Com. v. Doyle, D.

J-S33042-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DANON JON DOYLE :
:
Appellant : No. 1063 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 25, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002418-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2022
Danon Doyle appeals from the judgment of sentence1 imposed after he
was found guilty in a bench trial of Criminal Trespass.2 Doyle claims that the
trial court erred when it admitted evidence of prior bad acts and also argues
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
The trial court has set forth the factual and procedural history in this
matter.
[In March 2019, Officers Jason Hoover and Andrew Bixler] were
dispatched for a “domestic in progress” call from the home of
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1 Doyle purports to appeal from both the judgment of sentence imposed and
the trial court order denying his post-sentence motion. Because an appeal is
properly taken only from the sentence imposed, we have altered the caption
accordingly.
2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i).
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Alberta O’Daniell [(“Alberta”)3] located at 728 Noble Street,
Norristown, in Montgomery County. After arriving on the scene 2-
3 minutes later, Ofc. Bixler observed [Doyle] walking south on
Noble Street. Upon investigation, the officers learned that [Doyle]
had gone uninvited and unannounced in the middle of the night to
the home where his ex-girlfriend, Jennifer O’Daniell [(“Jennifer”),]
resided to, as he claimed, retrieve some of his personal
belongings. Once detained for investigation, he admitted entering
the darkened first floor of the home, after pushing the front door
open, and then proceeding upstairs to the 3rd floor attic bedroom
where [Jennifer], lying in bed, was terrified and immediately
screamed and called 911 upon seeing him. [Doyle] was
subsequently taken into custody.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/23/21, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).
At Doyle’s non-jury trial, in February 2020, Alberta testified that about
a month before the incident, Doyle came to her house looking for Jennifer.
She said that she told Doyle that he could not be there, and specifically told
him, “[D]on’t ever walk in my house again.” N.T. Trial, 2/14/20, at 60. She
further testified that she never gave him permission to come in the middle of
the night and pick up his clothing. See id. at 62.
The court found Doyle guilty of Criminal Trespass as a felony of the third
degree. On March 25, 2021, the court sentenced Doyle to time served to 23
months. The court denied Doyle’s post-sentence motion, and this timely
appeal followed.
Doyle raises three issues on appeal.
I. Did the lower court err in admitting prior bad acts where the
Commonwealth failed to provide adequate notice of the
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3 Because they have the same surname, to minimize confusion, we refer to
Alberta O’Daniell and Jennifer O’Daniell by their first names.
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prior acts as required by Pa.R.E. 404(b) and instead filed a
boilerplate 404(b) motion that gave [Doyle] no notice of the
acts the Commonwealth was seeking to admit?
II. Did the lower court err in admitting prior bad acts, namely,
the alleged theft of items from the complainant’s previous
residence, crude remarks to the complainant indicating her,
“eggs were all dried up,” and claims by [Doyle] that he was
God when these acts were completely irrelevant to the
charges in question and painted [Doyle] in an unfavorable
light?
III. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Doyle’s] conviction
since the Commonwealth failed to establish [Doyle] knew he
was not licensed to enter the property since he had
previously stayed there and was merely entering to obtain
his personal items?
Doyle’s Br. at 3.
In his first two issues, Doyle claims that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of prior bad acts. See id. at 12-17. The admissibility of evidence is
vested in the discretion of the trial court. We review such admission for an
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415, 446 (Pa.
2013).
Before reaching the merits of these issues, we must consider whether,
as the trial court stated, Doyle waived his claims concerning the admission of
prior bad acts evidence by failing to object to the introduction of such evidence
at trial. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.
Issues that were not raised before the trial court are waived on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). “It is axiomatic that issues are preserved when
objections are made timely to the error or offense.” Commonwealth v.
Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v.
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Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1145 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“‘The absence of a
contemporaneous objection below constitutes a waiver’ of the claim on
appeal”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa.
2008)).
In the instant case, the Commonwealth moved in limine to admit
testimony from Jennifer concerning “prior incidents between [Doyle] and
herself [as] a part of the complete story of the incident.” Motion, 12/9/19, at
¶ 4. The court heard argument on the motion prior to trial. There, the
prosecutor explained the specific acts it sought to admit as follows:
Prior to this incident, and sometime after January of 2019 but
before March when this incident happened, [Doyle] had previously
tried to enter this home without permission and was asked to
leave by one of the people in the home. And that, in addition,
[Jennifer] would offer testimony that the relationship was over,
she was afraid of him, and that he had been verbally abusive to
her.
N.T. Trial at 6.
Defense counsel objected, claiming that none of the specific bad acts
were placed in the Commonwealth’s motion. He explained that because he
was just hearing about them today, he had not been given fair notice and had
no opportunity to defend against them. See id. at 7.
The court then explained:
I don’t even know that—I don’t know if it falls within the category
of 404(b) evidence. It just sounds like[] to me that it’s the
background and the history that relates to a trespass case, in my
mind. I guess it’s just really prior communication, in terms of
whether or not the defendant was put on notice that he was not
permitted to enter into this premises and/or had an intent to do
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so. It seems like to me that it’s—and if it’s a bench trial, I think I
could sort through it.
Id. at 9. It stated that it was not going to rule on the motion but suggested
that defense counsel could object to any testimony elicited that he thought
was objectional. See id. at 10.
However, when the Commonwealth presented the disputed testimony
during trial, defense counsel did not object. At trial, Jennifer testified that
Doyle had told her that she would not get pregnant if they had sex because
her eggs were all dried up, he was God, and she was pregnant with the next
Jesus. See id. at 27, 43, 48. Counsel lodged no objection. Nor did counsel
object to Jennifer’s description of the past relationship. Defense counsel also
did not object when Alberta testified that on a previous occasion Doyle had
come to her house and she asked him to leave and not return to her house.
See id. at 59-60.
Accordingly, because Doyle did not lodge a contemporaneous objection
to the bad acts testimony that he now challenges, he has waived this issue on
appeal. See Baumhammers, 960 A.2d at 73.
In his final issue, Doyle challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his criminal trespass conviction. He claims that because he reasonably
believed that he had been given permission to go to the residence to get his
belongings, the Commonwealth failed to establish the requisite intent for
criminal trespass. See Doyle’s Br. at 19.
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When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our
standard of review is de novo, while “our scope of review is limited to
considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the
verdict winner.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420-21 (Pa.
2014).
In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note
that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943–44 (Pa.Super. 2011)).
To establish a violation of the subsection of the Criminal Trespass under
which Doyle was prosecuted, Section 3503(a)(1)(i), the Commonwealth must
prove that the defendant gained entry to a building or occupied structure,
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knowing that he was not privileged to do so. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3503(a)(1)(i).4
Here, it is not disputed that Doyle entered Alberta’s residence. Hence,
the only question is whether he knew that he was not privileged to do so.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner,
the evidence at trial established that Alberta did not give Doyle permission to
come to her house. The trial court as factfinder was free to believe Alberta’s
testimony that she specifically told Doyle, “[D]on’t ever walk in my house
again.” N.T. Trial at 60; see id. at 59-62. Accordingly, we conclude that the
evidence sufficiently proved that Doyle entered Alberta’s residence, knowing
that he was not privileged to do so. Doyle’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/11/2022
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4 Doyle was convicted of criminal trespass under Section 3503(a)(1)(i), which
is graded as a felony of the third degree. Therefore, the Commonwealth was
not required to establish that he “broke into” the structure, which would have
been required had he been convicted under Section 3503(a)(1)(ii).
Accordingly, although both the trial court and the Commonwealth discussed
whether Doyle broke into the house, the Commonwealth was not required to
establish that element for his conviction.
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