Adoption of: B.E.A., Appeal of: T.B.A.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.E.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.B.A., FATHER :
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:
:
: No. 934 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Decree Entered June 10, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 26-ADOPT-2020
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 25, 2022
Appellant T.B.A. (Father) appeals from the order granting the petition
of Appellees T.M.L. (Mother), and B.C.L. (Stepfather) (collectively, Petitioners)
and involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to B.E.A. (Child), born
in February of 2012. We affirm.
The orphans’ court set forth the following findings of fact:
• [Mother] and [Father] lived together when [Child] was born.
[Father] participated in [Child’s] care, including providing
physical, emotional, and financial support.
• In 2015, the relationship between [Mother] and [Father]
ended.
• On March 12, 2015, the court entered a Final Protection from
Abuse Order (PFA) against [Father] on behalf of [Mother].
[Father] violated the PFA by communicating with [Mother] via
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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her cell phone and once serendipitously meeting her at the
mall.
• The PFA afforded [Father] visitation with [Child] every other
weekend and permitted [Father] to contact [Mother] regarding
[Child]. [Father] exercised custody of [Child] under the PFA.
• In February 2016, [Father] was incarcerated for non-payment
of child support. He was released in April 2016.
• [Father]’s first priority after his release from incarceration was
seeking rehab. In April 2016, [Father] entered an in-patient
rehab program. He was discharged in November or December
2016.
• On February 11, 2016, the court entered a Custody Order
(2016 Order). The 2016 Order granted [Mother] and [Father]
shared legal custody. The 2016 Order also granted [Mother]
primary physical custody.
• The 2016 Order granted [Father] partial physical custody on
alternating weekends subject to three preconditions; [Father]
was required to: 1) pass a hair follicle drug test; 2) maintain a
stable residence for at least four months; and 3) possess a
reliable and working cell phone. [The 2016 Order also provided
that Father had the right to supervised partial physical custody
through the Salvation Army, ABC House, or another mutually
agreed-upon supervised visitation program.]
• [Father] never fulfilled the preconditions under the 2016 Order
so he could exercise partial physical custody. Thus, [Father]
never exercised physical custody of [Child] under the 2016
Order.
• Although [Father] reads and understands the English language,
he claims he did not understand the 2016 Order, including how
to arrange a drug test. However, [Child’s] paternal
grandmother spoke to [Father] about the preconditions.
Further, [Father] read the 2016 Order aloud from the witness
stand without issue.
• [Father] testified he believed the PFA prohibited him from
contacting [Mother] and exercising custody under the 2016
Order. However, the PFA contained a provision permitting
[Father] to contact [Mother] regarding [Child].
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• [Father] moved in with his fiancé[e] . . . in March 2017.
[Father] has lived at his current address since June 2017.
• [Mother] last saw [Father] in-person in 2017. During a
meeting at the Domestic Relations office, [Father] asked
[Mother] how he could see [Child]. [Mother] referred [Father]
to the 2016 Order and her attorney.
• In 2018, [Father] was incarcerated on a DUI charge for 72
hours.
• In mid to late 2018, [Father] learned [Mother] and [Child’s]
address through [Child’s] paternal extended family.
• [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] occurred on June
22, 2018. [Father] stopped by [Child’s] paternal
grandparent[s’] house without knowing [Child] was there.
[Father] and [Child] spent about two hours together.
• [Father] had not fulfilled the preconditions of the 2016 Order
prior to his contact with [Child] on June 22, 2018.
• [Mother] and Stepfather married on September 15, 2018.
[Child] has known Stepfather since 2015 and lived with
Stepfather since 2018. Stepfather and [Child] have formed a
parent/child bond. They enjoy time together hunting, target
shooting, working around the house[,] and playing video
games. Stepfather provides for [Child’s] financial, physical,
and emotional needs.
• [Child] refers to Stepfather [by his first name] except when
[Child] is in an upset emotional state; during those times
[Child] refers to Stepfather as “Father” or “Dad.”
• [Child] has expressed his desire to be adopted by Stepfather.
• Stepfather is willing to accept legal and physical custody of
[Child] and intends to adopt him.
• [Father] reached out to legal aid organizations three or four
times from June 2019 to November 2020 regarding custody of
[Child] but did not qualify for services. [Father] testified he
also reached out to private attorneys but could not afford them.
• [Father] did no research or investigation into representing
himself in the custody court.
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• [Father] testified he reached out to Alternative Behavior
Consultants (ABC), a supervised parental visitation program,
for intake in August 2019 and again at the beginning of 2020.
However, ABC only received one request for visitation from
[Father] in January 2020.
• In August 2019, [Father] messaged Stepfather twice via
Facebook regarding ABC. [Mother] filed paperwork at ABC in
2019.
• In February 2020, [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook
requesting [Mother] submit additional paperwork to ABC, but
[Mother] was not required to file additional paperwork by ABC.
• [Father’s] intake at ABC was delayed to July 2020 because of
[Mother’s] limited availability and COVID-19 restrictions.
[Father] never exercised physical custody of [Child] at ABC.
• In February 2020, [Child] told Stepfather he wanted Stepfather
to adopt him. Stepfather intends to adopt [Child].
• In June 2020, [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook
stating [Child] is [Father’s] son, not Stepfather’s son.
• As of May 2021, [Father] was $547.92 in arrears on child
support for [Child]. [Father] is currently unemployed and was
last employed in January 2021.
• [Mother’s] cell phone number, which [Father] has used to
contact her in the past, has not changed since 2015. [Mother]
and [Child] have lived at the same address since 2018.
• [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook from 2015 to
2020. [Father] never inquired after [Child] in these messages.
• When [Father] requested information from [Mother] in
Facebook messages to Stepfather, [Mother] responded by
texting her answers to [Child’s] paternal aunts. [Mother] does
not have a working cell phone number for [Father].
• [Mother] is in contact with several members of [Child’s]
extended paternal family, including paternal grandparents, two
paternal aunts, and a paternal uncle. [Father] inquires about
[Child] to [Child’s] paternal aunts and uncle. [Child] is not
aware of [Father’s] inquires through [Child’s] paternal aunts
and uncle.
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• [Father] has never attempted to contact [Mother] or [Child]
through [Child’s] extended paternal family.
• [Child] spends every other weekend with his paternal
grandparents and takes occasional week-long vacations with
them. [Mother] intends to maintain [Child’s] relationship with
his paternal grandparents.
• [Father] is not involved in [Child’s] education or medical care,
nor has he sent notes, cards, or presents to [Child]. [Father]
posts a birthday message on Facebook every year on [Child’s]
birthday, but no evidence was presented [Child] is aware of
these messages.
• [Petitioners filed a petition for involuntary termination of
Father’s parental rights on July 13, 2020.] The legal grounds
asserted for the termination of the parental rights of [Father]
are: 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) – “The parent by conduct
continuing for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a
settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has
refused or failed to perform parental duties.”
Orphans’ Ct. Decree, 6/10/21, at 2-6 (footnotes omitted and formatting
altered).
The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petition to involuntarily
terminate Father’s parental rights on May 4, 2021.1 Mother, Stepfather, and
Father all testified at the hearing. The parties also stipulated as to what Child’s
paternal grandmother and paternal uncle would testify to if they had been
called as witnesses.
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1 The orphans’ court appointed Lauren Sulcove, Esq. as Child’s legal counsel
pursuant to Section 2313(a) on September 3, 2020. See In re Adoption of
K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1223-24 (Pa. 2020) (stating “[a]s we have previously
recognized, [23 Pa.C.S. §] 2313(a) requires that the common pleas court
appoint an attorney to represent the child’s legal interest, i.e. the child’s
preferred outcome, and the failure to appoint counsel constitutes structural
error in the termination proceedings” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
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On June 10, 2021, the orphans’ court issued a decree involuntarily
terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
and (b). Id. at 11-12.
On July 9, 2021, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion
adopting the reasons set forth in its June 10, 2021 decree. See Orphans’ Ct.
Op., 7/15/21, at 3-4.
On appeal, Father raises a single issue for our review: “Whether the
[orphans’] court’s decision to terminate [Father’s] parental rights was
supported by clear and convincing evidence and did not constitute an abuse
of discretion.” Father’s Brief at 5.
Our Supreme Court has explained:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion
standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial
courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific
determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are
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observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and
parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,] which requires a bifurcated
analysis:
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid.
In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1178-79 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations
omitted and formatting altered).
We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence
is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511(a)(1)
Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in concluding that there was
clear and convincing evidence that Father had shown a settled purpose of
relinquishing his parental rights and/or he failed to perform parental duties for
at least six months prior to the filing of the instant petition. Father’s Brief at
14. Father acknowledges that he was absent from Child’s life but contends
that he credibly testified that he was absent because he was focusing on his
sobriety so that “he could be well for his son.” Id. at 14-15. Father also
argues that the orphans’ court did not consider the efforts he made to perform
parental duties in the six months preceding the filing of the petition to
terminate his parental rights or the obstacles he faced in doing so. Id. at 15-
16. Specifically, Father asserts that he reached out to Stepfather to restore
contact with Child and that Mother testified that she never responded to
Father’s attempts at contact. Id. at 15. Father notes that he worked with
ABC to initiate supervised custodial time with Child, but there were delays in
setting up supervised visitation resulting from a scheduling conflict and the
COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 15-18. Additionally, Father contends that Mother
was uncooperative with Father’s attempts to initiate supervised custody by
not communicating with Father and then by filing the instant petition. Id. at
17-18. Finally, Father claims that the orphans’ court did not give proper
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weight to the circumstances beyond Father’s control, i.e., the COVID-19
pandemic and Mother’s unavailability and uncooperativeness, which
prevented him from exercising custody of Child through ABC. Id. at 18.
Section 2511(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either
has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).
“A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where
the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a
child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (emphasis in original). “Although it is the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical in the
analysis, the trial court must consider the whole history of [the] case and not
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.” In re B., N.M., 856
A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
This Court has explained:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child
needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,
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physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held
that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional
needs.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In B., N.M., the Court rejected
the father’s claims that his ignorance of the law and lack of information about
the mother’s new telephone number prevented him performing his parental
duties. Id. at 856-57. The B., N.M. Court held that although the “[f]ather
was not required to perform the impossible, he was obligated to act
affirmatively to maintain his relationship with [the child], even in difficult
circumstances” and that the “[f]ather failed to act to the best of his ability to
meet his obligation despite his incarceration and the obstacles [the m]other
placed before him.” Id. at 857 (citation omitted).
Our Supreme Court has held that
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[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)
(citation omitted); accord In re J.T.M., 193 A.3d 403, 409-11 (Pa. Super.
2018) (affirming the termination of the incarcerated father’s parental rights
when the father only sent the child a single letter and had paternal aunt
engage in limited contact with the child on his behalf).
This Court has noted that
we may not consider any effort by the parent to remedy the
conditions described in subsection (a)(1) . . . if that remedy was
initiated after the parent was given notice that the termination
petition had been filed. Further, this evidentiary limitation applies
to the entire termination analysis. The court, however, may
consider post-petition efforts if the efforts were initiated before
the filing of the termination petition and continued after the
petition date.
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.
Additionally,
to be legally significant, the post-abandonment contact must be
steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious
intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child
relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity
to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish
his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
question.
Id. at 1119 (citation omitted and formatting altered).
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Here, in addressing Section 2511(a)(1), the orphans’ court explained:
The facts that support . . . termination [of Father’s parental rights]
are as follows:
a. [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] was June
22, 2018. Prior to this, [Father’s] last physical contact
with [Child] was in 2015.
b. [Father] has not been involved in [Child’s] education
or medical care, nor has he sent notes, cards, or
presents to [Child]. [Father] supports [Child]
financially only by virtue of a court order compelling
child support.
c. [Father] never vindicated his parental and custodial
rights through the 2016 Order or filed for modification
of that order.
* * *
[Father] has not played any significant role in [Child’s] life since
2015. [Father’s] last physical contact with [Child] occurred on
June 22, 2018, when [Father] stopped by [Child’s] paternal
grandparent[s’] house. [Father] and [Child] spent about two
hours together. Notably, this contact was mere happenstance,
not the result of [Father]’s initiative; [Father] did not know [Child]
would be present at [Child’s] paternal grandparent[s’] house.
Further, this contact violated the 2016 Order, as [Father] had not
completed any of the preconditions under the 2016 Order.
[Father] has not sent notes, cards, or presents to [Child] since
2015 or otherwise attempted to communicate with him. [Father]
posts a message on Facebook every year on [Child’s] birthday and
inquires after [Child] through [Child’s] paternal extended family,
but there is no evidence [Child] has awareness of this.
[Father] made few efforts to communicate with [Mother] about
custody. [Father] testified he believed the PFA prohibited him
from reaching out to [Mother]; however, the PFA explicitly
permitted [Father] to contact [Mother] regarding [Child].
[Mother’s] cell phone number, which [Father] had used to contact
[Mother] in the past, has not changed. [Father] learned [Mother]
and [Child’s] current address in 2018, but [Father] never sent
communication to their address. Additionally, both [Father] and
[Mother] are in contact with [Child’s] extended paternal family,
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but [Father] never attempted to contact [Mother] or [Child]
through them. [Father] messaged Stepfather via Facebook on
multiple occasions from 2015 to 2020 but never inquired about
[Child’s] well-being or asked to relay messages to [Child].
[Father] testified to three reasons for his lack of contact with
[Child]: 1) [Father] did not understand the 2016 Order; 2)
[Father] did not have an attorney; and 3) [Father’s] struggles with
addiction. We do not find any of these explanations persuasive.
First, [Father] testified he did not understand the terms of the
2016 Order. However, [Child’s] paternal grandmother spoke to
[Father] about the 2016 Order, including the preconditions for
[Father] to exercise[] partial physical custody of [Child]. Further,
[Father] previously exercised custody under the PFA, and [Father]
read the 2016 Order from the witness stand during the hearing
without issue.
Second, [Father] testified he did not exercise custody because he
did not have an attorney. Crucially, [Father] never invoked the
custody court to vindicate his rights after the 2016 Order went
into effect. [Father] made some efforts to acquire counsel through
legal aid organizations and private attorneys, but [Father] never
researched or attempted to represent himself in the over five
years since the 2016 Order has been in effect.
Third, [Father] testified about his struggles with addiction,
including his time in rehab in 2016 and his relapse in 2018 (when
he was incarcerated for DUI). His efforts in rehab are laudable.
However, [Father’s] substance abuse issues do not justify his
almost complete absence from [Child’s] life.
During the hearing, [Father] repeatedly expressed that he
believes there is room for himself, [Mother], and Stepfather in
[Child’s] life. However, [Father] has done nothing in the past five
years demonstrating this is true. [Child] is not required to wait
for [Father] to assert a place in his life.
The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Father],
by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition, refused or failed
to perform parental duties. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).
Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 6, 9-10.
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Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in
the orphans’ court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence
to support termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1).
See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also M.T., 101 A.3d at 1178-79.
Instantly, the orphans’ court noted that Father has been absent from
Child’s life since Father separated from Mother in 2015. Although the orphans’
court considered Father’s explanations for his absence, see Charles E.D.M.,
II, 708 A.2d at 91, the court did not find those assertions credible.
Specifically, the orphans’ court rejected Father’s claim that he did not
understand the 2016 custody order. See Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 10. The
orphans’ court also found that Father “never invoked the custody court to
vindicate his rights after the 2016 Order went into effect” and made no
attempt to represent himself in the custody action. See id. Finally, the
orphans’ court acknowledged Father’s struggle with sobriety, but concluded
that it did not justify Father’s “almost complete absence” from Child’s life.
See id.
With respect to Father’s post-abandonment contact with Child, the
orphans’ court noted that Father had no contact with Child after 2015, except
for an unplanned visit at paternal grandparents’ home on June 22, 2018.2
Although the record indicates that Father made some attempts to exercise
supervised custody of Child at ABC, the orphans’ court explained that he
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2Father visited paternal grandparents’ home that day without knowing that
Child would be there. See Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 3.
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“made few efforts” to communicate with Mother about custody arrangements
and made no attempt to communicate with Child. See id. at 9.
The record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. See S.P., 47 A.3d at
826-27. Further, we decline to reweigh the evidence or interfere with the
court’s credibility determinations in that these conclusions are based on clear
and convincing evidence established in the record. Id. Therefore, we discern
no abuse of discretion or legal error by the orphans’ court in concluding that
Father failed to perform his parental duties pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1). See Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 91; J.T.M., 193 A.3d at
409-11; see also B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855.
Section 2511(b)
Father contends that Petitioners failed to prove the grounds alleged for
termination of his parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), such that the
orphans’ court should not have considered whether the termination served the
interests of the Child under Section 2511(b). Father’s Brief at 18.
Father further claims that the orphans’ court
failed to consider all possible options to maintain strong familial
ties and relationships for [Child]. . . . Child spent . . . his formative
years, years when significative familial bonds are formed, in the
care of both Mother and Father. The evidence shows that [Child]
was happy and excited when he last saw Father, and was
distressed when Father had to leave. [Child’s] emotional needs
and welfare are best served by maintaining all familial bonds and
ties and allowing him to continue to enjoy the relationships with
Mother, Father, and Stepfather.
Id. at 19.
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Initially, we note that Father did not preserve his appellate challenge to
the orphans’ court’s ruling under Section 2511(b) in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Additionally, Father failed to cite any relevant legal authority to
support his Section 2511(b) claim. See Father’s Brief at 19. While we could
conclude that Father has waived this issue, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii),
2119(a); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2017), we
will consider the orphans’ court’s ruling under Section 2511(b) in the interest
of justice. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1009 (addressing the trial court’s analysis
of Section 2511(b) despite the mother’s failure to present a challenge under
that subsection).
Once the statutory grounds for termination have been met under
Section 2511(a), the court must consider whether termination serves the
needs and welfare of Child, pursuant to Section 2511(b). See M.T., 101 A.3d
at 1178-79.
Section 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
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“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under
Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.”
C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008 (citation omitted).
The C.L.G. Court further explained that regarding Section 2511(b):
Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.
The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-
child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of
permanently severing the bond.
Moreover, [t]he court should also consider the importance of
continuity of relationships to the child, because severing close
parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider
whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent,
and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration
must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted and formatting altered).
“[W]hen evaluating a parental bond, the court is not required to use
expert testimony. . . . Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal
bonding evaluation.” In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 328 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, this Court has explained that
“the existence of some bond” between a parent and a child “does not
necessarily defeat termination of . . . parental rights.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Rather, the question is whether the bond
between the parent and the child “is the one worth saving or whether it could
be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the child. Id.Here, the orphans’ court addressed Child’s best interests as follows:
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No evidence was presented that whatever limited bond existed
between [Father] and [Child] on June 22, 2018, still exists.
[Child] does not look to [Father] for emotional or physical support;
[Father’s] only support toward [Child] has been financial and only
then as compelled by the [c]ourt. It is clear [Mother] and
Stepfather, not [Father], provide [Child] the love, comfort,
security, and stability he needs. [Child] looks to [Mother] and
Stepfather as his parental figures, not [Father]. Indeed, [Child]
himself expressly desires to cement his parent/child bond with
Stepfather through adoption.
Severing [Child’s] bond with [Father], to the extent it even exists,
will allow [Child] to move forward in life with little to no long-term
ill effects. It is in the [C]hild’s best interests that the parental
rights of [Father] be terminated.
Orphans’ Ct. Decree at 10-11.
Based on our review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the
orphans’ court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights would best
serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. After hearing
testimony from Father, Mother, and Stepfather during the termination
hearing, the orphans’ court concluded that there is no significant bond
between Father and Child. See N.T. Termination Hr’g, 5/4/21, at 21, 29
(Mother testified that Child does not recognize Father in photographs or ask
about Father), 43 (Stepfather testified that Child does not look at Father as
his father anymore), 88-89 (the parties stipulated that paternal grandmother
would testify she does not believe Child has a relationship with Father because
of lack of contact over an extended period). Further, the court found that
Stepfather and Mother have consistently provided Child with the “love,
comfort, security, and stability” that Child needs. See id. at 23-24, 39-41
(Stepfather performs recreational activities with Child, Stepfather provides
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emotional support for Child, when Child is emotional, he addresses Stepfather
as “Dad”, Mother and Stepfather provide for Child’s emotional, psychological,
and financial needs, and Child asked Stepfather to adopt him), 88-89 (the
parties stipulated that paternal grandmother would testify about the bond
between Stepfather and Child). Upon review, the record supports the orphans’
court’s findings of fact, including its credibility determinations. See S.P., 47
A.3d at 826-27.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the orphans’ court
appropriately considered the developmental, physical, and emotional needs
and the welfare of Child and determined that they were best served by the
termination of Father’s parental rights. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010. The
record evidence supports the orphans’ court’s finding that there was little to
no bond between Father and Child, that Stepfather has a parental bond with
Child, and that severing the bond between Father and Child to allow Stepfather
to adopt Child is in Child’s best interest. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. For
these reasons, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion, and that its determinations and findings were supported by clear
and convincing evidence, free of legal error. Accordingly, we affirm the decree
involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-
27.
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Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/25/2022
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