Document Info

DocketNumber: 1586-1589 C.D. 2022

Judges: Wolf, J.

Filed Date: 7/8/2024

Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024

  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Shanyse Rushemeza,                         :   CASES CONSOLIDATED
    Petitioner       :
    :
    v.                           :   Nos.    1586 C.D. 2022
    :           1587 C.D. 2022
    Unemployment Compensation                  :           1588 C.D. 2022
    Board of Review,                           :           1589 C.D. 2022
    Respondent             :
    :   Submitted: June 4, 2024
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
    HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE WOLF                                                    FILED: July 8, 2024
    Shanyse Rushemeza (Claimant) petitions for review from four identical
    decisions of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), affirming
    a Referee’s determinations finding her ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b)
    of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Claimant was employed by Fulton Bank NA from September 2018
    through March 12, 2021, as a full-time repossession administrator at a rate of pay of
    $18.75 per hour. She was earning approximately $36,000 annually. Claimant
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
    802(b) (relating to leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature).
    resides with her husband who earns approximately $38,000 annually. Certified
    Record (C.R.) at 83, Referee’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1, 3-4.
    After her last day of work on March 12, 2021, Claimant went on
    maternity leave with a scheduled return date of May 4, 2021. Prior to her scheduled
    return date, Claimant researched daycare centers and found the most reasonable
    option to be approximately $200 per week. Claimant did not return to work after the
    expiration of her maternity leave; rather, she resigned due to the cost of childcare.
    C.R. at 82, F.F. Nos. 2, 5-6.
    Claimant then filed for unemployment compensation benefits.
    Claimant continued to search for work after her separation. She remained able and
    available for work from home and was also available to work during weeknights and
    on weekends when her husband was available to watch their child. C.R. at 82, F.F.
    Nos. 7-9.
    Following a review and investigation of Claimant’s claim for
    unemployment compensation benefits, the UC Service Center found her ineligible.
    Claimant appealed and a hearing was held before a Referee. Employer did not attend
    the hearing. C.R. at 83, Referee’s Decision at 2.
    The Referee denied benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law.
    The Referee acknowledged that lack of childcare may, in some cases, give rise to a
    necessitous and compelling reason for voluntary separation from employment;
    however, in this case, given the combined incomes of Claimant and her husband, the
    Referee determined that the issue was not a lack of childcare, but rather Claimant’s
    belief that she was unable to afford childcare. Based on the totality of the credible
    evidence presented, the Referee determined that Claimant was not in a more
    favorable financial situation as a result of resigning; rather, “[C]laimant made a
    2
    personal choice to not . . . place her child in daycare.” C.R. at 84, Referee’s Decision
    at 3. Thus, the Referee held that Claimant did not establish a necessitous and
    compelling reason for her separation from employment. Id.2
    For the compensable weeks ending June 5, 2021, through November
    27, 2021, Claimant received regular unemployment compensation benefits in the
    amount of $10,088. For compensable weeks ending June 5, 2021 through September
    4, 2021, Claimant received federal pandemic unemployment compensation benefits
    in the amount of $4,200. C.R. at 82, F.F. Nos. 10-11.                  The Referee held that
    Claimant had a nonfault overpayment for the unemployment compensation benefits
    and a nonfraud overpayment for federal pandemic unemployment compensation
    benefits.
    Claimant appealed and the Board affirmed, adopting and incorporating
    the Referee’s findings and conclusions. Claimant filed petitions for review to this
    Court. By order dated April 27, 2023, this Court granted the Board’s motions to
    consolidate Claimant’s appeals.
    ISSUE
    On appeal,3 Claimant challenges the Board’s determination that she did
    not have a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary separation under
    Section 402(b) of the Law.
    2
    The Referee further held that Claimant was able and available for work pursuant to Section
    401(d)(1) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1) (pertaining to whether a claimant is able and available
    for suitable work). This portion of the Referee’s ruling is not in dispute.
    3
    Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an
    error of law was committed, or whether the necessary factual findings are supported by substantial
    evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
    3
    DISCUSSION
    In an unemployment compensation case, the Board’s findings of fact
    are binding on appeal if the findings, after reviewing the record as a whole,
    are supported by substantial evidence. Brandt v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Rev., 
    643 A.2d 78
    , 79 (Pa. 1994). Substantial evidence has been defined by this
    Court as “relevant evidence upon which a reasonable mind could base a
    conclusion.” Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 
    502 A.2d 738
    , 740
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). We examine the evidence and testimony in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of any inferences
    logically and reasonably drawn from the evidence. 
    Id.
     The critical consideration in
    assessing the Board’s findings is not whether evidence exists in the record
    that could support a contrary finding, but rather, whether there is evidence to support
    the findings the Board made. Rodriguez v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 
    174 A.3d 1158
    , 1163 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
    Under Section 402(b) of the Law, an employee is ineligible for
    unemployment benefits for any week “[i]n which his unemployment is due to
    voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.” In
    a voluntary quit case, the claimant has the burden of proving the right to
    unemployment compensation benefits. St. Clair Hosp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Rev., 
    154 A.3d 401
    , 404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). Although the Law does
    not define the term “necessitous and compelling,” case law has discussed it. An
    employee who claims to have left employment for a necessitous and compelling
    reason must prove that: (1) circumstances existed which produced real and
    substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel
    a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary
    4
    common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her
    employment. Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 
    714 A.2d 1126
    , 1129
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    The inability of a parent to care for a child may constitute a necessitous
    and compelling reason for terminating employment. See Truitt v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Rev., 
    589 A.2d 208
    , 210 (Pa. 1991); Shaffer v. Unemployment Comp.
    Bd. of Rev., 
    928 A.2d 391
    , 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Gantner v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Rev., 
    723 A.2d 272
    , 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). In order to prove a
    necessitous and compelling reason to quit, a claimant must establish that she
    exhausted all other alternative childcare arrangements, such as making a concerted
    effort to find another babysitter or locate a daycare center. Shaffer.
    Here, Claimant notes that she and her husband make a combined
    $74,000 annually while the cost of daycare (at the least expensive daycare center
    that Claimant could find) would total over $10,000 annually. Claimant contends
    that case law appears to reflect that the standard applied in these situations is whether
    childcare expenses would total more than what an employee earns. Claimant asserts
    this is an unreasonable standard and that, for public policy reasons, this Court should
    set a lesser standard. “[Claimant] advocates for this Honorable Court to adopt the
    standard of it being a necessitous and compelling reason to terminate employment
    where the least expensive childcare available would cost more than 25% of an
    employee’s gross salary . . . .” Claimant’s Brief at 11.
    In response, the Board contends that Claimant failed to show that her
    decision to resign due to the cost of childcare constituted a necessitous and
    compelling reason to quit. The Board correctly held that, considering Claimant and
    5
    her husband’s combined income, preserving her employment would not have created
    circumstances that necessitated Claimant to voluntarily quit employment.
    The Board notes that by quitting her employment, Claimant lost nearly
    50% of her total household income whereas, if she had continued to work, the cost
    of childcare (at $200 per week) would have amounted to only approximately 14%
    of her total household income. Board’s Brief at 7. Claimant was not in a more
    favorable financial situation as a result of resigning; rather, Claimant made a
    personal choice to not pay to place her child in daycare. 
    Id.
     The facts of this case
    are similar to those presented in Elmolla v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
    Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 811 C.D. 2014, filed January 23, 2015) (holding that the
    claimant failed to establish an inability to afford childcare and that quitting merely
    removed the childcare expense), slip op. at 6.4 Furthermore, the Board argues,
    Claimant’s recommendation for a 25% threshold is arbitrary and unsupported by the
    Law.
    Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the Board erred
    in concluding that Claimant failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason
    for her separation from employment.               Admittedly, the cost of childcare is
    burdensome, and we empathize with Claimant’s situation. Nevertheless, the record
    is devoid of any evidence establishing that Claimant was unable to afford childcare.
    Instead, Claimant asks this Court to issue an arbitrary, across-the-board
    standard that if a claimant’s childcare expenses total more than 25% of the claimant’s
    salary, they have a necessitous and compelling reason to leave employment.
    4
    Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited
    for their persuasive value pursuant to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 126(b), and Section 414(a) of the Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,
    
    210 Pa. Code §69.414
    (a).
    6
    Obviously, this Court is in no position to establish policy and make such a ruling.
    Claimant’s efforts in this regard would be better focused on the Legislature.
    As the Board aptly observed, Claimant’s decision to quit her
    employment and reduce her family’s household income in half did not improve her
    family’s financial situation.   Indeed, like the claimant in Elmolla, Claimant’s
    decision to quit her employment in this case simply removed the potential childcare
    expense. Without more, we must conclude that Claimant has not met her burden of
    showing a necessitous and compelling reason to leave her employment.
    Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    _____________________________________
    MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
    7
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Shanyse Rushemeza,                    :   CASES CONSOLIDATED
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                        :   Nos.   1586 C.D. 2022
    :          1587 C.D. 2022
    :          1588 C.D. 2022
    Unemployment Compensation             :          1589 C.D. 2022
    Board of Review,                      :
    Respondent        :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 8th day of July, 2024, the Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review’s orders dated December 13, 2022 are AFFIRMED.
    _____________________________________
    MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge