Amazon.com Services LLC v. M.A. Snyder & People 2.0 Global, Inc. (WCAB)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Amazon.com Services LLC, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 310 C.D. 2023
: Submitted: June 6, 2024
Melissa A. Snyder and People :
2.0 Global, Inc. (Workers’ :
Compensation Appeal Board), :
Respondents :
BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: July 2, 2024
Amazon.com Services LLC (Employer) has petitioned this Court to
review an adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which
affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). Specifically,
Employer challenges the WCJ granting Melissa A. Snyder’s (Claimant) claim
petition and denying Employer’s joinder petition seeking to join Claimant’s former
employer People 2.0 Global, Inc. (People). Upon review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
Claimant worked for Employer as a fulfillment center picker. On
November 19, 2020, while lifting a tote in the course of her job duties, she
1
Unless stated otherwise, we adopt the factual background for this case from the WCJ’s
decision, which is supported by substantial evidence of record. See WCJ’s Dec., 8/15/22.
experienced a sharp pain in her right shoulder. She immediately reported this to her
supervisor and went to an AmCare facility.2 The next day, she went to an urgent
care facility and, a few days later, an orthopedic surgeon. During this, an x-ray was
taken, her arm was placed in a sling, and she received pain medication and was given
restrictions. Claimant returned to work with restrictions for one day, December 27,
2020, but she did not return because she did not want to violate the handbook for
taking medications while in the building. Claimant has not worked since then. A
short time later, on January 15, 2021, Claimant underwent right shoulder surgery,
performed by Gregor Hawk, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Post-
surgery, Dr. Hawk confirmed Claimant’s injury as a strain, partial bursal-sided
rotator cuff tear with impingement and bursitis. Claimant later underwent a second
shoulder surgery, performed by Gabriel Lewullis, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic
surgeon, on October 5, 2021.
On January 19, 2021, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she
sustained a work-related injury on November 19, 2020, in the nature of a right rotator
cuff tear and right shoulder strain/sprain. The next day, Employer issued a Notice
of Temporary Compensation Payable (NTCP), acknowledging that Claimant
sustained a work injury on November 19, 2020, in the nature of “multiple body parts
strain or tear.” On February 12, 2021, Employer issued an amended NTCP that did
not change the description of the injury but indicated that Claimant’s injury was
medical only. A few days later, Employer issued a Notice Stopping Temporary
Compensation and a Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial, asserting that
Claimant did not sustain a work-related injury but rather aggravated a preexisting
condition.
2
AmCare is Employer’s on-site medical clinic.
2
The case proceeded with hearings before the WCJ. During the
proceedings before the WCJ, Employer filed a joinder petition seeking to join People
as an additional defendant. Employer claimed that Claimant’s current injury was
causally related to a work-related injury to her right arm and shoulder that she
sustained on April 14, 2019, while employed by People.3, 4
Claimant testified on her own behalf and presented expert testimony
from Dr. Hawk and Dr. Lewullis. Employer presented the testimony of Gregory
Menio, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who evaluated Claimant in May
2021, and Donald Diverio, M.D., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who
evaluated Claimant in June 2019.
The WCJ generally credited Claimant’s testimony. Additionally, the
WCJ credited Dr. Hawk’s and Dr. Lewullis’s testimony to the extent that it
conflicted with Dr. Menio.5 In resolving the conflicting medical testimony, the WCJ
gave weight to the fact that Claimant was not under any work restrictions when she
started her job with Employer, and although both injuries involved Claimant’s right
shoulder/extremity, the two injuries differed in nature. The April 2019 injury was
radicular in nature, such as nerve root irritation, while the November 2020 injury
3
People is a staffing company. Although she was employed by People at this time, she was
working at Freshpet. Claimant’s job at Freshpet entailed making dog food which required
repetitive lifting and mixing ingredients. Prior to her job with Employer, Claimant became directly
employed by Freshpet.
4
The April 2019 incident involved three 50-pound boxes falling on Claimant’s right forearm
and causing pain to her right shoulder, trapezius, and scapular. The NTCP identified the injury as
a right arm contusion.
5
The WCJ also found Dr. Diverio credible but recognized that he was only testifying about
his June 2019 treatment note and not offering an opinion on causation. See WCJ’s Dec., 8/15/22,
Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 45.
3
consisted of shoulder impingement and damage to the rotator cuff. Therefore, the
WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petition and denied Employer’s joinder petition.6
Employer appealed to the Board. The Board affirmed finding that the
WCJ acted within his discretion in resolving conflicting evidence and did not
commit any legal errors. See Bd.’s Dec., 3/8/23, at 13-15. Employer appealed to
this Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Employer filed an Application for
Supersedeas seeking a stay of Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits.
Employer’s application was denied.
II. ISSUES
Employer raises four pertinent issues for our review. Generally,
Employer asserts that the WCJ erred in granting the claim petition because the WCJ
capriciously disregarded substantial competent evidence; the WCJ relied on legally
incompetent medical testimony regarding causation; and the WCJ erroneously
shifted the burden of proof to Employer. Employer also asserts that the WCJ erred
in denying its joinder petition. Claimant and People (collectively, Respondents)7
generally respond that the WCJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and was free from legal error.
6
The WCJ also denied Claimant’s penalty petition and found that Employer made a
reasonable contest. These dispositions are not at issue in this appeal.
7
When referring to the legal positions of the parties we collectively refer to Claimant and
People as Respondents. Each filed separate briefs. Although People writes to defend the WCJ’s
denial of the joinder petition, see People’s Br. at 3, its arguments equally support the WCJ’s
granting of the claim petition. See id. at 8-19. Claimant generally asserts that any issue raised by
Employer invades the WCJ’s province as factfinder. See Claimant’s Br. at 8-10. People’s
arguments are consistent with Claimant’s position but also more specifically address each of
Employer’s arguments. See generally People’s Br.
4
III. DISCUSSION8
A. The WCJ’s Decision was Supported by Substantial Evidence
Initially, we address several challenges by Employer to the WCJ’s
findings. According to Employer, these findings are not supported by substantial
evidence, and the WCJ capriciously disregarded substantial competent evidence.
See Pet’r’s Br. at 13-18. Specifically, Employer asserts that the WCJ did not
consider conflicting evidence regarding the mechanism and nature of Claimant’s
injury. Id. Also, Employer asserts that the WCJ did not account for evidence that
Claimant was not released from care for her April 2019 shoulder injury. Id. Lastly,
Employer asserts that Claimant’s testimony regarding her work history could not be
credited because Claimant was found not credible regarding her April 2019 injury.
See id. Respondents counter that each finding by the WCJ was supported by
substantial evidence and that the WCJ properly resolved evidentiary conflicts. See
People’s Br. at 10-17; Claimant’s Br. at 8-10.
“Capricious disregard occurs only when the fact[]finder deliberately
ignores relevant, competent evidence.” McCool v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Sunoco, Inc.), 78 A.3d 1250, 1256 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Importantly, “where
substantial evidence of record supports a [WCJ’s] findings, and the findings in turn
support the [WCJ’s] conclusions, it should remain a rare instance where a reviewing
court disturbs an adjudication based on a capricious disregard of the evidence
standard.” Metal Green Inc. v. City of Phila., 266 A.3d 495, 515 (Pa. 2021) (citing
8
Our review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact were supported by
substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether constitutional rights were
violated. Hollis v. C&R Laundry Servs. LLC (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 299 A.3d 1086, 1091
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).
5
Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478,
487 n.14 (Pa. 2002)).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Williams v. City of Phila.
(Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 312 A.3d 976, 985 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). In
performing a substantial evidence analysis, the evidence must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the party that prevailed before the WCJ. W. Penn Allegheny
Health Sys., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cochenour), 251 A.3d 467, 475
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). Also, “it is immaterial that there is evidence in the record
supporting a factual finding contrary to that made by the WCJ; rather, the pertinent
inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports the WCJ’s factual finding.”
Id.The WCJ as factfinder has sole discretion to assess credibility and to
resolve conflicts in the evidence. Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co. v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 1244, 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Accordingly,
a WCJ is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in part,
including medical witnesses. Griffiths v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Red Lobster),
760 A.2d 72, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). As such, accepting the medical opinion of one
expert witness over that of another is not the basis for reversible error. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Herder), 765 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2000).
Here, the WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant testified that, on November 19, 2020, while performing her work duties of
picking up items for orders, she felt a pinch in her shoulder. Hr’g Tr., 3/31/21, at
11-12. She tried but was unable to continue working and reported the situation to
6
her supervisor. Id. at 12. The WCJ credited this testimony. WCJ’s Dec., FOF ¶
44a. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s finding that Claimant
suffered a right shoulder injury on November 19, 2020, while performing her work
duties.
Next, the WCJ did not capriciously disregard substantial competent
evidence regarding the nature of Claimant’s injury. The parties offered conflicting
expert testimony in this regard. In support of Claimant, Dr. Hawk opined that she
suffered an acute injury to her right shoulder consisting of damage to her rotator
cuff, swelling, impingement, and bursitis. See Hr’g Tr., 6/3/21, at 18-20, 25.
Similarly, Dr. Lewullis described Claimant’s injury as shoulder impingement from
a traumatic event. Hr’g Tr., 2/18/22, at 33-35. On the other hand, Dr. Menio testified
on behalf of Employer that Claimant’s injuries were degenerative in nature, not
traumatic. Hr’g Tr., 9/15/21, at 18. The WCJ did not credit Employer’s expert
testimony. WCJ’s Dec., FOF ¶¶ 46-47. The WCJ properly acted within his
discretion by resolving this conflict between the medical testimony. The WCJ’s
finding on this matter was supported by substantial evidence and is not a basis for
reversal. See Herder, 765 A.2d at 417.
Employer also asserts that the WCJ capriciously disregarded substantial
competent evidence that Claimant was not released from medical care for her April
2019 injury. Employer points to evidence that Claimant’s primary care physician
(PCP), who referred her to Dr. Diverio, placed Claimant on a 10-pound restriction,
and that Dr. Diverio did not complete his examination of Claimant because Claimant
did not follow up after their initial appointment. See Pet’r’s Br. at 16-17. Thus,
according to Employer, Claimant was not able to meet her burden of establishing
that she suffered a new injury in November 2020. See id. at 17.
7
However, the WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony regarding her
treatment and work restrictions. See WCJ’s Dec., FOF ¶ 44a-b. Claimant worked
with no restrictions from July 1, 2019, to November 19, 2020, and received no
medical treatment for her right shoulder during this time. See id. The WCJ
acknowledged that Claimant had complaints for her right shoulder and received
medical attention from April-June 2019, but found it significant that Claimant did
not receive any medical attention or have any work restrictions after this point. Id.
¶ 46. The fact that Dr. Diverio intended on seeing Claimant for another examination
and that Claimant’s PCP initially gave her a weight restriction does not necessarily
establish that Claimant required such medical attention. Therefore, the WCJ did not
capriciously disregard this evidence. See McCool, 78 A.3d at 1256.
Lastly, the WCJ acted within his discretion in finding Claimant credible
in part. The WCJ did not accept Claimant’s testimony that she received no prior
treatment for her right shoulder or that her April 2019 injury happened to her left
arm. Id. ¶ 46. However, the WCJ found Claimant credible regarding her
employment history and the events surrounding the November 2020 injury. Id. ¶
46a-c. The WCJ was permitted to accept some of Claimant’s testimony while
rejecting other parts and did not capriciously disregard substantial competent
evidence by doing so. See Griffiths, 760 A.2d at 76.
As explained above, the WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence of record. The WCJ did not capriciously ignore relevant competent
evidence in rendering his decision. Rather, the WCJ assessed the conflicting medical
testimony and found Claimant’s medical witnesses to be more credible regarding
causation. Additionally, Employer offers no compelling reason for why this case is
one of the “rare instance[s]” in which a WCJ’s decision supported by substantial
8
evidence should be found to constitute a capricious disregard of evidence. See Metal
Green, 266 A.3d at 515. For these reasons, Employer’s claim is without merit.
B. Claimant’s Medical Experts Testified Competently
Employer asserts that the WCJ erred in crediting Claimant’s medical
witnesses on causation because they lacked information regarding Claimant’s
medical history prior to November 19, 2020, and thus their testimony was legally
incompetent. Pet’r’s Br. at 18-22. Respondents counter that this testimony was not
incompetent because these experts did not rely solely on any purported inaccuracies
in Claimant’s medical history. See People’s Br. at 17-18.
The competency of evidence is a question of law fully subject to our
review. Namani v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (A. Duie Pyle), 32 A.3d 850, 854
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “A medical expert’s opinion is not rendered incompetent unless
it is solely based on inaccurate or false information.” Casne v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (STAT Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14, 16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis
added). “The opinion of a medical expert must be viewed as a whole, and even
inaccurate information will not render the opinion incompetent unless it is
depend[e]nt on those inaccuracies.” Id. Additionally, “the fact that a medical expert
does not have all of a claimant’s medical records goes to the weight given the
expert’s testimony, not its competency.” Marriott Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Knechtel), 837 A.2d 623, 631 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); see also Cmty.
Empowerment Ass’n v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Porch), 962 A.2d 1, 8 n.7 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008) (rejecting an employer’s argument that a medical opinion was not
competent where the medical witness was unaware of the claimant’s prior
hospitalization because the medical opinion was not based on false information, and
9
the lack of knowledge of the claimant’s complete medical history went to the
weight).
Here, Employer’s argument that Claimant’s medical experts rendered
incompetent opinions is without merit. First, as a factual matter, Dr. Lewullis was
aware of Claimant’s April 2019 injury. Dr. Lewullis reviewed Dr. Diverio’s 2019
office note. Hr’g Tr., 2/18/22, at 34-35. Based on this review, Dr. Lewullis opined
that Claimant experienced “radicular type pain from the cervical spine[]” and little
to no shoulder impingement, whereas his examination and surgery indicated
shoulder impingement from a traumatic event. See id. at 33-35. As such, Dr.
Lewullis’s opinion was not predicated on his ignorance about Claimant’s April 2019
injury.
Also, although Dr. Hawk was unaware of Claimant’s April 2019 injury,
his opinion was not dependent on this lack of knowledge. Rather, Dr. Hawk’s
opinion that Claimant’s November 2020 work incident caused an acute injury to her
right shoulder consisting of damage to her rotator cuff, swelling, impingement, and
bursitis was based on his physical examination and review of Claimant’s magnetic
resonance image scan. See Hr’g Tr., 6/3/21, at 18-20, 25. Accordingly, the medical
opinions of Dr. Lewullis and Dr. Hawk were not based solely on inaccurate or false
information, and the WCJ was free to give weight to their testimony. See Casne,
962 A.2d at 16; Marriot Corp., 837 A.2d at 631 n.10. Therefore, Employer’s
argument that Claimant’s medical experts rendered incompetent opinions is without
merit.
C. The Burden Did Not Erroneously Shift to Employer
Employer asserts that the WCJ improperly required Employer to show
that Claimant had work restrictions related to her April 2019 injury. See Pet’r’s Br.
10
at 22. Specifically, Employer argues that there was evidence that Claimant had work
restrictions and anticipated continued treatment for her April 2019 injury. See id. at
22-24. According to Employer, the only countervailing evidence came from
Claimant whom the WCJ did not find credible regarding her treatment history. See
id. Respondents assert that the WCJ did not shift the burden but rather simply
credited Claimant’s testimony that she did not have any work restrictions when she
began working for Employer. People’s Br. at 15-17.
“[T]he claimant bears the burden of establishing all of the elements
necessary to support an award of [workers’ compensation] benefits, including the
existence of an injury and disability, and a causal relationship between the injury
and the claimant's work.” Kurpiewski v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Caretti, Inc.),
202 A.3d 870, 880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). This entails both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion. Steglik v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Delta Gulf
Corp.), 755 A.2d 69, 74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (en banc).
Here, we discern no erroneous burden shifting. Although the WCJ did
not find Claimant credible that the April 2019 injury happened to her left shoulder,
the WCJ did credit Claimant’s testimony regarding her work history. WCJ’s Dec.,
FOF ¶ 44. The WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony that when she stopped working
at Freshpet and began working for Employer she did not have any work restrictions.
Id. ¶ 44a-b. The WCJ reasonably inferred that her ability to work without restrictions
during that period is indicative that she was not limited by her April 2019 injury.
Therefore, the WCJ did not erroneously shift the burden to Employer.
D. The Denial of the Joinder Petition was not an Abuse of Discretion
Lastly, Employer asserts that the WCJ erred in denying the joinder
petition. According to Employer, testimony from Dr. Diverio established that
11
Claimant did not fully recover from her April 2019 injury. Pet’r’s Br. at 25-26.
People counters that the WCJ did not err because the WCJ properly weighed the
evidence and his finding that Claimant’s shoulder condition was caused by the
November 2020 work injury was supported by substantial evidence. See People’s
Br. at 18-19.
Joinder of additional defendants is permitted as of right, provided a
petition for joinder is timely filed and supported by specific facts and a legal basis.
See 34 Pa. Code § 131.36. However, the WCJ has broad discretion to grant or deny
a joinder petition. Pennsylvania Uninsured Emps. Guar. Fund v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Dudkiewicz), 89 A.3d 330, 335 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
As we have discussed, the decision granting the claim petition was
supported by substantial evidence, and competent medical testimony, and was not
the result of improper burden shifting. The analysis applies to the WCJ’s denial of
the joinder petition – Claimant’s injury occurred during the course and scope of her
employment with Employer, not while employed by People. Apart from repeating
arguments directed against the WCJ’s factual findings, Employer offers no further
explanation as to why the WCJ abused his discretion in denying the joinder petition.
See Pet’r’s Br. at 25-26. Employer’s argument is not persuasive, and we discern no
abuse of the WCJ’s discretion. See Dudkiewicz, 89 A.3d at 335.9
IV. CONCLUSION
The WCJ did not err in granting Claimant’s claim petition and denying
Employer’s joinder petition. The WCJ’s findings were supported by substantial
9
Employer sought joinder, asserting that “[People] is liable for Claimant’s right shoulder
condition and need for surgery based on the 4/14/2019 work injury.” See Joinder Pet., 8/6/21. We
note that an employer need not join a previous employer to assert a defense that a claimant’s injury
occurred during her previous employment. See Pope & Talbot v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Pawlowski), 949 A.2d 361, 368-69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
12
evidence and were not the result of capriciously disregarding substantial evidence.
See W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 251 A.3d at 475; Metal Green, 266 A.3d at 515;
McCool, 78 A.3d at 1256. Claimant’s expert medical testimony was legally
competent, and thus, the WCJ acted within his discretion in weighing the testimony.
See Cmty. Empowerment Ass’n, 962 A.2d at 8 n.7. Also, the WCJ did not
erroneously shift the burden to Employer. For these same reasons, the WCJ did not
abuse his discretion in denying Employer’s joinder petition. See Dudkiewicz, 89
A.3d at 335. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order.
________________________________
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
13
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Amazon.com Services LLC, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 310 C.D. 2023
:
Melissa A. Snyder and People :
2.0 Global, Inc. (Workers’ :
Compensation Appeal Board), :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of July, 2024, the order of the Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board, entered March 8, 2023 is AFFIRMED.
_______________________________
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge