The Hoopskirts Lofts Condominium Association v. V. Vurimindi and A. Boris ~ Appeal of: V. Vurmindi

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
The Hoopskirts Lofts Condominium :
Association :
:
v. : No. 1430 C.D. 2018
:
Vamsidhar Vurimindi and Ann S. : Submitted: March 8, 2024
Boris :
:
Appeal of: Vamsidhar Vurimindi :
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: March 28, 2024
Vamsidhar Vurimindi (Vurimindi) appeals, pro se, from the October
16, 2018 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court),
which denied Vurimindi’s Second Motion to Strike Default Judgment entered in a
foreclosure action. Upon review, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
On February 15, 2008, Vurimindi and his now ex-wife, Ann S. Boris
(Boris), purchased Condominium Unit 607, located in the Hoopskirt Factory Lofts
at 309-313 Arch Street in Philadelphia. On December 16, 2013, while Vurimindi
was incarcerated1 at the Philadelphia Detention Center, the Hoopskirt Lofts
Condominium Association (Association) filed a complaint in foreclosure to recover
unpaid condominium fees against Vurimindi and Boris, as co-owners, of the unit.
The Association filed an affidavit of service stating that on January 7, 2014, the
1
On February 4, 2012, Vurimindi was arrested and charged with two counts of stalking
two of his condominium neighbors and one count of disorderly conduct and sentenced to a two-
to-five-year period of incarceration, followed by five years of probation.
foreclosure complaint was served upon Vurimindi by handing a copy of the
complaint to an individual named Lieutenant J. Smith at the Philadelphia Detention
Center where Vurimindi was incarcerated. Vurimindi failed to file a responsive
pleading to the complaint. As a result, on January 31, 2014, the Association served
Vurimindi by certified mail to the Philadelphia Detention Center a notice of its intent
to file a praecipe to enter default judgment. On February 11, 2014, the trial court’s
prothonotary entered default judgment against Vurimindi upon the Association’s
filing of the praecipe.
On February 23, 2015, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the
claims against Boris. Vurimindi was transported to the courthouse to testify as a fact
witness. Following the bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
Association, awarded damages against both Boris and Vurimindi totaling
$29,506.18, and permitted the Association to sell the unit under Section 3315(a) of
the Uniform Condominium Act.2
On June 4, 2015, Vurimindi filed a motion to strike the default
judgment,3 arguing, inter alia, that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter
the default judgment because he was not served with the complaint.
2
68 Pa. C.S. § 3315(a).
3
A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which operates as a demurrer
to the record. Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Phillips, 276 A.3d 268, 273-
74 (Pa. Super. 2022). A petition to strike a default judgment will only be granted where a fatal
defect appears on the face of the record. Navarro v. George, 615 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1992). See e.g., Grady v. Nelson, 286 A.3d 259, 264 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that a fatal defect
existed on the face of the record at the time of entry of judgment as evidenced by the sheriff’s
return of service indicating that address did not exist). A fatal defect on the face of the record
denies the prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. Erie Insurance Co. v. Bullard, 839 A.2d
383, 388 (Pa. Super. 2003). When a prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment
is void ab initio. Id. “When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face of the record for the
purposes of a petition to strike a judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2
On June 30, 2015, the trial court denied the motion to strike. The trial
court rejected Vurimindi’s claim that he was not properly served with the complaint,
noting that Vurimindi testified that he “had not been able to respond to the
[Association’s] filings [the complaint and notice of default] because he had not been
afforded sufficient access to the prison law library,” and also that there was nothing
facially invalid with service of the complaint upon Lieutenant J. Smith at the
Philadelphia Detention Center. The Hoopskirt Lofts Condominium Association v.
Vurimindi (C.P. Phila., 1973 December Term 2013, filed February 1, 2017), at 5, 8.
The trial court explained:
Per the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, a litigant
can properly serve original process by transmitting a hard
copy of [his] Complaint, via personal service, to an adult
person in charge of the residence where a defendant
resides. Pa.R.Civ.P. 402(a)(2). Here, Vurimindi admitted
that, at the time of service, he was incarcerated at the
Philadelphia Detention Center, and thus, from a
commonsense standpoint, was unable to have the
Complaint handed to him directly by the process server.
Rather, service had to go through an intermediary,
presumably a prison employee. [The Association’s]
Affidavit of Service states that service was made at 8201
State Road, Philadelphia, PA, the Philadelphia Detention
Center’s address, upon an individual name Lieutenant J.
Smith, who this Court reasonably assumed to be a
correctional officer. This Court could not look beyond
those facts reflected on the record and, as such, determined
that [the Association’s] service of its Complaint was not
facially improper.
the judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa.
1997). Matters outside of the record will not be considered, and if the record is self-sustaining,
the judgment will not be stricken. Keller v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2013).
3
The Hoopskirt Lofts Condominium Association v. Vurimindi (C.P. Phila., 1973
December Term 2013, filed February 1, 2017), at 9. Vurimindi, proceeding pro se,
appealed from that order.4 One of the findings that Vurimindi challenged was the
trial court’s conclusion that he had received the foreclosure complaint. By order and
memorandum opinion filed on October 10, 2017, this Court affirmed the trial court’s
order by adopting the trial court’s opinion in its entirety. Hoopskirts Lofts
Condominium Association v. Vurimindi (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 15-18 C.D. 2016, Nos.
157-160 C.D. 2016, filed October 10, 2017) (unreported). With regard to service of
the complaint, we specifically concluded that Vurimindi “did not contest service” of
the complaint, stating instead that “he did not respond to the Association’s lawsuit
because he did not have sufficient access to the prison library.” Id. at 3, n.5. We
quoted the exchange between the trial court and Vurimindi during which the trial
court noted that there was proof that Vurimindi had received the complaint and the
default judgment and Vurimindi’s response stating that the reason he did not respond
was because he did not have library access. Id.On October 20, 2017, Vurimindi filed a petition for reargument,
arguing among other things, that this Court erred by adopting the trial court’s
conclusion that he was served with the foreclosure complaint because: (1) he swore
under oath that he did not receive it; and (2) under Philadelphia Prison System Policy
3.F.8 (Inmate Legal Mail)5 correctional officers are not authorized to accept original
4
Vurimindi’s appeal from the trial court’s June 30, 2015 order denying his motion to strike
the default judgment was consolidated with his appeals from the trial court’s orders denying his
petition to open the default judgment, motion to stay writ of execution, motions to postpone the
sheriff’s sale, and motion to appeal nunc pro tunc. Hoopskirts Lofts Condominium Association v.
Vurimindi (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 15-18 C.D. 2016, and Nos. 157-160 C.D. 2016, filed October 10,
2017).
5
The Policy states, with regard to incoming legal mail:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
4
process on an inmate’s behalf. On December 4, 2017, this Court denied the petition
for reargument. Vurimindi petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court.
On July 2, 2018, the Supreme Court denied Vurimindi’s petition for allowance of
appeal.
On August 8, 2018, Vurimindi filed a second motion to strike the
default judgment in the trial court based on “newly discovered” evidence of “fraud
and mistake.” (Original Record (O.R.) at 1059.) Therein, Vurimindi set forth
essentially the same allegations as he had in his first motion to strike, namely that he
was not served with the foreclosure complaint. In addition, Vurimindi attached a
copy of Philadelphia Prison System Policy 3.F.8 and alleged that, pursuant to that
policy, Lieutenant J. Smith was not authorized to accept original service on behalf
of inmates at the Philadelphia Detention Center because he neither worked in the
mailroom or in the housing unit where Vurimindi was housed. Id. at 1065. The trial
For incoming legal mail the Mailroom Officer will maintain a Daily
Log of Legal Mail for inmates. The log will contain the following
information: date and time; housing location; PID number; inmate’s
name; address of sender; inmate[’]s signature of receipt; and
Officer’s initials.
The unit/housing Officer will maintain a record of legal mail
delivered to inmates in the unit. A Daily Legal Mail Report . . . for
delivered legal mail will consist of the following information: date
and time; housing location; PID number; inmate’s name; address of
sender; inmate[’]s signature of receipt; and Officer’s initials.
The unit/housing Officer will have the inmate sign for the legal mail
upon delivery. If the inmate refuses to acknowledge receipt by
signature, the Officer will put “refused” in the signature box and
delivery the legal mail to the inmate.
(Original Record (O.R.) at 1076.)
5
court denied the second motion to strike in its order entered on October 16, 2018,
based upon the law of the case doctrine.
On appeal,6 Vurimindi argues that the trial court erred in denying his
second motion to strike because Philadelphia Prison System Policy 3.F.8 plainly
shows that the Association’s foreclosure complaint was served upon a prison
correctional officer who was not authorized to accept service of the original
complaint. (Vurimindi’s Br. at 4, 19.) He argues that this newly discovered
evidence of defective service demonstrates the lack of his actual or constructive
notice of the foreclosure action. He maintains that because he was not properly
served with notice of the complaint, the trial court did not obtain the requisite
personal jurisdiction needed for the entry of the default judgment. Therefore, the
default judgment should be stricken.7
Relying on Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (Pa. 1995),
Vurimindi further contends that the law of the case doctrine is not applicable here
because the doctrine can be disregarded in exceptional circumstances where there is
intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or
evidence giving to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly
erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.
6
Vurimindi filed his Notice of Appeal on October 24, 2018. On December 18, 2018,
Vurimindi was detained by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USICE). In
January 2019, we granted a stay of the briefing schedule based on Vurimindi’s immigration
detention. On March 10, 2023, we vacated the stay after Vurimindi informed the Court that he
regained lawful permanent resident status and is no longer subject to immigration detention.
7
We precluded the Association and Boris from filing briefs in this matter for failing to
comply with our July 6, 2023 order directing them to file briefs within 14 days of that order.
6
II. Discussion8
Law of the Case Doctrine
The law of the case doctrine exists to prevent a party from relitigating
claims or issues that have been resolved previously within the same action, either in
a prior appeal or by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction. Zane v. Friends Hospital,
836 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 2003). The doctrine prohibits an appellate court from revisiting
an issue that has been decided in an earlier appeal or another phase of the same case
between the same parties. Application of Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 715
A.2d 1219, 1223, n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998); Tandon v. State Board of Medicine, 705
A.2d 1338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). In Tandon, we cited Tyro Industries, Inc. v. James
A. Wood, Inc., 614 A.2d 279, 284 (Pa. Super. 1992), in which the Superior Court
described the law of the case doctrine as follows:
Law of the case means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of the decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be
the law of the case. Banker v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., []
585 A.2d 504, 508 ([Pa. Super.] 1991)[]. The doctrine of
‘law of the case’ applies only if the parties on the two
appeals are the same. Issues decided by an appellate court
on a prior appeal between the same parties become the law
of the case and will not be considered on appeal. Id.Here, this Court has already affirmed the trial court’s factual conclusion
that Vurimindi received the foreclosure complaint because it was supported by
substantial evidence, namely Vurimindi’s own concession at trial that he received
the complaint and notice of default judgment but did not respond to those filings
because he did not have access to the prison library. That is, the factual issue of
8
This Court’s review of a grant of a petition to strike a default judgment is limited to
determining whether the trial court committed an error of law. City of Philadelphia v. David J.
Lane Advertising, Inc., 33 A.3d 674, 677 n.6. (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
7
whether Vurimindi received service of the foreclosure complaint was finally
resolved by this Court. We also, when we denied Vurimindi’s application for
reargument, previously rejected Vurimindi’s bald argument that Philadelphia Prison
System Policy 3.F.8 plainly forbade Lieutenant Smith from accepting service of
original foreclosure complaint on his behalf. The law of the case doctrine applies
here to preclude this Court from readdressing our prior affirmation. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied Vurimindi’s Second Motion
to Strike the Default Judgment.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err as a
matter of law or manifestly abuse its discretion in denying Vurimindi’s Second
Motion to Strike Default Judgment. The trial court’s October 16, 2018 order is
affirmed.
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
The Hoopskirts Lofts Condominium :
Association :
:
v. : No. 1430 C.D. 2018
:
Vamsidhar Vurimindi and Ann S. :
Boris :
:
Appeal of: Vamsidhar Vurimindi :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of March, 2024, the October 16, 2018 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby AFFIRMED.