J. Coats v. DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Justin Coats, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 329 M.D. 2022
: Submitted: March 10, 2023
Department of Corrections, :
:
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: October 2, 2023
Justin Coats (Petitioner) has filed a petition for review seeking
mandamus and declaratory relief in this Court’s original jurisdiction. Petitioner
requests that an adverse disciplinary decision reached by the Department of
Corrections (Department) be rescinded and a new disciplinary hearing be granted.
In response, the Department has filed preliminary objections asserting this Court’s
lack of jurisdiction and Petitioner’s failure to state a claim. To the extent the
Department asserts this Court’s lack of appellate jurisdiction, we sustain the
Department’s preliminary objection. Conversely, we overrule its preliminary
objection to this Court’s original jurisdiction because the Department has not
formulated clear and specific grounds for our review. Nevertheless, after careful
review, we sua sponte conclude that Petitioner has failed to invoke this Court’s
original jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review with
prejudice.1
I. BACKGROUND2
Petitioner is an inmate at State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Greene.
On October 11, 2021, a correctional officer attempted to conduct a parole urinalysis
on Petitioner. Petitioner stated that he was unable to urinate. Instead of waiting for
the officer to return, Petitioner went out to “morning yard,” i.e., one hour of
recreational time. Petitioner received a misconduct for refusing to provide a urine
sample in violation of DOC policy regarding urinalysis testing. Following a hearing,
the misconduct was upheld. Thereafter, Petitioner learned that the parole board had
denied his automatic reparole due to the misconduct. See Pet. for Rev., 6/15/22, Ex.
E (“Inmate’s Request to Staff Member,” 11/12/21).
Petitioner filed a grievance regarding the decision, denying that he had
refused to give a urinalysis sample. Following an initial review, the DOC denied
Petitioner’s grievance. See id., Ex. C (“Initial Review Response,” 1/4/22, at 1). The
chief hearing examiner of the Department denied Petitioner’s appeal, concluding
that Petitioner had not raised a specific issue and that the grievance appeal process
is not an opportunity to receive a new hearing on the merits. See id., Ex. G (letter
resp., 4/1/22, at 1). Further, according to the chief examiner, the findings of the
hearing examiner were supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. See id.
1
Based on our disposition, we need not consider the Department’s preliminary objection
by demurrer.
2
We base the statement of facts on those alleged in the petition for review. See Pet. for
Rev., 6/15/22. Additionally, Petitioner attached a number of documents as exhibits to his petition;
all citations to said exhibits are specifically noted. See Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308,
310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (observing that courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only
consider the facts pleaded in the petition for review, but also any documents or exhibits attached
to it).
2
Petitioner filed a series of additional grievances, complaining that he
was denied due process in the disciplinary proceedings because he was not provided
copies of the policies he had violated. He also argued that he had a learning disability
that impacted his ability to read, understand instructions, and understand prison
policy. All of his grievances were denied. See, e.g., id., Ex. I (“Initial Review
Response,” 1/7/22).
Subsequently, Petitioner filed the instant petition for review, addressed
to this Court’s original jurisdiction, raising counts in mandamus and declaratory
judgment. In response, the Department filed preliminary objections, arguing that to
the extent Petitioner seeks appellate review of past misconduct procedures, those
claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because 1) agency policies do not
create enforceable rights and 2) due to disclaimer language present in the
Department’s policy, there is no claim arising from said policy. See Prelim. Objs.,
7/22/22, ¶¶ 1-19. The Department also raised an objection in the nature of a
demurrer, asserting that Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. See id. ¶ ¶¶ 20-37.
II. DISCUSSION
When reviewing preliminary objections to petitions for review in our
original jurisdiction, we “must treat as true all well-pleaded, material and relevant
facts together with any reasonable inference[s] that can be drawn from those facts.”
Cnty. of Berks v. Pa. Off. of Open Rec., 204 A.3d 534, 539 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
(citations omitted). We are not required to accept as true “conclusions of law,
unwarranted inferences from facts, expressions of opinion or argumentative
allegations.” See id. “[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary
objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the
3
preliminary objections.” Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep’t of
Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
The Department’s first preliminary objection asserts that Petitioner’s
claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 1-19.
According to the Department, to the extent Petitioner seeks appellate review of past
misconduct procedures, those claims should be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
See Prelim. Objs., ¶ 13. We agree. “Inmate misconducts are a matter of internal
prison management and, thus, do not constitute adjudications subject to appellate
review.” Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., 64 A.3d 1159, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
B. Original Jurisdiction
The Department also asserts that this Court lacks original jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s claims. For example, according to the Department, to the extent
that Petitioner’s claims could be interpreted as “springing from an alleged violation
of [the Department’s] own internal regulations,”3 this Court would “not have original
jurisdiction to consider such a claim” as the regulations themselves do not confer
actionable rights.” See id., ¶¶ 14-15; Dep’t’s Br. at 12-13 (unpaginated). Moreover,
the Department claims, disclaimer language included in its policy specifically
advises inmates that grievances do not create enforceable rights and, thus, precludes
any claim in our original jurisdiction. See Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 16-19; see also Dep’t’s
Br. at 12-13.
In our view, these preliminary objections to our original jurisdiction do
not address adequately the substance of Petitioner’s petition, which purports to
3
The Department uses “regulations” and “policies” interchangeably.
4
allege a violation of his right to procedural due process.4 See id., ¶¶ 14-15; Dep’t’s
Br. at 12-13 (unpaginated). As the Rules of Civil Procedure require, preliminary
objections must state specifically the grounds relied on. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(b).
The Department has not stated specific, relevant grounds here, and accordingly, we
overrule this objection as stated. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police, 909
A.2d at 416.
However, this does not end our inquiry. “The test for whether a court
has subject matter jurisdiction inquires into the competency of the court to determine
controversies of the general class to which the case presented for consideration
belongs.” Blount v. Phila. Parking Auth., 965 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 2009) (citation
omitted). It presents a “fundamental issue of law” that we may raise sua sponte. Id.The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in relevant part, that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “Procedural due
process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest.”
Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). “If, and only if, the
party establishes the deprivation of a protected interest, will the Court consider what
type of procedural mechanism is required to fulfill due process.” See Shore v. Dep’t
of Corr., 168 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
In the context of prison litigation, “the Department’s decisions
regarding inmate misconduct convictions generally fall outside the scope of our
original jurisdiction, even where a prisoner’s constitutional rights have allegedly
been violated.” Feliciano v. Dep’t of Corr., 250 A.3d 1269, 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth.
4
The Department does not address procedural due process in its preliminary objection to
jurisdiction, but rather obliquely in the context of its preliminary objection by demurrer. See
Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 20-27.
5
2021), aff’d, 283 A.3d 196 (Pa. 2022). However, a prisoner may invoke our original
jurisdiction by identifying an interest not limited by Department regulations and
affected by a final Department decision. See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275. A
procedural due process violation occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.”5 See Feliciano, 350 A.3d at 1275-76 (citing Brown, 833 A.2d at 1172). If a
petitioner cannot show such a violation, the disciplinary decision is “not an
adjudication subject to this Court’s review and therefore falls outside the scope of
our original jurisdiction.” See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 (citing Bronson v. Cent.
Off. Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1998)).
Petitioner’s claims are difficult to parse. See generally Pet. for Rev.
He appears to assert that the process afforded him by the Department, i.e., his
disciplinary proceedings, was “atypical” and caused him “significant hardship.” Id.,
¶ 17. However, Petitioner does not challenge any specific sanction imposed but
merely pleads broadly that his sentence was improperly enhanced or extended. See
id., at ¶¶ 17-23. Petitioner does not qualify the nature of his incarceration, for
example, whether he served confinement in disciplinary segregation, nor does he
quantify any extended period of incarceration. See generally id. Ultimately,
construing his pleadings liberally, we infer that Petitioner challenges the denial of
his reparole and any additional time spent incarcerated as a deprivation of his liberty
interest.6 See generally id.
5
This is in contrast to lesser restraints on a prisoner’s freedom, which are deemed to fall
“within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Brown, 833 A.2d at
1172 (cleaned up).
6
We acknowledge Petitioner’s arguments that he was denied access to certain confidential
Department policies and that he suffers from an undisclosed, “unique mental infirmity.” See Pet.
for Rev., ¶ 17; see generally Pet’r’s Br. However, such arguments are critical of the process
afforded Petitioner rather than any resulting deprivation of a liberty interest.
6
We are not prepared to recognize a procedural due process claim herein.
It is well settled that there is no right to parole or reparole: the grant of either “is a
matter of grace and administrative discretion.” Bostic v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
682 A.2d 401, 403 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996); see also Bowman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 709 A.2d 945, 948 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (“Although a prisoner has a right to
apply for parole upon the expiration of his minimum term, under Pennsylvania law
a prisoner has no absolute right to be released from prison upon the expiration of
that minimum term.”). Moreover, because parole is discretionary, its denial does
not constitute an improper enhancement of a sentence, nor will we characterize the
denial of parole as an atypical and significant hardship such as would invoke our
original jurisdiction.7 See Feliciano, 350 A.3d at 1275-76; see also Sandin v.
Conner, 51 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (rejecting procedural due process claim brought by
prisoner in Hawaii that a misconduct charge would impact his chances of parole as
“too attenuated”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Department’s preliminary
objection to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction and overrule as stated its objection to
our original jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we sua sponte conclude that Petitioner has
7
Even if we were to conclude that Petitioner had invoked our jurisdiction, we discern no
grounds for relief. In prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate is entitled to “advance written
notice of the claimed violation[;] a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken[;] . . . . [and the ability] to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 (citing
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 566 (1974)). By his own admission and the exhibits
attached to his petition for review, Petitioner was provided with advance written notice of the
claimed violation, a statement of the evidence the Department relied upon, and the reasons for the
disciplinary action taken. See Pet. for Rev., Exs. A-I. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot claim that
the Department violated his procedural due process rights. See Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275.
7
failed to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss the
petition for review with prejudice.8
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
Judge Ceisler dissents.
8
The Feliciano Court recognized that prior precedent considering procedural due process
claims was inconsistent. 250 A.3d at 1275-80 (discussing cases). It therefore granted the petitioner
therein leave to amend his petition. Id. at 1280. However, following this Court’s clear articulation
of the components of a viable procedural due process claim, such relief is unwarranted here.
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Justin Coats, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 329 M.D. 2022
:
Department of Corrections, :
:
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of October, 2023, the Department of
Corrections’ (Department) preliminary objection to this Court’s appellate
jurisdiction is SUSTAINED; the Department’s preliminary objection to this Court’s
original jurisdiction is OVERRULED as stated. Nevertheless, the Court concludes
sua sponte that Petitioner Justin Coats has failed to invoke this Court’s original
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for review, filed June 15, 2022, is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge