, that the authority to regulate and control interstate commerce cannot be divided and the authority of the United States is absolute. The court said in that case: "We are satisfied that the trial judge was right in holding that the attempted regulation [of wharfage] here complained of would be a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and cannot be sustained under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, by which such cases are governed. . . . If the federal interstate commerce regulations do not apply to respondent as a wharfinger, the shipping board legislation does. The field is therefore entirely occupied by federal legislation and regulations. In such case it is well settled that the state is deprived of any authority to regulate such utilities."
The "ferry cases" are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Port Richmond and Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Board ofChosen Freeholders of Hudson County,
If we are "faced with the question" (as plaintiff states) of whether we regard the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the "M. L. C. No. 10 Case" (supra), or the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in the "Luckenbach Case" (supra) "as authority," we will resolve the question so faced by saying that we regard the opinion in the "M. L. C. No. 10 Case" as inapposite to this case, and the opinion in the Luckenbach Case in respect to the exclusive possession of "the field" by federal legislation and regulations, as apposite and correct, it being in accord both with sound reason and with the decisions in cognate cases of the highest judicial authority in the land, to wit: the Supreme Court of the United States.
The relief sought is an injunction restraining defendants from collecting or attempting to collect the proposed charges pending determination of the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Commission or the proper filing therewith of tariffs and schedules of rates. We decide that the Commission named is without jurisdiction in the matter, the governmental agencies of the State being impuissant in the presence in the same field of the paramount authority of the government of the United States. *Page 147
The bill is dismissed, at the cost of the plaintiff.
St. Clair County v. Interstate Sand & Car Transfer Co. ( 1904 )
Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett ( 1928 )
Red "C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Agriculture ( 1912 )
Southern Railway Co. v. United States ( 1911 )
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad v. Settle ( 1922 )
Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, Sheriff & Tax Collector ( 1929 )
Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch ( 1888 )
Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg ( 1883 )
Cardwell v. American Bridge Co. ( 1885 )
Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture ( 1898 )
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Van Zant ( 1923 )
Wilmington Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission of ... ( 1915 )
Texas & New Orleans Railroad v. Sabine Tram Co. ( 1913 )