A. Saunders v. M. Munch

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Antonio Saunders, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Michael Munch, Karen Mengel, :
John Morganelli, James Augustine, :
John Capobianco, Nick Englesson, :
Nuria DiLuzio, Edward Andres, :
Michael Light, Leigh Ann Fisher, :
Jamie Adams, BB&T Bank, : No. 102 C.D. 2023
Joshua Shapiro, and Jennifer Sletvold : Submitted: July 5, 2024
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: September 6, 2024
Antonio Saunders (Inmate), an inmate at the State Correctional
Institution at Dallas, filed a civil complaint (complaint),1 pro se, in the Court of
Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) against various law enforcement
and judicial personnel who had been involved in his criminal prosecution. The trial
court sustained the various defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissed the
complaint. Inmate filed an appeal with the Superior Court, which transferred the
appeal to this Court. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing
Inmate’s complaint.
1
Inmate filed four versions of his complaint, the last of which was titled Amended
Complaint. That fourth and final version is the subject of this appeal and is cited as the complaint
herein.
I. Background
In January 2019, Inmate, a New York resident, applied for a $30,000
loan from Truist Bank, incorrectly identified as “BB&T Bank,” formerly known as
Branch Banking and Trust Company (Bank) in Easton, Pennsylvania, using another
person’s identity. Appellees’ Joint Reproduced Record (JRR) at 25a-26a & 496a.2
When Inmate appeared at Bank in connection with the pending loan transaction, he
was arrested. Id. at 25a. He was subsequently prosecuted and convicted of identity
theft, forgery, and theft by unlawful taking. Id. at 496a. According to Inmate, a
proceeding seeking relief from that conviction is pending under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA).3 Br. for Appellant at 10 (stating “Post Conviction Relief Act
Pending”).
Inmate filed the complaint in the trial court alleging various instances
of wrongful conduct relating to his arrest, prosecution, and conviction. JRR at 22a-
62a. He named as defendants, “in their individual and official capacities,” Michael
Munch, a detective with the Colonial Regional Police Department in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania (Det. Munch); Karen Mengel, Court Reporter for the trial court (Ct.
Rep. Mengel); the Honorable John Morganelli, District Attorney (now Judge) of
Northampton County (DA Morganelli); James Augustine, an Assistant District
Attorney of Northampton County (ADA Augustine); Hon. John Capobianco, a
Magisterial District Judge with chambers in Nazareth, Pennsylvania (MDJ
Capobianco); the Honorable Nicholas Englesson, a Magisterial District Judge with
2
Appellees submitted what would normally be a supplemental reproduced record, but,
presumably because Appellant was not required to file a reproduced record, Appellees have
designated their filing as a reproduced record and numbers its pages as such. We cite Appellees’
joint filing using their page designations.
3
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
chambers in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (MDJ Englesson); Nuria DiLuzio, Chief
Public Defender of Northampton County (CPD DiLuzio); Edward Andres, an
Assistant Public Defender of Northampton County (APD Andres); Michael Light,
an Assistant Public Defender of Northampton County (APD Light); Clerk of Court
Leigh Ann Fisher (Clerk Fisher); Jamie Adams, Bank’s Branch Manager at 3704
Nazareth Highway, Easton (Branch Mgr. Adams); Bank; Joshua Shapiro, Attorney
General (now Governor) of Pennsylvania (AG Shapiro); and the Honorable Jennifer
Sletvold, a Judge in the trial court (Judge Sletvold). Id. at 22a-24a.
The complaint alleged, in a rambling fashion, violations of various
constitutional rights of Inmate by various Appellees, asserting that various Appellees
were guilty of
“[d]iscriminatively [sic] prosecuting [Inmate]; trespassing
under the disguise of the color of state law criminal
prosecution and [Appellees’] violating [Inmate’s]
constitutional rights of [a]rt.1, ss [sic] sec. 1, 8 and 26 of
the Pa. [C]onst. [(Pa. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8 , and 26)], U.S.
[C]onst. 4th, 8th and 14th Amendments [(U.S. Const.
amends. IV, VIII, XIV)] and the [sic] Pa.R.Crim.P. 540,
573, 541 and 581(I); subjecting [Inmate] to illegal
restraint’s [sic], false arrest, illegal confiscation of
[Inmate’s] real person and real personal property by was
[sic] of the premise that [Appellees] have the authority to
do so when [a]rticle V of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution
is repealed in it’s [sic] entirety and those provisions of
schedules No. 1 and No. 2 are repealed to the extent they
are inconsistent with this Article; [t]hereby no saving
clause schedule applicable to criminal prosecution and
after [Bank, Br. Mgr. Adams, and Det. Munch] acted in
concert to arrest [Inmate] on false charges, slandered,
libeled and defamed [Inmate] as described in 42 Pa.C.S.
[§] 8343; on or about January 28, 2019; without any
independent reasonable suspicion of probable cause, and
trespassing, false arrest, intruding, illegally searching and
seizure of [Inmate] on false charges and affidavit of
probable cause; thereby accusing [Inmate] of a crime that
3
he did not commit and initiation [sic] the charges in which
the named [Appellees] acted in concert, in collusion in a
nefarious scheme to over take [sic] [Inmate’s] person and
personal property and then under the premise to
[d]iscriminatively [sic] prosecute [Inmate] on charges
without having no [sic] basis in authority; while acting
under color of law, 42 U.S.C. ss [sic] 1983.
JRR at 24a-25a. The specific acts on which Inmate based his civil complaint
included a statement in the criminal case’s affidavit of probable cause that Inmate
had applied for the loan in person at Bank, although testimony later established that
the application was initially made by telephone; an alleged review of evidence at the
police station without signing a form to maintain the chain of custody; imposition of
“a $100,000.00 cash ransom bail”; alleged improper advice to Inmate to waive his
preliminary hearing; failure to release Inmate despite no finding of probable cause
at a preliminary hearing; alleged defense representation of Inmate without his
permission; alleged inadequate legal representation of Inmate; and alleged deletion
of a portion of a transcript that Inmate insists contained a ruling the judge in his
criminal case later stated had not been made. JRR at 25a-54a.
Inmate alleged as his “[i]njuries”
[f]alse [a]rrest, illegal detention, illegal restraints of
liberty, cruelty, cruel and unusual punishment; deprived of
equal protection of law, deprived [sic] due process of law,
libel, slander, defamation, [a]rbitrary and capricious
treatment, [d]iscriminatively [sic] prosecution, bias,
prejudice [sic] treatment, racism, threats, harassment,
shock, wanton disregard towards rights, conniving, frauds,
fraud on the court, prosecuted [sic] without any basis of
authority, misuse of process, abuse of process, abuse of
jurisdiction, assault’s [sic], deception, trickery,
misrepresentation, false impersonation, theft, mail theft,
mail fraud, false pretenses, theft by unlawful taking,
deliberate indifference, 42 U.S.C. ss [sic] 1983, set up,
illegal commitment’s [sic], false pretense, illegal
representations, false representations without notice nor
4
[sic] consent, inviolation [sic] of court order, framed [sic],
lien on property, levy on natural person and property,
heartache, headaches, pain, drugged [sic], [COVID]-19,
shackles and chains, fabricated [a]ffidavit; stress, false
information, full restraint’s [sic], kidnapped [sic],
captured [sic] corporation, robbery of property, civil
right’s [sic] and liberty, mental anguish, trespass,
conflict’s [sic], intrusions, loss of works [sic], business,
depress [sic], false charges, intrusions and other injuries.
JRR at 55a. Inmate sought a declaration that his criminal conviction was void; he
also demanded money damages totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. at 57a-
62a.
The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the
complaint in an order without an opinion. JRR at 493a. After Inmate filed his notice
of appeal, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), directing Inmate to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal (1925 statement). Id. at
494a. Inmate filed a 1925 statement 10 pages long, listing, again in rambling
fashion, 19 alleged errors by the trial court. JRR at 495a & 499a-508a. The trial
court thereafter filed its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The trial court opined that Inmate had
waived all issues on appeal by filing a 1925 statement “so prolix and abstruse that if
there [was] any issue buried therein, it [was] so well hidden that [the trial court could
not] find it.” JRR at 495a. The trial court opined further that, to the extent it could
discern the bases of Inmate’s assertions of error, they were baseless, as “[e]ven the
most cursory review of [the complaint] discloses that it fails to set forth any cause
of action against any defendant. . . ,” in that Inmate’s subsequent convictions
absolved the Bank and Bank Mgr. Adams of any liability for pre-arrest statements
5
made to police, and all the other defendants were immune from Inmate’s claims. Id.
at 496a-97a.
II. Discussion
A. Preservation of Issues
As a threshold matter, we acknowledge the trial court’s opinion that
Inmate has failed to preserve any issues for appeal because of his defective statement
of errors on appeal. We agree with the trial court’s assessment.
Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires a trial court, upon receipt of a notice of appeal from its decision, to provide
a written opinion explaining the reasons for its decision. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Rule
1925(b)(4) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Direction to file statement of errors complained of on
appeal; instructions to the appellant and the trial court.—
If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of
appeal (“judge”) desires clarification of the errors
complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order
directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court
and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors
complained of on appeal (“[1925(b)] Statement”).
....
(4) Requirements; waiver.
(i) The [1925(b)] Statement shall set forth
only those errors that the appellant intends to
assert.
(ii) The [1925(b)] Statement shall concisely
identify each error that the appellant intends
to assert with sufficient detail to identify the
issue to be raised for the judge . . . .
....
6
(iv) The [1925(b)] Statement should not be
redundant or provide lengthy explanations as
to any error. Where non-redundant, non-
frivolous issues are set forth in an
appropriately concise manner, the number of
errors raised will not alone be grounds for
finding waiver.
(v) Each error identified in the [1925(b)]
Statement will be deemed to include every
subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial
court . . . .
Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). Because the appellant’s statement of errors is necessary to
allow the trial court to address those errors and, in turn, to allow meaningful review
by the appellate court, a defective statement of errors will result in waiver of the
appellant’s issues; “a [statement of errors] which is too vague to allow the court to
identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [statement of
errors] at all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001).4
Here, the trial court posited that Inmate’s statement of errors was so
vague and rambling as to impede the trial court’s ability to address the alleged errors
in a meaningful fashion.5 See JRR 495a-96a. This Court’s review of the statement
4
Although not binding on this Court, opinions of the Superior Court offer persuasive
authority where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180
A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
5
The length and rambling nature of Appellant’s statement of errors is also problematic. In
Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 938 A.2d 417 (Pa. 2007), a plurality of our Supreme
Court opined that the number of issues in a 1925(b) statement should not, standing alone, result in
waiver. Id. at 427 n.16. The current Rule 1925(b)(4)(iv) reflects that principle. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(iv). However, a 1925(b) statement must not be “so lengthy that it does not meet the
goal of narrowing down the issues previously raised to the few that are likely to be presented to
the appellate court without giving the trial judge volumes to plow through.” Commonwealth v.
Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 89-90 (Pa. Super.
2005) (7-page statement listing 29 issues in narrative form showed lack of good faith effort to
comply with Rule 1925(b); “such ‘voluminous’ statements do not identify the issues that [the
7
of errors confirms that it is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty the
true nature of the errors being asserted. See id. at 499a-508a. The trial court opined
in understandable frustration that Inmate had failed to preserve any issues for appeal.
Id. at 495a-96a. Nonetheless, to the extent that it was able to glean from Inmate’s
statement the errors he was asserting, the trial court addressed them to the best of its
ability.
We, likewise, will address the errors asserted in Inmate’s brief, to the
extent that we are able to provide meaningful review. Inmate’s brief lists 11 alleged
errors by the trial court.6 We will address each.7
B. Statements by Bank Appellees and Det. Munch
In his first assertion of error, Inmate contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by sustaining the preliminary objections of Bank and Branch Mgr.
Adams (Bank Appellees) and Det. Munch, all of whom Inmate accuses of having
falsely stated that Inmate forged a loan application. The apparent basis for Inmate’s
argument is the statement by Det. Munch, in his affidavit of probable cause, that
Inmate had signed a loan application with a false name, when actually, according to
a]ppellant actually intends to raise on appeal . . . ”). Here, Appellant’s 10-page statement of 19
perceived errors forced the trial court to wade through an unreasonable amount of content in its
attempt to discern what errors Appellant was asserting.
6
To the extent Inmate claims that his statement of errors or brief raises claims beyond
those identified by the trial court, they are waived. See Dowling; Eiser.
7
To the extent that this Court’s analysis differs in any respect from that of the trial court,
we note that we may affirm on any basis that is supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Rensel,
315 A.3d 248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (citing Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 965 A.2d 1194, 1200 (Pa.
2009)). We also note, as a general observation on Inmate’s claims, that to the extent he is
attempting to assert any allegation of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or other violation of his
federal constitutional rights, any such claim is barred because he was convicted and that conviction
has not been reversed, expunged, or invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
8
the subsequent testimony of Branch Mgr. Adams, Inmate’s initial loan application
was made by telephone. Inmate’s assertion of error is without merit.
1. Bank Appellees’ Preliminary Objection
Inmate asserted a claim for defamation against Bank Appellees,
alleging that they falsely stated he had forged a loan application, in that Bank Mgr.
Adams later stated that the application was initially made by telephone. 8 Bank
Appellees filed preliminary objections raising the statute of limitations, privilege,
and the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
A claim for defamation is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5523(1). Bank Appellees point out that Inmate did not file his first
complaint until more than one year after the alleged defamation and did not first
allege defamation until his final complaint filed three years after his arrest. Although
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense normally raised in new matter, a
court may address it on preliminary objections where its applicability is clear on the
face of the complaint and the plaintiff does not file a preliminary objection to the
preliminary objection asserting the statute of limitations. See Laskaris v. Hice, 247
A.3d 87, 89 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Petsinger v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
Off. of Vocational Rehab., 988 A.2d 748, 758 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). Here, the
complaint alleges that Inmate was arrested on January 28, 2019, based on false
information from Bank Appellees. JRR at 24a-25a. The trial court’s docket
indicates that Inmate’s first complaint was filed on February 24, 2020, more than a
year later. Id. at 5a. Thus, the application of the statute of limitations was clear on
the face of the complaint. Moreover, Inmate has not asserted on appeal that Bank
8
Appellant does not explain whether or why applying for a loan in another person’s name
by telephone would make him any less culpable than applying in person.
9
Appellees should not have raised the statute of limitations by preliminary objection.
We agree with Bank Appellees that Inmate’s defamation claim was barred by the
statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, we need not reach
Bank Appellees’ additional preliminary objections relating to privilege and the
coordinate jurisdiction rule.9
2. Det. Munch’s Preliminary Objection
Inmate further asserts that the trial court wrongly dismissed his claim
against Det. Munch, who Inmate insists falsified an affidavit of probable cause by
stating that Inmate had signed another person’s name on a loan application. Inmate
insists he never signed an application and points to testimony by Branch Mgr. Adams
that Inmate made the loan application by telephone. However, Inmate does not
explain how this alleged discrepancy supposedly harmed him.
An alleged misstatement in an affidavit of probable cause is material
only if the statement is essential to the warrant, not if it merely strengthens the
warrant application. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 664 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa.
Super. 1995). If the affidavit sets forth sufficient facts to support a probable cause
finding without the misstatement, the misstatement is immaterial. See Commonwealth
v. Yucknevage, 390 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. Super. 1978).
Noticeably absent from Inmate’s complaint and brief is any assertion
that he did not seek a loan in the name of another person whose identity he had
stolen; rather, his averments relate solely to the absence of his signature on the loan
application. Likewise absent from the complaint is any averment by Inmate that he
9
We note, however, that the discrepancy between using a false name in a signed loan
application and doing so in an application made by telephone is equally immaterial to Appellant’s
defamation claim as it is to the probable cause affidavit discussed in the next section.
10
could not have been arrested and convicted for seeking a loan by identity theft
through a loan process initiated in a telephone application. In short, Inmate focuses
on an alleged misstatement in the affidavit of probable cause but does not explain
whether or how it was actually material to his arrest and conviction. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the preliminary objection of
Det. Munch relating to the affidavit of probable cause.
C. Effectiveness of Defense Counsel
In his second assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by dismissing his claim against APD Andres, who Inmate insists acted
negligently in advising Inmate to waive a preliminary hearing and in failing to
advocate for a dismissal of the criminal charges because there had allegedly been a
finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing.10 This argument, too, is
meritless. The law is clear that any averment relating to ineffective assistance of
counsel may be pursued only in a proceeding in the original sentencing court under
the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (providing for post-conviction relief
where the defendant was convicted because of ineffective assistance of counsel); 42
Pa.C.S. § 9542 (stating that the PCRA provides “the sole means of obtaining
collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for
the same purpose that exist . . .”). Inmate’s claim against APD Andres could not be
asserted in a separate civil action. Therefore, it was properly dismissed.
10
We note the logical inconsistency between Inmate’s averment that he waived a
preliminary hearing and the averment that there was a finding of no probable cause made at a
preliminary hearing.
11
D. Failure to Dismiss by Magisterial District Judges
In his third assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by dismissing Inmate’s claims against MDJ Englesson and MDJ
Capobianco (MDJ Appellees). Inmate insists the MDJ Appellees acted without
jurisdiction and committed abuse of process by ordering Inmate’s detention, in that
Inmate had been arrested without a warrant or probable cause. In addition, in his
eleventh assertion of error, Inmate contends that MDJ Englesson issued process
without probable cause. Inmate’s assertions of error by the trial court are without
merit.
We agree with the trial court that MDJ Appellees are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity. See Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 367 (Pa.
2021) (quoting Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 405 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (stating
that “judicial immunity is not only immunity from damages, but also immunity from
suit” and declining to reach other issues, as judicial immunity was dispositive));
Wright v. Doyle (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 405 M.D. 2019, filed Mar. 7, 2023),11 slip op. at
4-5 (addressing issue of judicial immunity first because it barred not only liability,
but the suit itself, and declining to reach other preliminary objections where judicial
immunity was dispositive of the case). In Wright, this Court explained judicial
immunity as follows:
Judges are immune from liability for damages when
performing judicial acts, even if they err or perform an act
with malice, provided they do not lack jurisdiction.
Chasan [v. Platt, 244 A.3d 73,] 81 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)].
Thus, “[j]udicial immunity requires a two-part analysis:
first, whether the judge has performed a judicial act; and
second, whether the judge has some jurisdiction over the
11
This unreported decision is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of
this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
12
subject matter before [him].” Id. (citing Langella v.
Cercone, . . . 34 A.3d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. 2011) . . .).
The first part of the judicial immunity analysis is whether
the [j]udge[] performed a judicial act. When evaluating
whether an act is a judicial one, we consider “the nature of
the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.” Petition of Dwyer, . . . 406 A.2d 1355,
1361 ([Pa. ]1979) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 362 . . . (1978)).
....
The second part of the judicial immunity analysis is
whether the [j]udge[] had subject matter jurisdiction. The
Judicial Code[12] sets forth the subject matter jurisdiction
of the courts of common pleas. The Judicial Code states:
“Except where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action
or proceeding is by statute or by general rule adopted
pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of
matters) vested in another court of this Commonwealth,
the courts of common pleas shall have unlimited original
jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 931(a) . . . .
Id., slip op. at 4-5 (footnote omitted). Further, judicial immunity extends to
magisterial district judges as well as other judges. Heicklen v. Hoffman, 761 A.2d
207, 209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
Inmate attempts to avoid the effect of immunity by asserting that MDJ
Appellees acted without jurisdiction. We disagree. They clearly had subject matter
jurisdiction over Inmate’s criminal arraignment and preliminary hearing. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(4) (providing that magisterial district judges have subject matter
“to preside at arraignments, [to] fix and accept bail, . . . and to issue warrants and
12
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.
13
perform duties of a similar nature, including the jurisdiction of a committing
magistrate in all criminal proceedings”).
Inmate complains about the MDJ Appellees’ rulings, conduct, and
handling of his criminal case. However, all of the alleged conduct was performed
within the scope of their judicial duties and, thus, within the scope of their subject
matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the MDJ Appellees are entitled to absolute
immunity, and the trial court properly dismissed the claims levied against them.
E. Consent to Defense Representation
In his fourth assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court erred
in dismissing his claim against APD Light. Inmate avers that APD Light represented
him “fraudulently” by appearing at a bail reduction hearing on Inmate’s behalf
without Inmate’s prior knowledge or consent after CPD DiLuzio had obtained court
approval to withdraw from the case. Inmate’s entire argument on this issue is a
single paragraph containing a bare averment with no explanation or citation of
authority. Therefore, it is waived for failure to develop it in Inmate’s brief. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Blue Pilot Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 241 A.3d 1254,
1271 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting In re Condemnation ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 76
A.3d 101, 106 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (stating that “[a] party’s failure to develop an
issue in the argument section of its brief constitutes waiver of the issue”)).
Moreover, assuming that Inmate is suggesting that APD Light acted
improperly at the hearing, such a suggestion amounts to an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Such a claim cannot be brought outside of a PCRA
proceeding, as explained in Section C above. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9542 &
9543(a)(2)(ii).
14
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in dismissing Inmate’s claim
against APD Light.
F. Alleged Theft of Mail
In his fifth assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing Inmate’s claim that Clerk Fisher committed federal mail theft and mail
fraud by removing from the mailbox of the Northampton County Jail some mail that
Inmate had directed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Inmate further argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his claim
against Judge Sletvold, in that she allegedly acted outside her jurisdiction by
directing Clerk Fisher to steal Inmate’s mail and by ruling on matters directed to a
federal court. We discern no error in the trial court’s dismissal of these claims.
A plaintiff may not file a private complaint for violation of a federal
statute unless that statute creates a private cause of action. See Winton v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 263 A.3d 1240, 1244 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (explaining that an inmate was
prohibited from bringing a claim for violation of a federal statute that did not provide
a private right of action) (additional citation omitted). Here, there are no private
causes of action for alleged violations of federal laws regarding mail theft and mail
fraud. See Addlespurger v. Corbett, 461 Fed. App’x 82, 87 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating
that “there is no private cause of action for a violation of the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes . . .”); Ball v. Sisley, Civil No. 1:11-CV-877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71056, *2 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2012) (stating that “[t]he criminal offenses of theft and
obstruction of mail do not . . . provide for a private right of action for the violation
of these penal statutes”) (first citing Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823
F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987); and then citing Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal
15
Serv., 648 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1981)). Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing
Inmate’s claim against Clerk Fisher and Judge Sletvold relating to alleged mail theft
and fraud.
G. Prosecutorial Conduct of ADA Augustine and DA Morganelli
In his sixth, seventh, and eights assertions of error, Inmate maintains
that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against ADA Augustine and DA
Morganelli, both of whom, according to Inmate, committed improper acts. All of
these assertions of error are meritless, and we address them together.
As Inmate implicitly acknowledges, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity for any action taken in his official capacity. See Durham v. McElynn, 772
A.2d 68, 70 (Pa. 2001). As our Supreme Court explained in Durham,
[t]he public interest requires that district attorneys be able
to carry out their duties without being hampered by civil
suits claiming damages for actions taken in their official
capacities. The public would indeed suffer if the
prosecution of criminals were impeded, as would be the
case if district attorneys were not accorded absolute
immunity.
Id.Inmate posits that ADA Augustine acted outside his position and acted
as a police investigator by examining evidence and, while doing so, failing to sign
the proper form to preserve the chain of custody. We disagree. A district attorney’s
duties and responsibilities include investigating as well as prosecuting crimes. See,
e.g., Hoffman v. Borough of Macungie, 63 A.3d 461, 472 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)
(observing that the “broad discretion vested in [a district attorney’s] office to
investigate and prosecute crimes on behalf of the Commonwealth is indisputable”)
(emphasis added). Because ADA Augustine was performing his duty by
16
investigating the criminal charges against Inmate, he enjoyed absolute immunity
from suit relating to his conduct in doing so.
The other acts Inmate alleges by ADA Augustine and DA Morganelli,
such as improper treatment of evidence and acting without probable cause, even if
purportedly improper, related to the prosecution of Inmate’s criminal charges and,
therefore, fell squarely within the scope of their official duties. Accordingly, ADA
Augustine and DA Morganelli enjoyed absolute immunity, and the trial court did not
err in dismissing Inmate’s claims against them.
H. Transcript Claims
In his ninth assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing his claim that Judge Sletvold and Ct. Rep. Mengel acted together to alter
the transcript of Inmate’s pretrial hearing. He insists that Judge Sletvold denied his
suppression motion at the hearing but later stated that she had not ruled on it.
According to Inmate, the ruling was omitted from the pretrial hearing transcript. We
find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of this claim.
Regarding the claim against Judge Sletvold, she is entitled to absolute
judicial immunity for the reasons stated in Section D above. See Brooks, 259 A.3d
at 367; Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 405 n.11. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed
Inmate’s claim against Judge Sletvold.
Regarding the claim against Ct. Rep. Mengel, although this Court was
unable to locate any Pennsylvania state court decision on point, we find persuasive
the federal decisions ruling that a court reporter, as a judicial employee, is entitled
to qualified quasi-judicial immunity. For example, in Murrell v. Consiglio, 841 Fed.
App’x 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2021), the court distinguished Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
17
Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 434-37 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that a court reporter was not entitled to absolute judicial immunity; the Third Circuit
held in Murrell that, notwithstanding the Antoine holding, court reporters are still
entitled to qualified immunity. Murrell, 841 Fed. App’x at 360. The rationale for
immunizing court reporters is concern “that disappointed litigants, blocked by the
doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will vent their wrath on
clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.” Stout v. Naus, Civil No. 4:CV-
09-0380, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53063, *9 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2009) (additional
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Notably, the Murrell court relied on Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013,
1019 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a court reporter was entitled to qualified immunity for following a
judge’s alleged instruction to alter a transcript. See Murrell, 841 Fed. App’x at 360
(citing Green). This case is closely analogous. Here, Inmate alleges that Ct. Rep.
Mengel followed an instruction from Judge Sletvold to alter Inmate’s pretrial
hearing transcript. We find the holding of Green persuasive and likewise conclude
that a court reporter is immune from a claim based on allegedly following a judge’s
instruction to alter a transcript.
In addition, as this Court explained in Elkington v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 478 M.D. 2018, filed May 27, 2021),
a claim averring an improper omission from a transcript is subject to dismissal where
the claim asserts “no factual disputes that are authentic, real, or free from pretense
that would directly affect the outcome of th[e] matter . . . .” Id., slip op. at 16. Here,
Inmate maintains that Judge Sletvold denied his pretrial suppression motion but later
stated she had not ruled on such a motion. Inmate fails to explain what material
18
difference exists between denial of the motion and failure to rule on the motion that
would have directly affected the outcome of his criminal trial. Therefore, the trial
court properly dismissed Inmate’s claim against Judge Sletvold and Ct. Rep. Mengel
for this additional reason.
I. Arrest Warrant and Probable Cause
In his tenth assertion of error, Inmate argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing another claim by Inmate against Det. Munch. According to Inmate, Det.
Munch violated Inmate’s constitutional rights by falsely arresting and searching him
without either a warrant or probable cause, then failed to give Inmate a receipt and
maintain the chain of custody regarding cash that was seized from Inmate at the time
of his arrest. This claim is without merit.
As Det. Munch cogently explains in his brief,
[u]nder both [United States] Supreme Court and
Commonwealth Court precedent, a plaintiff seeking
damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment
or conviction must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, or declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determinations. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486-87 (1994); Weaver v. Franklin C[nty.], 918 A.2d
194, 202 (Pa. Cmw[l]th. 2007).
....
Any additional unconstitutional searches and seizures
allegedly performed by Det.[] Munch, as well as alleged
violations of police department evidence procedures, are
also Heck-barred. Keeling v. Att[’]y Gen[.] . . . , 575 Fed.
App’x 16, 18 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that Fourth
Amendment search and seizure[] claims were Heck-barred
where plaintiff claimed they resulted in his unlawful
conviction).
19
Br. for Det. Munch at 7-8. We agree with Det. Munch that Inmate may not bring a
collateral action alleging police violation of his constitutional rights resulting in his
conviction, where that conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, or declared invalid. See Heck. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in dismissing Inmate’s claim against Det. Munch.
J. Claims Against the Attorney General
Finally, although AG Shapiro is named in the caption and the
complaint, Inmate on appeal has not developed any assertion of error in the trial
court’s dismissal of the claim against AG Shapiro. Accordingly, we need not discuss
that claim.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Antonio Saunders, :
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
Michael Munch, Karen Mengel, :
John Morganelli, James Augustine, :
John Capobianco, Nick Englesson, :
Nuria DiLuzio, Edward Andres, :
Michael Light, Leigh Ann Fisher, :
Jamie Adams, BB&T Bank, : No. 102 C.D. 2023
Joshua Shapiro, and Jennifer Sletvold :
PER CURIAM ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Northampton County, dated September 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED.