Smith v. City of Philadelphia

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY, Justice.

Section 8553 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142 § 221(1), as amended, 42 Pa C.S.A. § 8553, limits recovery of damages against political subdivisions of the Commonwealth to $500,-000 in the aggregate for legally cognizable tort injuries arising from the same transaction. The question in this case is whether this limitation is constitutionally permissible.

On May 11, 1979 a gas explosion in the Bridesburg section of Philadelphia killed seven persons, injured many others, and caused extensive property damage. Forty-four separate actions on behalf of seventy-two claimants were filed for property damage, death and personal injury. After their initial tort claims had been filed, Ruth V. Smith and two other plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act is unconstitutional in its limitation of damages to an aggregate amount of $500,000.

Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and held that the provision of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, which limits damages to an aggregate amount of $500,000, violates Art. Ill, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

A direct appeal to this Court was taken pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 722(7). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.¹

I

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO LIMIT TORT RECOVERY AGAINST THE COMMONWEALTH

The statute in question, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 8553(b), the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, provides:

Amounts recoverable — Damages arising from the same cause of action or transaction or occurrence or series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not exceed $500,000 in the aggregate.

Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part:

Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.

(Emphasis added). The Court of Common Pleas determined that although the Legislature has the power to regulate the manner, the courts and the cases which may be brought against the Commonwealth,² it has no power to limit the amount of damages which may be recoverable in a particular case.

The lower court also held that Article III, Section 18 prohibits any legislative limitation on damages in cases brought against the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions. Article III, Section 18, in pertinent part, provides:

[Other than workmen’s compensation] in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property____

Since this is a case other than a workmen’s compensation case, the Court of Common Pleas reasoned that the General Assembly had no authority to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries to persons or property.

We begin our review of the lower court’s holding by observing, as mentioned earlier, Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution permits the legislature to regulate the manner, the courts and the cases in which suits may be brought against the Commonwealth. In granting the legislature power to control not only the cases, but also the manner and the courts in which cases against the Commonwealth may be brought, the Framers intended that the legislature have complete control over suits brought against the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs agree that the legislature has complete control in that it could abolish altogether the right to recover against the Commonwealth in tort actions, but they assert that the legislature has no power to limit the amount of recovery in actions which it has said may be brought. We disagree. If the legislature may abolish a cause of action, surely it may also limit the recovery on the actions which are permitted. To hold otherwise would be, in our view, to grant with one hand what we take away with the other. Such a result would be absurd, or at least, unreasonable.³ We conclude, therefore, that Article I, Section 11 should not be read to prohibit the Legislature from enacting a limit on the tort liability of its political subdivisions.

In addition, we disagree with the Common Pleas Court's conclusion that Article III, Section 18 prohibits the statutory limitation of damages against the Commonwealth or its subdivisions. As this Court stated in Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975), “the full scope and meaning of [Article III, Section 18] should be considered ... in light of the evil intended to be remedied by its adoption.” Id., 464 Pa. at 396, 346 A.2d at 901. Article III, Section 18⁴ was drafted in 1872 and 1873, and adopted in 1874 in response to the fact that certain powerful private interests had been able to influence legislation which limited recovery in negligence cases filed against them.

In particular, the Framers were reacting to the passage of the Act of April 4, 1868, P.L. 58, which limited recoveries in negligence actions against railroads and other common carriers. II Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 742-44 (1873). See also White, Commentaries on the Convention to Amend The Constitution of Pennsylvania (1907). The corporations who effected this legislation were perceived by the Framers as a privileged and powerful class of overreachers who had purchased special, self-serving legislation, and Article III, Section 18 was meant to prevent such powerful private interests from unduly affecting the legislative process. Consideration of the full scope and meaning of Section 18, therefore, reveals that the Framers were addressing themselves to private, not governmental defendants.

It has been argued, however, that the language of Article III, Section 18 applies to all cases, not merely those involving private defendants (“in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered”) and that the section should not be construed as applicable only to private parties. This argument ignores that the Framers would have had no occasion to apply the prohibition against limiting damages to government, for government, at that time, was immune from suit. It was not for more than 100 years after this provision was drafted that this Court in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Depart. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) abrogated common-law sovereign immunity.

We conclude, therefore, both because the intended scope of this section was to prevent private parties from securing an unfair limitation of liability through influence in the General Assembly, and because the Framers would have had no reason to concern themselves with governmental liability in tort, that Article III, Section 18 does not operate to restrict the General Assembly from providing for less than full recovery for injuries to persons or property where the defendant is a governmental entity.⁵

II

EQUAL PROTECTION

Even though we have determined that the statute does not exceed the power granted to the Legislature in Article I, Section 11 or Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, plaintiff-appellees contend, nevertheless, that the damage limitation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause, in pertinent part, provides:

No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law....

This Court has determined that these provisions, federal and state, have “meaning and purpose sufficiently similar to warrant like treatment.” Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 67 n. 13, 436 A.2d 147, 155 n. 13 (1981).

