Com. of PA v. H. Markowitz

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :
:
v. :
:
Hillel Markowitz, : No. 671 C.D. 2022
Appellant : Submitted: April 3, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 10, 2023
Hillel Markowitz (Appellant) appeals from the February 9, 2022 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) that denied his
Petition to Restore Firearms (Petition) for lack of jurisdiction. Upon review, we
affirm.
I. Background and Procedural Posture
On March 1, 1999, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of driving
under the influence (DUI) pursuant to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code,1 former 75
Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1)2 (DUI Conviction). The DUI Conviction was graded as a
misdemeanor of the first degree by virtue of it being Appellant’s third DUI
1
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3101-3817.
2
Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code was repealed by the Act of September 30, 2003, P.L.
120, No. 24, § 14, effective February 1, 2004, which replaced Section 3731 with Section 3802 of
the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.
conviction. See Appellant’s Criminal History Record, Petition Exhibit A;
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 27a. On May 25, 1999, Appellant was sentenced to 3
to 36 months’ incarceration. See Docket No. CP-35-CR-0001492-1998 (Trial Court
Docket) at 2; R.R. at 2a. Appellant did not appeal the DUI Conviction. See Trial
Court Docket at 5; R.R. at 5a.
Nearly two decades later, Appellant was prohibited from purchasing a
firearm as a result of a check of the Pennsylvania Instant Check System (PICS). See
Pennsylvania State Police PICS Challenge Letter dated April 6, 2017 (PICS
Challenge Letter); R.R. at 36a. Appellant filed a challenge of the PICS denial with
the Pennsylvania State Police (PICS Challenge), which upheld the denial of
Appellant’s attempt to purchase a firearm based on the PICS information, explaining
that “the basis of [the] denial can be found under federal law, [Section 922(g) of the
Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Federal Gun Control Act),] 18 [U.S.C.] § 922(g).”
PICS Challenge Letter; R.R. at 36a. The Pennsylvania State Police further
explained:
[The] 1999 [DUI C]onviction [] is prohibiting. Please be
advised that regardless of any penalty [Appellant] may
have received, this decision is based on the maximum
penalty [Appellant] could have received for [the DUI
Conviction].
Id.
Appellant filed the Petition on July 9, 2021. See Petition; R.R. at 19a-
39a; see also Trial Court Docket at 5; R.R. at 5a. In the Petition, Appellant alleged
that he is entitled to the reinstatement of his firearms rights pursuant to Section
2
6105.1 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (Firearms Act),3 18
Pa.C.S. § 6105.1. See Petition at 1-4; R.R. at 19a-22a. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth), through the Pennsylvania State Police, filed an
Answer to the Petition on July 23, 2021.4 See Answer; R.R. at 40a-45a. The Answer
included New Matter alleging that the DUI Conviction is not a “disabling offense”
under Section 6105.1(e) of the Firearms Act. See Answer at 2-3; R.R. at 41a-42a;
Trial Court Docket at 5; R.R. at 5a. Appellant filed a response to the New Matter
on August 10, 2021. See Petitioner Hillel Markowitz’s Response to the
Pennsylvania State Police’s New Matter; R.R. at 46a-52a; Trial Court Docket at 5;
R.R. at 5a.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the Petition on September 3,
2021. See Transcript of Proceedings, September 3, 2021 (Tr. 9/3/2021); R.R. at 53a-
61a. On February 9, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying the Petition (Trial
Court Order) wherein the trial court explained:
[Appellant] pled guilty to one (1) count of [DUI] pursuant
to 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3731, which is currently graded as a
crime punishable by up to five (5) years of imprisonment.
This offense does not meet the requirements for the
Restoration of Firearms, therefore [Appellant’s] Petition is
Denied. 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 6105.1[.]
3
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6187.
4
Although dated by counsel and signed on July 21, 2021, the Answer was filed in the trial
court on July 23, 2021. See Answer at 3 (pagination supplied), R.R. at 42a; see also Trial Court
Docket at 5; R.R. at 5a.
3
Trial Court Order at n.1. This timely appeal followed.5
II. Issues
On appeal, Appellant claims the trial court erred by failing to restore
his firearms rights. See Appellant’s Br. at 4-5.6 Appellant claims the trial court’s
5
In reviewing a trial court’s determination of a petition seeking the restoration of firearms
rights, this Court’s standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law, or whether constitutional rights were violated. See
Commonwealth v. Spell (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1720 C.D. 2016, filed November 9, 2017), slip op. at 2
n.2.
6
In his brief, Appellant states the questions involved in this appeal as eight separate
questions:
(1) Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant] the opportunity to
[be] heard regarding his good character and reputation during the
September 3, 2021 hearing in violation of the [Firearms Act], as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,
U.S. Const. amend. XIV]?
(2) Did the trial court err by failing to restore [Appellant’s] firearms
rights in violation of the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution[, U.S. Const. amend. II]?
(3) Did the trial court err by failing to resolve the discrepancy
regarding the grading of [Appellant’s] 1999 DUI conviction on the
Lackawanna County Criminal Docket and the Pennsylvania State
Police Criminal History Record?
(4) Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant’s] Petition on the
ground that his 1999 DUI conviction is not a “disabling offense”
pursuant to the [Firearms] Act?
(5) Did the trial court err by determining that [Appellant’s] 1999
conviction is currently graded as a crime punishable by up to five
(5) years’ imprisonment, despite [Appellant’s] successful
completion of the accelerated rehabilitative disposition (“ARD”)
program for a prior DUI?
(6) Does the Pennsylvania [Superior] Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Chichkin mandate that the DUI offense for which
4
failure to restore his firearms rights violated his rights under the Second Amendment
of the United States Constitution.7 He also claims the trial court erred by
determining that the DUI Conviction was not a “disabling offense” pursuant to
Section 6105.1(e) of the Firearms Act, by misunderstanding the current grading of
the DUI Conviction, and by failing to resolve discrepancies in Appellant’s criminal
history and the Trial Court Docket regarding the proper grading of the DUI
Conviction. Appellant further claims that pursuant to Commonwealth v. Chichkin,
232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020), the DUI Conviction represented a second DUI
[Appellant] successfully completed the ARD program would not
count as a “prior offense” for purposes of grading and, as such, the
1999 DUI conviction would constitute a second offense, rather than
a third offense?
(7) Does the Pennsylvania [Superior] Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Chichkin apply where [Appellant] does not seek
to invalidate a prior sentence on collateral review pursuant to the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546],
but instead seeks to restore his firearms rights after twenty-three (23)
years with zero (0) additional criminal convictions?
(8) Do fairness and equity mandate the restoration of [Appellant’s]
firearm rights when his last criminal conviction occurred more than
two (2) decades ago and, since that time, [Appellant] has gotten
married, started a family and maintained a good reputation and
character?
Appellant’s Br. at 4-5. The Commonwealth restates these purportedly distinct issues as one:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law
when it denied Appellant’s petition for restoration of firearms rights
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1?
Commonwealth Br. at 2.
7
“A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
5
conviction, not a third, and therefore was a “disabling offense” under Section
6105.1(e) of the Firearms Act. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by not
allowing Appellant to testify as to his character at the hearing on the Petition, and
that fairness and equity mandate the restoration of his firearms rights based on his
good reputation and behavior.
III. Discussion
Section 6105(a) of the Firearms Act prohibits persons convicted of one
of 38 enumerated offenses or of certain specified conduct from possessing, using,
controlling, selling, transferring, or manufacturing firearms, or from obtaining a
license to do any of the above in reference to firearms in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a). Additionally, relevant here, Section
6105(c)(3) subjects persons convicted of DUI under either 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 or
former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 on three or more separate occasions within a five-year
period to the prohibitions of Section 6105(a) of the Firearms Act. See 18 Pa.C.S. §
6105(c)(3).
Section 6105.1(a) of the Firearms Act provides for the restoration of
firearms rights by a trial court upon application as follows:
(a) Restoration.--A person convicted of a disabling
offense may make application to the court of common
pleas in the county where the principal residence of the
applicant is situated for restoration of firearms rights. The
court shall grant restoration of firearms rights after a
hearing in open court to determine whether the
requirements of this section have been met unless:
(1) the applicant has been convicted of any other
offense specified in [S]ection 6105(a) or (b)
(relating to persons not to possess, use,
manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms) or
6
the applicant’s conduct meets the criteria in
section 6105(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7);
(2) the applicant has been convicted of any other
crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one
year as defined in [S]ection 6102 [of the Firearms
Act] (relating to definitions);[8] or
(3) the applicant’s character and reputation is such
that the applicant would be likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(a). Therefore, under its plain language, Section 6105.1(a) of
the Firearms Act applies only to “disabling offenses.” See id. Section 6105.1(e) of
the Firearms Act defines a “disabling offense” as:
A conviction for any offense which:
(1) resulted in a Federal firearms disability and is
substantially similar to either an offense currently graded
as a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment for not
more than two years or conduct which no longer
constitutes a violation of law; and
(2) was a violation of either of the following:
(i) the former act of May 1, 1929 (P.L. 905, No.
403) [1929 Vehicle Code], known as The Vehicle
Code, or the former act of April 29, 1959 (P.L. 58,
No. 32) [1959 Vehicle Code], known as The
Vehicle Code; or
(ii) the former act of June 24, 1939 (P.L. 872, No.
375), known as the Penal Code.
8
Section 6102 of the Firearms Act excludes “[s]tate offenses classified as misdemeanors
and punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years” from the definition of “[c]rime
punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102.
7
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(e). Based on this definition, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
has found that
Section 6105.1 [of the Firearms Act] applies only to
persons convicted of a “disabling offense;” i.e., persons
who have a federal firearms disability that resulted from
an offense under the previous Penal or [Vehicle] Code of
this Commonwealth, and which is no longer graded as an
offense punishable by two or more years’ imprisonment
under the current laws of this Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Stiver, 50 A.3d 702, 706 (Pa. Super. 2012).9 Therefore, Section
6105.1 of the Firearms Act applies neither to convictions under previous versions of
the Vehicle Code nor to convictions punishable by more than two years’
imprisonment because such convictions are not “disabling offenses” under Section
6105(e) of the Firearms Act. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(e)(2); see also Stiver, 50 A.3d
at 706 (relief not available to petitioner under Section 6105.1 of the Firearms Act
where underlying theft offense was punishable by more than two years’
imprisonment).
Here, Appellant is not entitled to restoration of his firearms rights
because the DUI Conviction is not a “disabling offense” as defined in Section
6105.1(e) of the Firearms Act. First, Appellant incurred the DUI Conviction in 1999
pursuant to the then-current version of the Vehicle Code, Act of June 17, 1976, P.L.
162, No. 81, § 1 (which has since been revised by more recent amendments), not
under either the 1929 Vehicle Code or the 1959 Vehicle Code. The DUI Conviction
is therefore not a “disabling offense” under Section 6105.1(e) for this reason. See
9
Although not binding, Superior Court decisions are persuasive authority in this Court.
Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
8
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(e)(2); see also Stiver. Further, the DUI Conviction is not a
“disabling offense” under Section 6105(e) of the Firearms Act because it was
punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. The DUI Conviction was
Appellant’s third and was graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree. See former
75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(e)(1) (“Any person violating any of the provisions of this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, except that a person convicted of a
third or subsequent offense is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree[.]”). As a
misdemeanor of the first degree, the DUI Conviction was punishable by up to five
years’ imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(6) (“A crime is a misdemeanor of the
first degree if it is so designated in this title or if a person convicted thereof may be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more than five
years.”). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(e)(1); see also Stiver. For these reasons, the DUI
Conviction is not a “disabling offense” under Section 6105.1 of the Firearms Act,
and the restorative relief provided by this statute is not available to Appellant.
Further, Appellant’s firearms disability did not stem from Section
6105(c) of the Firearms Act. As the trial court noted, the record in this matter is
devoid of evidence that the DUI Conviction was Appellant’s third conviction for
DUI within a five-year period. See Statement In Lieu of [Opinion Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P.] 1925([a]) (Trial Court Opinion) at 3. Accordingly, Appellant’s firearms
disability stems from federal law and must be challenged through procedures
established thereunder.10 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). Appeals of adverse results in such
10
We observe that the Federal Gun Control Act provides the procedure by which a person
prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law may restore their firearms rights. See 18
U.S.C. § 925(c). The Federal Gun Control Act outlines this procedure in relevant part as follows:
(c) A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make
9
federal challenges are appealable to, and exclusively within the jurisdiction of, the
United States District Court in which such a petitioner resides. See id. Therefore,
we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that, “because Appellant’s prohibition
of firearm possession stems from federal and not Pennsylvania law, and because
[the] DUI [C]onviction is not considered a disabling offense, th[e trial c]ourt lacks
the power to grant Appellant’s requested relief.” Trial Court Opinion at 3.
To the extent Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to
resolve an alleged discrepancy in the grading of the DUI Conviction, we do not
agree. See Appellant’s Br. at 14-16. While we acknowledge that the Trial Court
Docket lists the DUI Conviction as a misdemeanor of the second degree, this
document is not controlling. See Trial Court Docket at 2; R.R. at 2a. The Trial Court
Docket itself indicates that it is not authoritative by including the following
disclaimer at the bottom of each page:
Neither the courts of the Unified Judicial System of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nor the Administrative
Office of Pennsylvania Courts assume any liability for
inaccurate [] data, errors or omissions on these reports.
Docket Sheet information should not be used in place of a
application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities
imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt,
transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the
Attorney General may grant such relief if it is established to his
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the
applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not
be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied
by the Attorney General may file a petition with the United States
district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review
of such denial.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
10
criminal history background check which can only be
provided by the Pennsylvania State Police.
Trial Court Docket at 1-8; R.R. at 1a-8a. Instead, Appellant’s Criminal Record
History controls the question of appropriate grading in this matter and lists the DUI
Conviction as a misdemeanor of the first degree. See Criminal History Record, R.R.
at 27a. Additionally, the original trial court record from the DUI Conviction
contains a Sentencing Guideline Form filed the day of Appellant’s sentencing that
also grades the DUI Conviction as a misdemeanor of the first degree. See Sentencing
Guideline Form, filed May 25, 1999. Further, to the extent Appellant maintains that
the Criminal Record History is incorrect, we observe that the proper procedures to
challenge the accuracy of a criminal history proffered by the Pennsylvania State
Police are contained in Section 6111.1(e) of the Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §
6111.1(e),11 which procedures Appellant did not employ to challenge the accuracy
11
Section 6111.1(e) of the Firearms Act provides the following procedure to challenge the
accuracy of criminal history records:
(e) Challenge to records.—
(1) Any person who is denied the right to receive, sell, transfer,
possess, carry, manufacture or purchase a firearm as a result of the
procedures established by this section may challenge the accuracy
of that person’s criminal history, juvenile delinquency history or
mental health record pursuant to a denial by the instantaneous
records check by submitting a challenge to the Pennsylvania State
Police within 30 days from the date of the denial.
(2) The Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct a review of the
accuracy of the information forming the basis for the denial and shall
have the burden of proving the accuracy of the record. Within 20
days after receiving a challenge, the Pennsylvania State Police shall
notify the challenger of the basis for the denial, including, but not
limited to, the jurisdiction and docket number of any relevant court
decision and provide the challenger an opportunity to provide
11
of his criminal history following the denial of his attempt to purchase a firearm and
the Pennsylvania State Police’s denial of his PICS Challenge.
Additionally, to the extent Appellant relies on Chichkin to argue that
the DUI Conviction could not be considered a third offense and therefore was a
“disabling offense” under Section 6105.1(e) of the Firearms Act, he is incorrect. In
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Supreme Court of the United States
established a rule that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum criminal penalty
other than the fact of a previous conviction must be proven to a factfinder beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Chichkin, the Superior Court applied the Alleyne rule to DUI
sentencing such that an ARD disposition for a first DUI conviction could not be
considered as a prior DUI offense in sentencing for subsequent DUI convictions.
See Chichkin, 232 A.3d at 966-69. In short, the Superior Court determined that the
acceptance of ARD, which involves no admission or proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, did not constitute a conviction for Alleyne purposes. See id. at
968-69. Therefore, the Superior Court determined that the mandatory imposition of
criminal penalties based solely on the previous acceptance of ARD in a prior DUI
additional information for the purposes of the review. The
Pennsylvania State Police shall communicate its final decision to the
challenger within 60 days of the receipt of the challenge. The
decision of the Pennsylvania State Police shall include all
information which formed a basis for the decision.
(3) If the challenge is ruled invalid, the person shall have the right
to appeal the decision to the Attorney General within 30 days of the
decision. The Attorney General shall conduct a hearing de novo in
accordance with the Administrative Agency Law. The burden of
proof shall be upon the Commonwealth.
(4) The decision of the Attorney General may be appealed to the
Commonwealth Court by an aggrieved party.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(e).
12
matter was unconstitutional. See id. Accordingly, the Superior Court held 75
Pa.C.S. § 3806 unconstitutional to the extent it defines prior acceptance of ARD as
a “prior offense” for the purpose of imposing enhanced criminal penalties for
subsequent DUI convictions. See id.
Appellant argues that, pursuant to the Superior Court’s decision in
Chichkin, the DUI Conviction should be considered a second, not a third DUI
conviction, and thus properly graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree, which
grading carries a maximum punishment of not more than two years’ imprisonment.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(7). However, during the pendency of this appeal, the
Superior Court expressly overruled Chichkin, holding instead “that the portion of
Section 3806(a) [of the Vehicle Code], which equates prior acceptance of ARD to a
prior conviction for purposes of imposing a Section 3804 mandatory minimum
sentence, passes constitutional muster.” Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227,
233 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc).12 Therefore, the Superior Court expressly permitted
the use of a prior ARD at sentencing to enhance the mandatory minimum of a second
or subsequent DUI conviction. See id.Additionally, before the Superior Court handed down the Moroz
decision, this Court, sitting en banc, addressed the question of collateral civil
consequences in reference to ARDs for DUIs in Ferguson v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 267 A.3d 628 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021),
appeal granted, 280 A.3d 859 (Pa. 2022).13 In Ferguson, the Court determined that
12
We observe and appreciate that Appellant filed his brief in this matter forwarding his
Chichkin-based argument prior to the Superior Court’s en banc decision in Moroz.
13
We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has granted a petition for allowance of appeal
in Ferguson to hear and decide the ARD-as-prior-offense issue. See Ferguson v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 280 A.3d 859 (Pa. 2022). While the Supreme Court may on appeal
13
a licensee’s procedural due process rights were not violated when the Department of
Transportation suspended his driving privileges as a subsequent or repeat DUI
offender following the licensee’s completion of ARD for his first DUI, which the
Department of Transportation viewed as a “prior offense” under Section 3806(a) of
the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) (concerning prior DUI offenses). See
Ferguson, 267 A.3d at 632. The Court reasoned that, because license suspensions
are civil proceedings, the Chichkin ruling did not invalidate Section 3806(a) of the
Vehicle Code for civil license suspension purposes. See id. Likewise, here, the
Petition seeks relief in a civil action from a collateral civil consequence of
Appellant’s prior criminal behavior – multiple DUI convictions, for one of which
Appellant received an ARD – in a civil proceeding to reinstate his firearms rights.
As in Ferguson, Appellant is not entitled to relief in a civil proceeding from the
collateral civil consequences of the DUI Conviction (that the DUI Conviction was a
third DUI conviction for “disabling offense” definitional purposes) because
Appellant’s initial DUI resulted in an ARD. For these reasons, Appellant’s argument
based on Chichkin that the DUI Conviction does not represent a third DUI conviction
for Section 6105.1(e) purposes fails.
Further, to the extent Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to testify as to his character and reputation for the past 23 years because
evidence of his good character would have “justified” the restoration of his firearms
rights, he is incorrect. See Appellant’s Br. at 12-14 & 23-24. Contrary to
overturn this Court’s determination regarding the use of ARDs as “prior offenses” in license
suspension cases, until it does, this Court’s determination in Ferguson remains the law of the
Commonwealth. See Germantown Cab Co. v. Phila. Parking Auth., 27 A.3d 280, 283 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that a decision of an appellate court remains binding precedent,
even if it has been appealed, unless and until it is overturned by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.”).
14
Appellant’s argument, Section 6105.1(a)(3) of the Firearms Act does not provide an
avenue whereby an individual who has lost their firearms rights may restore the same
by demonstrating good character and reputation since the loss of the firearms rights.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105.1(a). On the contrary, in addition to subsequent convictions
following the conviction for which a petitioner originally lost their firearms rights
disqualifying a petitioner from having firearms rights restored,14 Section
6105.1(a)(3) of the Firearms Act outlines an additional, alternative disqualifier to a
petitioner seeking the restoration of firearms rights, proof of which will serve to
prevent a common pleas court from granting a petition for the restoration of firearms
rights. See id. Thus, this subsection does not, as Appellant suggests, provide an
avenue for a petitioner to prove an entitlement to have their firearms rights restored
by proving their good character and reputation since their disqualifying convictions,
but instead provides only a separate avenue beyond additional subsequent
convictions whereby the Commonwealth might prove a petitioner’s continuing
unworthiness for such restoration.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm the Trial Court Order.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
14
See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105.1(a)(1) and (a)(2).
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :
:
v. :
:
Hillel Markowitz, : No. 671 C.D. 2022
Appellant :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2023, the February 9, 2022 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge