DocketNumber: Appeal, No. 1929 C.D. 1986
Citation Numbers: 107 Pa. Commw. 419, 528 A.2d 1042, 1987 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 2304
Judges: Colins, MacPiiail, Narick
Filed Date: 7/16/1987
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
Opinion by
Statesman Insurance Company appeals an order of the Insurance Commissioner directing reinstatement of a homeowners’ insurance policy issued to Raymond and Elaine Johnson.
The Johnsons own a one-story ranch-type house without a basement, the floors of which are concrete slab. There is a hot water heating system utilizing copper pipes beneath or within the concrete floor. Al
Following the 1983 claim, the Johnsons, pursuant to Statesman’s instructions, began to compile and present Statesman with estimates, bids and recommendations concerning the system prepared by engineers and contractors. In September 1984, the Johnsons’ engineer suggested that they should pursue alternate methods to solve the heating system’s problems, and it was later recommended that the concrete-encased pipe system should be abandoned or completely reinstalled, the estimated cost being $40,000, exclusive of dislocation, storage and related expenses. Pursuant to further instructions by Statesmans claims supervisor, the Johnsons obtained another contractor’s estimate in the amount of $16,000 for removal of the concrete floor and repair of the leaks in six rooms of the house. As late as April 30, 1985, the Johnsons were still receiving es
In May, 1985, Statesman hired a claims adjuster, who informed the Johnsons that they no longer had an insurable, fortuitous loss, and who requested them to submit cost estimates for repair and replacement of interior walls and floors and related temporary dislocation expenses. Such estimates were sought in order to assist him in the claims adjustment process. The Johnsons were confused as to whether the requested estimates were for cost of repairs or replacement of the heating system, but the adjuster failed to respond to their requests for clarification. In June 1985, Mrs. Johnson asked Statesmans claims vice-president for specifics as to what type of estimates she was to obtain. He then informed her that he could not authorize repair of more existing leaks, explaining to her that they would only break out again.
In July 1985, Statesman sent the Johnsons a Notice of Non-renewal, which set forth as the reason for termination an “[i]ncrease in hazard due to failure to repair or replace heating system in home.”
Section 5(a)(9) of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act prohibits the cancellation of residential property insurance “unless there has been a substantial change or increase in . . . the risk assumed . . . subsequent to the date the policy was issued; or there is a substantial increase in hazards insured against by reason of willful or negligent acts or omissions by the insured.” (Emphasis added.) 40 P.S. §1171.5(a)(9).
The Insurance Commissioner determined that Statesmans non-renewal notice indicated that the basis of its decision not to renew the policy was its belief that the Johnsons’ acts or omissions resulted in an increase in hazards covered by the policy. Such a reason is, of course, a legitimate basis for cancellation or non-renewal
Statesman contends that its Notice of Non-renewal was adequate for purposes of the Act, arguing that the notice subsumed both statutory criteria for termination, i.e., increased risk and an increase in hazards attributable to conduct of the insureds.
The Act clearly delineates two separate bases for non-renewal set forth in distinct clauses within the statute. The Commissioner determined that, although Statesman could have used either or both of the reasons permitted by the statute, it chose to supply only the second, more specific of the two reasons as the stated basis for its decision not to renew the Johnsons’ policy. It could have used both. Inasmuch as such provisions are to be strictly construed in favor of the insured, and against the party providing the notice, the Commissioner correctly held Statesman to the reason it gave as the basis for non-renewal. There is no impediment, of course, to Statesman issuing another notice relying upon the increase in risk. Moreover, if the Johnsons still failed to take remedial action within a reasonable time after being apprised of their duty to do so, they could
Statesman also contends that substantial evidence was not adduced to support the conclusion that the Johnsons’ duty to repair or replace the system first arose only in June 1985. It argues that Mrs. Johnson testified that she and her husband became aware of the necessity of replacing the heating system between May 1984 and January 1985. Although the Johnsons may have received notice of the deteriorating condition of their system by January 1985, they were not placed under a duty to replace the system prior to June, 1985, when Statesman informed them that it would not honor their 1983 claim and would not honor future claims because the system should be replaced. Our review of the record reveals that there is substantial evidence in the record to support this finding, and we therefore reject Statesman’s argument in this respect.
Statesman also argues that substantial evidence was not produced to support two findings supporting that conclusion. One such finding provides that Statesman’s claims adjuster told the Johnsons in May 1985 that they no longer had an insured, fortuitous loss. Statesman maintains that testimony of its claims adjuster indicates that he did not specifically tell the Johnsons that their claim was no longer insurable as not fortuitous. Statesman concedes that the Commissioner accepted as credible the contrary testimony of Mrs. Johnson, but it maintains that the Commissioner erred in giving such testimony the weight he did in using it as the basis of the finding in question.
We believe, however, that the finding is based upon substantial evidence inasmuch as the Commissioner’s acceptance and weighting of such testimony is a matter within his exclusive province as the finder of fact and is not a matter subject to review by this Court.
We will, therefore, affirm the order of the Insurance Commissioner.
Order
And Now, this 16th day of July, 1987, the order of the Insurance Commissioner in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.