Moon Twp. v. A. Papa

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Moon Township, Chief Greg :
Seamon, and Sgt. Robert Phillis, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 234 C.D. 2022
:
Amanda Papa : Submitted: November 4, 2022
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: March 3, 2023
Moon Township, Chief Greg Seamon, and Sergeant Robert Phillis
(collectively, Township) appeal from a December 30, 2021 order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) denying the Township’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. Upon review, we reverse and remand to the Trial Court for
the entry of judgment in favor of the Township.
I. Background
On April 22, 2018, Amanda Papa was attending an Earth Day celebration in
a local park. See Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Wasserman, a.k.a. Papa (C.C.P.
Allegheny Cnty., No. CP-02-CR-0008419-2018, filed July 20, 2020) (Criminal Trial
Opinion), at 9. Ms. Papa objected to the presence of representatives of a petroleum
company that had sponsored the event, and loudly demanded that one representative
explain their presence. Id. at 12. Dissatisfied with the explanation, Ms. Papa became
enraged and accused the representatives of handing out propaganda to children. Id.
Ms. Papa then grabbed a stack of backpacks that were being offered to attendees and
attempted to run out of the booth with them. Id. A representative grabbed the
backpacks. A struggle ensued and Ms. Papa hit the representative in the chest. Id.
Township police officers were called to the scene. When the responding officers
instructed Ms. Papa to leave the park, she physically attacked them. Id. at 13. The
officers placed Ms. Papa under arrest and led her toward a patrol car. Ms. Papa
continued to kick, scream, and swear. Id. at 13.
Ms. Papa was charged with resisting arrest, defiant trespass, disorderly
conduct (unreasonable noise), two counts of harassment (subjecting others to
physical contact), disorderly conduct (engaging in fighting), and aggravated assault
against both officers. Id. at 3. On March 4, 2019, following a bench trial, Ms. Papa
was acquitted of the aggravated assault charge, but convicted of the remaining
charges.1 At sentencing on March 27, 2019, Ms. Papa was sentenced to a term of
probation with several conditions.2 Id. Ms. Papa was specifically directed to not
contact any of the victims or any of the involved parties, and to refrain from making
any “offensive or derogatory social media posts” about any of the involved parties
or entities. Criminal Trial Op. at 3. Almost immediately after conviction, Ms. Papa
wrote a public Facebook post accusing an officer who testified at her trial of “lying
under oath.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 371a-438a. Police Chief Seamon notified
Ms. Papa’s probation officer and provided printouts of the posts in question. At a
violation hearing on June 20, 2019, the trial judge ordered Ms. Papa to be placed on
1
Ms. Papa appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the convictions. See
Commonwealth v. Amanda Lynn Papa (Pa. Super., No. 1407 W.D.A. 2019, filed Nov. 12, 2021),
appeal denied, 275 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2022).
2
At the same trial, Ms. Papa was convicted of institutional vandalism and a further count
of resisting arrest due to a series of incidents that occurred on May 30, 2018. Criminal Trial Op.
at 3. The charges were consolidated for trial, conviction, and sentencing. Id. at 1. The May 30,
2018 events, and the convictions that followed, form the factual basis of a separate civil action and
appeal to this Court. See Borough of Coraopolis v. Papa (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 233 C.D. 2022, filed
March 3, 2023.
2
electronic monitoring and admonished her again to avoid making social media posts
about her case or the parties. Id. at 302a-03a.
On September 23, 2020, Ms. Papa filed a Complaint pro se3 alleging that the
Township and its employees were liable for malicious abuse of process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of free speech rights under the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.4
Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 8. On May 12, 2021, the Township filed
Preliminary Objections in which it asserted governmental and official immunity
from all of Ms. Papa’s claims. Original Record (O.R.), Item No. 12. In a July 12,
2021 order, the Trial Court overruled the Preliminary Objections but instructed Ms.
Papa to make further amendments within 45 days.5 O.R., Item No. 14. On August
25, 2021, Ms. Papa submitted a Second Amended Complaint to the Trial Court.
O.R., Item No. 17. Apart from the reference to federal constitutional rights, which
was omitted, the Second Amended Complaint contained the same averments as the
original complaint. As a proposed remedy, Ms. Papa requested an award of money
damages in an unspecified amount, plus legal costs, in her favor. Id. ¶ 50.
3
While examining Ms. Papa’s claims, we are mindful of the rule that “allegations of a pro
se complainant are held to a less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by
attorneys.” Rosario v. Beard, 920 A.2d 931, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Danysh v. Dep’t of
Corr., 845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2005)). Where a pro
se complainant’s allegations are adequately set forth, they will not be dismissed just because they
are not artfully drafted. Hill v. Thorne, 635 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 1993).
4
Since the complaint referenced violations of federal constitutional rights, the Township
removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See
Papa v. Moon Twp. (W.D. Pa., 20-CV-01528-CCW, filed Apr. 30, 2021), slip op. at 1. Ms. Papa
submitted an Amended Complaint omitting references to the federal constitution. Id. Accordingly,
the district court remanded the case to state court in a May 6, 2021 order. O.R., Item No. 11.
5
It is not clear from the record what amendments Ms. Papa was directed to make.
3
In support of her claims, Ms. Papa submitted five exhibits. First was the
handwritten witness statement of a Township employee, Amy Ottaviani who
witnessed the April 22, 2018 incident. Ms. Ottaviani explained that Ms. Papa first
drew her attention when Ms. Papa sat down on top of a table that had been set up for
the event sponsor, and became “loud and very disruptive.” R.R. at 37a. Ms.
Ottaviani also stated that Moon Township police had “acted professionally.” Id. at
37a-38a. Second was a document from the Allegheny County probation office
regarding Ms. Papa’s “continuing violation” of her probation terms. Id. at 39a.
Third and fourth were Ms. Papa’s own summary and analysis of her social media
activity, in which she denied creating any posts that violated her probation. Id. at
40a-41a. Fifth was a letter from a health care provider describing Ms. Papa’s
“symptoms of anxiety and depression.”6 Id. at 43a.
On September 17, 2021, the Township filed an Answer and New Matter to the
Second Amended Complaint, in which it maintained its immunity defense. O.R.,
Item No. 18. On October 1, 2021, the Township filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. O.R., Item No. 24. Therein, the Township again asserted that it was
governmentally immune from Ms. Papa’s claims under Sections 8541 and 8542 of
the Judicial Code, commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542.7 Id. ¶¶ 36-41. According to the
6
The health care provider explained that Ms. Papa’s “anxiety typically manifest[s] as
intense anger and posturing as a way to protect herself when she feels she is under threat.” R.R.
at 43a. The provider then opined that Ms. Papa’s suicidal ideations, “as well as interactions with
police in the midst of crisis, further escalated her sense of immediate and intense peril.” Id. The
letter does not make any other reference to police or Ms. Papa’s interactions with them.
7
Section 8541 provides that, except as otherwise specified in the Tort Claims Act, “no
local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property
(Footnote continued on next page…)
4
Township, Chief Seamon and Sergeant Phillis were protected by official immunity
under Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act.8 Id. ¶¶ 42-49. The Township further
argued that Ms. Papa’s claims amounted to an improper collateral attack on her
criminal conviction. Id. ¶ 55. Finally, the Township alleged that the Pennsylvania
Constitution does not recognize a private right of action for alleged violations of
constitutional rights. Id. ¶¶ 65-66. Opposing summary judgment, Ms. Papa argued
that her probation file, which had been obtained by the Township through a subpoena
on the probation office and recently shared with Ms. Papa, “may result in further
evidence.”9 O.R., Item No. 27, Response ¶ 21.
On December 30, 2021, the Trial Court issued an order denying the
Township’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which consisted simply of a printout of
the Township’s proposed order granting summary judgment, with the text crossed
out and the single word “denied” written in the margin. O.R., Item No. 29.
The Township subsequently petitioned this Court for permission to appeal. In
a May 19, 2022 per curiam order, this Court granted its petition and directed the
parties to submit briefs on three issues: whether the Township or its employees were
immune from suit, whether Ms. Papa’s suit constituted a collateral attack on her
caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
8541. Section 8542 provides certain exceptions, all of which involve negligence claims that are
not at issue in this case. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542.
8
Section 8545 provides that an “employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages on
account of any injury to a person or property caused by acts of the employee which are within the
scope of his office or duties only to the same extent as his employing local agency and subject to
the limitations imposed by [the Tort Claims Act].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545.
9
The Township obtained Ms. Papa’s complete probation file through a subpoena on the
probation office on September 21, 2021. See R.R. at 370a. The file includes, inter alia, printouts
of the social media posts that were later determined to violate Ms. Papa’s probation agreement.
See generally id. at 291a-302a.
5
conviction, and whether the Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes a private right of
action for violations of its provisions.
II. Issues
The Township argues that summary judgment was improperly denied because
it and its employees are immune from suit as a matter of law, and because Ms. Papa’s
claims constitute an improper collateral attack on her criminal conviction.10
III. Discussion
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides:
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment
in whole or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be
established by additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion,
including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts
essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would
require the issues to be submitted to a jury.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2. A party seeking to avoid summary judgment must show by
specific facts in the depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 28 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015).
Here, the Township moved for summary judgment on the basis that “Ms. Papa
has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery,” and that she has failed to
“demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for the jury’s consideration.” O.R.,
10
Our standard of review on appeal from the grant or denial of summary judgment is de
novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Clean Air Council v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 185 A.3d
478, 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed an error of law or abuse of discretion. Id.6
Item No. 24, Motion ¶ 15. In response, Ms. Papa argues that summary judgment on
the malicious abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
malicious prosecution claims would be inappropriate because discovery is ongoing,
and that she should be allowed time to complete it. O.R., Item No. 27, Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 21, 24, 27. Ms. Papa argues that e-mail
communications between Chief Seamon and her probation officer “may result in
further evidence.” Id. ¶ 21. The rest of Ms. Papa’s Response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment consists of restatements of the allegations set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint. See generally id. ¶¶ 4-47.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a),11 the Trial Court submitted a single sentence
statement explaining its denial of summary judgment, which reads as follows:
“When [Appellants] filed their [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment, discovery was
not closed and it was therefore not free and clear from all doubt that [Appellants]
were entitled to summary judgment.” The memorandum cites a single case, Brown
v. Tunkhannock Township, 665 A.2d 1318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), which is inapposite
to the issues at hand.12
11
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) provides that, upon the receipt of a notice of appeal, “the judge who
entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already
appear of record, shall . . . file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order.”
12
The Trial Court’s reliance on Brown is perplexing since Brown does not discuss the
status of discovery or its impact on summary judgment. In Brown, the plaintiff sustained injuries
at a softball game on township-owned land and brought an action in negligence against the
township. 665 A.2d at 1319. After the close of pleadings and a single deposition, the township
moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity pursuant to the Recreational Use of Land and
Water Act (RULWA), Act of February 2, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1860, as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 477-1–
477-8. 665 A.2d at 1319. The trial court granted the township’s motion. Id. at 1319-20. This
Court reversed, holding that the ballpark was “improved land” and therefore outside the scope of
the RULWA. Id. at 1322.
7
It is important to note that the Trial Court did not address any of the three
issues set forth in this Court’s order granting the interlocutory appeal. Furthermore,
the Trial Court offers an incomplete statement of when summary judgment is
appropriate.
The close of discovery is not the only condition allowing summary judgment
to be considered. Pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2(1), summary judgment
is equally appropriate when “there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by
additional discovery.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(1). The Trial Court’s statement fails to
provide any insight or explanation as to why Rule 1035.2(1) is inapplicable in this
instance. For the reasons set forth below, we have determined Ms. Papa’s claims
fail as a matter of law, and that further discovery would therefore serve no purpose.
A. Governmental Immunity
Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides the general rule of governmental
immunity: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall
be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused
by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 8541. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542 provides eight exceptions to immunity, all of
which involve acts of negligence.13 The clear legislative intent to insulate local
agencies and their employees from tort claims mandates that courts construe these
exceptions narrowly. Cornelius v. Roberts, 71 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
13
The exceptions include: (i) the operation of motor vehicles; (ii) the care, custody, or
control of personal property; (iii) the care, custody or control of real property; (iv) a dangerous
condition of trees, traffic controls and street lighting; (v) a dangerous condition of steam, sewer,
water, gas or electric systems; (vi) a dangerous condition of streets; (vii) a dangerous condition of
sidewalks; and (viii) the care, custody or control of animals. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).
8
Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that the Township is liable for acts allegedly committed
by Chief Seamon and Sergeant Phillis as their employer.14 Since none of the acts
alleged fall under any of Section 8542(b)’s exceptions to the general rule of
governmental immunity, the Township is immune from all of Ms. Papa’s claims.
B. Official Immunity
Pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act: “An employee of a local
agency is liable for civil damages on account of any injury to a person or property
caused by acts of the employee which are within the scope of his office or duties
only to the same extent as his employing local agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545.
However, Section 8550 provides that immunity is waived if an injury was caused by
an act that is judicially determined to have “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice or willful misconduct.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. Courts have consistently held
that “willful misconduct” is synonymous with “intentional tort”; that is, the actor
“desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it
was substantially certain to ensue.” Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 196 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012).
Instantly, Ms. Papa alleges that Chief Seamon and Sergeant Phillis are
personally liable for malicious abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, deprivation of free speech rights, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.
Those claims may only overcome official immunity if it is judicially determined that
the officers’ actions constituted willful misconduct; that is, intentional torts. For the
14
In response to Moon Township’s assertion of immunity, Ms. Papa argues that under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governments “may be sued
in certain limited circumstances.” O.R., Item No. 20, Response ¶ 13. While that is true, Monell
concerned civil actions for loss of federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ms.
Papa is no longer pursuing any federal claims, which is why this case was remanded to state court.
9
following reasons, we conclude that the averments in the Second Amended
Complaint fail as a matter of law and fact to support any such determination.
1. Malicious Abuse of Process
According to Ms. Papa, Chief Seamon “initiated legal process against [her]
by alleging [that she] violated conditions of probation by posting various news
articles unrelated to the case to [Ms. Papa’s] Facebook page.” O.R., Item No. 17,
Second Amended Complaint ¶ 25. Ms. Papa explained that, by his own admission,
Chief Seamon had assigned “multiple people” to monitor her social media accounts
during her probation. Id. ¶ 27. Ms. Papa asserts that these actions establish the claim
of malicious abuse of process. Id. ¶ 28.
In order to prove a cause of action for malicious abuse of process, “the rule is
well established that one of the necessary prerequisites . . . is that the previous
prosecution terminated favorably to the plaintiff.” Smoker v. Ohl, 6 A.2d 810, 811
(Pa. 1939). Instantly, Chief Seamon’s reporting of Ms. Papa’s social media activity
led to a determination that she had indeed violated her probation. See R.R. at 302a-
03a. As a consequence, no reasonable inference can be made that Chief Seamon
engaged in the malicious abuse of process.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Ms. Papa next asserts that as a result of Chief Seamon’s reporting of her social
media activity she suffered severe distress and was admitted to therapy at the Center
for Victims partly as a result of his activity. O.R., Item No. 17, Second Amended
Complaint ¶ 32. According to Ms. Papa these actions constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Even if true, this allegation is legally insufficient to
support such a claim.
10
A person is subject to liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress
if, by extreme and outrageous conduct, she/he intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another. Carson v. City of Phila., 574 A.2d 1184, 1187
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Conduct or statements are “outrageous” if they “go beyond all
bounds of decency and are regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Id. Before the question reaches a jury, it is for the court to determine whether the
defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery. Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Instantly, Chief Seamon reported Ms. Papa’s social media activity, which was
a clear and direct violation of the terms of her probation. Chief Seamon had
legitimate and compelling reasons to report her activities, and his actions were
therefore entirely consistent with his duties as a law enforcement officer. No
reasonable inference can be made that the performance of his duties constitutes
extreme or outrageous conduct.
11
3. Deprivation of Free Speech Rights
Ms. Papa further seeks declaratory or injunctive relief for alleged violations
of her right to free speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution.15, 16 Ms. Papa alleges
that her free speech right was violated when Sergeant Phillis confronted her
“primarily due to [her] speech” regarding the petroleum company sponsoring the
Earth Day event. O.R., Item No. 17, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 35. This is
inaccurate. As indicated by the uncontradicted facts, Ms. Papa was confronted by
Township officers because they had probable cause to believe that she was
committing several criminal offenses. Police had no duty to let Ms. Papa finish her
speech while she was engaged in criminal activity that endangered the safety of
others. Consequently, the facts cannot support a reasonable inference that Ms.
Papa’s right to free speech was violated.
4. False Arrest
Ms. Papa next alleges that Sergeant Phillis is liable for false arrest because he
lacked probable cause for arresting her on April 22, 2018. Id. ¶ 41. The necessary
elements of a cause of action for false arrest are: (1) the detention of another person,
and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention. Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d
289, 293 (Pa. 1994). An arrest that is based upon probable cause is legally justified,
15
The right to free speech is guaranteed by article I, sections 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Section 7 provides, inter alia, that “every citizen may freely speak, write and print
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” Section 20 provides that “the
citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good, and to
apply to those invested with the powers of government.” PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 20.
16
The Township argues that Ms. Papa’s claim fails because “the Pennsylvania Constitution
does not provide a private right of action for alleged deprivation of free speech.” Township’s Br.
at 26. However, private persons may bring actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief when
alleging violations of Pennsylvania constitutional rights, which is what Ms. Papa seeks here.
12
regardless of whether the individual arrested was eventually found guilty or not. Id.
A guilty plea or conviction conclusively establishes probable cause, precluding a
cause of action for false arrest. McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1997).
There was clearly probable cause to arrest Ms. Papa and she was ultimately
convicted of numerous offenses. Furthermore, these convictions were upheld on
appeal. Consequently, no reasonable inference can be made that Sergeant Phillis is
liable for false arrest.
5. Malicious Prosecution
Ms. Papa next asserts that Sergeant Phillis is liable for malicious prosecution
because he “did not have probable cause to initiate arrest or legal action.” O.R.,
Item No. 17, Second Amended Complaint ¶ 46. A cause of action for malicious
prosecution generally requires proof that the defendant (1) instituted criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff, (2) without probable cause and (3) with malice,
and (4) that the proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Tomaskevitch v.
Specialty Recs. Corp., 717 A.2d 30, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). A showing of probable
cause is an absolute defense to a charge of malicious prosecution. Id.Once again, Sergeant Phillis indeed had probable cause to arrest Ms. Papa.
No reasonable inference can be made that he is liable for malicious prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, all of Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter of law.
Consequently, there is nothing in the record that would justify a judicial
determination that Chief Seamon or Sergeant Phillis engaged in willful misconduct.
Pursuant to Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act, they are officially immune from
those claims.
13
C. Collateral Estoppel
Finally, Township argues that Ms. Papa’s claims constitute an improper
collateral attack on her criminal conviction. As authority for this assertion,
Township cites Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
In that case, a prison inmate sued a county government for conspiracy, negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel following his conviction and
imprisonment for sexual assault. In rejecting his claims, this Court concluded that
the plaintiff’s “inability to aver that the underlying conviction was invalidated” was
an absolute bar to recovery. Id. at 203. The principle underlying that conclusion,
commonly referred to as collateral estoppel, is that a party may not relitigate an issue
that has already been resolved in another proceeding. See Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d
872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (noting “that a criminal conviction collaterally estops a
defendant from denying his acts in a subsequent civil trial”).
Since it has already been demonstrated that Ms. Papa’s claims fail as a matter
of law, it is not necessary to engage in a separate collateral estoppel analysis of those
claims. However, for the sake of thoroughness, we note that underlying every one
of Ms. Papa’s claims is an effort to negate the legality and propriety of her arrest and
conviction, and the later determination that she violated the terms of her probation.
Even if we were so inclined, this Court is powerless to undo the outcome of valid
criminal proceedings. The purpose of civil actions such as the one brought by Ms.
Papa is not to provide second or third opportunities to relitigate criminal convictions
after the proper avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
IV. Conclusion
The Township and its employees are governmentally and officially immune
from suit pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. Ms. Papa’s claims fail for the additional
14
reason that they constitute a collateral attack on the outcome of valid criminal
proceedings. Even if we accept Ms. Papa’s allegations as true, these allegations
clearly fail as a matter of law. Thus, any further discovery would only delay the
inevitable dismissal of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the Trial Court’s order
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Township.
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Moon Township, Chief Greg :
Seamon, and Sgt. Robert Phillis, :
Appellants :
:
v. : No. 234 C.D. 2022
:
Amanda Papa :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of March, 2023, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County (Trial Court) in the above-captioned matter, dated
December 30, 2021, is hereby REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Trial Court
for the entry of judgment in favor of Appellants.
Jurisdiction relinquished.