Judges: Leadbetter, McGinley, Pellegrini
Filed Date: 12/23/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/26/2024
OPINION BY
Before us in our original jurisdiction are preliminary objections
Heffran is an inmate at SCI-Graterford who works in its Shoe Shop Rubber Mill making boots for inmates. Heffran alleges that SCI-Graterford is his “employer,” and, as such, under the Act, was required to label chemical receptacles for workers, post a list of hazardous substances in the work area, provide training programs for inmate/employees, and allow him to view MSDS. Heffran alleges that on May 18, 2004, he made a complaint to L&I which is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act,
The overall purpose of the Act is to protect employees from the dangers that can occur from exposure to hazardous chemicals used in the workplace or transported and disposed within the community, and to make current information available as to the known or suspected health hazards posed by the use of or exposure to such hazardous substances. This is achieved by imposing on employers and chemical suppliers certain obligations and by making available to employees the identity of chemicals used in the workplace.
The Act defines “employee” in relevant part as “[a]ny person currently working for any employer, except domestic or casual laborers employed at the employer’s place of residence.” 35 P.S. § 7302. It has long been settled that an inmate at a correctional facility is not an employee of the correctional facility because there is no employer/employee relationship as an inmate’s labor belongs to the prison, and the remuneration paid to the inmate is a gratuitous payment authorized by the state as a rehabilitative tool rather than wages. Mays v. Fulcomer, 122 Pa.Cmwlth. 555, 552 A.2d 750 (1989); Salah v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 394 A.2d 1053 (1978). Because the Act only imposes burdens on employers, and SCI-Graterford is not Heffran’s employer but his jailer, and Heffran is an inmate of SCI-Graterford and not an employee of SCI-Graterford, he has no standing as an employee to compel L&I to enforce the provisions of the Act.
Accordingly, the preliminary objections filed by L&I are sustained.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of December, 2004, the preliminary objections filed by the Department of Labor and Industry are sustained.
.In deciding preliminary objections, this Court must take as true all well-pleaded and material facts and inferences deduced therefrom. Heffner Funeral Chapel & Crematory, Inc. v. Department of State, Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, 824 A.2d 397 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), affirmed, 578 Pa. 41, 849 A.2d 1135 (2004). In order to sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt as to their certainty should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the preliminary objections. Id.
. Act of October 5, 1984, P.L. 734, No. 159, 35 P.S. §§ 7301-73120.
. Section 14 of the Act empowers L&I, among other things; to prevent any violations of the Act, issue orders to comply with the Act, assess civil penalties for violations of the Act, and to levy penalties against employers. 35 P.S. § 7314.
. Specifically, this complaint alleges that SCI-Graterford violated the Act because Hef-fran was not furnished with requested MSDS for 11 hazardous substances allegedly used in the boot production (35 P.S. § 7305(c)(2));
.Section 15(b) of the Act grants standing to an aggrieved person to bring an action in this Court against L&I for failure to enforce provisions of the Act or regulations promulgated under the Act. That section provides:
(b) ORIGINAL ACTION. — Any aggrieved person may bring a civil action in the appropriate court of common pleas on his own behalf against any employer or supplier for a violation of any provision of this act, except section 11, or any rule promulgated thereto, or may bring suit in the Commonwealth Court against the ¡department for failure to enforce the provisions of this act or any rule promulgated pursuant thereto. Where the action involves the rights of more than one employee, any certified or recognized collective bargaining representative shall have standing to sue on behalf of said employees. The court may issue, whenever it deems appropriate, a preliminary, permanent or special injunction. Under no circumstances may this act be read to require, and under no circumstances may a court award, compensatory and liquidated damages, costs and expenses of litigation, including expert witness fees and reasonable attorney fees.
35 P.S. 7315(b). (Emphasis added.)
. In its preliminary objections, L&I also argues that even if Heffran does have standing, this Court still lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Heffran failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because of the way we resolve this case, we need not address that issue.
. The Act also provides that the community is protected by providing for hazardous substance surveys and furnishing them to the local police, fire and emergency response services, as well as disseminating that information to the public. 35 P.S. §§ 7303; 7305; 7310; 7312. Heffran makes no claim under any of those provisions.