Document Info

DocketNumber: 621 C.D. 2023

Judges: McCullough, J.

Filed Date: 3/6/2024

Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/6/2024

  •                  IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Borough of Pleasant Hills                      :
    :
    v.                            :   No. 621 C.D. 2023
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                  :   Argued: February 6, 2024
    Department of Transportation,                  :
    Appellant                    :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
    OPINION
    BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                         FILED: March 6, 2024
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
    (PennDOT) appeals from the May 23, 2023 judgment (Modified Verdict) entered in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) in favor of the Borough
    of Pleasant Hills (Borough) and finding that PennDOT is responsible for the stability
    of the slope of, and maintaining safe sight distances in an area located within the
    Borough adjacent to, State Route 51 (SR 51) and Pleasant Hills Boulevard. The trial
    court also granted the Borough’s request for damages as to its eminent domain de facto
    taking claim and referred the matter to the Board of Viewers to assess this award. On
    appeal, PennDOT challenges the trial court’s decision on multiple bases, including that
    the court lacked jurisdiction over this matter where original jurisdiction was vested in
    the Commonwealth Court, that its determination conflicted with provisions of the State
    Highway Law,1 and that the trial court erred in finding that PennDOT’s actions resulted
    1
    Act of June 1, 1945, P.L. 1242, as amended, 36 P.S. §§ 670-101 to 670-1102.
    in a de facto taking under the Eminent Domain Code (Code).2 Upon careful review,
    we affirm.
    I.      Background
    On January 17, 2018, the Borough filed a Complaint against PennDOT in
    the trial court seeking declaratory relief that it was responsible for the continued
    maintenance and repair of the slope located at the intersection of SR 51 and Pleasant
    Hills Boulevard and to restore the sight distance for vehicles traveling in that area.
    PennDOT filed preliminary objections to the Complaint, arguing that the trial court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions brought against
    the Commonwealth and that such actions are properly brought before this Court. The
    trial court granted the Borough leave to file an Amended Complaint, which the
    Borough filed in April of 2018, stating claims for negligence (Count I), eminent
    domain/de facto taking under the Code (Count II), alteration of lateral support (Count
    III), negligent alteration of lateral support (Count IV), trespass (Count V) and a request
    for a declaratory judgment (Count VI). (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 064a-080a.)
    PennDOT then filed preliminary objections again challenging the trial court’s
    jurisdiction over this matter, which the court overruled on June 11, 2018.
    The trial court granted the Borough leave to file a Second Amended
    Complaint to request appointment of a Board of Viewers pursuant to Section 502 of
    the Code,3 which the Borough filed on June 29, 2018.                      The Second Amended
    Complaint included the same counts as its previous filing and amended the eminent
    domain/de facto taking claim at Count II to request the appointment of a Board of
    2
    26 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-1106.
    3
    Section 502(c)(1) of the Code allows a property owner that asserts that its property interest
    has been condemned without the filing of a declaration of taking to file a petition for the appointment
    of a board of viewers setting forth the factual basis of the petition. 26 Pa. C.S. § 502(c)(1).
    2
    Viewers to assess appropriate damages. (R.R. at 112a-30a.) On July 19, 2018,
    PennDOT filed an Answer, which included a New Matter and Preliminary Objections
    to Count II of the Second Amended Complaint. PennDOT lodged several preliminary
    objections to the Borough’s request for the appointment of a Board of Viewers and
    requested that the trial court dismiss the petition with prejudice. (R.R. at 144a-62a.)
    The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial on May 29, 2019, at which
    several witnesses testified including PennDOT engineer Dean Poleti, public works
    superintendent for the Borough Jamie Smith and engineer for the Borough Jason
    Stanton. Mr. Poleti testified that PennDOT widened SR 51 in the 1950s by increasing
    its width from 30 to 54 feet as a result of a condemnation in the area of Pleasant Hills
    Boulevard, and that this condemnation was recorded in the office of the Allegheny
    County Recorder of Deeds. (R.R. at 208a-10a.) This modification changed the grade
    of the area and altered the slope adjacent to SR 51 that supported Pleasant Hills
    Boulevard, making the incline steeper. (R.R. at 210a-11a.) With respect to the sight
    distances, Mr. Poleti recognized that there is impairment at the intersection, and the
    traffic study PennDOT obtained showed that, whether a driver is entering or exiting
    Pleasant Hills Boulevard onto SR 51, the sight distances in both the left and right
    directions were inadequate. (R.R. at 214a-15a, 219a.)
    In addition to the issue of sight distance, Mr. Poleti relayed that PennDOT
    removed the toe of the slope between SR 51and Pleasant Hills Boulevard and installed
    a storm drain. Mr. Poleti testified that the slope provided lateral support for Pleasant
    Hills Boulevard, that the area is located within PennDOT’s right-of-way, and that to
    his knowledge the Borough had not taken any actions that would have altered or
    affected the stability of the slope. (R.R. at 222a, 226a-31a.) Mr. Poleti confirmed that
    3
    Pleasant Hills Boulevard existed prior to SR 51, and that when SR 51 was constructed
    it cut the Boulevard in half.
    Mr. Smith testified that Pleasant Hills Boulevard is one of the roads that
    he maintained and that, in his experience, drivers need to be as careful as possible when
    trying to access or pull out of the roadway. He stated that because the steep slope
    makes it difficult to see approaching traffic, turning out of the roadway for some
    vehicles can be a “harrowing experience.” (R.R. at 238a.) Mr. Smith testified that he
    reviewed records relative to whether the Borough had taken any action to alter the slope
    or grade at the intersection, and he found no indication that the Borough had made
    modifications. (R.R. at 239a-40a, 247a.) He recalled that the road began to deteriorate
    to a substantial degree in June of 2017, and that the slope has continued to move
    downhill. Mr. Smith relayed that PennDOT did not respond to the Borough’s requests
    that it address the stability of the slope located within its right-of-way and that the
    Borough has sustained damage to the berm and guardrail along Pleasant Hills
    Boulevard necessitating the installation of orange safety fencing and lighted barricades
    as the road continued to erode. (R.R. at 245a-46a, 248a.)
    Borough Engineer Mr. Stanton opined within a reasonable degree of
    professional certainty that PennDOT’s widening of the roadway caused the dangerous
    condition of sight distance impairment, and that PennDOT had a duty to fix that
    condition. (R.R. at 314a-15a.) He saw no evidence that the Borough undertook any
    action to cause the sight distance issue. (R.R. at 315a.) Mr. Stanton further opined that
    PennDOT caused the dangerous condition of the erosion of the slope/removal of lateral
    support, and that PennDOT was responsible for remediating this condition. (R.R. at
    315a.) He explained that the Borough would not be able to perform any maintenance
    4
    in this area without PennDOT’s permission, as it would need to obtain a highway
    occupancy permit (HOP) to enter PennDOT’s right-of-way. (R.R. at 317a.)
    On April 18, 2022, after visiting the intersection, the trial court issued a
    verdict granting the Borough’s request for a declaratory judgment providing that
    PennDOT is solely responsible for the condition of the area, for the continued
    maintenance and repair of the slope, and for restoring the sight distance. In the
    alternative, the trial court granted relief in favor of the Borough and against PennDOT
    in the amount of $350,000. The trial court additionally granted the Borough’s request
    for damages pursuant to Count II of the Second Amended Complaint and referred this
    matter to the Board of Viewers for an award of damages. (R.R. at 525a.)
    PennDOT filed post-trial motions which the trial court denied on May 23,
    2023, with the exception of PennDOT’s request to strike the alternative relief. The trial
    court amended the verdict “to reflect its agreement that the Borough was not seeking
    monetary damages in the amount to effectuate repairs, only that PennDOT is
    responsible for the repairs of the slope and correction of the sight distance deficiency.”
    (PennDOT’s Br., App. A). The trial court’s Modified Verdict provided:
    The [trial c]ourt finds in favor of the Borough of
    Pleasant Hills on the request for Declaratory Judgment.
    [PennDOT], and not the Borough of Pleasant Hills, is
    responsible for the condition of the area and for the continued
    maintenance and repair of the slope between State Route 51
    [SR 51] and Pleasant Hills Boulevard. [PennDOT] is solely
    responsible to restore the stability of this slope and to restore
    sight distance for vehicles entering and exiting Pleasant Hills
    Boulevard.
    In addition, the Borough’s request for damages in
    Count II of the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED
    and this matter is referred to the Board of Viewers for an
    5
    award of damages, as set forth in Count II of the Second
    Amended Complaint.
    Id., App. B.
    PennDOT appealed from the Modified Verdict and complied with the trial
    court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The trial court filed its
    Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 27, 2023.4
    II. Discussion
    A. Original Jurisdiction
    PennDOT first challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case and
    argues that this Court, and not the trial court, had original jurisdiction to hear it.5
    PennDOT argues that, pursuant to Section 761 of the Judicial Code,6 this Court has
    4
    With respect to the appealability of the Modified Verdict, we note that preliminary objections
    are the exclusive method under the Code of raising objections to a petition for the appointment of a
    board of viewers alleging a de facto taking. Genter v. Blair County Convention & Sports Facilities
    Authority, 
    805 A.2d 51
    , 54 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); see also 26 Pa. C.S. § 504(d)(1) (providing that
    “[a]ny objection to the appointment of viewers may be raised by preliminary objections filed within
    30 days after receipt of notice of the appointment of viewers). In that regard, preliminary objections
    in de facto taking cases render final and appealable a trial court order overruling preliminary
    objections to a petition for the appointment of viewers, such that where a party fails to file preliminary
    objections, we lack jurisdiction to consider that party’s appeal. Gerg v. Township of Fox, 
    107 A.3d 849
    , 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
    Here, PennDOT did file the requisite preliminary objections, albeit as part of the same
    document as its Answer to the Second Amended Complaint. Because Section 504 of the Code does
    not require any specific form of preliminary objections, we conclude that PennDOT has complied
    with its obligation under the Code, and that the Modified Verdict referring this matter to the Board of
    Viewers effectively overruled the preliminary objections and is a final, appealable order.
    5
    Because this appeal concerns issues of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory
    interpretation, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Scott v.
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 
    284 A.3d 178
    , 185–86 (Pa. 2022).
    6
    Section 761 states in relevant part as follows:
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    6
    exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions brought against the
    Commonwealth, and that because the core of the Borough’s complaint is a declaratory
    judgment action regarding the maintenance/sight distance responsibility of the slope
    area, its complaint was improperly filed in the trial court. (PennDOT’s Br., at 15-21.)
    We begin by observing that this Court has original jurisdiction in only a
    narrow class of cases. Stackhouse v. Commonwealth, 
    832 A.2d 1004
    , 1007 (Pa. 2003)
    (plurality). That class is defined by Section 761 of the Judicial Code, which provides
    that, as a general rule, the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction in cases
    asserted against “the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting
    in his official capacity.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1). However, this rule is subject to
    certain enumerated exceptions, including that this Court does not have original
    jurisdiction over actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 85 (setting forth
    exceptions to sovereign immunity) relating to the creating of a dangerous condition7
    and to actions concerning eminent domain proceedings.
    (a) General rule.—The Commonwealth Court shall have original
    jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:
    (1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer
    thereof, acting in his official capacity except: . . .
    (ii) eminent domain proceedings;
    (iii) actions or proceedings conducted pursuant to Chapter 85 (relating
    to matters affecting government units)[.]
    42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(ii)-(iii).
    7
    As the trial court observed, Section 8522(b)(4) of Chapter 85 is included in Section 761 as
    an exception to the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to which the
    Commonwealth may be held liable for:
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    7
    Our Supreme Court’s decision in Stackhouse is instructive. In Stackhouse,
    the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against her employer, the Pennsylvania State
    Police, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by an improper internal
    investigation by her supervisors, and she sought injunctive relief in addition to money
    damages. Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1005-06. The court of common pleas concluded
    that it lacked jurisdiction over the complaint and transferred the case to this Court
    which disagreed, noting that the complaint was essentially a “tort action in the nature
    of trespass for money damages as redress for an unlawful injury” and, therefore, fell
    outside of this Court’s original jurisdiction. Id. at 1006.
    On appeal, our Supreme Court found that “the sum and substance of [the
    plaintiff’s] complaint, then, [was] that her privacy and reputational interests were
    invaded when state police officials unlawfully delved into her intimate inter-personal
    relationship during an internal affairs investigation, and that she [was] entitled to
    compensation accordingly.” Id. at 1008. The Supreme Court concluded that the equity
    cause of action was based on the same factual allegations as the tort claims for
    defamation/invasion of privacy and that under these circumstances, “the inclusion of a
    count for declaratory or injunctive relief premised upon the same events cannot
    properly be understood to transform the complaint from one sounding in trespass into
    the type of matter contemplated . . . by the Legislature, as belonging within the
    A dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate
    and sidewalks, including Commonwealth-owned real property,
    leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and
    Commonwealth-owned real property leased by a Commonwealth
    agency to private persons, and highways under the jurisdiction of a
    Commonwealth agency, except conditions described in paragraph (5).
    42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(4); (see also Trial Ct. Op., at 3.)
    8
    Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
    determined that the matter had properly been filed in the court of common pleas.
    Here, as in Stackhouse, the allegations and circumstances upon which the
    Borough’s negligence, de facto taking, and equitable claims are based are the same.
    The inclusion of a count for declaratory relief in a multi-count complaint cannot
    transform this action from one sounding in negligence/de facto taking into one
    belonging in this Court’s narrow original jurisdiction. Therefore, we conclude that the
    core of the Borough’s complaint is a tort and eminent domain action seeking monetary
    damages and, as such, is an action over which this Court lacks original jurisdiction
    under Section 761 of the Judicial Code. See id.
    We also emphasize that in cases where the plaintiff seeks both equitable
    relief and money damages that it “is not our function to ignore a portion of [the] request
    for relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this Court, a court of limited
    original jurisdiction, rather than in the common pleas court, a court of broad original
    jurisdiction.” Miles v. Beard, 
    847 A.2d 161
    , 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Adopting such
    an approach would run contrary to the precept that in determining whether this Court
    has original jurisdiction over a matter we must consider that such cases are appealable
    as of right to our Supreme Court, and the efficient administration of justice is not well
    served when that Court is forced to hear collateral matters because “such an
    interpretation of its jurisdiction would crowd cases involving important and unique
    issues from its allocatur docket.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that
    jurisdiction was properly vested in the trial court on this basis as well.
    9
    B. State Highway Law
    PennDOT next argues that the trial court ignored the plain language of
    Section 513 of the State Highway Law8 in assigning maintenance responsibilities for
    the slope to PennDOT. According to PennDOT, this provision authorizes the Secretary
    of Transportation to determine the scope and type of maintenance activities PennDOT
    will perform on state highways located within boroughs and that PennDOT has
    historically exercised this authority by assuming maintenance responsibility for
    roadway features between curb lines—which it refers to as its “curb-to-curb policy.”
    (PennDOT’s Br., at 21-27.)
    Section 513 of the State Highway Law provides that PennDOT “shall, at
    the expense of the Commonwealth improve or reconstruct and maintain all State
    highways within boroughs and incorporated towns, to such width and of such type as
    shall be determined by the secretary.” 36 P.S. § 670-513. However, in asserting that
    it is vested with exclusive authority to determine the extent of its own maintenance
    responsibilities, PennDOT wholly ignores the testimony at trial which established that
    it condemned the area at issue and that its modifications to the roadway caused the
    dangerous conditions. As the trial court aptly explained:
    [PennDOT’s] position since at least 1999 is that neither [the
    slope nor sight distance] issues were PennDOT’s
    responsibility. [PennDOT] bases its position merely upon
    the law which restricts its maintenance responsibility in the
    Borough from “curb to curb.” That argument simply leaves
    an area outside the curb but within its own right of way that
    [PennDOT] need not maintain. However, in this case, it is
    not a question of general maintenance but of [PennDOT’s]
    direct damage to the slope’s lateral support that is the
    question.
    8
    36 P.S. § 670-513.
    10
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 4.)
    We agree with the trial court’s assessment and find no merit in
    PennDOT’s contention that the Modified Verdict assigning it responsibility to maintain
    the condition of an area in its own right-of-way as a result of condemnation conflicts
    with Section 513.
    With respect to the trial court’s ruling requiring PennDOT to restore safe
    sight distances at the intersection, PennDOT contends that the trial court’s decision
    runs contrary to Section 420 of the State Highway Law. (PennDOT’s Br., at 27-31.)
    PennDOT points to the following provisions, which address the issuance of permits:
    (b) The secretary may issue permits for the opening of streets
    and driveways onto State highways and for the opening of
    the surface and occupancy of State highways on terms and
    conditions established in department regulations.
    ....
    (2) No person, municipality or municipality authority shall
    open a driveway onto a State highway or open the surface of
    or occupy a State highway without a permit.
    36 P.S. § 670-420(b)(2).
    Despite its reliance on Section 420, PennDOT simultaneously maintains
    that the “issuance of an HOP or the Borough’s unpermitted connection to the state
    highway system are not at issue in the present matter” and that “what is at issue is the
    question of which party has the responsibility for ensuring adequate sight distance[.]”
    (PennDOT’s Br., at 29.) We agree. As the trial court explained with respect to the
    responsibility for maintaining safe sight distance:
    [PennDOT’s] argument [] ignores the fact that it is not so
    much a condition of maintenance but [PennDOT’s] direct
    creation on the access by significantly reducing sight
    11
    distance safety when it widened SR 51 and reduced safe
    access to SR 51 from Pleasant Hills Boulevard. . . .
    [I]t has been recognized by PennDOT and validated by
    traffic studies performed at the behest of PennDOT that there
    has been a problem with sight distance since the widening.
    As a result of PennDOT’s study it was determined that
    whether entering or exiting Pleasant Hills Boulevard onto SR
    51, the sight distance on both the left and right direction was
    not sufficient. This is because of PennDOT’s widening of
    SR 51 as the sight distance was adequate prior to PennDOT’s
    alterations. . . .
    It is also expert witness opinion that PennDOT had a duty to
    maintain an area where [it] created a dangerous condition.
    And that the dangerous condition of the sight distance was
    created by PennDOT.
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 4-6) (record citations omitted).
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that PennDOT’s argument that the
    trial court’s ruling on the sight distance issue somehow conflicts with Section 413
    governing the issuance of permits lacks merit.
    C. De Facto Taking
    PennDOT next challenges the trial court’s decision with respect to the
    Borough’s de facto taking claim at Count II of the Second Amended Complaint and
    the trial court’s appointment of a Board of Viewers to assess damages. PennDOT’s
    argument is twofold in that it asserts that the Borough was required to file a separate
    action under the Code rather than include it in a multi-count complaint and that it failed
    to meet its burden of proving a de facto taking as a result of PennDOT’s conduct.
    (PennDOT’s Br., at 31-39.)
    With respect to its argument that the Borough was required to bring its de
    facto taking claim as a separate action, PennDOT relies on a footnote in Peters
    12
    Township v. Russell, 
    121 A.3d 1147
    , 1152 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), which states that
    “a de facto condemnation claim is not an affirmative defense” and cannot “be presented
    as a counterclaim but only as a separate petition that conforms to the Eminent Domain
    Code.” (PennDOT’s Br., at 33.)
    Here, however, the underlying procedural posture did not involve a
    defendant raising a de facto taking claim as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s
    complaint or as a counterclaim. Rather, the Borough included it as one of several bases
    for recovery in a multi-count complaint. As PennDOT has cited no authority to support
    its contention that the Borough was prohibited from including its de facto taking claim
    as part of its broader complaint resting on the same allegations, this issue merits no
    relief.
    PennDOT lastly contends the trial court erred in finding that the Borough
    met its heavy burden of establishing a de facto taking with regard to its property.
    PennDOT describes the Borough’s damage claims as minimal at best and it argues that
    the Borough failed to demonstrate that exceptional circumstances deprived it of the
    beneficial use and enjoyment of its property or that any damages were caused by
    PennDOT’s conduct. (PennDOT’s Br., at 34-39.)
    In order to prove a de facto taking, the property owner must
    establish exceptional circumstances that substantially
    deprived him of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his
    property. This deprivation must be caused by the actions of
    an entity with eminent domain powers. Also, the damages
    sustained must be an immediate, necessary and unavoidable
    consequence of the exercise on the entity’s eminent domain
    powers. A de facto taking is not a physical seizure of
    property; rather, it is an interference with one of the rights of
    ownership that substantially deprives the owner of the
    beneficial use of his property. The beneficial use of the
    13
    property includes not only its present use, but all potential
    uses, including its highest and best use.
    Property owners alleging a de facto taking bear a heavy
    burden of proof. . . . Further, there is no bright line test to
    determine when a government action results in a de facto
    taking; each case turns on its own facts.
    York Road Realty Company, L.P. v. Cheltenham Township, 
    136 A.3d 1047
    , 1050-51
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation and emphasis omitted).
    The trial court in the instant case found that the Borough met this standard
    and explained its rationale as follows:
    It was conclusively established in testimony and
    documentary evidence at trial [] and not disputed that
    [PennDOT] condemned the area at issue which was widened
    and the condemnations were recorded in the recorder of
    deeds of Allegheny County. [PennDOT] condemned the
    area at issue and they are responsible for it. According to 26
    Pa.C.S. Section 714 of the Eminent Domain Code all
    condemners shall be liable for damages to the property
    abutting the area of the improvement resulting from change
    of a road or highway, permanent interference with access or
    injury to surface support, whether or not the property is
    taken.[9]
    Evidence at trial was more than adequate to establish that
    PennDOT exercised its control over the area it condemned
    for its improvements. It alone was responsible for the work
    there and for the extensive and permanent damage to the
    roadway in question and access to it. Those damages it left
    unaddressed as the department let the chips fall where they
    may. [PennDOT] denied any responsibility for creating
    these dangerous conditions in the face of overwhelming
    9
    Section 714 of the Code states: “All condemnors, including the Commonwealth, shall be
    liable for damages to property abutting the area of an improvement resulting from change of grade of
    a road or highway, permanent interference with access or injury to surface support, whether or not
    any property is taken.” 26 Pa. C.S. § 714.
    14
    evidence to the contrary throughout the trial. In conclusion,
    the findings that [PennDOT] is responsible for the damage to
    the slope supporting Pleasant Hills Boulevard, and the
    dangerous sight distance problem at the access to SR 51
    should be affirmed.
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 6-7.)
    After review, we agree with the trial court’s determination that
    exceptional circumstances did exist that impacted the Borough’s beneficial use and
    enjoyment of its property and that the dangerous sight distance at the intersection and
    erosion to the slope were caused by PennDOT’s actions. Accordingly, the Borough
    sustained its burden of establishing that a de facto taking occurred with respect to its
    property. PennDOT’s argument to the contrary lacks merit.
    For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s May 23, 2023 Modified
    Verdict.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    15
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Borough of Pleasant Hills            :
    :
    v.                      :    No. 621 C.D. 2023
    :
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
    Department of Transportation,        :
    Appellant          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 6th day of March, 2024, the May 23, 2023 judgment
    entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge