K. Manna d/b/a 9th & Lloyd Inspections v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kedecia Manna d/b/a 9th and : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Lloyd Inspections :
:
v. : Nos. 1057 C.D. 2022
: 1058 C.D. 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : Submitted: July 5, 2024
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :
Appellant :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: November 14, 2024
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Motor Vehicles (Department) appeals1 from the Orders of the Court of Common
Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), which sustained the appeals of Kedecia
Manna (Manna), d/b/a 9th and Lloyd Inspections (Station), from the Department’s
suspension of Manna’s Certificate of Appointment as an Official Safety Inspection
Station (Safety Certificate) and Certificate of Appointment as an Official Emission
Inspection Station (Emissions Certificate) (together, Certificates), and reinstated the
1
On October 31, 2024, the Department filed a Motion for Leave to File Praecipe to
Withdraw Appeal (Motion to Withdraw). Kedecia Manna subsequently filed an answer opposing
the Motion to Withdraw. Upon consideration of the Motion to Withdraw and the answer thereto,
we deny the Motion to Withdraw.
Certificates.2 Before this Court, the Department argues the trial court erred or abused
its discretion in reinstating the Certificates because the evidence supported a finding
that the violations occurred. Upon review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Manna operates the Station located at 1033 West Ninth Street in Chester,
Pennsylvania. On April 2, 2021, the Department hand delivered notices to Manna
suspending the Certificates and fining Manna for alleged violations of the
Department’s regulations discovered during audits performed one day earlier.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 21a, 55a.) Specifically, Manna’s Emissions
Certificate was suspended for a term of one year for faulty inspection of equipment
or parts, three months for improper assigning of certificate of inspection, and three
months, or until produced, whichever is greater, for failure to produce records upon
demand.3 (Id. at 55a.) Manna was also fined $2,500.00 for the alleged violation of
faulty inspection of equipment or parts, and Manna received a warning for an alleged
violation of improper security of certificate of inspection. (Id.) The notice stated
these violations were the result of an audit the prior day and include violations for
failure to test a gas cap, failure to provide sticker receipts and Garage Keepers
Liability Insurance, and failure to account for unused stickers. (Id.) The Safety
Certificate was suspended for four months for failure to affix a certificate of
2
The appeal related to the Emissions Certificate suspension was given trial court docket
number cv-2021-003849 and docket number 1057 C.D. 2022 in this Court. The appeal related to
the Safety Certificate suspension was given trial court docket number cv-2021-004058 and docket
number 1058 C.D. 2022 in this Court. The Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals by order
dated July 17, 2023. In addition to these appeals, there are numerous other appeals involving the
parties either recently decided by the Court or still pending before it.
3
The suspensions were to commence immediately and be consecutive to one another, for
a total period of 18 months, as well as consecutive to any other suspensions. (R.R. at 55a.)
2
inspection immediately upon successful completion of inspection, six months or
until produced for failure to produce records, certificate of inspection, signature
cards, certificate of appointment, or mechanic card upon demand, and one year for
improper and careless record keeping.4 (Id. at 21a.) These violations related to an
audit performed 1 day earlier at which 8 inspections were noted as passing but
awaiting stickers, not entering 50 inspections into the MV-431 book,5 and not
producing the MV-431. (Id.) Both notices said the suspensions were pursuant to
Section 4724 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4724,6 and the notice related to the
Safety Certificate also cited the Department’s regulation at 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(a),
whereas the notice related to the Emissions Certificate cited 67 Pa. Code §
177.602(a).7 (R.R. at 21a, 55a.) Attached to the notices were copies of the audit
reports upon which they were based. (Id. at 290a-98a, 309a-20a.)
4
The suspensions were to run consecutively for a total of 22 months and commenced
immediately. (R.R. at 21a.)
5
The MV-431 is a log book that stations use to record inspections. (Finding of Fact (FOF)
¶ 58.)
6
Section 4724(a) provides:
The [D]epartment shall supervise and inspect official inspection stations and may
suspend the certificate of appointment issued to a station or may impose a monetary
penalty or may issue a warning against the station which it finds is not properly
equipped or conducted or which has violated or failed to comply with any of the
provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the [D]epartment. A schedule
of all penalties, points and suspension may be established by the [D]epartment by
publishing a notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin until the regulations governing
these penalties are promulgated by the [D]epartment. The [D]epartment shall
maintain a list of all stations holding certificates of appointment and of those whose
certificates of appointment have been suspended. Any suspended certificate of
appointment and all unused certificates of inspection shall be returned immediately
to the [D]epartment.
75 Pa.C.S. § 4724(a).
7
These regulations set forth a schedule of penalties for various violations.
3
Thereafter, Manna filed statutory appeals to the trial court, and consolidated
hearings were held. At the hearing Gregory Neely, a quality assurance officer
(QAO) with Parsons Corporation, with which the Department contracts to conduct
investigative and administrative audits, testified as an expert in the field of
Pennsylvania vehicle safety and emissions inspections.8 Manna also testified.
Based upon the testimony, the trial court found, in relevant part, as follows.9
On April 1, 2021, the QAO went to the Station to investigate a consumer complaint.
(Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 24, 31, 117, 141.) When the QAO arrived, Manna was
not present, so the QAO spoke with an employee of the Station (Employee). (Id.
¶¶ 32, 34.) The Employee told the QAO that Manna was in court and probably had
her phone turned off. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 121.) The Employee also told the QAO that on
March 25, 2021, the landlord evicted Manna from the premises, but a court reversed
the eviction the next day. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) The Employee further relayed to the QAO
that while Manna was evicted, the Station sustained a break-in, at which time its
security system, computers, and its MV-431 were stolen, all of which was reported
to police. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 39-40.) The Employee showed the QAO where the records
that had not been stolen were kept, which the QAO began reviewing. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.)
The QAO found 10 work orders dated between February 25, 2021, and March
16, 2021, with nonsequential emission and safety sticker numbers written on them,
which the QAO believed signaled customers returned to the Station to get their
stickers at a later time. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) During the review, the QAO found work
orders that stated, “Passed Safety Inspection station awaiting stickers from [the
Department]/UPS,” which would be against the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-
8
Manna objected to the QAO testifying as an expert, but based upon voir dire of the QAO,
the trial court qualified the QAO as an expert. (FOF ¶¶ 4, 19.)
9
The Department does not challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings.
4
9805. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54, 63.) The QAO was aware of times it took 14 days or longer for
the Department to send stickers to a station, but according to the QAO, if a station
did not have stickers, it should not perform any inspections. (Id. ¶¶ 127, 129.) The
QAO also stated the 10 work orders all had the same brake and tire measurement on
them, which did not seem correct and was not typical. (Id. ¶¶ 55-56.)
The QAO testified 50 inspections were completed but not logged into an MV-
431 between March 25, 2021, to April 1, 2021, and Manna did not provide proof
that the MV-431 was stolen. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) The QAO further testified that this
number of inspections in a such a short period for a one-bay garage with a jack
instead of a lift seemed to be a lot. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 110.)
While in the garage bay, the QAO observed the Employee back a Hyundai out
of the garage, which the QAO assumed was for the Employee to perform a road test.
(Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) The Employee had been completing an emissions test on the same
vehicle when the QAO first arrived. (Id. ¶ 41.) After the Employee returned a short
time later without the vehicle, the QAO asked the Employee what happened to it and
why she did not perform the safety inspection, which according to the QAO is to be
performed after the emissions inspection. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48.) The Employee indicated
the safety inspection was performed before the emissions inspection, and when the
QAO told the Employee that was not the proper procedure, the Employee responded
she was new and still learning. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)
The QAO also testified to seeing the Employee improperly complete an
emissions test. (Id. ¶ 69.) The QAO explained that a gas cap checker is used to test
the seal on a vehicle. (Id. ¶ 78.) According to the QAO, after a Hyundai left, there
was a Honda gas cap in the gas cap checker, although the QAO did not see a Honda
at the Station. (Id. ¶¶ 79-80.) The QAO inquired of Employee who acknowledged
5
she did not check the gas cap on the Hyundai and used the Honda gas cap in the gas
cap checker, which was a violation of Department regulations. (Id. ¶¶ 81-84.) The
QAO acknowledged that some vehicles use universal gas caps, and the QAO was
unaware whether Hondas and Hyundais used the same type of gas cap. (Id. ¶¶ 85-
86.)
The QAO further testified he also checked the emission analyzer,10 which had
not communicated with the Department since March 25, 2021, six days earlier. (Id.
¶¶ 88-89.) The analyzer would not communicate with the Department when the
QAO tried to use it; instead, it indicated it could not access a network. (Id. ¶ 90.)
The Employee told the QAO the landlord must have disconnected the internet. (Id.
¶ 91.) Because the analyzer was not connected to the internet, the QAO concluded
all inspections performed in the last six days were improper. (Id. ¶ 93.) Because the
analyzer was inoperable due to the lack of internet access, the QAO could not have
the analyzer locked. (Id. ¶¶ 96-99.) Even without internet access, the QAO testified
the analyzer could be used to conduct an emissions test. (Id. ¶ 100.) According to
the QAO, the Department should have been notified when the internet was lost
because the analyzer cannot communicate data from tested vehicles. (Id. ¶ 101.)
The QAO testified he requested to see the Station’s emissions records, but
most of them were not available; the Employee told the QAO they were stolen and
the theft was reported to police. (Id. ¶¶ 102, 104.) The Department introduced the
Station’s sticker reconciliation report, which the QAO explained shows which
stickers have been used and which should be at the garage. (Id. ¶¶ 105-06.) The
QAO observed a pack of 50 stickers and another pack of 38 stickers. (Id. ¶ 103.)
The QAO thought that an unusual amount of stickers had been ordered but not used,
10
The emission analyzer was described as a machine used to run diagnostics on a vehicle
and communicate all inspections with the Department every 48 hours. (FOF ¶¶ 88, 92.)
6
especially for that size station. (Id. ¶¶ 107, 112.) In January and February 2021, the
Station ordered 50 tickets, and previously 100 to 150 stickers. (Id. ¶¶ 109, 111.)
The QAO testified most stations work off one package of stickers and have one pack
unopened ready to use. (Id. ¶ 108.) The QAO also testified the Station did not have
certain signs that were required, including one listing the prices of various
inspections and tests; it also did not have its Certificate of Appointment of
Mechanic’s License posted. (Id. ¶ 113.) The QAO did not believe three vehicles
would fit in the bay area. (Id. ¶ 115.) Although Manna was cited for not having
Garage Keepers Liability Insurance, the QAO did not testify about this or include it
in his report. (Id. ¶ 132.)
Manna testified about the eviction and the break-in. (Id. ¶¶ 133-34.) Manna
said employees from an adjacent business took the items and vandalized the Station,
which was caught on video, after the landlord gave them a key. (Id. ¶¶ 135-37.) At
the time of the audit, Manna said the Station was still in disarray. (Id. ¶¶ 148-49.)
The MV-431 was stolen and a police report was filed, a copy of which was provided
to the QAO’s manager. (Id. ¶¶ 179-80.) Manna also read a copy of the report into
the record, which described the items taken including the inspection book, a Comcast
box, and emissions stickers. (Id. ¶¶ 183-84.)
Manna explained how the Station developed a system for performing
inspections efficiently and properly due to the space available, and that practice was
deemed acceptable during 20 prior audits. (Id. ¶¶ 153-56, 161.) Manna explained
how the garage bay can hold three vehicles and there is space to park seven others
in the backyard. (Id. ¶ 157.) A vehicle upon arrival is road tested before being
pulled into the garage bay to prevent it from getting blocked in the bay. (Id. ¶¶ 158-
59.) While the vehicle is getting emissions testing, another employee pulls the tires
7
so the inspector can check the brake pads, rotors, and tire threads. (Id. ¶ 160.)
Manna explained how some people leave their gas caps behind. (Id. ¶ 164.) Manna
also described how a station can perform at least 100 inspections before being locked
out of the analyzer and there is no regulation requiring connection to the internet.
(Id. ¶ 165.) Manna claimed the landlord broke her router, which disconnected the
internet. (Id. ¶ 166.) Manna also testified that the Employee did not know how to
plug the internet into the router and Wi-Fi would not work for the analyzer. (Id. ¶¶
167-68.) Manna explained she always orders the same amount of stickers and the
extra stickers are the result of some vehicles only needing safety inspections, not
emissions inspections. (Id. ¶¶ 173-74.) Manna also described the Department did
not always send stickers in a timely manner, so she takes all necessary steps to ensure
she has stickers on hand. (Id. ¶ 175.) Manna testified that when a customer has to
return to get reinspected because the Station did not have stickers available, that
inspection is performed for free and is a hassle. (Id. ¶ 176.) Manna testified that all
records requested by the QAO were provided by the Employee, including all work
orders from February 2021. (Id. ¶ 178.)
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded the Department did not
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Manna engaged in any fraudulent
or deceitful conduct as it relates to the recordkeeping. (Id. ¶ 194.) The trial court
credited Manna’s testimony that numerous documents, including the MV-431, were
stolen after the Station’s eviction from the premises. (Id. ¶¶ 195, 198.) It also found
Manna credibly testified that the landlord disconnected the electricity at the Station,
resulting in the Station losing internet connectivity. (Id. ¶ 196.) Moreover, the trial
court found Manna credibly explained the process she follows to properly inspect
vehicles in an efficient manner, the issue as to testing of the gas cap, and that it
8
reinspects the vehicle if the Station does not originally have a sticker to issue. (Id.
¶¶ 200-02.) As for the allegation that Manna did not produce Garage Keepers
Liability Insurance, the trial court concluded there was no evidence produced as to
this alleged violation. (Id. ¶ 199.) Thus, the trial court granted Manna’s appeals and
reinstated the Certificates.
The Department filed notices of appeal, and the trial court directed the
Department to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
(Statement). The Department filed separate Statements as to each appeal. The first
two issues raised by the Department were identical in both appeals: (1) whether the
trial court erred or abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of the
certificates when such authority is vested with the Department; and (2) whether the
trial court error or abused its discretion as “the weight of the evidence, by a
preponderance of the evidence, supported a finding that violations had occurred and
that suspension of the Certificates . . . was supported by the evidence.” (R.R. at
433a, 436a.) Specific to the Emissions Certificate, the Department also argued the
trial court erred or abused its discretion by finding that “engaging in fraudulent or
deceitful activity” was necessary to find a violation of improper or careless
recordkeeping and by addressing only the recordkeeping violation without
addressing the others. (Id. at 433a.) Specific to the Safety Certificate, the
Department asserted the trial court erred or abused its discretion by not addressing
the violations related to failing to enter 50 inspections in the MV-431 book, failing
to produce the MV-431 book, and inspecting vehicles while awaiting stickers from
the Department. (Id. at 436a.)
9
In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, after recapping the evidence presented, the trial
court first stated the Department’s Statements lacked specificity, such that the trial
court had to “guess as to the exact issue that [the Department] is asserting.” (Rule
1925(a) Op. at 25.)11 Notwithstanding the perceived deficiency in the Department’s
Statements, the trial court stated it was relying on Section 4724(b) of the Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4724(b), for its authority to review the suspensions. (Id. at 25-
26.) It further explained that while caselaw prevents a common pleas court from
modifying a penalty when its findings are the same as the Department’s, if its
findings are different than the Department, it may alter the penalty. (Id. at 26.) The
trial court stated “[i]t is abundantly clear . . . the [t]rial [c]ourt made findings of fact
and conclusions of law that are different from [the Department].” (Id. at 27.) The
trial court further concluded that Section 4724(b) of the Vehicle Code “specifically
authorizes the [t]rial [c]ourt to alter the penalty,” as does the language of the notices
of suspension, which expressly provide for an appeal. (Id.) The trial court stated:
The ability to appeal without the right of redress is equivalent to having
no right to appeal. That premise is in contradiction to [Section]
4724(b). It is incomprehensible that [the Department] would notify []
[p]etitioner[s]/[a]ppell[ants] that they have a right to appeal if the [trial
c]ourt did not have the authority to alter the penalty.
(Id.)
The trial court likewise concluded the second issue raised in each of the
Department’s Statements, related to the sufficiency of the evidence, was too vague
and therefore waived. (Id. at 28.)
As for the Department’s argument regarding the recordkeeping violation, the
trial court stated the notice did “not explain which of the items are considered
11
A copy of the Rule 1925(a) Opinion may be found in the Reproduced Record beginning
at page 439a.
10
improper record keeping or how they were improper as [they] relate[] to” the Vehicle
Code or regulations. (Id.) The trial court also noted the QAO never referenced a
specific section. (Id.) Moreover, the trial court found the notice simply cited Section
4724 and 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(a), which are not substantive provisions. (Id. at 28-
29.) As such, the trial court found the Notice violated Manna’s due process rights.
(Id. at 29.) Citing precedent from our Court, the trial court stated that “[a]dequate
notice for procedural due process purposes requires at a minimum that the notice
contain a sufficient listing and explanation of the charges against an individual.”
(Id.) The trial court further explained that neither the statute nor regulations define
“improper” or “careless,” and, as such, they should be construed according to their
common and approved usage. (Id. at 30.) Based upon the dictionary definitions of
those terms, the trial court reasoned that the QAO never explained “what was
incorrect, inaccurate, neglectful, or inattentive as to these records,” or what statutory
or regulatory provision was allegedly violated. (Id.) To the extent the charge related
to the MV-431, the trial court found Manna credibly testified it was stolen and
reported to police as such. (Id.) Because the QAO did not “articulate what was
improper or careless in the record keeping . . . the [t]rial [c]ourt [would not] speculate
as to what code section or statute Manna had violated.” (Id. at 31.)
II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
On appeal, the Department argues there is substantial evidence, in the form of
the QAO’s testimony, to support a finding that Manna violated the Vehicle Code
and Department’s regulations. It argues Employee admitted to the QAO that she
performed the safety inspection before the emissions inspection, which is contrary
11
to the regulation found at 67 Pa. Code § 175.42(d)(4).12 It also asserts the QAO
observed the same employee using a Honda gas cap test on a Hyundai, which
violates emissions inspection standards. Further, in terms of the Safety Certificate
suspension, the Department points to testimony that the Station was passing vehicles
that were inspected but not affixing stickers to them, which violates 67 Pa. Code
§ 175.41(d),13 and approximately 50 inspections were completed between March 25,
12
This provision provides:
(4) Prohibitions against replacing a certificate of inspection. Inspection stations
may not replace a certificate of inspection to which a temporary inspection approval
indicator has been affixed if one or more of the following apply:
(i) The inspection station did not perform the original inspection of the
vehicle or issue the temporary inspection approval indicator affixed to the
current certificate of inspection.
(ii) The vehicle does not display a renewed emission certificate of
inspection.
(iii) The original safety certificate of inspection has expired.
(iv) The vehicle is in an obviously unsafe condition, including, but not
limited to, bald tires, exhaust leaks, broken glazing and broken or missing
lighting.
67 Pa. Code § 175.42(d)(4).
13
This provision provides, in pertinent part:
Affixing certificate of inspection or temporary inspection approval indicator. The
certificate of inspection or temporary inspection approval indicator shall only be
affixed to the vehicle immediately upon the successful completion of the
inspection, on the premises of the official inspection station and on a portion of the
premises located within 100 feet and on the same side of the street as the official
inspection station. A certificate of inspection or temporary approval indicator may
not be issued or affixed at another area or location.
67 Pa. Code § 175.41(d).
12
2021, and April 1, 2021, but not logged into the MV-431, as required by 67 Pa. Code
§ 175.42.14 In addition the Department argues that when the QAO asked to see
certain records, they were not available, which violates the regulations at 67 Pa.
Code §§ 177.421(a)(5),15 175.42(c). Thus, in the Department’s view, the trial court
erred in sustaining Manna’s appeals on the basis the Department did not meet its
burden. It asks the Court to reverse the trial court’s Orders and reinstate the
Certificates’ suspensions.
14
Presumably, the Department is referring to Section 175.42(c), which provides:
(c) Records retention.
(1) The original official inspection report sheet (Form MV-431 or MV-480)
shall be retained as a garage record and kept on file at the station for audit.
At the close of each inspection period, the official inspection report sheet
shall be placed in the station’s files, even though all spaces may not have
been used, and a new inspection report sheet shall be started for the new
inspection period.
(2) A work order signed by the inspecting mechanic as required under this
section shall be available for inspection upon request by the inspection
station supervisor or an authorized representative of the Department.
67 Pa. Code § 175.42(c).
15
Section 177.421(a)(5) provides:
(a) Personal liability. It is the responsibility of the owner of an emission inspection
station to:
....
(5) Keep, at the station, as applicable, for 2 years, duplicate copies of
completed Certificate of Emission Requisition Forms, repair order forms
related to waivers and the original Certificate of Waiver Forms, and other
required forms.
67 Pa. Code § 177.421(a)(5).
13
Manna, proceeding pro se, argues that the Department’s authority to suspend
certificates is not limitless. Manna argues the notices that were issued violate her
due process rights as they did not specify what regulations she allegedly violated and
the Department did not provide Manna a hearing prior to immediate suspension,
which itself is contradictory to the Department’s regulations, namely 67 Pa. Code §
177.651.16 She also asserts the notices were deficient as they did not allege which
records were not properly kept or how they were improper. Manna further argues
the QAO did not identify specific sections of the Vehicle Code or regulations during
his testimony. Manna argues the notices only referenced Section 4724 of the Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4724, and 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(a), which merely provides the
Department with authority to suspend certificates and lists penalties, respectively.
Manna also claims the notices were insufficient as they include phrases, such as
“including but not limited to,” which is too broad and vague to put Manna on notice
as to what she was defending. Further, Manna argues that since “improper” and
“careless” are not defined by statute or regulation, they should be given their
common meaning. Lastly, with regard to the MV-431 book, Manna argues she did
present evidence that it was reported to the police as stolen, which the trial court
credited. Because the Department did not meet its burden of proof, Manna argues
the trial court’s Orders should be affirmed.
16
This regulation provides:
Prior to the immediate suspension of any official emission inspection station,
certificate of appointment, emission inspector certification or certified repair
technician, the Department shall, within 3 days, provide written notice of the
alleged violation and the opportunity to be heard.
67 Pa. Code § 177.651.
14
III. DISCUSSION
When reviewing an inspection certificate suspension, our review “is limited
to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether the trial
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.” McCarthy v. Dep’t of
Transp., 7 A.3d 346, 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). We have defined “substantial
evidence” as “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind, without weighing the
evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the fact finder, might accept as
adequate to support the conclusion reached.” Snyder v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of
Motor Vehicles, 970 A.2d 523, 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citation omitted).
Moreover, if the record evidence “is adequate to support the finding found by the
trial court, as fact finder, we are precluded from overturning th[e] finding and must
affirm.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873, 875
(Pa. 1989). In addition, we must review the record “evidence in a light most
favorable to . . . the prevailing party in the trial court.” Sillah v. Dep’t of Transp.
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1311 C.D. 2016, filed Jan. 16, 2018), slip op. at 10 n.15 17 (citing
McDonald v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 708 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1998)). Issues of witness credibility and evidentiary weight are within the
trial court’s province. Id.; Castagna v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles,
831 A.2d 156, 160 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). The Department bears the burden, by
the preponderance of the evidence, to prove a violation of the Vehicle Code or
Department regulations. Firestone Tire & Serv. Ctr., O.I.S. #798 v. Dep’t of
Transp., 871 A.2d 863, 867 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
17
This unreported panel decision is cited for its persuasive, rather than binding, value
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and Section
414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
15
The Department argues it presented evidence that establishes violations of
various regulations. However, it is unnecessary to reach this issue because, as it did
in a prior case involving Manna and the Station, Manna v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 516-17 C.D. 2022,
filed September 20, 2024), slip op. at 10-12 (Manna I), the Department’s notices
were deficient in that they did not identify the specific statutory and/or regulatory
provision allegedly violated, such as to satisfy due process requirements. The only
section of the Vehicle Code and the regulations cited in the notices are not
substantive provisions; rather, Section 4724 of the Vehicle Code simply provides the
Department with the authority to supervise and inspect stations, and both regulatory
provisions merely list penalties. As such the trial court found they violated due
process:
Adequate notice for procedural due process requires at a minimum that
the notice contain a sufficient listing and explanation of the charges
against an individual. Dunn v. [Dep’t of Transp.], Bureau of Driver
[L]icensing[,] 819 A.2[d] 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), citing Gombach v.
Dep[’t] of State, Bureau of Comm[’ns], Elections & Legis[.], 692 A.2d
1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). At the very least, the notice must have a
“sufficient listing and explanation of the charges against an
individual.” [] Id. Pursuant to the holding in Walker v. Department of
Transportation[, Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 771 C.D.
2018, filed April 30, 2019),] sufficient notice requires including the
date, time, and location of the conduct, the specific section and
subsection of the regulation violated, and a summary of facts
sufficient to inform the licensee of the nature of the conduct forming
the basis for the violation.
(Rule 1925(a) Op. at 29-30) (emphasis in original).18 Given our precedent cited by
the trial court both in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion in these matters, and as discussed
18
The trial court’s due process analysis appears in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion in the section
related to the Emissions Certificate. (Rule 1925(a) Op. at 28-30.) However, its reasoning is
(Footnote continued on next page…)
16
more fully in Manna I, we agree the notices are deficient and violative of Manna’s
due process rights. Although the Department tries to remedy its deficiencies by
providing more specific citations to other regulations in its brief to this Court,
providing such information after the fact defeats the purpose of due process.19
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s Orders.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
equally applicable to the notice involving the suspension of the Safety Certificate, which suffered
from the same deficiencies. “[T]his Court may affirm on grounds different than those relied upon
by the court or agency below if such grounds for affirmance exist.” Motor Coils MFG/WABTEC
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bish), 853 A.2d 1082, 1087 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
19
We note that even if we were to reach the merits of the Department’s arguments, based
upon the trial court’s credibility determinations, we would still affirm.
17
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kedecia Manna d/b/a 9th and : CASES CONSOLIDATED
Lloyd Inspections :
:
v. : Nos. 1057 C.D. 2022
: 1058 C.D. 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :
Appellant :
ORDER
NOW, November 14, 2024, the Orders of the Court of Common Pleas of
Delaware County, entered in the above-captioned matters, are AFFIRMED. The
Motion for Leave to File Praecipe to Withdraw Appeal, which was opposed, is
DENIED.
__________________________________________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge