B. Puricelli v. Com. of PA DOT (Office of Chief Counsel)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Brian Puricelli, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 42 M.D. 2022
: Submitted: July 22, 2022
Commonwealth of :
Pennsylvania Department :
of Transportation (Office of :
Chief Counsel), :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: January 4, 2023
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (PennDOT),
has filed a preliminary objection (PO) in the nature of a demurrer to Brian
Puricelli’s (Puricelli) petition for review in the form of a complaint for mandamus
relief (Petition).1 In his Petition, Puricelli requests this Court order PennDOT to
provide requested records related to a civil action pending in the Court of Common
Pleas of Bucks County (Bucks County Court). After review, we sustain
PennDOT’s PO and dismiss the original jurisdiction portion of Puricelli’s Petition.
1
Puricelli has filed a dual jurisdiction Petition, seeking both appellate review of PennDOT’s
adjudication regarding his request for records and mandamus relief in our original jurisdiction.
Puricelli was the plaintiff in a civil action against Winston Williams (Driver)
in Bucks County Court, where he alleged personal injury/property damage caused
by Driver during a motor vehicle collision. Petition ¶¶ 6-7. While this case was
pending, Bucks County Court entered judgment in favor of Puricelli and against
Driver. See Trial Ct. Judgment Arbitration 5/10/2022. In response, this Court
issued a Rule to Show Cause why Puricelli’s Petition was not rendered moot by the
Bucks County Court judgment entered in his favor, to which Puricelli responded
asserting that the matter was not moot as it was capable of repetition yet evading
review. See Puricelli’s Cause, Pursuant to the August 19, 2022 Per Curiam Show
Cause Order. Satisfied that Puricelli has shown cause why this case should not be
dismissed as moot, we turn to the merits.
The relevant facts, as averred by Puricelli, are as follows. At the time of the
collision between Puricelli and Driver, Driver had a valid Pennsylvania driver’s
license. Petition ¶ 7. At some point after obtaining his driver’s license, Driver
became blind in one eye following a “stabbing incident.” Petition ¶ 7. Driver
admitted to a history of collisions with other vehicles but claimed not to have
records of those prior collisions. Petition ¶ 9. Additionally, Driver claimed not to
know his vision acuity or whether he informed PennDOT of his vision acuity
change after he lost vision in one eye. Petition ¶ 9.
Based on these assertions by Driver, Puricelli filed a motion with the Bucks
County Court requesting leave to obtain PennDOT records of Driver. Petition ¶
10. Driver consented to Puricelli’s request. Petition ¶ 10. Bucks County Court
entered an order indicating that Puricelli “may produce a copy of this Order to
[PennDOT] to confirm that [Driver] has consented, and this Court orders, the
2
release of [Driver’s] complete driving history to [Puricelli].” Petition, Exhibit
(Ex.) A.
Subsequently, Puricelli submitted a PennDOT “Request for Driver
Information Form” (record request form), payment, a cover letter, and the Bucks
County Court order to PennDOT. The record request form instructs the requester
to check only one box and offers seven options for requesting PennDOT records
including: (1) basic information; (2) 3-year driver record; (3) 10-year driver record;
(4) full history; (5) certified driver record; (6) copy of document from file
(microfilm); and (7) certified copy of document from file. Petition, Ex. C. On
Puricelli’s record request form, he checked the box requesting a “certified copy of
document from file.” Id. In his cover letter, Puricelli specified that he was
requesting the following:
[A]side from [Driver’s] driving history for accidents and traffic
violations, and the dispositions, requested from PennDOT is the
following: all eye exams of [Driver] . . . [a]ll notice to PennDOT by or
for [Driver] of his blindness, vis[i]on change, and vision acuity. All
records for licensing, restrictions, and renewal of [Driver’s] license, if
a restriction was removed, then the records for the reason and date
when the restriction was removed. Further, all records concerning or
related to any and all administrative action against [Driver] and too
the disposition of such. All [PennDOT] records about [Driver][,] and
too those that are related to a physician record created by PennDOT or
sent to PennDOT for PennDOT to license [Driver] as a licensed driver
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Also, all applications from or
for [Driver] to become licensed, suspensions, reinstatement and
renewed records of his driver’s license. In short, all records that
PennDOT hold[s] and are about [Driver].
Petition, Ex. B.
In response, PennDOT sent Puricelli a letter (PennDOT letter) indicating
that it was in receipt of the request for “certain medical information pertaining to
3
[Driver]” and, relying on 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1518(c)-(d)2 and 1519(b)-(c)3 of the
Vehicle Code, that it was “prohibited by statute from releasing any such records it
2
Section 1518(c)-(d) states the following:
(c) Responsibility of institution heads.--The person in charge of every mental
hospital, institution or clinic, or any alcohol or drug treatment facility, shall be
responsible to assure that reports are filed in accordance with subsection (b).
(d) Confidentiality of reports.--The reports required by this section shall be
confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of any person to drive a motor vehicle on the highways of this
Commonwealth.
75 Pa. C.S. § 1518(c)-(d).
3
Section 1519(b)-(c) states the following:
(b) Confidentiality of reports and evidence.--Reports received by the department
for the purpose of assisting the department in determining whether a person is
qualified to be licensed and reports of examinations authorized under this
subchapter are for the confidential use of the department and may not be divulged
to any person or used as evidence in any trial except that the reports and statistics
and evaluations used by the department in determining whether a person should
be required to be examined under this subchapter shall be admitted in proceedings
under section 1550 (relating to judicial review).
(c) Recall or suspension of operating privilege.--The department shall recall the
operating privilege of any person whose incompetency has been established under
the provisions of this chapter. The recall shall be for an indefinite period until
satisfactory evidence is presented to the department in accordance with
regulations to establish that such person is competent to drive a motor vehicle.
The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any person who refuses
or fails to comply with the requirements of this section until that person does
comply and that person's competency to drive is established. Any person
aggrieved by recall or suspension of the operating privilege may appeal in the
manner provided in section 1550. The judicial review shall be limited to whether
the person is competent to drive in accordance with the provisions of the
regulations promulgated under section 1517 (relating to Medical Advisory
Board).
(Footnote continued on next page…)
4
may hold to anyone for any purpose and may use such records only to determine
whether the subject of the records is qualified to operate motor vehicles.” Petition,
Ex. D. PennDOT indicated that due to the “limits placed on [PennDOT] and, more
specifically, the prohibition against disclosing the records you seek . . . [PennDOT]
is not able to provide the medical forms or reports that you seek.” Id.
Subsequently, Puricelli filed his Petition with this Court. In his Petition,
Puricelli asserts that the PennDot letter is an adjudication. Petition ¶ 14. Puricelli
requests this Court “review [PennDOT’s] adjudication and reverse. Further by
Mandamus order [PennDOT] to obey the [Bucks County Court] Order, and send
the certified records to the petitioner, including for vision acuity.” Petition at 12.
PennDOT filed its PO in the nature of a demurrer asserting that Puricelli’s Petition
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Our review of a preliminary objection is limited to the contents of the
pleadings. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep’t of Conservation &
Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). We accept as true all well-pled
allegations of material fact, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible from
those facts. Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 185 A.3d 421, 423 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)
(citation omitted). We do not accept as true any conclusions of law, unwarranted
inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. Torres
v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). For a preliminary objection to
be sustained, it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery,
and we resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Id. A preliminary
(continued…)
75 Pa. C.S. § 1519(b)-(c).
5
objection in the nature of a demurrer specifically challenges the legal sufficiency
of a pleading. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4). A demurrer can only be sustained in
cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a government agency
to act where a petitioner can show (1) a clear right to relief, (2) a corresponding
duty on the respondent to act, and (3) a lack of any alternative legal remedy.
Humphrey v. Dep’t of Corr., 939 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citing
McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa. 2005)). The purpose of
mandamus is not to establish legal rights, but to enforce rights which are already
established. Jamieson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 495 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1985). Mandamus cannot be used to direct the exercise of discretion of
an official in a particular way nor will mandamus issue to compel a party to do that
which is illegal, invalid, or in violation of a statute. Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155,
159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Jamieson, 495 A.2d at 625-26.
In considering whether Puricelli has sufficiently pled his mandamus action,
we begin by analyzing whether Puricelli can establish a clear right to relief. To do
so, we must consider the provisions of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-9701,
that are crucial to our discussion of this case. In enacting the Vehicle Code, one of
the overriding goals of the legislature was to promote and facilitate the safety of
our public highways. Crosby by Crosby v. Sultz, 592 A.2d 1337, 1343-45 (Pa.
Super. 1991). In furthering this purpose, the legislature considered that there are
certain medical disorders which by their nature have a discernable impact upon an
individual’s ability to safely drive. See 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1517-1518; 67 Pa. Code §§
83.1-83.3.
6
Section 1517 of the Vehicle Code provides for the creation of a Medical
Advisory Board, which is comprised of a variety of medical, law enforcement, and
government officials and is responsible for developing rules and regulations
pertaining to the physical and mental criteria for the licensing of drivers, which are
then reviewed and adopted by PennDOT. 75 Pa. C.S. § 1517(b) and 67 Pa. Code §
83.1. The requisite medical conditions are outlined in the Pennsylvania Code at 67
Pa. Code § 83.5.
The legislature imposes upon physicians who diagnose and treat such
medical conditions the duty to notify PennDOT of the existence of individuals who
are diagnosed with these specific conditions and who, in the opinion of the
physician, are rendered unable to drive in a safe manner. This requirement is
outlined in Section 1518(b) of the Vehicle Code, which states:
All physicians, podiatrists, chiropractors, physician
assistants, certified registered nurse practitioners and
other persons authorized to diagnose or treat disorders
and disabilities defined by the Medical Advisory Board
shall report to [PennDOT], in writing, the full name, date
of birth and address of every person over 15 years of age
diagnosed as having any specified disorder or disability
within ten days.
75 Pa. C.S. § 1518(b). Thus, the Vehicle Code’s reporting requirements
effectively apply to various medical personnel who are capable of making
diagnostic determinations and treating the specified medical conditions.
Additionally, Section 1519(a) of the Vehicle Code states:
[PennDOT], having cause to believe that a licensed
driver or applicant may not be physically or mentally
qualified to be licensed, may require the applicant or
driver to undergo one or more of the examinations
authorized under this subchapter in order to determine
7
the competency of the person to drive. [PennDOT] may
require the person to be examined by a physician, a
certified registered nurse practitioner, a physician
assistant or a licensed psychologist designated by
[PennDOT] or may require the person to undergo an
examination by a physician, a certified registered nurse
practitioner, a physician assistant or a licensed
psychologist of the person’s choice. If [PennDOT]
designates the physician, a certified registered nurse
practitioner, a physician assistant or licensed
psychologist, the licensed driver or applicant may, in
addition, cause a written report to be forwarded to
[PennDOT] by a physician, a certified registered nurse
practitioner, a physician assistant or a licensed
psychologist of the driver’s or applicant’s choice. Vision
qualifications may be determined by an optometrist or
ophthalmologist. [PennDOT] shall appoint one or more
qualified persons who shall consider all medical reports
and testimony in order to determine the competency of
the driver or the applicant to drive.
75 Pa. C.S. § 1519(a). Thus, Sections 1518 and 1519 of the Vehicle Code
unambiguously govern PennDOT’s acquisition of various medical records it
receives from medical providers related to a driver’s competency and eligibility to
obtain or retain a driver’s license. 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1518-1519.
Turning to the specific issue raised in this case, both Sections 1518 and 1519
provide provisions safeguarding the confidentiality of the reports received by
PennDOT under these sections. Pursuant to Section 1518(d), the reports required
by Section 1518 “shall be confidential and shall be used solely for the purpose of
determining the qualifications of any person to drive a motor vehicle on the
highways of this Commonwealth.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1518(d). Further, Section
1518(e) indicates that no report provided to PennDOT under this section “shall be
used as evidence in any civil or criminal trial” except in a proceeding related to
8
incompetency. Section 1519(b) further specifies that reports received by
PennDOT for the purpose of assisting PennDOT with a competency determination
“are for the confidential use of [PennDOT] and may not be divulged to any person
or used as evidence in any trial[.]” 75 Pa. C.S. §1519(b) (emphasis added).
In interpreting these sections of the Vehicle Code, it is this Court’s duty to
ascertain the intent of the General Assembly and construe every statute, if possible,
in a manner that gives effect to all of its provisions. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921. When a
statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, we must consider the plain meaning of
its words. Id.; Combine v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib.
Corp.), 954 A.2d 776 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Further, we presume the General
Assembly does not intend results that are absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable. Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Snyder, Jr.),
834 A.2d 524 (Pa. 2003).
Here, the intent of the legislature is clear from the language of the Vehicle
Code. In furtherance of the legislature’s goal of promoting safe highways,
PennDOT is tasked with determining whether individuals are competent to drive
and permitted to obtain or retain a driver’s license. In order to accomplish this
task, PennDOT must have access to records pertaining to medical conditions that
could impact an individual’s ability to safely drive. The legislature specifically
indicates in the statute that these records are to be “confidential.” 75 Pa. C.S. §
1518(d). Such records “may not be divulged to any person.” 75 Pa. C.S. §
1519(b). Such records are precluded from being used as evidence in any trial. 75
Pa. C.S. §§ 1518(e) & 1519(b). The General Assembly’s intent, which is evident
from a plain reading of these statutes, is that medical records provided to
PennDOT are solely for the purpose of assisting PennDOT with competency
9
determinations and for use by PennDOT at competency hearings. Otherwise, such
records are required by statute to remain confidential. PennDOT is precluded from
providing such records to any person, including Puricelli, who seeks the records
for litigation purposes.
Puricelli argues that “the statute does not override consent from the person
that is in the zone of protection for the statute.” Puricelli’s Br. at 5. We disagree.
The legislature did not outline any exceptions to the confidentiality provisions in
the statutes or any procedure for obtaining confidential records, even with consent
of the party whose records are being sought. In compliance with the Statutory
Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a), this Court will not supply a
provision omitted from these statutory sections by the legislature. Because there is
no mention in Sections 1518 or 1519 of the Vehicle Code of an exception or
procedure for obtaining otherwise confidential medical records in PennDOT’s
possession, Puricelli is not entitled to PennDOT’s medical records of Driver.
Mandamus will not issue to compel PennDOT to act in violation of these
statutes. Because PennDOT has no ministerial or mandatory duty to provide the
requested records to Puricelli, Puricelli cannot establish a clear right to relief and,
thus, cannot succeed in a claim for mandamus.4
4
While Puricelli’s record request mentions a request for Driver’s “driving record,” it is clear
from his cover letter, the box checked on the record request form, and his Petition that he is
requesting records related to Driver’s competency, specifically his vision acuity. Insofar as he is
requesting medical records or records PennDOT holds pursuant to Sections 1518 and 1519 to
determine Driver’s competency, Puricelli does not establish a clear right to relief. Because
Puricelli did not check the appropriate box on the record request form to properly request
Driver’s driving history, Puricelli can cure this defect by following proper record request
protocols established by PennDOT. Therefore, as it relates to any other records, Puricelli has an
alternative legal remedy and mandamus relief is not appropriate.
10
Accordingly, we sustain PennDOT’s PO and dismiss the original jurisdiction
portion of Puricelli’s Petition requesting mandamus relief.5
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
5
Because Puricelli’s prayer for relief in the appellate portion of his Petition is that this Court
review PennDOT’s “adjudication and reverse[,]” Petition at 12, and because the issues raised in
the original jurisdiction portion and appellate jurisdiction portion of the Petition are duplicative,
for the reasons set forth granting PennDOT’s PO, it is clear substantial evidence supports
PennDOT’s decision, and Puricelli is not entitled to reversal of PennDOT’s decision denying his
record request. Therefore, insofar as PennDOT’s letter is an adjudication, this Court affirms
PennDOT’s decision denying Puricelli’s record request.
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Brian Puricelli, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 42 M.D. 2022
:
Commonwealth of :
Pennsylvania Department :
of Transportation (Office of :
Chief Counsel), :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of January 2023, the preliminary objection
filed by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(PennDOT) is SUSTAINED, and the original jurisdiction portion of Brian
Puricelli’s (Puricelli) petition for review is DISMISSED.
Regarding the appellate portion of Puricelli’s Petition, in his prayer
for relief, Puricelli requests “this Court review [PennDOT’s] adjudication and
reverse.” Petition at 12. To the extent PennDOT’s letter denying Puricelli’s record
request is an adjudication, for the same substantive reasons set forth granting
PennDOT’s preliminary objection, Puricelli is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
Therefore, PennDOT’s decision denying Puricelli’s record request is AFFIRMED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge