Commonwealth v. Corban Corp.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

Elmer Kennedy worked for Corban Corporation as a forklift operator. In December, 2000, he sustained work-related burns to his back. He sought workers’ compensation benefits for the injuries; however, Corban Corporation’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier denied the claim due to a lack of insurance coverage.

As a result, on September 21, 2004, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint asserting six counts of third degree felony charges against Corban Corporation and William Condosta, a corporate officer of the company (collectively appellants), for failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to § 305 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).¹ The Commonwealth alleged appellants failed to maintain insurance coverage during the following periods: November 1 through November 30, 2000; December 1 through December 22, 2000; June 18 through June 30, 2002; July 1 through July 31, 2002; August 1 through August 31, 2002; and September 1 through September 9, 2002.²

Appellants filed separate omnibus pretrial motions, objecting to the criminal complaint’s timeliness. They argued the violations occurred more than two years before the Commonwealth filed charges, and that the applicable statute of limitations was the default provisions of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552. If true, the entire complaint failed as untimely. Holding § 5552 applied, the trial court granted appellants’ motions and dismissed the complaint. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court reversed, holding the five-year statute of limitations under § 1112 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 1039.12, controls. Commonwealth v. Corban Corporation, 909 A.2d 406, 413 (Pa.Super.2006). The Court relied on § 1039.12’s plain language, which states, “[a] prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after commission of the offense.” Id., at 412; 77 P.S. § 1039.12. The court held the General Assembly expressly intended § 1039.12 to apply to all offenses prosecuted under the Act. Id. Moreover, the court noted application of the default two-year period would be at odds with a provision of the Act permitting claim petitions to be filed within three years. Id., at 412-13.

We granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the statute of limitations provided in 77 P.S.- § 1039.12 or the default statute of limitations provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552 applies to prosecutions for an employer’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to 77 P.S. § 501. Since statutoiy interpretation is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. In re Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35, 911 A.2d 1258, 1261 (2006).

Appellants assert there is no provision in the Act setting forth a specific statute of limitations for failing to provide workers’ compensation insurance; in the absence of a specific provision, the default limitations period of § 5552 applies. Appellants maintain the five-year limitations in § 1039.12 applies only to prosecutions for workers’ compensation insurance fraud offenses under Article XI of the Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1039.1-1039.12. The Commonwealth contends the five-year limitations period applies to all prosecutions under the Act. The Commonwealth recognizes § 1039.12 is contained within a portion of the Act regarding insurance fraud, but notes this is the only provision of the Act which sets forth a statute of limitations for a criminal action. The Commonwealth, as did the Superior Court, relies on § 1039.12’s plain language to conclude it applies to all offenses under the Act.³

“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). “Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage....” Id., § 1903(a). “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Id., § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the best indication of legislative intent.” Chanceford Aviation Properties, L.L.P. v. Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors, 592 Pa. 100, 923 A.2d 1099, 1104 (2007) (quoting Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Snyder Jr.), 575 Pa.66, 834 A.2d 524, 531 (2003)) (internal citation omitted).

The Statutory Construction Act provides that headings prefixed to titles, parts, articles, chapters, sections, and other divisions of a statute shall not be considered to control the manner in which the statute is to be interpreted. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924. It is the statutory language itself that must be considered; not simply the location of the statute within the Act as a whole. See id.; see also O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, Department of Corrections, 566 Pa. 161, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (2001) (legislative intent can only be derived by reading all sections of statute together and in conjunction with each other and construed with reference to entire statute); Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999) (same).

Here, the Act’s language is free from ambiguity. Section 1039.12 specifies “[a] prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after commission of the offense.” 77 P.S. § 1039.12 (emphasis added). A plain reading of this section reveals the General Assembly intended its limitations period to apply to prosecutions under “this act,” which thus includes § 501 offenses.

A review of the language within Article XI of the Act reveals the General Assembly took great care in choosing among the words “clause,” “section,” “article,” and “act.” Cf. 77 P.S. § 1039.3(a) (“Upon a conviction for an offense under this clause, the prosecutor shall certify the conviction to the disciplinary board of the Supreme Court for appropriate action”) (emphasis added); id., § 1039.9(a) (“The district attorneys of the several counties shall have authority to investigate and to institute criminal proceedings for any violation of this article.”) (emphasis added); id., § 1039.11(b) (“If a prosecuting authority has probable cause to believe that a person has violated this section, nothing in this clause shall be construed to prohibit the prosecuting authority and the person from entering into a written agreement in which that person does not admit or deny the charges but consents to payment of the civil penalty.”) (emphasis added). In contrast, § 1039.12 does not use the term “article,” “section,” or “clause,” but provides, “A prosecution for an offense under this act must be commenced within five years after commission of the offense.” Id., § 1039.12 (emphasis added). By choosing the word “act,” the General Assembly expressed its intent for the five-year limitations period to apply to § 501 prosecutions.

We agree with the Superior Court’s apt observation that application of the two-year limitations period would be at odds with the Act’s three-year limitations period regarding the filing of claim petitions. Section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 602, covers the filing requirements for benefits, and permits an injured employee three years to file a claim petition, and typically it is upon filing of a claim petition that the agency which administers the claims process becomes aware of an employer’s failure to carry insurance. If the offense is not normally discoverable for up to three years, it makes little sense to apply a statute that has already run by the time the crime is uncovered. Application of the five-year limitations period furthers the Act’s intended purpose, which is to provide payment to the injured worker commensurate with the damage from accidental work-related injury, as a fair exchange for the surrender of every other right of action against the employer. See City of Erie v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Annunziata), 575 Pa. 594, 838 A.2d 598, 602 (2003). Application of the two-year limitations period, however, would unjustly impair the Commonwealth’s ability to prosecute offenses, effectively enabling employers to evade the Act’s requirements without consequence.

We find the five-year statute of limitations applies to prosecutions for an employer’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance pursuant to 77 P.S. § 501. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s order. This matter is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justice SAYLOR and Justice GREENSPAN join the opinion. Justice BAER files a concurring opinion in which Justice TODD and Justice McCAFFERY join.

1 . Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, added by, the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, as amended 77 P.S. § 501. Section 501 provides, in relevant part:

(a) (1) Every employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure the payment of compensation in the State Workmen's Insurance Fund, or in any insurance company, or mutual association or company, authorized to insure such liability in this Commonwealth. ...

(b) Any employer who fails to comply with the provisions of this section for every such failure, shall, upon conviction in the court of common pleas, be guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. If the failure to comply with this section is found by the court to be intentional, the employer shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree.

Id.

2 . The criminal complaint also averred Encor Coatings, Inc., did not maintain workers' compensation insurance coverage from June 1 through July 17, 2003. The Commonwealth ultimately withdrew this count.

3 . The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae brief, wherein it argues § 1039.12's plain language reveals a legislative intent that it apply to all prosecutions under the Act. Alternatively, it asserts the statute of limitations under § 1039.12 is specific, which always prevails over a general limitations provision such as § 5552. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933.