Citation Numbers: 61 A.2d 426, 360 Pa. 94
Judges: OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE HORACE STERN, September 27, 1948:
Filed Date: 7/6/1948
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
It is alleged that a State Mining Commission in Westmoreland County is threatening to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, and we are asked to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent such usurpation of judicial authority.
In 1944 Carpentertown Coal and Coke Company, lessee from the Thaw Coke Trust of coal underlying the Pennsylvania Turnpike, caused a State Mining Commission to be convened under the provisions of the Act of July 3, 1941, P. L. 259, in order to determine what portion of the coal must be left in place to support the turnpike and to assess the resulting damages to the Company. On appeal to this Court it was held that the State Mining Commission had jurisdiction in the proceedings over the Turnpike Commission: Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Appeal,
The Turnpike Commission, having been granted permission to intervene as a party respondent, opposes the petition on two grounds: (1) that this Court has no constitutional power to issue a writ of prohibition; and (2) even if such power exists it should not be exercised in the present instance. The Commonwealth has filed a brief disputing the former but concurring in the latter of these contentions. The argument against the existence of the power is based upon article V, section 3 of the Constitution, which provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in cases of injunction where a corporation is a party defendant, of habeas corpus, of mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction, and of quo warranto as to all officers of the Commonwealth whose jurisdiction extends over the State, "but shall not exercise any other original jurisdiction".
Prohibition is a common law writ of extremely *Page 98 ancient origin, — so ancient, indeed, that several forms for its use are set forth in Glanville, the earliest known treatise on English law (1187); in the following century it was recognized by Bracton as an established part of the common law. Being a prerogative writ of the king it was originally employed exclusively by the Court of King's Bench, but subsequently issued out of the Courts of Chancery, Common Pleas and Exchequer as well. Its principal purpose is to prevent an inferior judicial tribunal from assuming a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested in cases where damage and injustice would otherwise be likely to follow from such action. It does not seek relief from any alleged wrong threatened by an adverse party; indeed it is not a proceeding between private litigants at all but solely between two courts, a superior and an inferior, being the means by which the former exercises superintendence over the latter and keeps it within the limits of its rightful powers and jurisdiction.
We have no doubt as to the power of the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth to issue such a writ, — a power which in fact the Court has exercised with comparative frequency: FirstCongressional District Election,
It is suggested by the Turnpike Commission that although this Court has assumed the power to issue writs of prohibition the question as to its constitutional right so to do has not heretofore been challenged or discussed. Be that as it may, the justification for the Court's exercise of such power is to be found in the Act of May 22, 1722, 1 Sm. L. 131, 140, section XIII, which vested in the Supreme Court all the jurisdictions and powers of the three superior courts at Westminster, namely, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas and the Exchequer. Inherent in the Court of King's Bench was the power of general superintendency over inferior tribunals, a power which was of ancient inception and recognized by the common law from its very beginnings. Blackstone says, Book III, *42: "The jurisdiction of this court [of King's Bench] is very high and transcendent. It keeps all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit their progress below." By the Act of 1722 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was placed in the same relation to all inferior jurisdictions that the King's Bench in England occupied, and thus the power of superintendency over inferior tribunals became vested in this Court from the time of its creation: Commonwealth v.Ickhoff,
While the issuance of a writ of prohibition does not constitute an exercise of purely original jurisdiction no more can it be said to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction; it is, however, a means by which a court protects its appellate jurisdiction and may therefore be regarded as a writ ancillary to the exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus it was said inEx Parte Republic of Peru,
The writ of prohibition is not restricted in its operation to courts or to inferior judicial tribunals, but it may issue also against "inferior ministerial tribunals, possessing incidentally judicial powers, and known as quasi-judicial tribunals": First Congressional District Election,
This brings us, then, to the question whether, under the circumstances of the present case, a writ of prohibition should issue. We are clearly of opinion that it should not. The Act of July 3, 1941, P. L. 259, § 1, provides that "All parties in interest shall have the same right of appeal from decisions, orders and decrees of the State Mining Commission to the Superior and Supreme Courts, as now or hereafter provided for appeals from the decisions, orders and decrees of courts of common pleas". (See Glen Alden Coal Company *Page 102 Case,
Accordingly, the writ is refused. The petition of the Thaw Coke Trust and the Carpentertown Coal Coke Company is dismissed, without prejudice; costs to abide the event.
Commonwealth v. Ickhoff , 33 Pa. 80 ( 1859 )
Chase v. Miller , 41 Pa. 403 ( 1862 )
Commonwealth v. Balph , 111 Pa. 365 ( 1886 )
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. Appeal , 351 Pa. 139 ( 1944 )
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Phila. Co. , 331 Pa. 177 ( 1938 )
Park's Petition , 329 Pa. 60 ( 1938 )
Commonwealth v. Reilly , 324 Pa. 558 ( 1936 )
Glen Alden Coal Company's Case , 339 Pa. 149 ( 1940 )
McNair's Petition , 324 Pa. 48 ( 1936 )
Glen Alden Coal Company Case , 350 Pa. 177 ( 1944 )
First Congressional District Election , 295 Pa. 1 ( 1928 )
In re Quay , 189 Pa. 517 ( 1899 )
Commonwealth v. Smith , 185 Pa. 553 ( 1898 )
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Ex Parte Republic of Peru , 63 S. Ct. 793 ( 1943 )
United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States , 65 S. Ct. 1120 ( 1945 )
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In Re: Magisterial District Judge Mark Bruno ( 2014 )
In Re: Magisterial District Judge Mark Bruno ( 2014 )
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Public Defender's Office v. Venango County Court of Common ... , 586 Pa. 317 ( 2006 )
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In Re: Order Amending Rules 102, 105, 120, 121, 301, 313, ... ( 2020 )
Private Properties, LLC, Pets v. Gov & AG ( 2020 )
Schlesinger Petition , 367 Pa. 476 ( 1951 )
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