Bensalem Twp. v. S. Karley

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bensalem Township, John M. :
Chaykowski, Administrator William :
Cmorey, Trustee :
:
v. : No. 1053 C.D. 2021
: Argued: November 15, 2022
Samuel Karley, :
Appellant :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: January 3, 2023
Samuel Karley (Karley) has appealed the May 27, 2021, order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) that denied his post-trial
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment NOV) or for a new trial.1
The underlying matter was a breach of contract action brought by Bensalem
Township, John M. Chaykowski, and Administrator William Cmorey, Trustee
(collectively, Township), against Karley. The trial court held that Karley breached
his contractual obligation to remit his workers’ compensation payments to the
Township’s pension plan, as required in Karley’s severance agreement with the
Township. Karley asserts that the trial court erred, inter alia, because the severance
1
Because our analysis of the underlying issues leads to the same ultimate conclusion, we address
Karley’s post-trial motion, herein, simply as a “post-trial motion” or a “motion for judgment
NOV,” rather than as a “motion for judgment NOV or for a new trial.” In this regard, “when
analyzing a decision by a trial court to grant or deny a new trial, the proper standard of review,
ultimately, is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756
A.2d 1116, 1122 (Pa. 2000).
agreement violated the statute governing municipal pensions. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the trial court’s order.
On January 3, 2006, Karley began full-time employment as a Township
police officer. The terms of his employment were governed by the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Township and the Police Benevolent
Association (Union). The CBA provided, inter alia, for a disability pension.
On September 17, 2010, while on duty, Karley sustained a back and
neck injury, resulting in cervical radiculopathy. Despite his injury, he was able to
return to work. However, approximately four years later, in November 2014, Karley
exacerbated his 2010 injury while trying to restrain a suspect. As a result, he became
permanently unable to perform his duties.
On August 13, 2015, Karley entered into a severance and general
release agreement (severance agreement) with the Township. The severance
agreement provided that Karley would receive a disability pension at the rate of 50%
of his final average compensation, or $4,897.15 per month, effective October 16,
2015. The severance agreement also provided as follows:
The amount of Karley’s monthly disability pension may be
reduced by any amount of workers’ compensation benefit
received by Karley or which may in the future be received by
him. Karley has an affirmative duty to continue his workers’
compensation claim, cooperate in the requirements of that claim,
and inform the Township of the status of the claim and any
changes. If workers’ compensation benefits end or are changed
in amount or otherwise, and Karley has complied in good faith
with his obligations, the offset to Karley’s disability pension will
be eliminated or adjusted accordingly.
Reproduced Record at 251a (R.R. __) (emphasis added).
Thereafter, on November 1, 2017, the workers’ compensation judge
(WCJ) issued a decision, based on the stipulation of the parties, that Karley was
2
entitled to total disability compensation in the amount of $845 per week based on
his average weekly wage of $2,318.39, as of the date of his injury. The disability
compensation was awarded as of July 18, 2015. However, the weekly disability
compensation amount of $845 was adjusted to account for Karley’s disability
pension. As explained by the Township’s solicitor:
The Plan Actuary has calculated that 37.1% of [Karley’s]
monthly pension represents employer contribution to the plan.
Under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act,[2] employer/insurer
gets an offset in an amount equal to 37.1% of the pension. In this
case, that comes out to $419.27/wk, reducing Karley’s weekly
WC payment to [$]425.73 (his TTD rate is $845/wk). WC is
paying Karley $425.73 per week.
R.R. 322a (emphasis in original). Under the severance agreement, Karley was
required to remit the $425.73 weekly compensation benefit to the Plan.
By letter of September 23, 2016, the Township’s pension administrator
advised Karley that he had improperly retained these workers’ compensation
payments instead of remitting them to the Township, as required by the severance
agreement. The pension administrator instructed Karley that he “must immediately
deliver [] a certified bank check, payable to the ‘Bensalem Township Police Pension
Fund,’ in the amount of $26,292.59, by no later than Friday, September 30, 2016”
and that if he did not, the Township would start “reducing [his] monthly pension
benefit” to account for the workers’ compensation payments owed to the Township.
R.R. 256a.
On October 19, 2016, the Township initiated a civil action against
Karley asserting claims of conversion, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
unjust enrichment arising from his refusal to remit his workers’ compensation
2
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4, 2501-2510.
3
payments to the Township. In response, Karley asserted counterclaims of
conversion, unjust enrichment, mandamus, declaratory judgment, and a violation of
the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law,3 as a result of the Township’s
demand for his workers’ compensation payments. See Trial Court Opinion,
5/27/2021, at 2. The matter proceeded to trial on August 10 and August 11, 2020,
and at its conclusion, the parties requested a declaratory judgment on the legality of
the Plan’s offset for workers’ compensation. On December 23, 2020, the trial court
entered a judgment in favor of the Township on breach of contract and conversion.
However, because the Township had already recovered what was owed under the
severance agreement by adjusting Karley’s disability pension payments, the trial
court did not order an award of damages.
Karley filed a motion for judgment NOV, which the trial court denied.
The trial court observed that Karley’s post-trial motion was untimely filed because
it was not transmitted to the prothonotary within 10 days of the decision as required
by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Nevertheless, the trial court
addressed the merits of Karley’s motion for judgment NOV as follows:
3
Act of July 14, 1961, P.L. 637, as amended, 43 P.S. §§260.1-260.45.
4
The rules provide, in pertinent part:
(c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after
(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to agree, or
nonsuit in the case of a jury trial; or
(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case of a trial
without jury.
PA.R.CIV.P. 227.1(c). The trial court stated “the [m]otion was never filed with the [trial c]ourt.
Rather, [Karley] emailed, and sent by mail, the [m]otion on January 4, 2021. On January 5, 2021,
[Karley] filed the [c]ertificate of [s]ervice to which the [m]otion was attached, but the actual
[m]otion itself was never filed as a separate entry on the [d]ocket.” Trial Court Opinion,
5/27/2021, at 2-3.
4
[Karley] has set forth thirty-one separate alleged errors,
which individually nit-pick the [d]ecision, but which ignore
overriding legal principles which control this fact situation and
this dispute. [Karley] was a police officer, who received the
benefits of a contract negotiated by the [Union] in accordance
with the specific law which controls collective bargaining
agreements. [Karley] also entered into a Severance Agreement
and a General Release, as well as a Pension Letter Agreement
with the Township and the [Union]. Notwithstanding the clear
unambiguous language of the various documents and the CBA,
[Karley’s] legal position is that one provision of these
agreements is unfair, unlawful, [and] unacceptable. [Karley]
would like the [trial court] to enforce all other aspects of the
documents but carve out the section which relates to the
Township’s right to reduce pension benefits through an offset for
workers’ compensation benefits received by [Karley] for a work-
related injury . . . . [Karley] signed various contracts, accepted
the benefits of the various contracts and agreements, but refused
to account for workers’ compensation payments that were paid
to him. As a result, the Township unilaterally deducted payments
from monthly pension payments to reimburse the pension fund.
...
Where parties enter into a valid contract, they are required
to comply with its terms. If a contract [was] illegal, it is arguably
void or voidable. Parties can either rescind a contract, or affirm
a contract and recover damages, but they cannot do both.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/2021, at 7-8 (emphasis added). Denying Karley’s motion
for judgment NOV, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Township and
against Karley. It is from this order that Karley has appealed to this Court.
5
On appeal,5 Karley raises three main issues with respect to the trial
court’s denial of his motion for judgment NOV.6 First, he asserts that the trial court
erred by denying his counterclaim for declaratory judgment in which he challenged
the legality of the workers’ compensation offset provisions in the Township’s police
pension ordinance and in the severance agreement. Second, he asserts that the trial
court erred and abused its discretion by finding in favor of the Township on its
breach of contract claim. Third, he asserts that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in holding that there had been “an event of conversion.” Karley Brief at
45.
We begin with a review of the applicable statutes and principles of law.
The Municipal Police Pension Law, Act of May 29, 1956, P.L. (1955)
1804, No. 600, as amended, 53 P.S. §§767-778, commonly known as Act 600,
5
“The proper standard of review for an appellate court when examining the lower court’s refusal
to grant a judgment n.o.v. is whether, when reading the record in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner and granting that party every favorable inference therefrom, there was sufficient
competent evidence to sustain the verdict.” Adamski v. Miller, 681 A.2d 171, 173 (Pa. 1996). A
trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment NOV will be set aside where there has been an error
of law or an abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation of Right-of-Way for State Route
00700, Section 21H, in the Borough of Bentleyville, 264 A.3d 415, 423 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action determines whether the trial
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Yost v. McKnight, 865 A.2d 979, 982 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2005).
6
A motion for judgment NOV requests the court to direct a verdict in favor of the losing party
despite a jury verdict to the contrary. Department of Transportation of Right-of-Way, 264 A.3d at
422-23. There are two bases upon which judgment NOV can be entered:
The first is where a movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because, upon
reviewing the record and deciding all factual inferences adverse to the movant, the
law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor. The second is where the evidence
was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have
been rendered in favor of the movant.
Menkowitz v. Peerless Publications, Inc., 211 A.3d 797, 804 (Pa. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
6
governs police officer pensions. It authorizes the establishment of police officer
pensions by boroughs, towns, townships and regional police departments, and it
provides for their regulation and maintenance. In 2002, the legislature amended Act
600 to authorize a disability pension for police officers who sustain service-related
injuries.7 The amendment, known as Act 30, states as follows:
In the case of the payment of pensions for permanent injuries
incurred in service, the amount and commencement of the
payments shall be fixed by regulations of the governing body of
the borough, town, township or regional police department and
shall be calculated at a rate no less than fifty per centum of the
member’s salary at the time the disability was incurred, provided
that any member who receives benefits for the same injuries
under the Social Security Act (49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. § 301 [. .
.]) shall have his disability benefits offset or reduced by the
amount of such benefits.
Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600, 53 P.S. §771(e)(1) (emphasis added). Prior to Act 30,
municipalities were not required to pay police officers a disability pension. Section
5(e)(1) mandates an offset from the disability pension for Social Security benefits,
but it is silent in regard to an offset for workers’ compensation benefits.
Offsets are also addressed in Section 204(a) of the Workers’
Compensation Act, which states:
(a) No agreement, composition, or release of damages made
before the date of any injury shall be valid or shall bar a claim
for damages resulting therefrom; and any such agreement is
declared to be against the public policy of this Commonwealth.
The receipt of benefits from any association, society, or fund
shall not bar the recovery of damages by action at law, nor the
recovery of compensation under article three hereof; and any
release executed in consideration of such benefits shall be void:
Provided, however, That if the employe receives unemployment
7
Act of April 17, 2002, P.L. 239, No. 30.
7
compensation benefits, such amount or amounts so received shall
be credited as against the amount of the award made under the
provisions of sections 108 and 306, except for benefits payable
under section 306(c) or 307. Fifty per centum of the benefits
commonly characterized as “old age” benefits under the Social
Security Act (49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. § 301 [. . .]) shall also be
credited against the amount of the payments made under sections
108 and 306, except for benefits payable under section 306(c):
Provided, however, That the Social Security offset shall not
apply if old age Social Security benefits were received prior to
the compensable injury. The severance benefits paid by the
employer directly liable for the payment of compensation and the
benefits from a pension plan to the extent funded by the employer
directly liable for the payment of compensation which are
received by an employe shall also be credited against the amount
of the award made under sections 108 and 306, except for
benefits payable under section 306(c). The employe shall provide
the insurer with proper authorization to secure the amount which
the employe is receiving under the Social Security Act.
77 P.S. §71(a). In sum, the employer’s payment of severance and a pension will
reduce the amount of compensation benefits the employer must otherwise pay to a
claimant for his work injury.
Section 450 of the Workers’ Compensation Act8 states, in relevant part,
as follows:
(a) Any employer and the recognized or certified and exclusive
representative of its employe may agree by collective bargaining
to establish certain binding obligations and procedures relating
to workers’ compensation: Provided, however, That the scope of
the agreement shall be limited to:
(1) benefits supplemental to those provided in sections 306
and 307;
8
Added by Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57.
8
(2) an alternative dispute resolution system which may
include, but is not limited to, arbitration, mediation and
conciliation;
(3) the use of a limited list of providers for medical
treatment for any period of time agreed upon by the
parties;
(4) the use of a limited list of impartial physicians;
(5) the creation of a light duty, modified job or return to
work program;
(6) the adoption of twenty-four-hour medical coverage; []
(7) the establishment of safety committees; and
(8) a vocational rehabilitation or retraining program.
(b) Nothing contained in this section shall in any manner affect
the rights of an employer or its employes in the event that the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement refuse or fail to reach
agreement concerning the matters referred to in clause (a). In the
event a municipality and its police or fire employes fail to agree
by collective bargaining concerning matters referred to in clause
(a), nothing in this section shall be binding upon the municipality
or its police or fire employes as a result of an arbitration ruling
or award.
(c) Nothing in this section shall allow any agreement that
diminishes an employe’s entitlement to benefits as otherwise set
forth in this section. Any agreement in violation of this provision
shall be null and void.
77 P.S. §1000.6(a)-(c) (emphasis added). Section 450 authorizes collective
bargaining about “obligations and procedures” related to workers’ compensation
benefits, but the parties cannot agree to diminish an employee’s entitlement to
workers’ compensation benefits. Id. Stated otherwise, a union and public employer
cannot, for example, agree to reduce the workers’ compensation benefits required
by law in exchange for an increase in salary. 77 P.S. §1000.6(c).
With this background, we turn to Karley’s issues on appeal.
9
In his first issue, Karley argues that the offset provision for workers’
compensation benefits in the Township’s pension ordinance and in the severance
agreement violates Act 600, which guaranteed him a disability pension at 50% of
his time-of-injury salary. The offset imposed by the Township reduced his disability
pension below the minimum required in Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600, 53 P.S.
§771(e)(1). He also argues that the offset provision violates Section 450(c) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §1000.6(c), which prohibits collective
bargaining that purports to diminish a claimant’s entitlement to workers’
compensation.
As noted above, Act 600 provides that “any member who receives
benefits for the same injuries under the Social Security Act . . . shall have his
disability benefits offset or reduced by the amount of such benefits.” Section 5(e)(1)
of Act 600, 53 P.S. § 771(e)(1). However, there is no similar provision pertaining
to workers’ compensation benefits awarded “for the same injuries” received by a
member. Id. Karley argues that absent express authorization in Act 600, the offset
for workers’ compensation in the Township’s pension plan is unlawful because it
deprives him of the mandatory minimum pension in the amount of 50% of his time-
of-injury salary. The Township responds that Section 5(e)(1) mandates an offset for
social security, but it leaves other offsets to the discretion of the municipality.9
The pension offset is provided both in the Township’s pension
ordinance and the CBA. The ordinance states that “[t]he [p]lan shall receive an
offset for workers’ compensation payment or social security disability benefits paid
or payable to the [p]olice [e]mployee.” ORDINANCE NO. 2004-07, 4.06(A)(3); R.R.
9
This would certainly be the case where a municipality chooses to establish a pension above the
statutory minimum of 50% of the officer’s time-of-injury salary.
10
230a. The CBA that governed Karley’s employment states, in pertinent part, as
follows: “Included in computing the monthly pension benefit payable by reason of
a “service-related” disability are any monthly benefits paid or payable to the [p]olice
[e]mployee under the [] Workers’ Compensation Act . . . .” Article 21G.4. of the
CBA at 34-35; Supplemental Reproduced Record at 348a-49a. (S.R.R. __).10
Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600 establishes two mandates: (i) a disability
payment “no less than fifty per centum of the member’s salary at the time the
disability was incurred” and (ii) a reduction in the disability payment by the amount
of benefits received “for the same injuries under the Social Security Act.” 53 P.S.
§771(e)(1). Karley argues that the offset for workers’ compensation caused his
disability pension to fall below the 50% minimum. On that basis, he asked the trial
court to declare the ordinance and severance agreement unlawful.
The trial court declined to rule on Karley’s cross-claim for declaratory
judgment that the ordinance and the severance agreement violated the minimum
pension required by Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600. The trial court concluded it could
not address the request for declaratory relief because the Union, which had
negotiated the offset for workers’ compensation in the CBA, was a necessary party
to any declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over Karley’s cross-claim for declaratory judgment.
Karley’s claim that the pension offset violated the Workers’
Compensation Act was pursued in a penalty petition that was denied by a workers’
compensation judge (WCJ). In his decision of November 1, 2017, the WCJ held:
10
PA.R.A.P. 2173 provides that the pages of the supplemental reproduced record shall be
numbered in Arabic figures followed by a small b, e.g., 1b, 2b, etc. Here, the Township did not
follow this numbering scheme; we use the numbering as it appears in the supplemental record.
11
The issue of whether or not [Karley] is obligated to endorse his
workers’ compensation checks over to the pension plan involves
a dispute with the Pension Administrator, not the Workers’
Compensation Administrator. This WCJ has no jurisdiction over
the Pension Administrator, who is not a party to this litigation.
This WCJ notes that this issue is currently the subject of civil
litigation in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.
WCJ’s Decision, 11/1/2017, at 7, Finding of Fact 17; R.R. 283a. Karley did not
appeal this decision.
Nevertheless, Karley contends the pension administrator’s demand
violates Section 450(c) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which states that
“[n]othing in this section shall allow any agreement that diminishes an employe’s
entitlement to benefits . . . .” 77 P.S. §1000.6(c). We reject Karley’s contention.
His workers’ compensation benefits were calculated strictly in accordance with
Section 204(a) of the Act, using Karley’s average weekly wage on the date of his
injury and reducing it by 37.1% of his retirement disability. There was no
“diminishment” that was not authorized by the Workers’ Compensation Act,11 and
11
The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board has determined, in the matter of Mark Kelly v.
Bensalem Township, Appeal No. A17-0501 (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, July 10,
2018), that the Township’s offset did not violate the Workers’ Compensation Act. In this regard,
the Board stated:
[I]t is properly within the WCJ’s jurisdiction to ensure the claimant is receiving the
correct compensation benefit checks in accordance with the [Workers’
Compensation Act] . . . . However, WCJs cannot have any control over what the
claimant may do with these compensation benefits after they are properly issued
and received by the claimant. The WCJ cannot be expected to control the behavior
of [the] claimant or outside parties once compensation has been received, and
cannot be expected to direct or limit the claimant’s right to contract with outside
parties in regard to these duly-issued checks.
Mark Kelly v. Bensalem Township, Appeal No. A17-0501 (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board,
July 10, 2018), Board Opinion at 7-8; S.R.R. 370a-71a. Stated otherwise, the WCJ’s job is limited
to the proper calculation of workers’ compensation benefits but not how the claimant directs those
benefits to be spent.
12
the matter of what happens to a workers’ compensation payment is beyond the
purview of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as explained by the WCJ in his decision
of November 1, 2017.
The offset at issue here was expressly authorized by the pension plan
ordinance. It was agreed to by the Union in the CBA and by Karley, personally, in
the severance agreement. The trial court held that the CBA’s provision on the
pension offset for workers’ compensation was binding on Karley. Even if the offset
did not conform to Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600, the trial court explained that “parties
may not avoid limitations in a CBA, claiming that it conflicted with the law, after
they voluntarily negotiated and agreed to the contracted provisions.” Norcini v. City
of Coatesville, 915 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We discern no error by
the trial court in deciding the matter strictly on the basis of the terms of the severance
contract and not deciding Karley’s cross-claim for a declaratory judgment.
In his second issue, Karley contends that the trial court erred and abused
its discretion by holding him in breach of contract. Karley argues that the Township
“expressly waived its breach of contract and conversion claims,” stating that the
Township told the trial court that it had been “paid off” and was no longer “pursuing
those counts.” Karley Brief at 39. He contends that the trial court was obligated,
instead, to rule on the request for declaratory relief. As explained, the trial court did
not do so for the stated reason that the Union was an indispensable party to any
litigation on whether the pension offset in the ordinance and the CBA violated
Section 5(e)(1) of Act 600. The trial court confined its ruling to Karley’s alleged
violation of the severance agreement.
“The elements of breach of contract are (1) the existence of a contract,
(2) a breach of the duty imposed by the contract and (3) damages resulting from the
13
breach.” Sewer Authority of City of Scranton v. Pennsylvania Infrastructure
Investment Authority, 81 A.3d 1031, 1041-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Here, his
severance agreement provided that Karley’s service-connected disability pension
would be offset by any workers’ compensation benefits awarded to him. Karley
refused to remit his lump sum payment of $26,292.59, in workers’ compensation
benefits, as specified in the severance agreement. Although the Township was able
to recoup those monies by reducing Karley’s disability pension payments, it was
required to file suit because Karley refused to adhere to the terms of the severance
agreement.
The trial court held that “[a]t the time the cause of action was pleaded,
there were resultant damages; therefore, the cause of action was correctly pleaded
and established.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/2021, at 13. We discern no error in the
trial court’s conclusion that Karley breached the severance agreement with the
Township.
In his third issue, Karley argues that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion in finding “an event of conversion” had occurred. Karley Brief at 45.
Karley argues that the Township waived its conversion claim just as it waived its
breach of contract claim, by asking the court for a declaratory judgment.
Conversion is “an act of willful interference with a chattel, done
without lawful justification, by which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use
and possession.” Norriton East Realty Corporation v. Central-Penn National Bank,
254 A.2d 637, 638 (Pa. 1969). As the trial court stated:
[T]he language of the documents is clear and unambiguous.
There has been no credible challenge, and in fact, it appears that
[Karley] admits that the restitution taken by [the Township] as
deductions made from pension payments [was] consistent with
the language of the documents. In fact, during opening
14
statements, [Karley’s] Counsel admitted the “language of the
pension ordinance and the [CBA] says [the Township] can
reduce or deduct.” Therefore, the [trial court] did not err in
finding there was a conversion when [Karley] took the workers’
compensation benefits without accounting for same.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/2021, at 11 (internal citations omitted).
There is no merit to Karley’s claim that the “event” of conversion did
not take place. Although the Township recovered the converted monies, the “event”
of conversion still took place.
Finally, we turn to Karley’s subsidiary issues that relate to his three
main issues. The trial court stated: “[Karley] has set forth [31] separate alleged
errors, which individually nit-pick the [d]ecision, but which ignore overriding legal
principles which control this fact situation and this dispute.” Trial Court Opinion,
5/27/2021, at 7. Much the same may be said here.
The sub-issues raised by Karley need no direct response because they
do not control the disposition of this appeal. In its May 27, 2021, opinion and order,
the trial court summarized the overriding principles in the case as follows:
[Karley] was a police officer, who received the benefits of
a contract negotiated by the [Union] in accordance with the
specific law which controls collective bargaining agreements.
[Karley] also entered into a Severance Agreement and a General
Release, as well as a Pension Letter Agreement with the
Township and the [Union]. Notwithstanding the clear
unambiguous language of the various documents and the CBA,
[Karley’s] legal position is that one provision of these
agreements is unfair, unlawful, [and] unacceptable. [Karley]
would like the Court to enforce all other aspects of the document
but carve out the section which relates to the Township’s right to
reduce pension benefits through an offset for workers’
compensation benefits received by [Karley] for a work-related
injury . . . .
15
Where parties enter into a valid contract, they are required
to comply with its terms. If a contract [was] illegal, it is arguably
void or voidable. Parties can either rescind a contract, or affirm
a contract and recover damages, but they cannot do both.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/27/2021, at 7-8. We agree.
Karley agreed to the terms of the severance agreement, and he breached
that contract by retaining his workers’ compensation benefits. It is that simple.
Karley’s additional arguments are non-dispositive surplusage and need not be further
addressed.
For all the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court.
____________________________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita
16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bensalem Township, John M. :
Chaykowski, Administrator William :
Cmorey, Trustee :
:
v. : No. 1053 C.D. 2021
:
Samuel Karley, :
Appellant :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2023, the May 27, 2021, order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, in the above-captioned matter, is
AFFIRMED.
____________________________________________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita