DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 6 T.D. 1981
Judges: Mencer, Palladino, Williams
Filed Date: 12/17/1981
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
Opinion by
Despite the nonexistence of testimony, exhibits, or depositions to disclose the facts of this case, an examination of the pleadings indicates the following background for the instant appeal. Emanuel N. Hreha (appellant) owns a driving, school business in the City of Erie, and the School District of the City of Erie (School District) provides certain of its students with driver education or training at no cost to the students.
Although the procedure followed by the appellant here and the premise of his claim are unclear and not above challenge, it does appear that appellant seeks a court order that exempts him from the payment of 1) school taxes now due and 2) any future school taxes, for as long as the School District continues competing with his driving school.
The Erie County Tax Claim Bureau and the School District filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, without discussion, concluded that appellant’s claim was “totally without merit” and sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed appellant’s appeal. This appeal followed.
If appellant, in the court below, was endeavoring to appeal from his real estate assessment as his “notice of appeal” suggests, then we deem his appeal to be premature, and the lower court was correct in dismissing it since appellant had not followed the required statutory route of appealing disputed assessments to the Board of Assessment Appeals, in accord with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act of June 26, 1931, P.L. 1379, as amended, 72 P.S. §5349.
Order affirmed.
Order,
And Now, this 17th day of December, 1981, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, dated December 4, 1980, dismissing the appeal of Emanuel N. Hreha from assessment of school taxes relative to real estate situate at 348 East 27th Street, Erie, Pennsylvania, is hereby affirmed.
Uncertainty as to appellant’s procedural posture raises the possibility, that he seeks only an exemption from the payment of