DocketNumber: 81-3-388
Judges: O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Flah-Erty
Filed Date: 12/14/1982
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
OPINION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from the order of the Commonwealth Court,
In 1964, 88.7 acres of appellant’s 790.67 acre tract were condemned by appellee, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Department”), for construction of Interstate-81 and the relocation of a pre-existing public road which traversed Interstate-81. Appellant’s acreage contained a coal processing plant with culm banks and, in addition, was undergoing the planning and development of a lake, golf course, race track and airport. The highway construction divided the tract into two non-contiguous parts.
In 1973, a board of review awarded damages of $376,-400.00, from which both parties appealed to the court of common pleas. In a pre-trial ruling, appellant’s petition for change of venue, which, among other things, alleged local prejudice against coal operators, was denied without opinion. Appellant formally excepted to this ruling. The case went to trial before the Honorable George W. Heffner, and despite appellant’s claim of between $3 million and $5.5 million in damages, judgment at trial was entered on a jury verdict in favor of appellant for $75,000.00.
On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying the pre-trial petition for a change of venue.
A more decisive question is whether appellant’s pre-trial motion for change of venue was properly preserved for appellate review. The Department contends that appellant’s failure to raise the venue question as a specific ground for a new trial in his post-trial motions amounts to a waiver of this issue for purposes of appellate review. Appellant argues that his formal exception to the pre-trial ruling was sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.
It is axiomatic that timely and specific objections are required to preserve claims of error during a civil trial. In Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974), this Court held that the general claim of basic and fundamental error was insufficient to preserve for appeal the claim of an erroneous jury instruction, where no specific exception was taken at trial. 457 Pa. at 260, 322 A.2d at 117. In Dilliplaine, Mr. Justice Roberts cited numerous reasons for the requirement of filing timely, specific objections for purposes of aiding both appellate review and trial court review of post-trial motions. 457 Pa. at 258-59, 259 n. 8, 322 A.2d at 116-17,117 n. 8. Moreover, this Court in Benson v. Penn Central Transportation Company, 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393 (1975), held that a party failed to preserve for appellate review alleged instructional error in the court’s charge to the jury because he did not file post-verdict motions on the issue. 463 Pa. at 41, 342 A.2d at 396.
However, notwithstanding the necessity of preserving alleged errors which occurred during a civil trial through post-trial motions, this Court has not specifically enunciated
Furthermore, the record clearly indicates that appellant formally excepted to the trial court’s denial of a change of venue and that the venue issue was at least mentioned in appellant’s brief in support of his post-trial motions. In the absence of an explicit requirement in our Rules or cases that appellant take further steps to preserve the alleged error for appeal, we will not consider the pre-trial venue issue waived for purposes of appeal.
Turning now to the merits of appellant’s petition for change of venue, our standard of review of the denial of such a petition is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 248 A.2d 12
As with Yudaeufski, Seltzer involved the partial taking of a tract of land containing a coal processing plant. Both the Yudaeufski and Seltzer tracts were located in Schuylkill County and were taken for the construction of Interstate-81. In addition, both Seltzer’s and appellant’s condemnation claims involved a substantial amount of culm.
President Judge Curran, based his decision granting a change of venue in Seltzer on four factors, all of which are present in the instant case. After noting that culm was compensable under the Eminent Domain Code,
*611 [T]he jurisdiction where this action is presently pending is to a large extent an anthracite mining area. As a result, many of its residents have a peculiar first-hand knowledge of culm or refuse banks. These banks abound within the jurisdiction and are generally thought of as ecological and economic eyesores. We believe that this situation could have an adverse effect on a trial where the final verdict substantially depends on the jury’s monetary evaluation of such refuse or culm banks.
72 Sch.L.R. at 31 (1976). Clearly, the appellant’s trial which involved a considerable claim for culm could likewise have suffered this adverse effect.
The trial court in Seltzer also addressed the argument that there existed in Schuylkill County such a general bias against coal mine owners and operators that it would be difficult to totally eliminate this local bias from any jury in that county. The court declared, “Ordinarily, we would disagree with such an argument. However, when it is viewed in light of the culm or coal silt issue heretofore discussed, we believe it reinforces the advisability of change of venue in this particular case.” 72 Sch.L.R. at 32 (1976). Obviously, appellant’s status as a coal operator would subject him to this local bias.
The Seltzer court also grounded its decision to grant a venue change on two additional considerations. First, the court feared a re-occurrence of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
The decision of the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas in Seltzer, as set forth in President Judge Cur-ran’s thoughtful opinion, established the law of that judicial district, and appellant appropriately drew the lower court’s attention to the Seltzer decision. It is well-settled that, absent the most compelling circumstances, a judge should follow the decision of a colleague on the same court when based on the same set of facts. Fried for Use of Berger Supply Co. v. Feola, 129 F.Supp. 699 (W.D.Pa.1954); U.S. v. Skurla, 126 F.Supp. 713 (W.D.Pa.1954); Schmid Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 196 Pa.Super. 120, 173 A.2d 758 (1961). See Stanley Appeal, 204 Pa.Super. 29, 201 A.2d 287 (1964) (Watkins, J., dissenting). See also, TCF Film Corp. v. Gourley, 240 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.1957); Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 442 Pa. 553, 277 A.2d 159 (1971).
Although we recognize the interest of the trial judge in the swift and orderly administration of justice, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to follow the established precedent as set forth in Seltzer.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand this case to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County with directions to grant appellant’s petition for change of venue.
. Yudacufski v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 448, 422 A.2d 1181 (1980).
. Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to the Judicial Code, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 724.
This opinion was reassigned to the writer on October 20, 1982.
. Appellant also contended that the trial court verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the jury award was clearly inadequate. The Commonwealth Court, affirming the trial court, found no merit to these claims. Because of our ruling in this case, we need not decide these issues.
. Conversely, we note that the Rules of Criminal Procedure which, like the Rules of Civil Procedure, are promulgated by this Court, expressly require that exceptions to pretrial proceedings may only be preserved through written post-verdict motions. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a).
. A line of Commonwealth Court cases, starting with Department of Transportation v. Ambrosia, 24 Pa.Cmwlth. 8, 354 A.2d 257 (1976), have held that the Eminent Domain Code, and not the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the exclusive procedure by which eminent domain matters are governed. We need not now consider this line of cases since both the Eminent Domain Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure are silent on whether a pre-trial venue issue must be preserved through a post-trial motion.
. This is not to say that exceptions to pre-trial rulings need not be raised in a post-trial motion. On the contrary, this matter will be referred to the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to determine whether Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, regarding jury trials, and Pa.R.C.P. 1038(d) and 1518, regarding non-jury trials, should be amended to include an explicit requirement that exceptions to pre-trial rulings be raised in a post-trial motion or be considered waived upon subsequent appeal.
. Culm is a substance containing coal and coal residue that is free from rock and dirt contamination.
. Actually, condemnation of the Yudaeufski acreage directly involved only one culm bank containing approximately 314,000 tons of culm. Appellant alleges, however, that, by virtue of the taking, another sizeable culm bank was rendered worthless.
. See Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Seltzer, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 127, 334 A.2d 834 (1975).
. An earlier Seltzer trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County had been declared a mistrial because of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.