Trigg, M. v. Children's Hospital of Pgh., Aplt.

[J-85-2019]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
MENDY TRIGG, INDIVIDUALLY AND : No. 3 WAP 2019
SMITHFIELD TRUST, INC., AS THE :
GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF J. T., A : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
MINOR, : Court dated May 14, 2018 at No. 1041
: WDA 2017, vacating the Judgment of
Appellees : the Court of Common Pleas of
: Allegheny County, dated June 28,
: 2017 at No. GD 13-002322 and
v. : remanding.
:
: ARGUED: October 15, 2019
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF :
PITTSBURGH OF UPMC, :
:
Appellant :
OPINION
JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: APRIL 22, 2020
In this case, a medical negligence suit brought by Appellees against Appellant
Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh (“Hospital”), we accepted review to consider, inter alia,
Appellees’ argument that the trial court erred by not personally observing the demeanor
of prospective jurors they challenged for-cause during voir dire.1 The Superior Court
granted Appellees a new trial on this basis. After careful consideration, we conclude
Appellees waived their argument for appellate review, and, thus, that the Superior Court
erred in considering it. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and
remand to that tribunal for further proceedings.
1 Voir dire is a term of French legal origin which means “to speak the truth,” and it
generally describes the pretrial process of examining prospective jurors in order to obtain
“a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury.” 2 West’s Pa. Forms, Civil Procedure
§ 54:0 at 1.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Appellee Mendy Trigg is the parent of J.T., who, in 2011, was age 4 and afflicted
with craniosynostosis, a medical condition which results when, during an infant’s growth
and development process, his or her skull closes prematurely and exerts increased
pressure on the brain. Trial Court Opinion, 9/7/17, at 2. On May 19, 2011, J.T. underwent
surgery at the Hospital to correct this condition. Afterward, J.T. was transferred for post-
operative care to one of the Hospital’s intensive care units. While recovering there, J.T.
fell out of the hospital bed, and, as a result, suffered damage to the surgically repaired
cranial area, necessitating immediate ameliorative surgery. Id.
Subsequently, Appellees filed suit against the Hospital in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas alleging, inter alia, that the Hospital was negligent in placing J.T.
in a regular adult size hospital bed, due to the large spaces between the vertical side rails,
which they alleged enabled J.T.’s fall.2 The Hospital denied negligence, and, after
discovery was completed, the case was listed for trial during the March 2017 civil trial
term.
By way of background, in accordance with the Allegheny County Local Rules of
Civil Procedure (“A.C.L.R.C.P.”), all members of the pool of prospective jurors summoned
to serve during a civil trial term are required to fill out a written questionnaire in which they
provide, inter alia, general personal information about their age, occupation, family
members, prior involvement with any civil or criminal court cases, and relationships they
have with individuals employed by the court system, or by insurance or health care
professions. See Juror Questionnaire, A.C.L.R.C.P. 220.1. Pursuant to A.C.L.R.C.P.
212.2(b), prior to the commencement of voir dire, counsel for the plaintiff and defendant
2 Appellee, Smithfield Trust, was appointed guardian of J.T.’s estate for purposes of this
litigation.
[J-85-2019] - 2
are both required to prepare pretrial statements in which counsel must include any
statements which they wish to give to the entire group of prospective jurors at the outset
of voir dire, as well as any proposed additional questions to be asked of individual
prospective jurors. As required by A.C.L.R.C.P. 212.2(c), disputes between parties
regarding the content of such statements or questions are submitted to the calendar
control judge for resolution. Notably, however, although available to rule on objections,
neither the calendar control judge, nor the trial judge is ordinarily present during the voir
dire process. Rather, the process is normally managed by a court clerk.3
Under Rule 212.2(c), a group of prospective jurors is summoned to the “Jury
Assignment Room” on the seventh floor of the City County Building in downtown
Pittsburgh.4 For medical malpractice cases, the voir dire process proceeds in the manner
specified in A.C.L.R.C.P. 220.1(c) and (d).5 Under Rule 220.1(c), a court clerk first asks
the group of prospective jurors general questions enumerated in this rule regarding
whether their service constitutes a hardship; whether they have any social, business, or
professional contact with the attorneys in the case; and whether they have a social,
business, professional, or employment relationship with any of the parties in the case.
3 Allegheny County recently amended Rule 212.2, adding subsection (d), to allow any
party or the calendar control judge to request that a judge of the Allegheny County Court
of Common Pleas preside over Civil Division voir dire and the jury selection process, and
affording the presiding judge discretion over the voir dire and jury selection process. See
A.C.L.R.C.P. 212.2(d) (effective Feb. 18, 2020) (“Should a party, parties, or the Calendar
Control Judge request that a Judge preside over the voir dire and jury selection, the Judge
presiding over the voir dire and jury selection shall have complete discretion over the voir
dire and jury selection process, notwithstanding the preceding subsections of this local
rule.”).
4 As described by one veteran Pennsylvania civil practitioner, Thomas Cooper, “[t]he
Assignment Room is a large cavernous room designed to accommodate the selection of
four jury panels simultaneously. Clerks and counsel sit at a table facing the jury panel,
and the individual jurors move in sequence to the table where they are interrogated
individually.” Jury Selection in Pennsylvania, 70 Pa. Bar Association Quarterly 47.
5 By contrast, Rule 220.1(a) and (b) enumerate questions to be asked of jurors in general
civil cases, and Rule 220.1(e) and (f) mandate questions to be asked in asbestos cases.
[J-85-2019] - 3
After the clerk describes the broad nature of the case, i.e. medical malpractice, and
furnishes brief background details about the case, the attorney for the plaintiff and the
attorney for the defendant give their respective voir dire statements, indicating what each
believes the evidence will show at trial. At the conclusion of those statements, the clerk
asks the jurors, as a group, whether they have any knowledge about the case. The
witnesses in the case are then introduced by the attorneys, and the clerk again inquires
of the prospective jurors, as a group, whether they have any personal or familial
association with those witnesses.
Once this group questioning is complete, pursuant to Rule 220.1(d) the court clerk
questions each of the prospective jurors individually regarding: feelings or opinions they
have about personal injury and medical malpractice cases generally; whether they have
any feelings about medical malpractice cases or the parties in the case they are about to
hear which would cause them to favor either the patient or the medical care provider;
whether they believe it is improper to sue a medical care provider, even if the provider
was careless; whether they believe there is a maximum or minimum amount of money
which should be awarded to an injured party; whether they have any feelings or opinions
about the effect of medical malpractice suits on the cost and availability of medical
services; and whether they believe that the mere fact that a party suffers a complication
after receiving medical care indicates that the medical provider must have done
something wrong, which entitles the patient or the patient’s family to compensation. If
one or more of the jurors indicate that they possess such feelings or opinions, then the
clerk inquires further of those jurors as to whether those feelings or opinions would affect
their judgment, such that they could not render a fair and impartial verdict.
After these standard questions have been asked of each individual juror, Rule
220.1(g) requires that the court clerk ask each individual juror the additional voir dire
[J-85-2019] - 4
questions propounded by the parties. Once this process of asking the prospective jurors
all of these questions is complete, counsel for either party may ask reasonable follow-up
questions to individual jurors to further explore their answers.
In the instant case, 40 prospective jurors were summoned to the Jury Assignment
Room on March 17, 2017 for the trial of this case, and voir dire was conducted in
accordance with the aforementioned procedures. Of relevance to the case at bar, when
prospective juror number 29 was asked whether she had any feelings about medical
malpractice cases which would cause her to favor one party over the other, she answered
that her sister and brother-in-law were doctors, and her mother-in-law was a nurse. N.T.,
3/17/17, at 143. Under follow-up questioning by the court clerk as to whether she could
be fair and impartial, she replied “I would like to think I would be fair and impartial, but I
mean, it just depends on the facts and everything presented.” Id. at 144. The juror
elaborated that she could follow the judge’s instructions in arriving at a verdict and
determining damages and that she could decide the case based on the facts and the law.
Id. at 146-47.
Appellees’ counsel questioned this juror further:
[Appellees’ counsel]: Because of your family members, do
you think in a close call you would tend to favor the medical
profession?
Prospective Juror No. 29: Probably, yes.
[Appellees’ counsel]: And why is that?
Prospective Juror No. 29: Just I see what they go through
and I know how much they care about their patients and I
know they would never do anything wrong.
Obviously I realize there are people out there who
aren’t my siblings. So obviously they might not be as fair and
clear in judgment.
Id. at 148-49.
[J-85-2019] - 5
Prospective juror 29 was subjected to follow-up questioning by the court clerk in
which she affirmed that she would be able to listen to the law as presented by the judge,
and that her family members’ professions would not influence her judgment such that she
could not render a fair and impartial verdict. Id. at 149. At the conclusion of voir dire,
Appellees’ counsel challenged prospective jurors 28, 29, and 37 for cause.6 These
challenges were noted by the court clerk. Id. at 201.
Under the standard practice in Allegheny County, as noted, a judge is available
during voir dire to rule on objections raised by the parties. Starr v. Allegheny General
Hospital, 451 A.2d 499, 501 (Pa. Super. 1982). In this case, the judge tasked with this
responsibility was the calendar control judge — the Honorable Ronald W. Folino. At the
conclusion of voir dire, the parties moved to Judge Folino’s courtroom, where he asked
the objecting party — Appellees — to proceed. N.T., 3/17/17, at 201. Appellees’ counsel
asked if Judge Folino would like to read the transcripts of the prospective jurors’
questioning. Judge Folino replied: “Whatever you would want to do to make your record
on your objection, go right ahead.” Id. Counsel for Appellees then stated: “I think it would
be easier because some of them they talked about their biases and whether or not they
could be fair. Some of them — like 28 doesn’t believe in lawsuits, and just to read it would
probably be quicker.” Id. at 201-02. Thus, Judge Folino evaluated the for-cause
objections by reading the transcript of the questioning of the prospective jurors by the
court clerk and counsel for Appellees and the Hospital. At the conclusion of his evaluation
of the transcript, and after hearing arguments from the parties, Judge Folino denied
Appellees’ motion to strike for-cause prospective jurors 28, 29, and 37. Appellees then
6 As discussed at greater length herein, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for
a new trial based on what it viewed as the trial court’s improper denial of Appellees’ for-
cause challenge to prospective juror 29, which, in turn, caused them to exhaust their
preemptory challenges. Accordingly, further discussion of Appellees’ for-cause
challenges to jurors 28 and 37 is not necessary for purposes of this appeal.
[J-85-2019] - 6
used three of their four allotted preemptory challenges to exclude these jurors from
service. Appellees subsequently used their final preemptory challenge to exclude another
juror, thereby exhausting those challenges.
After a jury was seated, the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the five-
day case, during which plaintiff and defendant presented competing evidence on the
issue of negligence, the jury returned a verdict in the Hospital’s favor.
Appellees filed a post-trial motion alleging, inter alia, that Judge Folino erred in
denying their for-cause challenge to the prospective jurors. Specifically, Appellees
alleged:
There was no opportunity for the trial court to observe the
demeanor or tenor of the challenged venireman’s answers. At
a minimum, the court must assume the challenged venireman
exhibited extreme bias in demeanor and error (sic) in favor of
granting a challenge. Any other form of review would deprive
litigants in Allegheny County of the same Constitutional rights
of litigants in all other counties where a judge can assess
demeanor and tenor so as to identify and eliminate biased or
prejudiced jurors.
Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 4/3/17, ¶ 36.
Judge Folino denied the motion. In his opinion prepared pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a), he addressed the issue of his alleged error in not observing the demeanor of the
prospective jurors before ruling on Appellees’ for-cause challenges:
I do not see anywhere in the record provided, however, where
Plaintiff requested that I view the prospective jurors’
demeanor before ruling on the Motions to Strike for Cause. In
fact, counsel simply requested that I review the transcript of
the questions and answers before ruling. . . . I would have
been happy to meet with the subject prospective jurors had
such a request been made. In fact, I frequently do so when
requested by counsel or where I believe the transcript is
insufficient.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/7/17, at 9.
[J-85-2019] - 7
Appellees filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court raising a panoply of issues,
including that the trial court erred by not excluding prospective jurors 28, 29, and 37 for
bias and prejudice, and by not observing the demeanor and tenor of these prospective
jurors before denying their motion to strike them. Appellees asserted that, because the
trial court erred in refusing to exclude these jurors, Appellees were required to use three
of their four allotted preemptory challenges, causing them prejudice.7
The Superior Court reversed in a published opinion. Trigg v. Children’s Hospital
of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super. 2018).8 In its opinion, the court
focused its analysis on the trial court’s denial of Appellees’ for-cause challenge to
prospective juror 29, and to the trial court’s lack of personal observation of this juror’s
demeanor during voir dire. The court found that its resolution of this question was
dispositive of the appeal. Id. at 1016.
The court noted that, in Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017), this Court
endorsed a highly deferential standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a for-cause
challenge to a particular juror, because we attached great significance to the fact that the
trial court has the opportunity to personally observe the juror during the voir dire process.
Therefore, because the trial judge may assess the prospective juror’s credibility firsthand,
and due to the fact that such assessment cannot be replicated from a printed transcript,
7 Appellees also raised claims that the trial court erred by: denying their request to ask
voir dire questions about the Hospital and its relationship in the community; denying their
request to ask jurors questions on their understanding of the concept of unintentional
harm, as it related to the plaintiff’s burden of proof in civil cases; erred by restricting their
right to ask additional voir dire questions that did not include facts and law of the case;
erred by instructing the court clerk and having the clerk engage in rehabilitative
questioning following a juror’s alleged expression of bias, rather than the court exploring
the bias itself; and erred by limiting Appellees’ ability to ask follow-up questions after a
potential juror purportedly exhibited bias during the initial questioning by the court clerk.
8 The opinion was authored by Judge Deborah Kunselman and joined by Judges Mary
Jane Bowes and Judith Olson.
[J-85-2019] - 8
appellate courts cannot easily reevaluate the trial court’s credibility assessment. The
Superior Court found that, in the instant case, such deference would be inappropriate,
however, as the trial court did not witness the original questioning of the jurors by the
court clerk.
The court observed that, because of the juror selection process used in Allegheny
County, judges never view the demeanor of prospective jurors unless counsel requests
the juror appear before the judge to “recreate the initial voir dire.” Trigg, 187 A.3d at 1017.
The court rejected the Hospital’s contention that, because, during arguments before
Judge Folino, Appellees did not object to the trial court’s lack of personal observation of
prospective juror 29’s demeanor during voir dire, nor did they request that Judge Folino
individually question this juror, they waived this issue for appellate review. The court
reasoned that such a re-questioning “could never reproduce the authentic reactions that
[the juror] displayed when the questions were originally asked.” Id. The court additionally
concluded that the extra time which elapsed between the jurors’ original questioning and
the follow-up questioning by the judge would give the jurors time to “rethink” their original
answers and correct what they may have perceived to be errors in giving them. Id.
Consequently, the court held that “[a] judge personally witnessing the original voir dire is
essential, because it justifies our — and a losing party’s — faith in the trial court’s rulings
on challenges for cause.” Id. at 1018.
Because the trial court did not observe the voir dire process in this matter, the court
refused to apply the deferential standard of review utilized in Shinal, and it reviewed, de
novo, the trial court’s decision to reject Appellees’ for-cause challenge to prospective juror
29. The court determined that the trial court erred in denying this challenge, as, in its
view, this juror exhibited bias in favor of medical professionals due to her familial
relationships, which would have influenced her deliberations. Further, the court
[J-85-2019] - 9
determined that the error was not harmless given that it caused Appellees to utilize a
peremptory challenge to exclude prospective juror 29, and thereby “forced [Appellees] to
exhaust all of their peremptory challenges.” Id. at 1019. As a result, the court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.9 The court
did not address Appellees’ remaining issues.
Thereafter, the Hospital filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted,
raising four issues, of which we find the following to be dispositive: “[w]hether the Superior
Court improperly considered arguments regarding juror demeanor when those arguments
were waived.” Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 201 A.3d 145 (Pa.
2019) (order).
II. Arguments of the Parties
Because we conclude the Hospital’s waiver issue is dispositive, we begin by
addressing the parties’ arguments with respect thereto. In the Hospital’s view, the issue
for the Superior Court’s consideration was whether the answers provided by the
prospective jurors during voir dire provided a specific basis for disqualifying them based
on actual prejudice or bias, and it should have confined its analysis accordingly. The
Hospital contends that the Superior Court erred, however, by instead considering
arguments related to the conduct and demeanor of the prospective jurors, and the lack of
9 Judge Bowes, while joining the majority opinion, authored a separate concurrence,
joined by Judge Olson, expressing her concern as to whether the process utilized by
Allegheny County for selection of jurors in civil matters “results in sound disqualification
determinations.” Trigg, 187 A.3d at 1020 (Bowes, J., concurring). In her view, the
opportunity for a trial judge to view a prospective juror’s demeanor firsthand while he or
she is being questioned is critical in close cases where the juror’s potential bias is not
apparent from the record. She considers the trial judge’s lack of opportunity to observe
the jurors as they were being questioned as undercutting the judge’s ability to make a
well-founded decision, and hampers further appellate review of the judge’s ruling.
[J-85-2019] - 10
the presence of a judge at voir dire, because those arguments were waived for purposes
of appellate review, having never been properly raised in the trial court.
The Hospital considers the Superior Court to have committed clear error in basing
its decision on these waived arguments and, in so doing, contravened years of precedent
governing the voir dire process by deeming it “essential” for a trial judge to have
personally witnessed the original voir dire in order to rule on a for-cause challenge to a
juror. Hospital Brief at 22.10 The Hospital rejects the proposition that only an original
interrogation of a prospective juror in the presence of the trial court is sufficient to assess
the prospective juror’s candor. In its view, such a contention discounts the fact that many
witnesses at trial, who have their credibility assessed by the fact-finder, have been
previously questioned prior to trial via deposition or other means; hence, the Hospital
propounds that original interrogation is manifestly not the only acceptable way to gauge
credibility.
The Hospital emphasizes that Appellees, at no time before or during trial, “raised
any arguments or made any record as to how the demeanor of the challenged jurors was
relevant to Judge Folino’s analysis or revealed purported bias.” Id. The Hospital adds
that, when Appellees made their for-cause challenge, they did not present Judge Folino
with these arguments. Rather, Appellees merely asked Judge Folino to read the
transcript to assess whether the jurors were biased as they contended, and Appellees
declined to question the challenged jurors before Judge Folino, even though they had the
opportunity to do so. Consequently, the Hospital concludes that, because of this waiver,
issues relating to the propriety of the Allegheny County Civil Division juror selection
process are not properly before this Court, and, in any event, nothing in those jury
10 The parties filed redacted briefs in this matter to protect the identity of J.T., and our
references herein are to these redacted briefs.
[J-85-2019] - 11
selection procedures precludes an in-person examination of a prospective juror by a trial
judge.
Appellees respond by asserting that they could not have objected to the demeanor
of the challenged jurors during voir dire for the simple fact that the trial judge was not
present to rule on such an objection, and there was no way to record the objection for
appellate review. Appellees highlight that, in Shinal, our Court stressed the importance
of the trial judge’s ability to view a prospective juror’s demeanor when answering
questions in voir dire, and, thus, only if the judge has the opportunity to observe the juror’s
demeanor will appellate courts apply a highly deferential standard of review.
Appellees aver that, when prospective juror 29 made her initial statements during
voir dire reflecting her potential bias, these statements were made in such a fashion that
her demeanor reflected her bias, yet the trial judge did not observe that demeanor, as he
was not present at that time. Appellees claim that, when they made an argument
regarding the alleged bias of prospective juror 29, implicit in that argument was a
commentary on her demeanor, and, thus, they preserved the present issue for appellate
review. See Appellees’ Brief at 22 (discussing their argument to trial court that
prospective juror’s answer – that she would tend to favor the medical profession in a close
call – indicated that she was “on the fence,” and that her subsequent answers indicated
a willingness to engage in “open defiance” of the trial court’s directives (quoting N.T.,
3/17/17, at 204)).
Appellees deny that they should have challenged the jury selection process at the
outset of the trial, inasmuch as they assert that they were not challenging that process,
but only the prejudice which ensued. Appellees claim that they were merely following the
established procedures in Allegheny County and that they utilized the “only legitimate
recourse” available to them which was to have the trial judge read the transcript and rule
[J-85-2019] - 12
on their objection. Id. at 24. Lastly, Appellees argue that they properly preserved the
issue of the trial court’s lack of firsthand assessment of the jurors’ demeanor during voir
dire in their post-trial motions.
III. Analysis
The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Stapas v. Giant Eagle, 198 A.3d
1033, 1037 (Pa. 2018). As a general matter, it is axiomatic that issues not raised in lower
courts are waived for purposes of appellate review, and they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). This is because, as our Court has oft reminded, “issue
preservation is foundational to proper appellate review.” In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1211
(Pa. 2010). Requiring issues to be properly raised first in the trial court ensures that trial
judges have the opportunity to consider a potential appellate issue and correct any error
at the first available opportunity. Id. at 1212. It also promotes the orderly and efficient
use of judicial resources, ensures fundamental fairness to the parties, and accounts for
the expense attendant to appellate litigation. Id.
In the case at bar, we are constrained to conclude that Appellees waived their
argument that the trial court erred by not observing the demeanor and tenor of prospective
juror 29 during voir dire. Our review of the record indicates that Appellees made no
objection in pretrial motions to the trial judge’s absence from the Jury Assignment Room
during voir dire. Likewise, when Appellees made their challenge for-cause to the seating
of prospective juror 29, they did not contemporaneously object to the trial judge’s absence
from the room during voir dire. Moreover, review of the transcript of the argument before
Judge Folino regarding the challenge to this juror indicates that Appellees’ challenge was
predicated on the substance of the answers which she gave during voir dire, i.e., that her
familial relationship with members of the medical profession indicated her potential bias:
[J-85-2019] - 13
[Appellees’ Counsel]: The argument is that she’s the one
who brought up her relatives when asked about potential bias.
I asked her, “In a close call, would you favor the doctors?” She
said “yes.”
THE COURT: What did you mean by a close call?
[Appellees’ Counsel]: I meant -
THE COURT: 50-50?
[Appellees’ Counsel]: I didn't quantify it for her.
THE COURT: But what is that though?
[Appellees’ Counsel]: I thought that she understood that I
meant that, you know, “If you were on the fence one way or
another, as you sit here today, do you think you would favor,
the doctor?” And she said “yes.” And then again, I think we
went from there into really open defiance, and she said, No, I
wouldn’t defy it.
Would you try to be fair? And they were leading questions that
were permitted to be asked to rehabilitate her, and I don’t -- I
suggest that the -- that in trying to elicit bias, that cross-
examination for rehabilitation is inappropriate.
THE COURT: Well, your questions were leading, too.
[Appellees’ Counsel]: I respectfully disagree about the
question where I said if it’s a close case. Maybe it was, yeah.
N.T., 3/17/17, at 203-05. This record does not support Appellees’ claim that, as part of
their challenge for-cause, they implicitly raised issues concerning the inability of the trial
judge to assess the demeanor of prospective juror 29 as she gave her answers.
The fact that Appellees alleged, in post-trial motions, that the trial court erred in not
striking this juror for-cause because the trial court did not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor and tenor of her answers does not preserve this issue for review.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1 requires a party to raise an objection at trial,
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inter alia, by motion, or by a specific, on the record objection in order to obtain post-trial
relief:
(b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a)
[governing the admissibility or exclusion of trial evidence],
post-trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds
therefor,
(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial
proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge,
request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer
of proof or other appropriate method at trial; and
Note: If no objection is made, error which could
have been corrected in pre-trial proceedings or
during trial by timely objection may not
constitute a ground for post-trial relief.
Pa.R.E. 103(a) provides that the specific ground
for an overruled objection, or the substance of
excluded evidence, need not be stated at or
prior to trial, or without having made an offer of
proof, if the ground of the objection, or the
substance of the evidence sought to be
introduced, was apparent from the context.
(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state
how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings
or at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived
unless leave is granted upon cause shown to specify
additional grounds.
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b).
In Stapas, a personal injury action, our Court held that, because of these
requirements, the defendant’s failure to raise an objection to an alleged error in the jury’s
computation of damages prior to the jury’s dismissal resulted in waiver of that issue on
appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant raised the issue in post-trial motions.
Our Court reasoned that the failure to object deprived the trial court of the opportunity to
have the trial judge order the jury to take curative action and properly compute the
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damages before they were dismissed. We concluded that the rationale discussed above
— requiring timely objections to be made at trial so that the trial judge can take immediate
curative action — compelled a finding of waiver under such circumstances.
Likewise, in the case at bar, Appellees, in making their for-cause challenge to
prospective juror 29, failed to raise with the trial judge any issue relating to his lack of
observation of this juror’s demeanor in answering voir dire questions, nor did they request
that he personally interview the juror. As a result, the trial judge was deprived of any
opportunity to address and resolve this issue before the jury was finally empaneled.
Indeed, in his Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial judge indicated his express willingness
to conduct in-person interviews of prospective juror 29, had Appellees asked that he do
so, as it was his customary practice to grant such requests. However, Appellees made
no request for such individualized follow-up questioning, nor raised any claim that such
an ameliorative measure would be inadequate to cure the alleged harm they now assert
was caused by the trial court’s absence during voir dire, even though the trial court left
the question of the specific method it should use to address Appellees’ for-cause
challenges entirely up to them. N.T., 3/17/17, at 201. Because Appellees ultimately failed
to make either a timely objection to the trial court’s absence during voir dire, or request
that the trial court take other curative action for that absence, and, instead, gave their
express assent to having the trial court resolve their for-cause challenges solely on the
basis of the transcript of the voir dire process, they have waived for appellate review any
challenge to the use of this methodology.
The Superior Court therefore erred when it rejected the Hospital’s claim before that
tribunal that the issue of the trial court’s lack of personal observation of the demeanor of
prospective juror 29 during voir dire was waived. The court did not analyze this waiver
claim in accordance with the well-established requirements for issue preservation
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discussed supra. Rather, it essentially addressed the merits of the claim, deeming follow-
up in-person questioning by a trial judge of a prospective juror – the avenue Appellees
chose not to pursue or challenge – to be an insufficient means of discerning a juror’s
potential bias, thereby relieving Appellees of their obligation to raise the issue before the
trial court. This was improper.11
For this reason, we vacate the Superior Court’s order reversing the trial court.
However, as the Superior Court did not address Appellees’ other arguments regarding
the denial of their motion to exclude the prospective jurors, we remand this matter to that
tribunal so that it may consider those remaining issues.
The Order of the Superior Court is vacated, and this case is remanded to that court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion in which Justices Baer, Dougherty,
Wecht and Mundy join.
Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
11Because of the nature of our disposition of this appeal, we express no opinion on the
Superior Court’s merits-based conclusion in this regard.
[J-85-2019] - 17