E. Smith v. Warwick SD, PMA Mgmt. Corp. and Lancaster-Lebanon Public Schools WC Fund (WCAB)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Erin Smith, : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 1214 C.D. 2021
:
Warwick School District, PMA :
Management Corp. and Lancaster-Lebanon :
Public Schools Workers Compensation :
Fund (Workers’ Compensation Appeal :
Board), :
Respondents :
Warwick School District, PMA :
Management Corp. and Lancaster-Lebanon :
Public Schools Workers Compensation :
Fund, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 1240 C.D. 2021
: Argued: June 6, 2023
Erin Smith (Workers’ Compensation :
Appeal Board), :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: December 20, 2023
Erin Smith (Claimant) petitions for review of the October 6, 2021 Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board (Board) order reversing the January 28, 2020 order of
the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), as amended on January 29, 2020,1 which
granted Claimant’s Claim Petition. Claimant founded her Claim Petition on
suffering a psychological injury as a result of an allegation of child abuse made
against her at work. Warwick School District (Employer); PMA Management Corp.,
its third-party administrator; and Lancaster-Lebanon Public Schools Workers
Compensation Fund (collectively, the School District), filed a Cross-Petition for
Review (Cross-Petition), which is also before this Court. These matters are
consolidated for our disposition. After review, we conclude the Board did not err in
determining Claimant failed to establish the existence of an abnormal working
condition; accordingly, she failed to satisfy her burden of proof. We affirm the
Board’s order and dismiss the School District’s Cross-Petition.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On April 20, 2017, Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that on April 23,
2014, while working as a teacher, she experienced disabling psychological injuries
because “Employer intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently falsely accused the
Claimant of child abuse.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. Claimant sought full
disability benefits from May 12, 2014, through February 1, 2015, and then again
from November 24, 2015, ongoing. Id. at 7a. On August 8, 2016, Employer issued
a Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial. Id. at 2a.
The WCJ held a hearing on August 4, 2017. Claimant provided extensive
testimony at the hearing and both Claimant and the School District supplied the WCJ
1
The WCJ issued an amended order to correct an omission in Conclusion of Law ¶ 2. The
amended order included the WCJ’s finding of an “abnormal work condition.”
2
with deposition testimony from their witnesses. Based on the testimony, the WCJ
found Employer’s discipline of Claimant for her actions regarding a student was
“unusual.” WCJ Decision 1/29/20 (WCJ Dec.), Conclusions of Law (C.L.) ¶ 2.
Further, the WCJ found Claimant met her burden of proving a psychological injury,
“adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood,” and it resulted from
her experiences during April and May 2014. Id. Ultimately, in his Decision and
Order, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim Petition and awarded her benefits from
the time she stopped working for Employer in the spring of 2014, until the time she
returned in February 2015. WCJ Dec., Order. The WCJ suspended Claimant’s wage
loss benefits after her return to work and until November 9, 2016, finding her fully
recovered from her work injury as of that date. Id.
Both the School District and Claimant appealed the WCJ decision to the
Board. In its Opinion and Order, the Board disagreed with the WCJ’s conclusion
that Claimant established the existence of an “abnormal working condition.” The
Board concluded Claimant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing a
psychological stimulus caused a psychological injury. Accordingly, the Board
reversed the WCJ’s order granting Claimant’s Claim Petition. Because the Board
reversed the WCJ based on the absence of an abnormal working condition, the Board
did not address the School District’s other issues on appeal. Claimant filed a Petition
for Review and the School District filed a Cross-Petition.2
2
While not required to do so, the School District filed a protective Cross-Petition under Pa.R.A.P.
1512. In its Cross-Petition, the School District offered alternative grounds upon which this Court
could affirm the Board. In Saint Thomas Township v. Wyco, 758 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2005), this Court pointed out a party who prevailed below, at times, may be prudent to file a cross-
appeal. The Court explained, “[A]lthough a party receives the relief it sought, albeit on an
alternative basis, that fact alone would not preclude the successful party from filing a protective
cross[-]appeal on an issue which the lower tribunal decided against it, and a party choosing to
proceed in such a manner, i.e., not filing a protective cross[-]appeal, does so at the risk that the
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
II. Discussion
Claimant and the School District raise the same principal issue in their Petition
for Review and Cross-Petition. The issue is whether the Board erred in concluding
Claimant failed to establish the existence of an abnormal working condition. The
existence of an abnormal working condition is central to establishing causation in
the case of a psychological injury. Claimant argues the Board erred when it
disregarded evidentiary findings of the WCJ and overturned the WCJ’s ruling. The
School District presents several arguments why, in addition to Claimant’s failure to
prove an abnormal working condition, this Court should affirm the Board.
In her Claim Petition, Claimant sought benefits for the psychological injury
of adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood. For purposes of receiving
workers’ compensation benefits, the influence of the psychological element is
divided into three discrete classifications: (1) the “mental/physical” injury where a
psychological stimulus causes a physical injury; (2) the “physical/mental” injury
where a physical stimulus causes a psychological injury; and (3) the “mental/mental”
injury where a psychological stimulus causes a psychological injury. Ryan v.
Worksman’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cmty. Health Servs.), 707 A.2d 1130, 1133-34 (Pa.
1998).
By claiming conditions at work resulted in her psychological injury, Claimant
alleges a “mental/mental” injury. When a claimant alleges a mental stimulus caused
her mental injury, she must prove either: “(a) that actual extraordinary events
occurred at work which caused the trauma and that these specific events can be
pinpointed in time, or (b) that abnormal working conditions over a longer period of
issue on which it prevailed below will be reversed.” See also Comment to Pa.R.A.P. 511 (“In
deciding whether to cross-appeal, parties may also consider that appellate courts have discretion,
but are not required, to affirm for any reason appearing in the record.”).
4
time caused the injury.” Gulick v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pepsi Cola
Operating Co.), 711 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
In this mental/mental case, Claimant must prove she suffered the injury
caused by her employment and that an abnormal working condition caused the
mental injury. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the “abnormal working
condition” standard to distinguish between objective and subjective evidence of the
working conditions alleged to have caused the injury. See Martin v. Ketchum, Inc.,
568 A.2d 159, 164 (Pa. 1990). The standard is an objective one, rather than a
subjective one. The standard aims to distinguish psychological injuries that are
compensable because the necessary causal relationship between the employment and
disability has been established from those psychological injuries arising from a
claimant’s subjective reactions to normal working conditions. Id. at 164-65.
Whether a claimant has been exposed to abnormal working conditions is a
mixed question of law and fact and is fully reviewable by this Court. Jeanes Hosp.
v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Miller), 595 A.2d 725, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
Psychological injury cases are highly fact-specific and must be considered in the
context of specific employment. Payes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. State
Police), 79 A.3d 543, 552 (Pa. 2013). Such a fact-sensitive inquiry requires
deference to the fact-finding authority of the WCJ, and accordingly, we limit our
review of those factual findings to determining whether they are supported by the
evidence and overturn them only if they are arbitrary and capricious. Id. Thus, our
appellate review of this question of abnormal working conditions is a two-step
process of reviewing the factual findings and then the legal conclusion. Id.The WCJ found the evidence from Claimant’s psychiatric expert
demonstrated Claimant sustained an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
5
depressed mood, and the diagnosis was caused by Claimant’s experiences during
April and May 2014. WCJ Dec., C.L. ¶ 2. Regardless of this finding, our review
requires that we consider whether an abnormal working condition caused Claimant’s
psychological injury, or whether Claimant’s subjective reactions to normal working
conditions caused her injury. The WCJ found an abnormal working condition existed
because the particular discipline Employer meted out, a five-day suspension without
pay, was “unusual given the lack of evidence to support it.” Id. However, as the
Board indicated, “not agreeing on the ultimate decision by the administration,
obtained through the proper procedures, does not create an abnormal working
condition.” Bd. Op., 10/6/21 at 13.
The WCJ credited Employer’s witnesses who testified the events were not
highly unusual or extraordinary. Mark D. Leidich (Leidich), a human resources
expert in the area of education with experience as a school board member, testified
“it was not unusual for complaints of suspected child abuse being made to
authorities,” nor was it unusual for a school district to investigate allegations of
suspected child abuse. WCJ Dec., Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶ 7.e. Leidich said it was
not unusual for a school district to discipline an employee for deficiencies in
performance, for an employee or union to file a grievance, for an arbitrator to
partially grant and partially deny a grievance, for a school district to remove a teacher
from a classroom and place her in an administrative office during an investigation,
nor was it unusual for a school district to change the assignment of a teacher. Id.Additionally, Andrew Klein (Klein), an independent special education consultant,
testified the circumstances Claimant encountered were not unusual. Klein opined
there was nothing unusual about the filing of a suspected child abuse report, nor was
there anything unusual with Employer placing Claimant on administrative leave,
6
suspending her, requiring retraining, or reassigning her. Id. ¶ 8.b. Klein testified
the School District “behaved as any other district that I’ve worked for . . . they acted
in a way I’ve seen numerous times.” Id.
The Board held, “[t]his type of situation was not completely out of the
ordinary for a teacher to potentially experience, and the investigation was done with
professionalism and through the proper procedures.” Bd. Op. at 13. While Claimant
and the WCJ did not agree with Employer’s assessment regarding Claimant’s
treatment of the student or that it warranted the punishment she received, disagreeing
with the result of a proper investigation does not transform that investigation into an
abnormal working condition.
While always a fact-specific inquiry, this Court did conclude abnormal
working conditions existed when an employer accused its office manager of
embezzlement and threatened her with jail, despite knowing the accusation was
false. Miller v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (New Wilmington Fam. Prac.), 724
A.2d 971, 978 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). This Court also held abnormal working
conditions existed when an employer falsely accused an office clerk of committing
a wrongful act, intimidated her, and threatened to terminate her employment, all
despite knowing the accusation was false. U.S. Airways v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Long), 756 A.2d 96, 102 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Unlike in the present case, in
Miller and U.S. Airways, employers knowingly made false accusations and
participated in other intimidating or aggressive actions. In the case of Claimant,
someone filed a complaint with the authorities and Employer investigated it with
professionalism and with proper procedures.
7
III. Conclusion
We conclude the Board did not err in reversing the WCJ when the Board held
Claimant failed to establish the existence of an abnormal working condition in her
“mental/mental” claim for workers’ compensation benefits.3 Accordingly, we
affirm the Board and dismiss the School District’s Cross-Petition.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
3
The Board concluded the other issues raised by the School District became moot when it reversed
the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s Claim Petition. We concur. Similarly, because this Court affirms
the Board on the same grounds it relied upon, we need not reach the School District’s alternative
arguments.
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Erin Smith, : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 1214 C.D. 2021
:
Warwick School District, PMA :
Management Corp. and Lancaster-Lebanon :
Public Schools Workers Compensation :
Fund (Workers’ Compensation Appeal :
Board), :
Respondents :
Warwick School District, PMA :
Management Corp. and Lancaster-Lebanon :
Public Schools Workers Compensation :
Fund, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 1240 C.D. 2021
:
Erin Smith (Workers’ Compensation :
Appeal Board), :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of December 2023, the October 6, 2021 order of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED and the Cross-Petition
for Review filed by Warwick School District, PMA Management Corp. and
Lancaster-Lebanon Public Schools Workers Compensation Fund is DISMISSED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge