G.R. Mucci v. DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Giovanni R. Mucci, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 186 M.D. 2023
:
Department of Corrections; et al, :
Respondents : Submitted: July 5, 2024
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: September 19, 2024
Petitioner Giovanni R. Mucci (Mucci), an inmate currently incarcerated
within our Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a pro se amended “Petition for
Writ of Mandamus and or Extraordinary Relief” (Amended Petition) in our original
jurisdiction. In his Amended Petition, Mucci requests that we order Respondents
Department of Corrections (Department), Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole (Board),1 and Jessica Jo Welch of Central Office Records (Welch) to correct
what Mucci maintains are a variety of unlawful decisions affecting Mucci’s carceral
sentences. In response, the Department has filed preliminary objections to the
Amended Petition, as have the Board and Welch collectively. Additionally, the
Board has submitted an application for summary relief (Application). Upon review,
we overrule Respondents’ preliminary objections in part and sustain them in part,
1
We note that the Board’s proper name is “The Pennsylvania Parole Board.” See 61 Pa.
C.S. §§ 6101, 6111(a).
dismiss the Board’s Application for summary relief as moot, and dismiss the
Amended Petition with prejudice in part.
I. Background
In order to understand the basis for Mucci’s instant legal action, it is necessary
to summarize his criminal history and the actions taken in response to his attendant
convictions.
On July 20, 2005, Mucci pled guilty to robbery in Philadelphia County. Am.
Pet., ¶4,2 Ex. D. As a result, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
sentenced Mucci to a term of 6 to 12 years in state prison, with 26 days of credit for
time served in presentence detention. Id. The Board subsequently paroled Mucci on
September 6, 2011, at which point the maximum date on his Philadelphia sentence
was June 24, 2017. Id., ¶4.3
On September 13, 2012, Mucci was arrested on charges that had been lodged
against him in both Delaware County and Montgomery County, whereupon he was
detained pending disposition of those charges. Id., ¶5. Mucci was then convicted for
one count of aggravated assault in Montgomery County, whereupon the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County sentenced him on November 25, 2014, to a
term of 10 to 20 years in state prison. Id., ¶6, Ex. E. Additionally, the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County directed that Mucci receive 803 days of
credit towards that sentence for time served in presentence detention. Id., ¶6. Mucci
was subsequently found guilty in Delaware County of two counts of aggravated
assault and one count each of driving under the influence and fleeing or attempting
2
Mucci did not number all of the paragraphs in the Amended Petition. Despite this, we
have elected to cite to each paragraph therein as if they were properly enumerated.
3
Mucci did not attach the Board’s 2011 parole decision to his Amended Petition.
2
to elude a police officer. Id., ¶7, Ex. E. The Delaware County Court of Common
Pleas sentenced Mucci on January 9, 2015, to an aggregate term of 10 to 22 years in
state prison, to run consecutively to his Montgomery County sentence, with 848 days
of credit for time served in presentence detention to be applied towards the Delaware
County sentence. Id.
On January 8, 2015, the Board notified Mucci that it intended to hold a parole
revocation hearing as a consequence of his Delaware County conviction. Id., Ex. G.
On February 12, 2015, Mucci acknowledged in writing that he had received this
notice and formally waived his right to a parole revocation hearing. Id. Thereafter,
on May 28, 2015, the Board issued a decision through which it ordered Mucci to be
recommitted as a convicted parole violator (CPV) on account of his Delaware
County conviction. Id., ¶9, Ex. A. Consequently, the Board ordered Mucci to serve
24 months of backtime on his Philadelphia County sentence. Id. The Board also
stated in this decision that Mucci was not eligible for reparole on that sentence until
April 12, 2017, as well as that his Philadelphia County sentence’s new maximum
date was January 28, 2021. Id., ¶9, Ex. A. The Department then issued a sentence
status summary on June 11, 2015, which indicated that Mucci was to serve his
Philadelphia County backtime concurrently with his Montgomery County sentence.
Id., ¶10, Ex. C.
On December 22, 2022, the Board issued another decision, through which it
paroled Mucci on his Montgomery County sentence. Id., ¶13, Ex. F.4 In doing so, it
also calculated the maximum date on that sentence as September 14, 2032. Id.
Additionally, the Board ordered Mucci to begin serving his Delaware County
sentence at that point. Id.
4
Mucci was not actually paroled from his Montgomery County sentence until January 25,
2023. Am. Pet., Ex. G.
3
Thereafter, on March 6, 2023, Mucci was informed by an individual he
identifies as “counselor Daneker” that the Board and the Department were
“aggregating” his Delaware County and Montgomery County sentences. Id., ¶14.
Daneker also provided Mucci with a new sentence status summary on that date. Id.
This summary indicates that the Department had aggregated Mucci’s Delaware
County and Montgomery County sentences, so that the minimum and maximum
dates on those sentences were now respectively July 3, 2038, and July 3, 2060. Id.,
Ex. E. Mucci then sought clarification from the Department regarding its sentence
calculations, due to his belief that those calculations were incorrect. See id., Exs. K-
M.
Unsatisfied with the Department’s responses to his inquiries, Mucci filed a
“Petition for Writ of Mandamus and or Extraordinary Relief” with our Court on
April 7, 2023, followed by his Amended Petition on May 15, 2023. In his Amended
Petition, he alleges that Respondents have (a) effectively rescinded the parole he was
given on his Montgomery County sentence and did so without affording him a
hearing; (b) recalculated his Philadelphia County sentence in a manner that
wrongfully rescinded 372 days of credit for time served at liberty on parole that had
been awarded to him through the Board’s 2011 parole decision; (c) forced him to
serve his sentences in a manner that does not accurately reflect the sentencing orders
issued by the aforementioned courts of common pleas or the Board’s decisions; and
(d) failed to give him credit for the full amount of time served in presentence
detention that was awarded to him through the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County’s and the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County’s sentencing
orders (848 days and 803 days, respectively). Id., ¶¶18, 19-19(J). Mucci seeks
mandamus relief to correct these putative errors. Id., Relief Sought.
4
The Department, the Board, and Welch filed preliminary objections, seeking
the dismissal of Mucci’s Amended Petition. Additionally, the Board submitted the
aforementioned Application for Summary Relief. Mucci responded to the
preliminary objections, as well as the Board’s Application. Accordingly, this matter
is ready for disposition.
II. Discussion
We first address Respondents’ respective preliminary objections, which we
summarize as follows. The Department demurs to the Amended Petition by arguing
that Mucci’s mandamus claim is legally inadequate because he has failed to establish
that he has a clear right to the relief he seeks or that the Department has a
corresponding duty to give him that relief. Department’s Br. at 9. Specifically, the
Department asserts that it originally miscalculated Mucci’s Montgomery County
sentence by determining that it ran concurrently with the 24 months of backtime the
Board had imposed in 2015 on his Philadelphia County sentence and was required
by law to rectify that mistake. Id. at 9-10. Similarly, the Department argues that it
originally failed to aggregate Mucci’s Delaware County and Montgomery County
sentences and was required by law to remedy that error as well. Id. at 10-11.
According to the Department, these corrections turned the Board’s 2022 decision to
parole Mucci on his Montgomery County sentence into a nullity. Id. at 11.
Furthermore, the Department argues it has given Mucci all the credit for time served
in presentence detention to which he is entitled and notes that Mucci seeks
duplicative credit for that served time, which is legally prohibited. Id. at 11-12.
Finally, the Department asserts that Mucci has failed to establish that he lacks any
other appropriate or adequate way in which to resolve his time credit claim, as he
could have sought relief directly through the sentencing courts and via appeals of
5
any ensuing orders therefrom. Id. at 12. As for the Board and Welch, they rest their
collective preliminary objections on two points. First, they adopt by reference all of
the Department’s arguments. Board and Welch’s Br. at 4, 8. Second, they assert that
this Court lacks jurisdiction over Mucci’s action, to the extent he contests the
rescission of his parole, because any such challenge can only be brought in our
appellate jurisdiction, not our original jurisdiction. Id. at 8.
In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (cleaned up). “In addition,
courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pled in the
[petition for review], but also documents or exhibits attached to it.” Lawrence v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
every well-pleaded fact in the [petition for review] and all
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the
legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed
to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
the [petition for review].
Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245.
As for mandamus, it
is an extraordinary remedy, “designed to compel
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where
there exists a clear legal right in the [petitioner], a
corresponding duty in the [respondent], and want of any
other adequate and appropriate remedy.” Coady v.
6
Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (citing Bronson v.
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 421 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa.
1980)).
Toland v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 263 A.3d 1220, 1232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)
(cleaned up).
While . . . mandamus will not lie to compel discretionary
acts, this has usually been interpreted to mean that while a
court may direct that discretion be exercised, it may not
specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require
the performance of a particular discretionary act. The writ
cannot be used to control the exercise of discretion or
judgment by a public official or administrative or judicial
tribunal; to review or compel the undoing of an action
taken by such an official or tribunal in good faith and in
the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, even though the
decision was wrong; to influence or coerce a particular
determination of the issue involved; or to perform the
function of an appeal or writ of error.
In short, mandamus is chiefly employed to compel the
performance (when refused) of a ministerial duty, or to
compel action (when refused) in matters involving
judgment and discretion. It is not used to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, nor
to direct the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken.
Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Ins. Dep’t, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (Pa. 1986) (cleaned up).
Returning to Respondents’ preliminary objections, we recognize that
questions regarding a court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction constitute
“threshold matters[.]” In re Admin. Ord. No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 2007).
Accordingly, we first address the Board’s and Welch’s argument that we lack
jurisdiction to rule upon the merits of the Amended Petition, to the extent that Mucci
challenges the alleged rescission of the Board’s December 2022 decision to parole
him on his Montgomery County sentence. Generally speaking, the proper way for
an inmate to challenge the rescission of their parole is to file a petition for review in
7
our appellate jurisdiction, something which cannot be done until the Board has
issued a final, appealable order that memorializes that rescission. Forbes v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 931 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). However, in instances where the
Board has not issued an appealable order, an inmate is not required to challenge the
rescission of their parole through a petition for review addressed to our appellate
jurisdiction. Forbes, 931 A.2d at 91. Here, Mucci does not allege that the Board
rescinded his parole through a formal decision to that effect. Rather, Mucci states
that he learned that his Montgomery County sentence parole had been rescinded
when he received an updated sentence status summary on March 6, 2023. See Am.
Pet., ¶¶11-15. Furthermore, Mucci did not append any documentation to his
Amended Petition showing that the Board issued such a formal decision.
Accordingly, we cannot say with certainty at this stage of the litigation that we lack
subject matter jurisdiction over Mucci’s challenge to the rescission of his parole on
his Montgomery County sentence. We consequently overrule the Board’s and
Welch’s preliminary objection on that point.
Moving on, we agree with Respondents that Mucci is not, and was not, entitled
to have the 24 months of Board-imposed backtime on his Philadelphia County
sentence run concurrently with his Montgomery County sentence. Section
6138(a)(5)(i) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code) mandates that an inmate
complete CPV backtime prior to beginning service on a new, state-level sentence.
61 Pa C.S. § 6138(a)(5)(i);5 Kerak v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 153 A.3d 1134,
5
Specifically, Section 6138(a)(5) of the Parole Code states, in relevant part:
(5) If a new sentence is imposed on the offender, the service of the
balance of the term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court shall
precede the commencement of the new term imposed in the
following cases:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
8
1138 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing 61 Pa C.S. § 6138(a)(5)) (“Section 6138(a)(5) of
the . . . Parole Code provides that once a parolee is recommitted as a [CPV], the
original sentence and any new sentences must be served consecutively rather than
concurrently.”). In this instance, the Department initially determined in 2015 that
Mucci should serve his Philadelphia County sentence backtime concurrently with
his Montgomery County sentence. See Am. Pet., Ex. C. This was a clearly erroneous
and unlawful determination, given the Parole Code’s express directive to the
contrary. See 61 Pa C.S. § 6138(a)(5).
Next, we agree with Respondents that the Department was required by law to
aggregate Mucci’s Delaware County and Montgomery County sentences. It is well
settled that Section 9757 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9757,6 imposes upon
the Department a mandatory duty to aggregate an inmate’s consecutive sentences
for purposes of determining the minimum and maximum dates thereon. Gillespie v.
Dep’t of Corr., 527 A.2d 1061, 1065 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). This requirement applies
even when those sentences were imposed on different dates by different courts of
common pleas. Id. at 1066. As with its handling of Mucci’s Philadelphia County
backtime in relation to his Montgomery County sentence, the Department’s initial
treatment of his consecutive Delaware County and Montgomery County sentences
was in clear contravention of the obligations imposed upon by law through the
(i) If a person is paroled from a State correctional institution
and the new sentence imposed on the person is to be served
in the State correctional institution.
61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(a)(5).
6
This statute reads as follows: “Whenever the court determines that a sentence should be
served consecutively to one being then imposed by the court, or to one previously imposed, the
court shall indicate the minimum sentence to be served for the total of all offenses with respect to
which sentence is imposed. Such minimum sentence shall not exceed one-half of the maximum
sentence imposed.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9757.
9
Sentencing Code, due to the Department’s failure to aggregate those sentence. See
42 Pa. C.S. § 9757.
In addition, the Department did not act extralegally by correcting its initially
improper handling of Mucci’s carceral sentences. Rather, it properly exercised its
inherent authority to correct its erroneous calculations and, in doing so, ensured that
Mucci served his sentences, and attendant backtime, in a lawful manner. Forbes, 931
A.2d at 94. As such, Mucci cannot obtain mandamus relief that would undo those
corrections. See Jackson v. Vaughn, 777 A.2d 436, 438 (Pa. 2001) (mandamus
cannot be used to compel the Department to perform an illegal act).7
As pointed out by Respondents, the Department’s corrections also produced
additional effects that wiped out the Board’s December 2022 decision to parole
Mucci on his Montgomery County sentence. Though Mucci maintains that the Board
rescinded his parole, this is not an accurate characterization of what happened, as
the Board did not issue a valid decision that it subsequently retracted or reversed.
Rather, the Department’s aforementioned corrections to its sentence calculations
rendered the Board’s decision “a nullity[,] because that grant of parole was beyond
the authority of the Board.” Forbes, 931 A.2d at 95. In other words, since the Board’s
original sentence calculations were incorrect, Mucci was not actually eligible for
parole on his Montgomery County sentence in 2022, a fact which thereby rendered
7
Mucci argues that, per Keith v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 464 A.2d 659(Pa. Cmwlth. 1983), the Department did not have authority to aggregate his Delaware County and
Montgomery County sentences. Mucci’s Resp. to Prelim. Objs., ¶¶32-33. In doing so, however,
Mucci ignores the fact that we explicitly stated in Gillespie that Keith interpreted a sentence
aggregation statute that had been superseded by Section 9757 of the Sentencing Code and, thus,
was no longer good law. See Gillespie, 527 A.2d at 1066 (cleaned up) (“We duly note that the
prior sentence aggregation statute . . . was interpreted to apply only to sentences imposed at the
same time by the same court. See Keith . . . ; Com. ex rel. Lycett v. Ashe, 20 A.2d 881 (Pa. Super.
1941). Section 9757, however, clearly by its terms, referring specifically to previously imposed
sentences, applies to sentences imposed at different times by different courts.”).
10
the Board’s grant of such relief void ab initio. As such, Mucci lacks a clear right to
relief regarding the Board’s putative “rescission” of his parole regarding his
Montgomery County sentence.
This leaves Mucci with two remaining claims. First, Mucci argues that
Respondents did not properly credit him for all of his time served in presentence
detention which the Courts of Common Pleas of Delaware County and Montgomery
County had awarded to him through their respective sentencing orders. Am. Pet.,
¶¶18, 19-19(J). Second, Mucci argues that Respondents improperly recalculated his
Philadelphia County sentence in a manner that unlawfully stripped him of street time
credit that the Board had granted him in 2011. Id. Though he initially frames his
remaining claims as being against “Respondents,” Mucci specifically uses his
supporting averments to challenge only the Department’s sentence status summaries
and the calculations made therein. See id., ¶¶18-19 (in which Mucci avers that “the
new DC16 E (sic) does not have the calculations for the time credit for either the
Montgomery County or Delaware County sentences, which [Mucci] challenges. The
new DC16 E (sic) does show a time credit but said credit is not being calculated
properly towards [Mucci’s] sentences. Additionally, in relation to the new DC16 E
(sic), [Mucci] challenges the recomputing of his Philadelphia conviction.”).
Therefore, we interpret these remaining claims as being directed solely towards the
Department, rather than the Board and Welch.8
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error in
the Department’s computation of maximum and minimum
dates of confinement where the sentencing order clearly
gives the inmate credit for the time period in question and
8
“It is beyond cavil that the Department has a duty to credit . . . all inmates[] for all
statutorily mandated periods of incarceration. . . . The Department is an executive branch agency
that is charged with faithfully implementing sentences imposed by the courts.” McCray v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up).
11
the Department’s computation does not comply with that
credit. However, mandamus is not available to challenge
the Department’s failure to give credit where the
sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not specify
the credit at issue.
Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (cleaned up). Per
Section 9760(1) of the Sentencing Code, a sentencing court must award a convicted
individual:
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term
. . . for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal
charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result
of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit
shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial,
during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution
of an appeal.
42 Pa. C.S. § 9760(1). This statutory requirement, however, does not entitle a
convicted individual to duplicative credit towards sentences that were imposed in
separate cases by different courts. Barndt v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 902 A.2d 589, 594
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The fact that an inmate was being held in presentence detention
on charges from multiple, separate cases does not enable him to have credit for that
served time applied to all consequent sentences; rather, any credit for each day
served in presentence detention can only be applied once. See Taglienti v. Dep’t of
Corr., 806 A.2d 988, 993 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“[C]redit for time served prior to the
sentencing date is governed by Section 9760 [of the Sentencing Code,] which does
not provide for credit for time served on unrelated offenses or when credit has been
already credited against another sentence.”).
With regard to his first remaining claim, Mucci asserts the following:9 He was
arrested on September 13, 2012, and was then detained pending disposition of his
9
We note that Mucci did not attach any of his sentencing orders to his Amended Petition.
Instead, he includes copies of completed DC-300B forms, through which the Department has
(Footnote continued on next page…)
12
Delaware County and Montgomery County charges. Am. Pet., ¶5. He was
subsequently found guilty in Montgomery County on November 11, 2014, and was
sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County on November 25,
2014. Id., ¶6, Ex. E. As part of that sentence, the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County awarded Mucci 803 days of credit for time served in
presentence detention. Id., ¶6. Eight hundred three days is the amount of time that
elapsed between September 13, 2012, i.e., the date of his arrest, and November 25,
2014, i.e., the date upon which he was sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas of
Montgomery County. He was then found guilty in Delaware County and was
sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County on January 9, 2015.
Id., ¶7, Ex. E. As part of that sentence, the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County awarded Mucci 848 days of credit for time served in presentence detention.
Id., ¶7. Eight hundred forty-eight days is the amount of time that elapsed between
September 13, 2012, i.e., the date of his arrest, and January 9, 2015, i.e., the date
upon which he was sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County.
Thus, Mucci clearly seeks, at least in part, duplicative credit towards his Delaware
County and Montgomery County sentences for time he served in presentence
detention. To reiterate, the law mandates that he cannot receive such credit. Barndt,
902 A.2d at 594; Taglienti, 806 A.2d at 993.
Even so, we are unable at this juncture to determine whether the Department
has properly allocated this presentence detention credit towards Mucci’s Delaware
County and Montgomery County sentences. In the Department’s most recent
summarized the purported terms of those orders. See Am. Pet., Exs. I-J. Through those forms, the
Department indicates that the Courts of Common Pleas of Delaware County and Montgomery
County respectively awarded Mucci 848 days and 803 days of credit for time served in presentence
detention. See id.13
sentence status summary, dated March 6, 2023, the Department states that it applied
credit towards his Montgomery County sentence for the time he was held between
September 14, 2012, and January 25, 2014. Am. Pet., Ex. E. In addition, the
Department states that it applied credit towards his Delaware County sentence for
the time he was held between September 13, 2012, and April 11, 2015. Id. The
Department, however, does not show precisely how this credit was applied to each
of those sentences, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation for why it gave
Mucci credit on his Delaware County sentence that goes far beyond that which
Mucci seeks through this action and which fails to comport with the terms of the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s sentencing order. Therefore, we
cannot conclude that the Department has established that Mucci cannot state a viable
mandamus claim regarding its treatment of his presentence detention credit.
As to Mucci’s second remaining claim, the Department does not challenge his
assertion that it improperly stripped him of street time credit that the Board had
granted him in 2011. Given this, we are constrained to also allow that portion of
Mucci’s Amended Petition to survive at this point.
Finally, we conclude that there is no need to address the merits of the Board’s
Application. This is because we have sustained the Board’s preliminary objections
and, as a consequence, have neutralized all of the claims Mucci had lodged in his
Amended Petition against the Board. We therefore dismiss the Application as moot.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we overrule Respondents’
preliminary objections in part, regarding the Board’s and Welch’s collective
assertion that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to rule upon Mucci’s parole
rescission argument, as well as the Department’s demurrer to Mucci’s presentence
14
detention credit claim. In addition, we sustain Respondents’ preliminary objections
as to Mucci’s claims regarding the Department’s corrected sentence calculations, to
the extent those calculations reflected that Mucci was required to finish serving
backtime on his Philadelphia County sentence before starting his Montgomery
County sentence and could not serve both concurrently, as well as that the
Department was required to aggregate his Delaware County and Montgomery
County sentences. We also sustain Respondents’ preliminary objections regarding
Mucci’s claim that the Board’s December 2022 decision to parole him on his
Montgomery County sentence was “rescinded.” Furthermore, we dismiss Mucci’s
Amended Petition with prejudice as to the Board and Welch, and dismiss as moot
the Board’s Application.
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Giovanni R. Mucci, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 186 M.D. 2023
:
Department of Corrections; et al, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Respondents Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s (Board)
and Jessica Jo Welch of Central Office Records’ (Welch) preliminary
objection regarding our subject matter jurisdiction to rule upon
Petitioner Giovanni R. Mucci’s (Mucci) parole rescission claim is
OVERRULED;
2. Respondent Department of Corrections’ (Department) preliminary
objection regarding Mucci’s presentence detention credit claim is
OVERRULED;
3. Respondents’ preliminary objections regarding Mucci’s claim that the
Department incorrectly recalculated his sentences to reflect that Mucci
was required to finish serving backtime on his Philadelphia County
sentence before starting his Montgomery County sentence, and could
not serve both concurrently, are SUSTAINED;
4. Respondents’ preliminary objections regarding Mucci’s claim that the
Department was required to aggregate his Delaware County and
Montgomery County sentences are SUSTAINED;
5. Respondents’ preliminary objections regarding Mucci’s claim that the
Board’s December 2022 decision to parole him on his Montgomery
County sentence was “rescinded” are SUSTAINED;
6. Mucci’s Amended Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to
the Board and Welch;
7. The Board’s application for summary relief is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge