C. Talbert v. Commonwealth of PA, Governor Shapiro

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Charles Talbert, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 543 M.D. 2023
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Governor Josh Shapiro, Laurel Harry, :
Department of Corrections, Christine :
Meukel, Mindy Parks, and Smart :
Communications, :
Respondents : Submitted: September 9, 2024
BEFORE: HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 6, 2024
Petitioner Charles Talbert, an inmate currently incarcerated within our
Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a pro se amended petition for review
(Amended Petition) in our original jurisdiction. Therein, Talbert asserts that
Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth); Governor Josh
Shapiro; Laurel Harry; Department of Corrections (Department); Christine Meukel;
and Mindy Parks (collectively, Commonwealth Respondents) have violated various
constitutional provisions by preventing him from having sufficient internet access,
interfering with mail that has been sent to him, and limiting the amount of legal
materials he is allowed to keep while incarcerated. In addition, Talbert argues that
the Commonwealth, the Department, and Respondent Smart Communications have
conspired to commit fraud by agreeing to have Smart Communications process and
scan incoming inmate mail under the allegedly false pretense that doing so prevents
the Department’s employees from being exposed to, and sickened by, illicit and
dangerous substances contained therein. In response, Commonwealth Respondents
and Smart Communications have submitted preliminary objections, via which they
seek dismissal of the Amended Petition. Additionally, Talbert has filed an
application for summary relief, through which he requests judgment in his favor on
all counts. After thorough review, we sustain Commonwealth Respondents’
preliminary objections in part and overrule them in part. We also deny Talbert’s
application for summary relief in part. Finally, we sua sponte conclude we lack
jurisdiction to consider the Amended Petition in part, as to Count III, and
consequently transfer this matter in part to the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th
Judicial District- Forest County Branch (Common Pleas) for disposition of that
claim.1
I. Background
As Talbert essentially offers self-contained averments for each of his claims,
rather than an all-encompassing narrative, we will summarize those claims in
succession.
First, Talbert alleges that the Commonwealth, the Department, Governor
Shapiro, and Harry have arbitrarily and capriciously prevented him from accessing
1
Talbert was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest) at the
time that the facts giving rise to his lawsuit occurred. See Am. Pet., ¶¶43-46, 48-51, 57-60. We
take judicial notice of the fact that SCI-Forest is located in Forest County, as well as that Forest
County is part of the 37th Judicial District. See COM. OF PA., SCI Forest,
https://www.pa.gov/en/agencies/cor/state-prisons/sci-forest.html (last accessed November 5,
2024); 42 Pa. C.S. § 901(a) (stating that Forest and Warren Counties constitute the 37th Judicial
District); Pa. R.E. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.”).
2
“current information from the Internet[.]” Am. Pet., ¶¶14, 16-18. Talbert asserts that
this has deprived him of the ability to accrue new knowledge and will negatively
affect “his ability to adjust back into society” upon his release from prison in 2026.
Id., ¶¶15, 19. Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count I that this restriction violates
article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,2 and requests a preliminary
injunction barring those respondents “from depriving him [of] access to the
Internet[] and to thus allow him to research and print out lawful[,] up-to-date
information for his rehabilitation and reentry.” Id., ¶62, Count I Wherefore Clause.
Second, Talbert states that each carceral institution in our Commonwealth’s
prison system employs a correctional mail inspector supervisor (CMIS) to oversee
inmate mail services. Id., ¶¶20-24. Talbert also maintains that there is “a statewide
practice of encouraging and enabling . . . CMIS employees to [be] derelict [in
performing] their official duties by having non-mailroom correctional officers pick
up and deliver inmate mail.” Id., ¶25. According to Talbert, this has resulted in
“gross negligence, abandonment, and reckless indifference towards [his] incoming
2
Article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows:
The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake
to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of
government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right
thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of
the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak,
write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty. No conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the
publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or
men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public
investigation or information, where the fact that such publication
was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the
satisfaction of the jury; and in all indictments for libels the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of the court, as in other cases.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
3
and outgoing mail,” including “obstruction of his correspondence, by allowing
vindictive and unethical correctional officers to deprive him of his incoming mail
and/or to throw away his outgoing mail[,]” and “has also caused substantial
interference with contract agreements between [Talbert] and vendors that sell books
and magazines.” Id., ¶¶32-33; see id., ¶¶37-53 (alleged examples of interference
with Talbert’s mail). Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count II that this alleged
interference violates his constitutional right to free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 Id., ¶¶63-66. He therefore requests a
preliminary injunction against Commonwealth Respondents that would prevent
them from “(a) delaying service of his incoming mail and publications; (b) allowing
anyone other than mailroom employees from picking up and delivering his mail; and
(c) depriving him of all his mail.” Id., Count II Wherefore Clause.
Third, Talbert claims that the Commonwealth, the Department, Governor
Shapiro, and Harry agreed to have Smart Communications process and scan
incoming inmate mail “under false and fraudulent pretenses[,]” specifically on the
basis that illicit and dangerous substances were being smuggled into prisons through
the mail and sickening Department employees. Id., ¶¶53-54. Talbert argues that there
is no proof that such substances were being mailed to prisoners, or that Department
employees were actually sickened as a result, and maintains that drugs are now even
easier to procure inside the Commonwealth’s prisons, in spite of this mail handling
policy. Id., ¶54. Further, Talbert alleges that this policy has resulted in
3
The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
A. non-legal attorney mail taking approximately [two]
weeks to reach him from the date mailed, causing court
delays and interference with pending litigation[;]
B. unreasonable delays on other legal mail[; and]
C. confidential health care, family, and financial records
and mail being uploaded to a public scanning system, thus
depriving [him] of any privacy.
Id., ¶55. Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count III that those respondents and Smart
Communications have engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit fraud by handling
inmate mail in this manner. Id., ¶¶67-69. As relief, he requests a preliminary
injunction “enjoining them from having [his] incoming mail sent to [Smart
Communications] and [mandating that it be sent] directly to the institution(s) [at]
which he resides[,]” as well as unspecified monetary damages. Id., Count III
Wherefore Clause.
Finally, Talbert avers that he notified staff at the State Correctional Institution
at Forest (SCI-Forest) on December 5, 2023, that the 2 legal boxes he was allowed
to have under Department policy would be insufficient to store all the materials from
his 11 pending civil cases, and that he needed a total of 5 boxes to properly do so.
Id., ¶¶57-59. In response, SCI-Forest staff denied Talbert’s request and informed
him that he could instead request a “legal exchange”; this displeased Talbert because
it “would make things complicated even more by exchanging needed materials for
other needed materials.” Id., ¶60. This denial resulted in Talbert
A. throw[ing] away approximately $1,000.00 worth [of]
printing materials and publications[,] such as newspapers
and prison legal news[;]
B. stor[ing] all of his legal books, case law, and reference
materials in[] property storage without access[; and]
C. ship[ping] 2 boxes of legal records to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania[], seeking
for the Court to issue an order for the return of his legal
property.
5
Id., ¶61. Accordingly, Talbert asserts in Count IV that the aforementioned limit of
legal boxes violates his constitutional right under article I, section 11 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution4 to seek relief through the courts. Id., ¶¶70-73. He
consequently requests a preliminary injunction against the Commonwealth, the
Department, Governor Shapiro, and Harry, barring “them from depriving him [of]
all [of] his legal materials relevant to all of his legal matters.” Id., Count IV
Wherefore Clause.
Thereafter, Commonwealth Respondents and Smart Communications
contested the Amended Petition by filing their aforementioned, respective
preliminary objections, while Talbert presented his application for summary relief.
Each side subsequently responded to their opponent’s submission. As such, this
matter is ready for disposition.
II. Discussion
A. Preliminary Objections
We start off by considering respondents’ respective preliminary objections,
and elect to reorder and summarize their arguments as follows. First,
Commonwealth Respondents demur to each of Talbert’s claims by asserting that he
has not stated facially-viable constitutional claims based upon article I, sections 7
and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, or upon the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, as well as that he has not articulated a facially-viable civil
conspiracy claim. Com. Resps.’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 8-16. In addition,
Commonwealth Respondents demur to Counts I through III of the Amended
4
Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares that “[a]ll courts shall be
open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits
may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the Legislature may by law direct.” PA. CONST. art. I, §11.
6
Petition, asserting that each of those claims must be dismissed as to specific
respondents (Governor Shapiro and Harry for Counts I and III, and Governor
Shapiro, Harry, Meukel, and Parks for Count II) on account of Talbert’s failure to
offer averments establishing that those respondents were personally involved in the
complained-of conduct. Id. at 4-7. Finally, Commonwealth Respondents demur to
Count II and request that we dismiss that claim as to the Commonwealth and the
Department, because those entities cannot be sued for violations of the United States
Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Id. at 7-8. As for Smart Communications, it
both demurs to Count III, on the basis that Talbert has failed to articulate a facially-
viable civil conspiracy claim, and asserts in the alternative that the averments offered
by Talbert in support of Count III are insufficiently specific. Smart Commc’ns’
Prelim. Objs. at 6-15.
In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for
review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced
therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions
of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (cleaned up). “In addition,
courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pled in the
[petition for review], but also documents or exhibits attached to it.” Lawrence v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
5
Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, this statute allows individuals to sue a
“person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
7
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer . . .
tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and
will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has
clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. When ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine
its analysis to the [petition for review].
Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Count I
In Count I, Talbert asserts that Commonwealth, the Department, Governor
Shapiro, and Harry have violated article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
by arbitrarily and capriciously preventing him from accessing “current information
from the Internet[.]” Am. Pet., ¶¶14, 16-18, 62. Article I, section 7 states, in relevant
part: “The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. Where, as
here, prison regulations and restrictions impinge upon an inmate’s constitutional
rights, the government must establish that those limitations are related to a legitimate
penological interest in order to defeat a claim regarding that impingement. Thomas
v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In order to determine if the
requisite relationship exists, a court must consider:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between
the prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral,
governmental interest advanced to justify the regulation;
(2) whether the inmate has an alternative means of
exercising the right at issue; (3) the burden that the
accommodation would impose on prison resources; and
(4) “whether any ready alternatives to the regulation exist
that would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights at a de
minimis cost to valid penological objectives.”
Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).
8
In this instance, Commonwealth Respondents fall far short of satisfying the
Turner test. Instead of attempting to address each of the test’s prongs, they instead
baldy assert that “[c]ourts have consistently upheld restrictions on inmate’s access
to computers and the internet, reasoning that access to internet resources jeopardizes
facility security.” Com. Resp’ts’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 11. Beyond the
facial inadequacy of this response, Commonwealth Respondents fail to recognize
that both of the cases that they rely upon were decided at the summary judgment
stage and were based upon the particulars of each inmate’s situation. See Aguiar v.
Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (inmate did not have
constitutionally protected interest in using and maintaining Facebook account,
largely due to threat to institutional safety that would be imposed by allowing
unmonitored communication via social media and the monitoring burdens that
would be imposed upon prison staff); Solan v. Zickefoose, 530 F. App’x 109, 111
(3d Cir. 2013) (inmate did not have constitutional right to e-mail access, due to their
“knowledge . . . and . . . apparent inclination . . . to use e-mail for improper
purposes”). Here, there is nothing at this stage of litigation that clearly shows that
Talbert would pose a similar threat to institutional safety. Furthermore, by Talbert’s
own admission, he only seeks internet access that is properly monitored and subject
to appropriate access restrictions. See Am. Pet., ¶¶15-18. Thus, Talbert’s situation is
distinguishable from Aguiar and Solan on both the facts and the procedural posture.
Commonwealth Respondents also claim in passing that this issue is not ripe
because Talbert will be afforded internet access in the lead-up to his release from
prison in 2026. Com. Resp’ts.’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 11-12. However, the
fact that Talbert may obtain such access in the future does not resolve the question
of whether he has a constitutional right to that access on an ongoing basis while
9
incarcerated. We are unpersuaded by Commonwealth Respondents’ argument that,
effectively, Talbert’s putative ability to access the internet at some point in the future
will cure any deprivations, constitutional or otherwise, that he is currently
experiencing.
Moreover, we are not swayed by Commonwealth Respondents’ argument
regarding the lack of averments about Governor Shapiro’s and Harry’s personal
involvement with the restrictions imposed upon Talbert’s internet access. The
entirety of Commonwealth Respondents’ argument on this point is based upon 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 4-7. Section 1983 (as discussed infra) is a federal statute
that enables individuals to file suit based upon violations of the United States
Constitution. However, to state the obvious, Count I is premised upon a provision
contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution, not its federal counterpart.
Consequently, we are constrained to overrule Commonwealth Respondents’
demurrer to Count I.
Count II
In Count II, Talbert alleges that Commonwealth Respondents’ handling of his
mail has violated his First Amendment-based right to free speech. Am. Pet., ¶¶20-
25, 32-33, 63-66. We need only address Commonwealth Respondents’ second and
third arguments supporting their demurrer to Count II in order to dispose of this
claim.
It is beyond cavil that the Eleventh Amendment6 bars suit from “litigants who
seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties . . . unless the
6
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
10
State has waived its immunity, or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power
under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment[7] to override that immunity.” Will
v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress availed itself of
this authority over 150 years ago, by enacting Section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. This statute created an exception to the Eleventh Amendment, through
which individuals may sue a
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 claims may be brought in the courts of this
Commonwealth and are not subject to state sovereign immunity defenses. A state or
state agency, however, is not a “person” under Section 1983 and cannot be sued
under Section 1983 for violation of federal constitutional rights.” Watkins v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 274-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (cleaned up). Furthermore,
“the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution shields states and state officials acting in their
official capacity from Section 1983 actions.” Heinly v.
Com., 621 A.2d 1212, 1214 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (citing
Will, 491 U.S. 58). This Court has explained that “[a]n
action against [a defendant] in his official capacity . . . is
the equivalent of an action against . . . a state
instrumentality.” Law v. Fisher, 399 A.2d 453, 456 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1979). Accordingly, state officials sued in their
official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983.
See Verrichia v. Dep’t of Revenue, 639 A.2d 957 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1994). Notwithstanding, “a state official in his or
her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would
be a person under [Section] 1983 because official-capacity
7
This section vests “Congress [with] power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
11
actions for prospective relief are not treated as an action
against the state.” Verrichia, 639 A.2d at 962 n.11 (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10). Further, “state officials are
‘persons’ under Section 1983 and as such, may be sued in
their individual capacities and found liable for damages for
violating protected rights while in the course of their
employment.” Schnupp v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty.,
710 A.2d 1235, 1238 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis
added) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).
Murray v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 542 M.D. 2017, filed Aug. 8, 2018), slip op. at
2 n.2, 2018 WL 3747808, at *1 n.2 (cleaned up).8 In addition,
[i]t is well established that personal liability under Section
1983 cannot be imposed upon a state official based on a
theory of respondeat superior. It is also well settled . . .
that personal involvement of [respondents] in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a [Section]
1983 case and that a [petition for review] must allege such
personal involvement. Each named [respondent] must be
shown, through the [petition for review’s] allegations, to
have been personally involved in the events or occurrences
upon which [the petitioner’s] claims are based.
Shick v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 583 M.D. 2016, filed Sept. 10, 2018), slip op. at
4-5, 2018 WL 4288663, at *2 (quoting Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540-
41 (M.D. Pa. 2008)); accord Rivera v. Silbaugh, 240 A.3d 229, 237 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2020) (petitioner fails to plead a viable Section 1983 against a state official or
employee if the petitioner does not offer sufficiently specific averments that the
official or employee was personally involved in violating the petitioner’s
constitutional rights). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with
8
Per Section 414(a) of this Court’s internal operating procedures, “an unreported panel
decision of this Court issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited for its persuasive value. 210
Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
12
appropriate particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988).9
With this in mind, we agree with Commonwealth Respondents that Talbert
has failed to state a viable Section 1983 claim in Count II.10 This is for two reasons.
First, neither the Commonwealth nor the Department can be sued pursuant to Section
1983. Watkins, 196 A.3d at 275. Second, Talbert only offers vague allegations
regarding Governor Shapiro’s, Harry’s, Meukel’s, and Parks’ putative involvement
in the handling of his mail, all of which amount to generalized assertions that each
of them have some sort of supervisory role in administering the inmate mail system
in our Commonwealth’s prisons. See Am. Pet., ¶¶20-53. Such allegations fall far
short of establishing, even on a facial basis, that any of those four state officials were
personally involved with handling Talbert’s mail and directly caused him to suffer
the issues with sending and receipt that he complains of in his Amended Petition, or
even that they were aware of the alleged problems and nevertheless acquiesced to
their occurrence. We therefore sustain Commonwealth Respondents’ demurrer to
Count II.
Count III
Under normal circumstances, we would now move on to considering the
merits of Commonwealth Respondents’ and Smart Communications’ preliminary
objections to Count III. However, we cannot do so in this instance, because we sua
sponte conclude that we do not have original or ancillary jurisdiction to consider that
9
“[T]he pronouncements of the lower federal courts have only persuasive, not binding,
effect on the courts of this Commonwealth[.]” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1221 (Pa. 2012).
10
We read Count II as being a Section 1983 claim, even though Talbert does not expressly
characterize it in that way, due to the fact that he alleges therein that the Commonwealth and a
number of its appendages and officials have violated his First Amendment-based rights.
13
portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition.11 Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code states,
in relevant part:
The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions or proceedings:
(1) Against the Commonwealth government,
including any officer thereof, acting in his official
capacity, except:
....
(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of
trespass as to which the Commonwealth
government formerly enjoyed sovereign or
other immunity and actions or proceedings in
the nature of assumpsit relating to such
actions or proceedings in the nature of
trespass.
42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). “An action in trespass . . . lie[s] ‘for redress in the shape
of money damages for any unlawful injury done to the plaintiff, in respect either to
his person, property, or rights, by the immediate force and violence of the
defendant.’” Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. 1985) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1674 (4th rev. ed. 1968)). To that end, “all actions against the
Commonwealth or its officers acting in their official capacity for money damages
based upon tort liability fall outside the scope of the Commonwealth Court’s original
jurisdiction and are properly commenced in the courts of common pleas.”
Stackhouse v. Com., 832 A.2d 1004, 1008 (Pa. 2003). However, suits against the
Commonwealth government or its officials that seek purely declaratory relief or an
injunction restraining government action are not in the nature of trespass and, thus,
11
We note that neither Commonwealth Respondents nor Smart Communications have
challenged our jurisdiction over Count III. Nevertheless, this does not impede our authority to
address the jurisdictional defects present in that claim. “[Q]uestions of jurisdiction can never be
waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by [the] court.” Pennhurst Med.
Grp., P.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 796 A.2d 423, 425 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
14
may fit within the scope of our original jurisdiction. Fawber v. Cohen, 532 A.2d
429, 433 (Pa. 1987). Furthermore, Section 761(c) of the Judicial Code provides that,
“[t]o the extent prescribed by general rule the Commonwealth Court shall have
ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other matter which is related to a claim or
other matter otherwise within its exclusive original jurisdiction.” 42 Pa. C.S. §
761(c). In sum, actions in the nature of trespass are expressly excluded from our
original jurisdiction and therefore stand outside our ancillary jurisdiction as well,
unless such an action relates to another articulated claim that does fall within the
scope of our original jurisdiction. Id., § 761(a)(1)(v), (c).
Here, Talbert requests declaratory and injunctive relief targeted at
Commonwealth Respondents and Smart Communications, due to his belief that they
have conspired to commit fraud by agreeing under false pretenses to have Smart
Communications process and scan incoming inmate mail. Am. Pet., ¶¶53-54, 67-69.
Nevertheless, it remains that he also desires monetary damages as a remedy for the
same putative violations of the law. Id., Count III Wherefore Clause. We conclude,
then, that Count III also sounds in trespass. Furthermore, we conclude the assertions
Talbert makes in Count III are entirely unrelated to the claims he makes elsewhere
in his Amended Petition.
In these circumstances, we do not believe the inclusion of
a [request] for declaratory or injunctive relief premised
upon the same events can properly be understood to
transform [Count III] from one sounding in trespass into
the type of matter contemplated by Fawber, or by the
Legislature, as belonging within [our] original
jurisdiction.
Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1008.
[A]lthough one might argue that what [Talbert] really
wants is [declaratory and injunctive relief] rather than
money damages, he is the one who included a request for
15
money damages in [Count III of] his [Amended Petition].
It is not our function to ignore a portion of his request for
relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this
Court, a court of limited original jurisdiction, rather than
in the common pleas court, a court of broad original
jurisdiction.
Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As such, we have no
authority to review Count III as an original jurisdiction claim or pursuant to our
powers of ancillary jurisdiction.
In line with the foregoing analysis, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to
consider Count III. Rather than dismiss that claim outright, however, we will transfer
it to Common Pleas, which shall treat that portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition as
a complaint filed in its original jurisdiction. Stedman v. Lancaster Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 221 A.3d 747, 760-61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019); 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a); Pa.
R.A.P. 751; see PA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b) (our courts of common pleas “hav[e]
unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by
law”). Subsequent to transfer, Common Pleas shall rule upon Commonwealth
Respondents’ and Smart Communications’ respective preliminary objections to
Count III, as well as Talbert’s application for summary relief regarding Count III,
which Common Pleas shall treat as a motion for summary judgment.12
Count IV
In Count IV, Talbert alleges that Commonwealth Respondents’ refusal to
allow him to have five boxes for storing his legal materials, rather than the two
allowed under Department policy, violated his right to seek relief through the courts
under article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Am. Pet., ¶¶57-61, 70-
“An application for summary relief is properly evaluated according to the standards for
12
summary judgment.” McGarry v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 819 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2003).
16
73. We, however, agree with Commonwealth Respondents’ assertion that Talbert
has failed to articulate a viable legal claim in Count IV.
To state a cognizable claim for violation of the right to
access to the courts, a prisoner must allege and offer proof
that he suffered an “actual injury” to court access as a
result of the denial. See Hackett v. Horn, 751 A.2d 272,
275-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (observing that denial of
access to legal documents may constitute a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments). “The Supreme Court
has defined actual injury as the loss or rejection of a
nonfrivolous legal claim regarding the sentencing or the
conditions of confinement.” See id.Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 304 M.D. 2022, filed Mar. 22, 2024),
slip op. at 8-9, 2024 WL 1230802, at *4 (cleaned up). In this instance, Talbert does
not aver, either generally or specifically, that he has suffered the loss or rejection of
a nonfrivolous legal claim as a result of Commonwealth Respondents’ denial of his
storage request. See Am. Pet., ¶¶57-61, 70-73. He has therefore failed to state a
viable article I, Section 11 claim. Consequently, we sustain Commonwealth
Respondents’ demurrer to Count IV.
B. Application for Summary Relief
Moving on, we turn to Talbert’s application for summary relief.
Applications for summary relief addressed to this Court’s
original or appellate jurisdiction are authorized under Rule
1532(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which provides: “At any time after the filing of
a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction
matter the court may on application enter judgment if the
right of the applicant thereto is clear.” [Pa. R.A.P.
1532(b).] Summary relief is similar to summary judgment
under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, in that
the requested relief is only appropriate where there are no
disputed issues of material fact and it is clear that the
applicant is entitled to the requested relief under the law.
See Scarnati v. Wolf, 173 A.3d 1110, 1118 (Pa. 2017).
Moreover, we review the record in the light most favorable
17
to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the
existence of disputed material facts against the moving
party. Id.Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 216 A.3d 448, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
(cleaned up).
As Count I is the only portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition that has survived
preliminary objections and falls within the scope of our jurisdictional powers, we
confine our analysis and disposition of his application to summary relief to that
claim. Talbert asserts that he is entitled as a matter of law to judgment in his favor
on Count I because he has a “constitutional right [under article I, section 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution] to gain current information on legitimate subjects from
social media to enable his rehabilitation and enhance [the chances of] his reentry
success[.]” Talbert’s Br. in Supp. of Appl. for Summ. Relief at 5. However, it is well
settled that
“[p]rison inmates do not enjoy the same level of
constitutional protections afforded to non-incarcerated
citizens.” Bronson v. Cent. Off. Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d
357, 359 (Pa. 1998). As we have noted in the past,
“incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.” Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 13 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1980).
Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 50 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). None
of the cases referenced by Talbert address whether inmates have a constitutional
right to access current information through the internet, nor does Talbert offer any
other substantive legal arguments in support of his claim that he is constitutionally
entitled to be provided with such access. See Talbert’s Br. in Supp. of Appl. for
Summ. Relief at 5 (citing and quoting Packingham v. N. Carolina, 582 U.S. 98(2017); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.
18479 (1965)). It is therefore not clear that Talbert is entitled to judgment in his favor
regarding this claim.
III. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we overrule Commonwealth
Respondents’ demurrer to Count I and sustain their demurrers to Counts II and IV.
Additionally, we dismiss Counts II and IV with prejudice, and transfer Count III to
Common Pleas due to our lack of jurisdiction over that claim. Furthermore, we deny
Talbert’s application for summary relief as to Count I. Finally, we direct
Commonwealth Respondents to file their answer to Count I within 30 days.
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
19
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Charles Talbert, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 543 M.D. 2023
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Governor Josh Shapiro, Laurel Harry, :
Department of Corrections, Christine :
Meukel, Mindy Parks, and Smart :
Communications, :
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro,
Laurel Harry, Department of Corrections, Christine Meukel, and Mindy
Parks’ (collectively Commonwealth Respondents) demurrer to Count I
of Petitioner Charles Talbert’s amended petition for review (Amended
Petition) is OVERRULED;
2. Commonwealth Respondents’ demurrers to Counts II and IV of the
Amended Petition are SUSTAINED, and those claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE;
3. Count III is TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th
Judicial District-Forest County Branch (Common Pleas), due to lack of
jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Court’s Prothonotary shall transmit a
copy of the record of the above-captioned proceedings to Common
Pleas’ Prothonotary, together with a copy of this opinion and order, as
well as a copy of this matter’s docket entries. Subsequent to
transfer, the assigned Common Pleas judge shall rule upon
Commonwealth Respondents’ and Respondent Smart
Communications’ respective preliminary objections to Count III, as
well as Talbert’s application for summary relief regarding Count III;
4. Talbert’s application for summary relief is DENIED as to Count I;
5. Commonwealth Respondents will file their answer to Count I within 30
days.
ELLEN CEISLER, Judge