Judges: Cappy, Castille, Flaherty, Montemuro, Nix, Papadakos, Zappa-La, Zappala
Filed Date: 2/15/1995
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
OPINION
Appellant, Michael Hagan, appeals from an order and memorandum opinion of the Superior Court affirming a judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia for
We granted allocatur to determine whether a fenced storage lot was an “occupied structure” for the purposes of our burglary and criminal trespass statutes. We conclude that such a lot is an “occupied structure” and, accordingly, affirm the order of the Superior Court.
The pertinent facts in this case are as follows. Morris Iron and Steel (“Morris”) owned a lot located at 4800 Rhawn Street, Philadelphia. This lot was enclosed by a chain link fence and secured at the gate by a lock and chain. The site had been previously used as a manufacturing site by Morris, but was no longer in active use in that capacity. Thus, the lot contained two inactive and vacant buildings. Morris used the lot to store several tons of railroad steel.
On June 10, 1991, Appellant Hagan and his accomplice backed a pickup truck into the driveway of the Rhawn Street facility. They broke the chain and lock securing the gate to the site and entered the lot. Then, they arranged the steel and iron found at the lot into several piles near their truck.
Stanton Greller, manager of Morris, drove by the Rhawn Street site on a routine check of the property. He noticed the pick-up truck in the driveway and saw Hagan and his accomplice attempting to pry-open the lock and chain securing the gate. Greller contacted the police and informed them of what he had witnessed. The police arrived and arrested the pair. They were subsequently charged with burglary
In this appeal, Hagan asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the burglary and criminal trespass counts because a fenced storage lot is not an “occupied structure” within the meaning of those two statutes. It is well settled that the test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and drawing all proper inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have determined all the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 272, 615 A.2d 716, 719 (1992); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 Pa. 537, 540, 510 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1986).
Both our burglary and criminal trespass statutes have a required element of breaking and entering a “building or occupied structure, or separately secured portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a) (burglary)
We find that a fenced and secured storage lot is a “place adapted for carrying on a business.” Simply put, storage is a business activity no less than any other facet of a business such as manufacturing, retail sales or distribution. This was the holding of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Evans, 393 Pa.Super. 500, 574 A.2d 1051 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 597, 589 A.2d 688 (1990). Evans actually consisted of two consolidated cases, both involving storage lots. In the first of these consolidated cases, the defendant was found in the tank farm area of a refinery. This area was surrounded by a six foot high chain link fence in which a large hole was discovered. The defendant and his accomplice were caught removing aluminum sheeting from the side of a tank and were arrested. In the second case, the defendant was arrested in a bus storage yard completely surrounded by a fence and secured by a locked gate. The defendant was observed removing window frames from the buses and was arrested. The defendants in both of these cases were charged with criminal trespass and in each case the charges were dismissed by the trial court. The Superior Court reversed and held that the defendants could be charged with criminal trespass. The court stated:
Surely the storage of buses and petroleum products furthers the business purposes of SEPTA and ARCO. We conclude that the fenced enclosures which appellees are accused of breaking into are ‘places adapted for carrying on a business therein’ and are therefore ‘occupied structures’ ....
Evans, 393 Pa.Super. at 506, 574 A.2d at 1054.
We are in accord with the reasoning of the Superior Court in Evans. We agree the very act of storage is an activity that furthers the purpose of a business. Thus, any secured facility where goods are stored is a place adapted for the carrying on a business and, therefore, an occupied structure for the purposes of the criminal trespass and burglary statutes.
Appellant argues that the term “occupied structure” must be interpreted narrowly to include only a building or similar structure. However, our canons of statutory interpretation instruct that the plain words of a statute cannot be disregarded where the language is free and clear from ambiguity. Commonwealth v. Harner, 533 Pa. 14, 20, 617 A.2d 702, 705 (1992); Commonwealth v. Corporan, 531 Pa. 348, 351, 613 A.2d 530, 531 (1992); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). When a statute’s meaning is plain, there is no occasion for resorting to
Hagan also argues that finding a fenced storage lot an “occupied structure” is inconsistent with the Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Cannon, 297 Pa.Super. 106, 443 A.2d 322 (1982). In Cannon, the Superior Court was confronted with the question of whether a fenced and locked backyard was an “occupied structure” sufficient to support a conviction for criminal trespass. The court vacated the conviction holding that such a yard was neither a place adapted for overnight accommodation nor a place adapted for carrying on business. We find that the plain language of Section 3501 supports the conclusion of the Superior Court in Cannon and dictates the result that residential backyards are not protected under the criminal trespass and burglary statutes, while fenced and locked commercial lots are. Hagan argues that such a conclusion is absurd and, therefore, contrary to our canons of statutory interpretation. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (in construing statutes, we presume the legislature did not intend an absurd result). The Superior Court in Evans considered
The'actual result of our holding is to afford fenced locked business property, where equipment and material may be stored, more protection than private residences’ backyards which are not adapted for overnight accommodations. We do not consider such a result absurd.
Evans, 393 Pa.Super. at 507, 574 A.2d at 1055.
Utilizing the principles set forth above, we have reviewed the evidence and hold that, when viewed in the light most favorably to the Commonwealth, this evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Morris was “carrying on business therein” at the Rhawn Street site for the purposes of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3501 and § 3502. The record reveals that the Morris facility was surrounded by a fence with barbed wire. Notes of Testimony 1/10/92 at 20. The gate to the facility was secured by a lock and chain, and was also blocked by a large trailer truck to keep people out. Id. at 16. The facility had several signs indicating that it was owned by Morris. Id. at 25, 34. One of these signs was “larger than [a] courtroom.” Id. at 51. Other signs stated the company name, phone number, and told trespassers to “keep out.” Id. at 19. Although the facility had not been in operation for six months Id. at 31, Morris used it to store steel that had been purchased from a railroad. Id. at 17. The value of the steel at issue in this case was between $2000 and $2600. Id. at 18. Several years prior to the incident that is the subject matter of this case, Morris spent several thousand dollars cleaning the facility and securing it from illegal dumpers. Id. at 40. The record clearly indicates that Morris employees were “in the yard regularly.” Id. at 21. Stanton Greller, the facility manager, testified that he had been to the site on “the day before [the incident], the week before and so forth.” Id. at 15. He stated that he went into the property and rode by it on a regular basis. Id. at 21-22. He also testified that other employees entered the yard regularly. Id. at 21. In fact, he testified that his foreman checked the site every morning. Id. at 45-46. This evidence is sufficient to establish that the
Appellant also argues that his actions are more properly defined as a defiant trespass rather than a criminal trespass. A person commits the offense of defiant trespass if “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given____” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b). Defiant trespass is normally committed when a person enters or remains in a place where he is not privileged to remain after notice of trespass is given. See Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F.Supp. 1156 (E.D.Pa.1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 520 (3d Cir.1990) (abortion protesters convicted of defiant trespass for entering grounds of clinic); Commonwealth v. Downing, 511 Pa. 28, 511 A.2d 792 (1986) (non-student convicted of defiant trespass for refusing to leave a law school library); Commonwealth v. Sherlock, 326 Pa.Super. 103, 473 A.2d 629 (1984) (defendant convicted of defiant trespass after failing to leave the front yard of girlfriend’s house); Commonwealth v. Conyers, 238 Pa.Super. 386, 357 A.2d 569 (1976) (defendant convicted of defiant trespass after attempting to enter girlfriends’s house after repeated warnings to leave premises.) These cases are distinguished from the instant case in that they did not involve a surreptitious breaking and entering into a secured facility for the purpose of removing valuable items. Hagan argues that his actions were a defiant trespass because 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b) includes fencing as one of several ways in which a property owner can provide notice to trespassers that they are not welcome.
For the above-mentioned reasons we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
. 18 Pa.S.C. § 3502
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a) provides in pertinent part;
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured portion thereof, with the intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at that time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503 provides in pertinent part:
A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he:
(i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof; or
(ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Defiant trespasser.—
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by':
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(iii) fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.