In Re Adoption of R. W. B.

ROBERTS, Justice,

dissenting.

The Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County decreed the adoption of R.W.B. by appellees, Mr. and Mrs. U., after determining that appellant, C.W., R.W.B.’s natural mother, failed for a period in excess of six months to perform parental duties. The orphans’ court determined as well that adoption by the U.’s was in the best interest of R.W.B., who was then one year old. The majority, however, holds that termination of appellant’s parental rights pursuant to § 311(1) of the Adoption Act ^* was erroneous and reverses the decree of the orphans’ court. I dissent.

The proper scope of review of an involuntary termination of parental rights is limited to determining whether the orphans’ court’s decree is supported by competent evidence. E. g., In Re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.C.B. and K.T., 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535 (1977); Adoption of M.T.T., 467 Pa. 88, 364 A.2d 564 (1976). Findings of the orphans’ court supported by evidence of record are entitled to the same weight given a jury verdict and must be sustained unless the court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978); Cohen Will, 445 Pa. 549, 284 A.2d 754 (1971). Such findings must be accepted by this Court on appeal.

The findings of the orphans’ court are supported by competent evidence and reveal that R.W.B. was born on December 18, 1976. R.W.B.’s father, R.L.W., and mother, C.W., had separated some six months prior to their son’s birth. For the first forty-nine days of R.W.B.’s life, appellant cared for her son. Appellant and her son resided with appellant’s parents and appellant’s daughter, D.M.B. For the next six days of R.W.B.’s first six weeks of life, appellant left him in the custody of a friend.

Shortly after R.W.B.’s birth, appellant contacted appellees and inquired whether they were still interested in adopting a child. On February 11, 1977, at the direction of appellant, appellees drove from their home in Pennsylvania to Maryland where they obtained custody of R.W.B. Six days later, appellant travelled from Maryland to Pennsylvania for the specific purpose of formally consenting to the adoption of R.W.B. by appellees. While in Pennsylvania she executed such a consent.

During the next nine months, appellant occasionally spoke to appellees on the telephone. Apparently, calls were initiated by both appellees and appellant. Appellant did not visit her son during this period. Nor did she contribute financially or in any other way toward the physical and emotional well-being of R.W.B. Nonetheless, in August 1977, six months after appellant had surrendered custody of her son for adoption and had executed a consent to his adoption, appellant stated she was willing to regain custody of R.W.B. The orphans’ court specifically found, however, that appellant “performed no affirmative act in accordance with this expressed desire.”

Thus, the record indicates that for the better part of the first year of R.W.B.’s life, appellant was content to let others care for her son while she continued to lead her own life, free from the responsibility of caring for her child. The orphans’ court’s determination that appellant failed to provide her son with essential parental care for at least six months is clearly supported by the record and may not be disturbed by this Court. To reach its conclusion to the contrary, the majority exceeds the bounds of proper appellate review by completely disregarding the findings of the orphans’ court. Instead it reads the record de novo as though it and not the orphans’ court were the trier of fact and draws its own entirely independent findings from the notes of testimony.

Moreover, the majority ignores this Court’s repeated admonition that a parent has an affirmative duty to provide his or her child with love, protection, guidance and support. E. g., In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.C.B. and K.T., supra; Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975). Temporary hardship does not justify a parent’s failure to fulfill this affirmative obligation. “Parental rights may not be preserved by complete indifference to the daily needs of a child or by merely waiting for some more suitable financial circumstance or convenient time for the performance of parental duties and responsibilities (while others adequately provide the child with her immediate and continuing physical and emotional needs).” Smith Adoption Case, 412 Pa. 501, 505, 194 A.2d 919, 922 (1963). “Mere expressions of interest in the child and a desire to eventually be reunited with the child, unaccompanied by affirmative steps to bring that result about, are insufficient to preserve parental rights.” In re Adoption of P., 475 Pa. 197, 223, 380 A.2d 311, 317 (1977) (Dissenting Opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Eagen, C. J.). Rather than assuming her parental duty to take and maintain a position of importance in R.W.B.’s life and provide her son with love, protection, guidance, and support, appellant simply yielded to what she perceived as obstacles and temporary difficulties. Appellant was satisfied to allow appellees to fulfill the needs of her infant son even after the difficulties she may have encountered in the first weeks of R.W.B.’s life had ended.

The decree of the orphans’ court is amply supported by competent evidence of record. Here, as in innumerable cases in which this Court has not disturbed the orphans’ court’s findings of fact supported by the record, the decree should be affirmed.

* Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, § 311(1), 1 P.S. § 311(1) (Supp.1979).