Judges: Duncan, Gibson, Tilghman
Filed Date: 12/20/1817
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
William Negley, the plaintiff, below,
took out a writ of summons, against Stephen Flanegan, the defendant, in an action on the case, and before the summons was served on the defendant, the plaintiff entered a rule for arbitration. The only question is, whether the rule could be entered under these circumstances. In Hertzog v. Ellis, (3 Binn. 209,) the principle established by this Court, was, that a rule for arbitration might be entered by the plaintiff, at any time after the entry of the action on the docket of the prothonotary. The same principle .was affirmed in the case of Sharp (in error) v. Kilgore, decided at Chambersburg,
I entirely concur in the opinion just delivered. The issuing of a writ in the construction of the statute of limitations, is the bringing of an action to prevent the limitation running. The entry of an action on the docket, is such commencement of the action, as in the view of the legislature, without more done, would entitle the. party to enter a rule of arbitration. The inconveniences arising from this construction, are many, and call loudly on the legislature for amendments and alterations. But this consideration will not justify the Court in departing from the provisions of the act.
.Judgment affirmed.