The claim here being asserted, in essence, is that because there is a $500,000 limit on recoveries in tort cases filed against political subdivisions of the Commonwealth, but there is no such limit against private parties, or even against the Commonwealth itself, where the limit is $1,000,-000,⁶ the damages limitation provision of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal protection of the laws.⁷

Most recently in James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984), we observed that the Fourteenth Amendment does not absolutely prohibit the states from classifying persons differently and treating the classes in different ways. As this Court stated in Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. at 68, 436 A.2d at 155 (1981), “The concept of equal protection ... demands that uniform treatment be given to similarly situated parties. . . . If classifications are drawn, then the challenged policy must be reasonably justified.” What counts as justification will depend upon which of three types a classification belongs to, what the governmental interest is in promulgating the classification, and the relationship of that interest to the classification itself. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. at 145, 477 A.2d at 1306. Different types of governmental interests and different degrees of closeness of relationship between the interest and the classification are required depending upon the type of classification involved.

The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate a “suspect” class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications implicating an “important” though not fundamental right or a “sensitive” classification; and (3) classifications which involve none of these. Id. Should the statutory classification in question fall into the first category, the statute is strictly construed in light of a “compelling” governmental purpose; if the classification falls into the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied to an “important” governmental purpose; and if the statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is upheld if there is any rational basis for the classification.

In James, the statute in question required that persons suing the transit authority for personal injuries bring their suit within six months, whereas persons suing non-governmental tortfeasors were permitted to bring their suits at any time within two years. In order to determine whether this differential access to the courts is constitutionally permissible, we first examined the nature of the right involved in the case. The most protected rights, fundamental rights, are those which have their source, explicitly or implicitly, in the Constitution. James v. SEPTA, Id., 505 Pa. at 146, 477 A.2d at 1306, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, n. 15, 97 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Because the right implicated in James — access to the courts — is specifically limited by Art. I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we concluded that it is not a fundamental right.

We held, however, that James had an important interest in access to the courts and, therefore, that the statute in question should be examined pursuant to an intermediate standard of review. This standard of review requires that the government interest be an “important” one; that the classification be drawn so as to be closely related to the objectives of the legislation; and that the person excluded from an important right or benefit be permitted to challenge his exclusion on the grounds that in his particular case, denial of the right or benefit would not promote the purpose of the classification. James v. SEPTA, Id. 505 Pa. at 147, 477 A.2d at 1307. We concluded the analysis in James by upholding the statute on the grounds that the statute promoted an important governmental interest the realization of which was closely related to the classification.

In the present case, an almost identical analysis is applicable. No fundamental rights are implicated because the right to a full recovery in a tort suit brought against the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions is expressly limited by our interpretation of Article III, Section 18 and Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (permitting the legislature to limit recovery against governmental units). Strict scrutiny of the classification, therefore, is not required.

Again, as in James, although the right to a full recovery in cases brought against the Commonwealth has been constitutionally limited, that right is, nevertheless, generally an important right and its limitation by way of governmental classification requires a heightened scrutiny of the validity of the classifying statute. The governmental interest, preservation of the public treasury as against the possibility of unusually large recoveries in tort cases, is, self-evidently, an important governmental interest. Furthermore, this important interest is closely related to the classification established by the statutory scheme: only persons who might recover against the Commonwealth or its subdivisions are affected. Finally, just as in James, since only those who might recover against the Commonwealth are affected adversely by the classification and since all persons who fall into this classification will promote the governmental purpose by their inclusion, there is no requirement for any hearing process to determine whether some persons should not be included in the classification. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, therefore, is constitutional.

The order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia is reversed.

NIX, C.J., joins the majority opinion and files a separate concurring opinion. HUTCHINSON, J., joins Part I of the majority opinion and joins in a separate concurring opinion by ZAPPALA, J. ZAPPALA, J., joins in Part I of the majority opinion and files a concurring opinion joined by HUTCHINSON, J. LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion which PAPADAKOS, J., joins. PAPADAKOS, J., files a dissenting opinion joined by LARSEN, J.

1 . Various procedural objections have been raised concerning the propriety of trial court’s issuing a declaratory judgment in a case in which there was already pending another action for damages arising from the same transaction. Because the interests of judicial economy are best served by our addressing the merits of the case now, rather than after forty-four judgments have been rendered and the same issue is raised on appeal, and because the parties are better served by an early determination of the constitutional question, we address the merits of the constitutional questions presented.

2 . In Carroll v. County of York, this Court stated that the term "Commonwealth” encompasses political subdivisions. 496 Pa. 363, 366, 437 A.2d 394, 396 (1981).

3 . Absurd, impossible or unreasonable results are not favored by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922, the general principles of which have been applied to questions of constitutional as well as statutory interpretation. Montgomery v. Martin, 294 Pa. 25, 143 A.2d 505 (1928).

4 . Except for an amendment in 1915 exempting workmen’s compensation laws from the requirement that recoveries not be limited, and the renumbering of the section in 1967, Section 18 has remained unchanged.

5 . Our holding in this case is reinforced by the fact that "An Act of Assembly will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution." Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963) (Emphasis in original). See also James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984). Moreover, any uncertainty as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its validity. Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 198 A.2d 840 (1964).

6 . The Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8528(b).

7 . Appellees also assert that the act impermissibly classifies tort claimants against the government in that those who settle first or file their claims first may exhaust the total fund available for all claimants. This claim is without merit.

Firstly, the case where there are multiple claims against the government arising from the same transaction is not that different, practically speaking, from a case where there are multiple claims against a private tortfeasor, and the defendant has only limited insurance coverage.

Secondly, once claims have been filed, it is within the power of the trial court to regulate all claims, including settlements, administratively, such that all claimants receive a segment of the total fund proportionate to their injury. Further, should the trial court fail or refuse to coordinate such claims, relief may be sought in this Court.