Estate of Robert H. Agnew v. Ross, D.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
ESTATE OF ROBERT H. AGNEW, No. 347 MAL 2015
MARGARET ALZAMORA, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF ROBERT H. AGNEW, WILLIAM AND Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the
SHEILA HENNESSY, H/W, MARGARET Order of the Superior Court
HENNESSY, JAMES AND CHRISTINE
HENNESSY, H/W AND PAUL AND
EILEEN JANKE, H/W,
v.
DANIEL R. ROSS, ESQUIRE, MEGAN
MCCREA, ESQUIRE AND ROSS &
MCCREA, LLP
PETITION OF: DANIEL R. ROSS,
ESQUIRE AND MEGAN MCCREA,
ESQUIRE
ORDER
PER CURIAM
AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal
is GRANTED. The issues, as stated by petitioners, are:
(1) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determined, in a published
decision, contrary to Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983),
as well as reported Superior Court decisions, Gregg v. Lindsay, 437 Pa.
Super. 206, 649 A.2d 935 (1994), Cardenas v. Schober, 2001 Pa. Super.
253, 783 A.2d 317 (2001) and Hess v. Fox Rothschild, 20[0]7 Pa. Super.
133, 925 A.2d 798 (Pa. Super. 2007), an executed testamentary
document naming a third party as a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for
that third party to have standing to bring a legal malpractice action based
on breach of contract as third party intended beneficiary of contract
against the testator’s attorney?
(2) Whether the Superior Court so far departed from accepted judicial
practices or abused its discretion in failing to apply the clear precedent of
Guy v. Liederbach, as well as other reported Superior Court decisions,
Gregg v. Lindsay, Cardenas v. Schober and Hess v. Fox Rothschild, when
it determined an executed testamentary document naming a third party as
a beneficiary was not a prerequisite for that third party to have standing to
bring a legal malpractice action based on breach of contract as third party
intended beneficiary of contract against the testator’s attorney?
(3) Whether the Superior Court erred when it determined, in a published
decision, evidence of the intent of the promisor (the testator’s attorney)
alone was sufficient to establish an issue of fact to defeat summary
judgment on the issue of a third party’s standing to pursue a legal
malpractice breach of contract action against a testator’s attorney?
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