Miles v. Beard

OPINION BY Judge COHN.¹

Mickey Miles appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County that dismissed a complaint filed against Jeffrey A. Beard, Ph.D., Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, individually, and in his official capacity, Fredric A. Rosemeyer, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Laurel Highlands, (SCI-Laurel Highlands) individually, and in his official capacity, Reverend Elizabeth Scott, Chaplaincy Program Director at SCI-Laurel Highlands, individually, and in her official capacity, and Craig Copper, Corrections Food Services Manager at SCI-Laurel Highlands, individually, and in his official capacity. The order also denied Miles the right to proceed in forma pauperis. We are asked to determine whether original jurisdiction over this matter is in this Court rather than the court of common pleas and whether the sua sponte dismissal of the complaint was proper.

In his complaint, Miles alleged that he is an Orthodox Jew. Before entering the state correctional system, he had been incarcerated at the Philadelphia Detention Center and received kosher meals. He was, thereafter, transferred first to the State Correctional Institution at Grater-ford (SCI-Graterford) and later to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill). In both state facilities he requested and received kosher meals.

On December 27, 2002, Miles was transferred to SCI-Laurel Highlands. At this facility, he submitted a request for kosher meals to Reverend Scott. On January 2, 2003, when Miles did not receive approval for kosher meals, he filed a grievance (No. 40212) to which he received no response. When Miles spoke with Reverend Scott about it, she told him that she had forwarded the grievance to the Central Office in Harrisburg and was awaiting a reply. Miles also filed requests for kosher meals with Copper, who, allegedly, made no effort to accommodate Miles.²

Having learned from Reverend Scott that his grievance was still pending in Harrisburg after seven months, Miles filed this complaint, together with a request to proceed in forma pauperis, seeking an order directing that he receive kosher meals. He also sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, in-junctive relief and any other relief that the court deemed just. The common pleas court dismissed the complaint, sua sponte, concluding that: 1) it did not have original jurisdiction over Beard, a state-wide officer; 2) Miles had not exhausted his administrative remedies; and 3) Miles had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.³ Miles then filed this appeal challenging these three reasons for the dismissal.

The first issue we must decide is whether the common pleas court incorrectly concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction over Beard, and that original jurisdiction would lie with this Court. The common pleas court focused only on the fact that Beard is a state-wide officer within the meaning of Section 761 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761, see Madden v. Jeffes, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 414, 482 A.2d 1162 (1984); however, that fact is not dispositive of the jurisdictional issue here for two reasons.

First, in order for this Court to have original jurisdiction, the Commonwealth party must be indispensable. Piper Aircraft Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 209, 417 A.2d 283 (1980). Although Beard is named in the caption of the complaint, absolutely no relief is sought against him. Beard is mentioned only once in the body of the complaint, where Miles avers that he wrote a letter to him. (¶ 17, Complaint; Ex. 10 of Complaint (cash slip indicating letter was mailed)). Merely including in the caption of the complaint the Commonwealth government or a state-wide officer, against whom no relief is sought, will not operate to vest this Court with original jurisdiction. Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Department of Education, 101 Pa.Cmwlth. 497, 516 A.2d 1308 (1986). Here, only the food service at a single correctional institution is at issue and Miles does not allege the existence of any state-wide policy that would preclude his receiving kosher meals. In fact, Miles requested and received kosher meals while incarcerated at SCI-Graterford and SCI-Camp Hill. Thus, Beard is not indispensable to this action. Therefore, inclusion of Beard’s name in the caption did not divest the court of common pleas of jurisdiction.

Second, this Court lacks original jurisdiction over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hill v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 545 Pa. 38, 679 A.2d 773 (1996); Fawber v. Cohen, 516 Pa. 352, 532 A.2d 429 (1987); Balshy v. Rank, 507 Pa. 384, 490 A.2d 415 (1985). Miles’s complaint here requests money damages for a violation of Section 1983.

A recent opinion of our Supreme Court supports our conclusion that jurisdiction rests with the common pleas court. In Stackhouse v. Pennsylvania State. Police, 574 Pa. 558, 832 A.2d 1004 (2003), as here, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief in addition to money, damages. In that case Diane Stackhouse filed suit against the Pennsylvania State Police (State Police), Commissioner Paul J. Evanko and Deputy Commissioner Thomas K. Coury. She alleged that employees of the State Police had undertaken an investigation of her in connection with a job application she had filed. She asserted, specifically, that certain State Police employees were permitted to delve improperly into her personal affairs, including her private inter-personal relationships. She did not allege that the two individuals named as defendants had personally inquired into private matters; she merely contended that they had failed to insure that those who did conduct the investigation were properly trained to inquire only into matters that were appropriate and relevant to it. She also alleged that after she informed Commissioner Evanko of what had occurred, he did not take any corrective action. She sought both declaratory/injunctive relief and monetary damages. The defendants filed a preliminary objection asserting that original jurisdiction was with this Court. The common pleas court agreed and transferred the matter. Thereafter, we filed a per curiam order dismissing the case, citing Fawber, Bolshy and Hill. The matter was then appealed to the Supreme Court. It noted that the equity cause of action rested upon the same factual allegations as the tort claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. The Court held that, in such a circumstance, the inclusion of a count of declaratory or injunctive relief does not operate to transform the matter into the type of case envisioned by, inter alia, Section 761 of the Judicial Code. Further, it noted that were it to conclude otherwise, the result would be to permit a jurisdictional determination to turn “solely on the styling of claims within a complaint” and this would “arguably permit forum shopping through pleading.” Id. at 564, 832 A.2d at 1008. In addition, it observed that traditionally this Court and others have determined jurisdictional questions based upon substance, rather than on the form of the action. It, thus, concluded that the matter had properly been filed in the common pleas court.

Here, as in Stackhouse, the allegation upon which the equity and 1983 actions rest are clearly the same. Miles does not even attempt to separate the causes of action by denominating specific counts in his complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that Stackhouse controls here.

Additionally, although one might argue that what Miles really wants is a mandatory injunction rather than money damages, he is the one who included a request for money damages in his complaint. It is not our function to ignore a portion of his request for relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this Court, a court of limited original jurisdiction, rather than in the common pleas court, a court of broad original jurisdiction. Indeed, such an approach is clearly contrary to the holding in Stackhouse and to the spirit of Supreme Court cases such as Gossman v. Lower Chanceford Township Board of Supervisors, 503 Pa. 392, 469 A.2d 996 (1983), which caution that in determining whether this Court has original jurisdiction over a matter, we must consider that cases within our original jurisdiction are appealable as of right to the Supreme Court, and the efficient administration of justice is not well served when that Court is forced to hear collateral matters (in Gossman, an issue concerning further costs and counsel fees) because “such an interpretation of [its] jurisdiction would crowd cases involving important and unique issues from [its] allocatur docket.” Id. at 395-96, 469 A.2d at 998. While we certainly admit that the appeal sub judice does not concern a collateral matter, we are not convinced that where, as here, the plaintiff seeks, inter alia, money damages in a 1983 type of claim, this matter cannot be adequately addressed without mandatory review by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we hold that jurisdiction was properly vested in the common pleas court on this basis as well.⁴

The second reason the common pleas court dismissed the complaint was its conclusion that Miles had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. There is no question that equity will not lie when there is an adequate administrative remedy that has not been exhausted. Borough of Brentwood v. Brentwood (Borough) School District, 662 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995). The trial court held that Miles had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies based upon Exhibit 11 to the complaint, a letter from the Grievance Review Officer in Harrisburg, indicating that Miles had failed to comply properly with the grievance procedures and, therefore, no action would be taken on his grievances. However, none of the grievance numbers referenced in that letter matches the grievance number at issue here, which Miles alleges has been pending unanswered for seven months. Thus, there is no evidence in the record, as it now exists, that Miles has failed to do all he could to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court should not have dismissed the case for this reason, at least at this juncture.

The third reason that the common pleas court dismissed the complaint was its conclusion that Miles had failed to state a cause of action. It is unclear whether the rationale for this was the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or whether the court believed that Miles would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law, even had he exhausted his administrative remedies. We, thus, review it as we would review a demurrer that had been sustained.

The Third Circuit has recognized that, under certain circumstances, inmates have a constitutional right to a special diet for religious reasons. In DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3rd Cir.2000), the Court noted that if the inmate’s belief is sincere and religious in nature, then the court must next inquire whether there is a rational connection between the prison’s refusal to provide the food the inmate seeks and a legitimate penological interest. If there is, then the court must further decide if the refusal is reasonable in light of the nature of the penological interest, the inmate’s interest in practicing his religion, the overall effect on the prison community in granting the request, and the availability of ways to accommodate the request at a de minimis cost. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 52. In this instance, Miles alleged that he was an Orthodox Jew, that he had been denied kosher food, and that the consumption of only kosher food is a tenet of his faith. Thus, he pled a cause of action that requires a factual record for his claim to be decided in accordance with the relevant criteria denominated in DeHart. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Because we conclude that dismissal of the case at this early juncture was in error, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. The denial of in forma pauperis status is also reversed, since it was, presumably, based only upon the premise that the complaint had failed to state a cause of action, or was subject to the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

ORDER

NOW, April 12, 2004, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

1 . This case was reassigned to the opinion writer on February 10, 2004.

2 . Miles also submitted a request for kosher meals to Betsy Nightingale, the Superintendent’s Assistant, after he had been denied a kosher meal on the Fast of Esther. Nightingale responded in a memorandum to Miles, stating, "I was advised that you were denied the Kosher diet. As far as the Fast of Esther on [Purim], you were provided the food items as directed by Department of Corrections Central Office.” (Complaint, Exhibit 5.) Thereafter, Miles filed additional grievances with Rosemeyer and the Chief Grievance Coordinator in Secretary Beard’s Office. He also requested and received kosher food, including matzot, i.e., unleavened bread, for Passover.

3 .We presume the dismissal was pursuant to Section 6602(e)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2), which requires dismissal of a case concerning "prison conditions litigation” where the inmate seeks to proceed in forma pauperis and where the trial court concludes that the filing is frivolous, fails to state a cause of action or is subject to a valid affirmative defense.

4 . We acknowledge the dissenting opinion's reliance on Pastore v. State System of Higher Education, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 111, 618 A.2d 1118 (1992), but would distinguish it on the basis that there separate counts were pled. Thus, we severed the counts and transferred those involving trespass to the court of common pleas. In this case, however, there are no separate counts pled. Therefore, even assuming, without deciding, that Stackhouse would permit severance, here it is not practical to do so.