Craft Pittsburgh USA, Inc. v. Mt. Lebanon Planning Board and Friends of 50 Moffett St.

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Craft Pittsburgh USA, Inc., :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 1160 C.D. 2022
:
Mt. Lebanon Planning Board :
and Friends of 50 Moffett Street, :
an unincorporated non-profit :
association, R. Kent Hornbrook, :
Dorothy Sherwood, Louis Iafrate, :
Gretchen Oxenreiter, individuals : Submitted: May 8, 2023
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: July 20, 2023
Appellant Craft Pittsburgh USA, Inc., (Craft) appeals from the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County’s (Common Pleas) September 20, 2022 order.
Through that order, Common Pleas affirmed Appellee Mt. Lebanon Planning
Board’s (Planning Board) February 16, 2022 decision (Decision),1 in which the
Planning Board denied Craft’s application for approval of a preliminary land
development plan (Application). After thorough review, we vacate Common Pleas’
order and remand to the lower court, with instructions that it further remand this
matter to the Planning Board for issuance of an amended decision regarding the
Application.
1
The Decision is dated February 15, 2022, but was not issued until the following day. See
Decision at 1.
I. Background
Craft’s Application pertains to a 3.28-acre parcel of R-3 Low-Density Mixed
Residential-zoned land located at 50 Moffett Street in Mt. Lebanon, Pennsylvania
(Property). Decision at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 411a. Craft has an equitable
interest in the Property by virtue of an agreement of sale that it entered into with the
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, the Property’s current owner, at some point
in the recent past. Decision at 1; R.R. at 11a, 1951a. On September 17, 2021, Craft
filed an initial version of the Application with the Municipality of Mt. Lebanon
(Municipality), followed by a revised version of the Application on November 24,
2021. R.R. at 8a-9a, 411a. As shown in the Application, Craft wishes to erect 9
residential buildings containing a total of 41 condominium-style townhouses.
Decision at 1; R.R. at 411a. These townhouses would be arrayed in two rows, with
three to six connected townhouse units per individual structure. Decision at 1. The
two rows will be separated by an access route known as “Road A,” which will
facilitate vehicular access to the townhouses and will have a 22-foot-wide “cartway,”
a 29-foot-wide right-of-way, as well as a “hammerhead[-shaped] turnaround.”
Decision at 1-3.
The Planning Board subsequently considered the Application, as well as
related evidence and testimony, at three separate public hearings. During the course
of the final public hearing, which was held on February 15, 2022, the Planning Board
voted unanimously, with one abstention, to adopt the Decision and thereby deny
Craft’s Application. R.R. at 1123a. In this Decision, the Planning Board provided a
number of reasons for why it had chosen to deny the Application. First, Road A, as
proposed, did not satisfy the width-related standards for streets that are imposed by
Appendix V of the Municipality’s subdivision and land development ordinance
2
(SALDO).2 Decision at 2-4. Second, the condominium documents Craft had
submitted in connection with the Application did not make reference to the sewer
system that would connect to the townhouses, clarify that the system was private in
nature, or explain that the condominium owners would be responsible for the
system’s upkeep; failed to mention the fact that parking would not be permitted on
Road A; and contained covenants that “are not perpetual but are [instead] subject to
change and termination.” Id. at 4. The Planning Board also noted, in relation to its
concerns regarding parking, that “fire and emergency services vehicles need Road
A for access.” Id. Third, the Application showed that the sewer system would run
underneath Road A, but Craft had failed to demonstrate that it could not feasibly
situate the system “under seeded or planted areas.” Id. at 4-5. Fourth, the Application
did not contain a plan that addressed how garbage would be stored or disposed of in
the proposed development. Id. Finally, Craft had failed to address and resolve all of
the Application’s “open items” that the Municipality’s municipal engineer had
identified in his February 10, 2022 review letter. Id.; see R.R. at 1170a-85a (review
letter).
In response, Craft appealed the Planning Board’s denial of the Application to
Common Pleas on March 16, 2022. Common Pleas took no additional evidence and,
on September 20, 2022, affirmed that denial in full. This appeal to our Court
followed shortly thereafter.
2
Municipality of Mt. Lebanon Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance, as
amended, Allegheny County, Pa. (2020).
3
II. Discussion
Craft presents the following arguments for our consideration, which we have
summarized and reordered as follows.3 First, the Planning Board incorrectly
determined that Road A would not qualify as a “private driveway” under the
SALDO. Craft’s Br. at 21-22. Second, even if the Planning Board correctly
determined that Road A would constitute a private street, it nevertheless erred by
using Appendix V’s minimum width standards to deem that street to be legally
inadequate, because those standards are only applicable regarding public streets. Id.
at 22-23. Third, the Planning Board’s factual findings regarding the adequacy of the
condominium documents are not supported by substantial evidence, because those
documents show that the development’s condominium association will be
responsible for maintaining and repairing the development’s sewer system; make
explicitly clear that fire and emergency services vehicles will have adequate access
to all parts of the development, including Road A; and are in total compliance with
the requirements imposed by the Uniform Condominium Act.4 Id. at 24-26. Fourth,
the Planning Board abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by determining
that the denial was warranted due to the absence in the Application of a garbage
storage and disposal plan, as well as Craft’s failure to show that it could not
reasonably situate the development’s sewer system underneath a seeded or planted
3
Where a court of common pleas takes no additional evidence, our standard of review in
the context of a land use appeal is limited to determining whether the local governing body that
issued the challenged decision abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Miravich v. Twp.
of Exeter, Berks Cnty., 54 A.3d 106, 110 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). A local governing body abuses
its discretion when it makes factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Id.“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” In re Rural Route Neighbors, 960 A.2d 856, 860 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
4
68 Pa. C.S. §§ 3101-3414.
4
area. To the contrary, the record evidence shows that garbage will be handled in
compliance with both the condominium association’s rules and the Municipality’s
ordinances, as well as that Craft thoroughly considered where to install the sewer
system before determining that it should be placed underneath Road A. Furthermore,
the Application’s plans regarding garbage handling and the sewer system satisfy all
of the SALDO’s relevant objective requirements. Id. at 26-29. Fifth, the review
letter’s open items did not serve as a legally valid basis for denying the Application,
because “many [of the municipal engineer’s comments] are technical in nature or
note requirements for third[-]party approvals or actions that would need to be
satisfied leading into a final land development plan approval.” Id. at 29-30. Finally,
the Planning Board abused its discretion by denying the Application, because the
denial is inconsistent with the Planning Board’s recent approval of other, similar
land development plans. Id. at 30-33.
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)5 sets forth the
parameters for how local governmental entities shall handle an application for
approval of a land development plan. Of relevance to this matter, Section 508(2) of
the MPC establishes that “[w]hen [such an] application is not approved in terms as
filed the decision shall specify the defects found in the application and describe the
requirements which have not been met and shall, in each case, cite to the provisions
of the statute or ordinance relied upon.” 53 P.S. § 10508(2). “Where a subdivision
plan complies with all objective provisions of the applicable subdivision ordinance
as well as all other applicable regulations, the plan must be approved. . . . The
rejection of a plan may stand, however, if validly supported by even one of several
objections.” Herr v. Lancaster Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 625 A.2d 164, 168-69 (Pa.
5
Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.
5
Cmwlth. 1993) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he unmet requirements must be
objective in order to justify outright rejection of a plan. This means that the ordinance
must contain standards by which compliance can be measured. . . . Similarly, . . . the
unmet requirements must be substantive, not technical.” Robal Assocs., Inc. v. Bd.
of Sup’rs of Charlestown Twp., 999 A.2d 630, 636 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (internal
citation omitted).
Unfortunately, our ability to reach the merits of Craft’s arguments is fatally
impeded by the Planning Board’s failure to issue a sufficiently reasoned
adjudication. In its Decision, the Planning Board initially stated that Road A must be
classified as a driveway, because it would not meet “the [SALDO’s] standards for a
street.” Decision at 2. The Planning Board came to this conclusion because Road A’s
dimensions would not satisfy certain street width requirements established by Appendix
V of the SALDO, in that Road A’s right-of-way will be less than 50 feet and its cartway
will be less than 26 feet. Id. It is not, however, entirely clear why the Planning Board
chose to use those distances when it determined that Road A would constitute a
driveway. The SALDO contains specific definitions for “street, public” and “street,
private,” as well as separate definitions for three different kinds of public street (arterial,
collector, and local); the precise minimum requirements referenced by the Planning
Board expressly apply only to local public streets, but not to private streets (for which
Appendix V provides no minimum design standards) or the other classes of public street
(which are required to have even wider rights-of-way and cartways). Id. at 2-3; see
SALDO, App. V (Minimum Street Design Standards). Thus, the Planning Board
appears to have concluded that Road A was a driveway because it would not satisfy
Appendix V’s regulations for public streets, but did not see fit to explain its logic or
6
account for the fact that those regulations are silent regarding minimum widths for
private streets.
As if the foregoing was not already confusing enough, the Planning Board then
immediately contradicted itself. Inexplicably, it went on to declare that it “believes
Road A needs to be a street based on the [SALDO’s] definitions[,]” as well as that “[t]he
number of individual houses and the length of Road A indicate it is a street, not a shared
or common driveway.” Id. at 3. This about-face was done in such a hasty manner that
the Planning Board did not bother to specify the street category in which Road A should
be classified. See id.
In sum, the Planning Board failed to clearly articulate its reasoning and
conclusions regarding how Road A should be classified and, in doing so, has deprived
us of the ability to accurately dispose of Craft’s appeal. “Appellate courts cannot
properly and efficiently exercise even a limited function of judicial review without [an
administrative agency providing] necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law
together with reasons for its decision, even when the record contains complete
testimony presented to the [agency].” Upper Saucon Twp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of
Upper Saucon Twp., 583 A.2d 45, 48 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Accordingly, the Planning
Board must remedy this error by issuing a new, cogently articulated explanation for its
disposition of Craft’s Application.
III. Conclusion
In keeping with the foregoing analysis, we vacate Common Pleas’ September
20, 2022 order and remand this matter to the lower court. We instruct Common Pleas
to further remand Craft’s appeal to the Planning Board, with instructions that it issue
7
an amended decision containing sufficiently detailed and coherent findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
__________________________________
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Craft Pittsburgh USA, Inc., :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 1160 C.D. 2022
:
Mt. Lebanon Planning Board :
and Friends of 50 Moffett Street, :
an unincorporated non-profit :
association, R. Kent Hornbrook, :
Dorothy Sherwood, Louis Iafrate, :
Gretchen Oxenreiter, individuals :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County’s (Common Pleas) September 20, 2022
order is VACATED, as well as that this case is REMANDED to Common Pleas. It
is FURTHER ORDERED that Common Pleas shall REMAND this matter to
Appellee Mt. Lebanon Planning Board (Planning Board), with instructions that the
Planning Board issue an amended decision regarding Appellant Craft Pittsburgh
USA, Inc.’s application for approval of a preliminary land development plan that
complies with the directives contained in the foregoing opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
__________________________________
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge